THE 


MEXICAN    WAK: 

A 

HISTORY  OF  ITS  ORIGIN, 


AND 


DETAILED     ACCOUNT    OF    THE     VICTORIES     WHICH     TERMINATED    IN 
THE    SURRENDER   OF    THE    CAPITAL;     WITH   THE   OFFICIAL 
DESPATCHES    OF    THE    GENERALS. 

TO   WHICH   IS   ADDED, 

THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE, 

AND    VALUABLE    TABLES    OF    THE    STRENGTH    AJVD    LOSSES    OF    THE    UNITED 
STATES    ARMY. 

BY  EDWARD  D.  MANSFIELD, 

GRADUATE     OF     THE     UNITED     STATES     MILITARY     ACADEMY. 


TENTH  EDITION.  ^  4' ',  '   ;    ;  ; 


NEW  YORE 

PUBLISHED    BY    A.    S.    BARNES    &    CO. 

No.  51  JOHN-STREET. 

CINCINNATI:- H.  W.  DERBY  &  CO. 

1849. 


04 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1846, 

BY  A.  S.  BARNES  &  Co., 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  for  the  Southern  District  of 
New  York. 


Stereotyped  by 


C.  A.  ALVORD,  Printer, 
Corner  of  John  and  Dutch  streets. 


PREFACE. 


IT  has  been  wisely  remarked  by  a  distinguished 
American  statesman,  that  "the  commencement 
of  the  Mexican  War  was  the  opening  of  a  n'ew 
volume  of  American  history." 

Nations,  like  individuals,  are  often  borne  along 
in  their  progress,  without  pausing  to  consider  the 
particular  acts  which  are  to  shape  (and  control 
their  future  destiny;  and  perhaps  there  is  no 
subject  on  which  the  public  mind  is  less  likely  to 
act  with  caution  and  deliberation  than  on  the 
momentous  question  of  peace  or  war. 

The  present  Mexican  war  is  a  striking  illus 
tration  of  this  principle.  It  would  appear,  from 
the  public  documents,  that  neither  the  President 
nor  Congress  anticipated  it  until  hostilities  had 
actually  commenced,  and  it  may  well  be  doubted 
if  either  can  see  the  consequences  which  yet  may 
flow  from  it. 

To  pause,  therefore,  and  review  the  past,  to 
examine  into  all  the  causes  which  have  led  to  the 
unhappy  estrangement  of  two  sister  Republics, 


IV  PREFACE. 


has  seemed  a  fitting  introduction  to  the  narration 
of  those  military  achievements  which  now  form 
a  part  of  the  history  of  the  country. 

We  have  felt  no  pleasure  in  tracing  the  causes 
which  led  to  this  war,  and  certainly  none  in  con 
templating  its  progress  and  looking  forward  to  its 
final  consequences.  But  when  we  pass  to  the  army, 
and  behold  the  brilliant  results  obtained  with  such 
small  means,  against  such  immense  superiority  of 
force,  and  see  the  high  military  skill  of  the  com 
manding  officers  sustained  by  the  courage  and 
heroism  of  the  troops,  we  feel  a  just  pride  in 
describing  their  actions  and  recording  their  deeds. 

In  the  preparation  of  this  work  great  care  has 
been  taken  to  select  the  most  reliable  sources  of 
information. 

Those  who  have  taken  part  in  the  stirring 
scenes  which  are  described  must  have  viewed 
them  from  different  positions,  and  an  honest  dif 
ference  of  opinion  in  regard  even  to  facts  will 
sometimes  be  found  to  exist.  But  the  descrip 
tion  of  the  great  movements  and  battles  is  based 
on  public  documents,  despatches,  and  orders, 
which  must  ever  be  the  material  of  a  reliable  his 
tory  of  a  war. 

Cincinnati,  January,  1848. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Origin  of  the  War  with  Mexico. — Settlement  of  Texas.— Declaration  of 
Independence. — Santa  Anna's  Treaty. — Movement  towards  Annexa 
tion. — Correspondence  of  Boconegra. — Declaration  of  Almonte. — Mr. 
Calhoun's  Reasons.— Lord  Aberdeen's  Declaration. — The  Tyler  Treaty. 
— The  Joint  Resolution. — Departure  of  Almonte. — General  Taylor  or 
dered  to  Texas. — Strength  of  the  Army  at  Corpus  Christi  .  .  Page  9 

CHAPTER  II. 

War  inevitable. — General  Scott  at  Washington. — Recommends  an  In 
crease  of  the  Army. — Mission  of  Mr.  Slidell. — Downfall  of  Herrera. — 
Departure  of  Slidell. — General  Taylor  marches  from  Corpus  Christi. — 
Arrives  at  Point  Isabel — In  front  of  Matamoras. — Capture  of  Captain 
Thornton's  Party. — March  of  General  Taylor  to  Point  Isabel. — Battles 
of  Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  de  la  Palma. — Taylor's  Official  Reports  .  22 

CHAPTER  III. 

Action  of  Congress. — Declaration  of  the  President. — Legislation. — General 
Scott's  Views  of  the  War. — His  Comments  on  the  Plan  of  Campaign. — 
His  Correspondence  with  Secretary  Marcy. — The  Grounds  for  his  Opin 
ions. — Is  ordered  to  remain  at  Washington 44 

CHAPTER   IV. 

Campaign  of  the  Rio  Grande  continued. — Movement  of  the  Army. — March 
to  Monterey. — Battle  of  Monterey. — Armistice. — March  to  Saltillo. — 
Wool's  Corps. — Tampico. — Occupation  of  Victoria. — Conclusion  of  the 
Campaign. — General  Taylor's  Despatches. — Results 56 

CHAPTER   V. 

Government  Plan  to  invade  Northern  Mexico. — Assemblage  of  Troops  at 
Fort  Leavenworth. — Kearney's  March  to  Santa  Fe. — Nature  of  the 
Country. — Retreat  of  the  Mexicans. — Arrival  at  Santa  Fe. — Kearney's 
Proclamation. — Kearney  departs  for  California. — Wool's  Expedition. — 
Assembling  of  the  Troops  at  San  Antonio. — The  Object  of  the  Expedi 
tion. — March  to  Monclova  ;  to  Pedas. — Wool  joins  Worth  at  Saltillo. — 

Taylor's  March  to  Victoria 76 

A2 


O  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER   VI. 

Expedition  of  Captain  Fremont. — Arrival  at  Monterey,  California. — Sus 
picions  of  Governor  de  Castro. — Fremont  takes  position. — Returns  by 
Oregon. — Returns  again  to  Monterey. — Is  threatened  by  De  Castro. — 
Declares  War. — Capture  of  Mexicans. — Sails  from  Monterey  to  Diego. 
— Capture  of  the  City  of  Angels. — Conquest  of  California. — Object  of  the 
Government. — Marcy's  Letter  to  Stevenson. — Marcy's  Orders  to  Kear 
ney. — Scott's  Orders. — Insurrection  in  New  Mexico. — Murder  of  Bent 
—Battle  of  Covoda. — Battle  of  Pueblo  de  Taos. — Insurrection  in  Cali 
fornia. — March  of  Doniphan. — Battle  of  Brozitos. — Capture  of  El  Paso 
— Battle  of  Sacramento. —  apturo  of  Chihuahua. — March  to  Sal- 
tillo. — Arrival  at  New  Orleans. — March  of  Gilpiu  to  the  Rocky  Moun 
tains Page  91 

CHAPTER  VII. 

General  Scott  ordered  to  Mexico. — Letter  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to 
General  Taylor. — Letter  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  General  Scott. — 
General  Scott  leaves  Washington. — His  Letter  to  General  Taylor. — 
Plan  of  appointing  a  Lieutenant-General. — Scott  reaches  the  Rio 
Grande. — Condition  of  things  there. — Withdraws  a  part  of  Taylor's 
Troops  in  compliance  with  the  Orders  of  the  War  Department  .  110 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

General  Taylor's  Movements. — Taylor's  Position. — Santa  Anna's  Ad 
vance. — Importance  of  the  event. — Battle  of  Buena  Vista. — Retreat  of 
the  Mexicans. — Taylor's  Official  Account. — Santa  Anna's  Report,  119 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Advance  of  the  Army  to  Lobos  ;  thence  to  Antonio  Lizardo. — Siege  and 
Capture  of  Vera  Cruz. — Official  Despatches. — March  to  the  Interior. — 
Battle  of  Cerro  Gordo. — Official  Despatches. — Capture  of  Puebla,  163 

CHAPTER  X. 

Entrance  of  the  American  Army  into  Puebla. — Mexican  Account. — 
American  Officers. — Conduct  of  the  Army. — Situation  of  Puebla. — 
Character  of  the  Country. — The  Ancient  Cholula. — Strength  of  tho 
Army. — Scott's  Proclamation. — Humanity  of  the  Army. — Mission  of 
'IVist.— Reasons  for  remaining  in  Puebla. — Drilling  of  the  Army^Rais- 
ing  new  Regiments. — New  Volunteers. — Attack  on  the  Train  of  M'ln- 
tosh. — Advance  of  Pierce. — Concentration  of  the  Army  .  202 

CHAPTER   XL 

Strength  of  the  Army. — Reinforcements. — Divisions  of  the  Army. — 
March  from  Puebla.— Hospitals  of  Puebla. — Volcano  of  Popocatepetl.— 


CONTENTS.  7 

Pass  of  Rio  Frio. — View  of  Mexico. — Valley  of  Mexico.— Lakes.— 
Inundations.— Topography  of  the  Valley. — Position  of  the  Army  on 
the  13th  of  August. — Recohnoissance  of  the  Rifles. — El  Penon. — 
Mexicalcingo. — Turning  of  Lake  Chalco. — March  to  San  Augustine. — 
Skirmish  at  Buena  Vista. — Concentration. — Position  of  the  Army  on 
the  18th .  Page  221 

CHAPTER  XII. 

Mexican  Line  of  Defence. — Position  of  the  American  and  Mexican  Ar 
mies. — Action  of  the  19th. — Position  in  the  Hamlet  of  Contreras. — Po 
sition  of  General  Scott. — Arrangements  for  the  Battle. — Distribution  of 
the  American  and  Mexican  Forces. — Battle  of  Contreras. — Rout  of  the 
Mexicans. — Surrender  of  Mexican  Generals. — Recapture  of  the  Buena 
Vista  Guns. — Scott's  Arrangements. — Evacuation  of  San  Antonia. — 
Storm  of  the  Tete  du  Pont. — Battle  of  Churubusco. — Defeat  of  the 
Mexicans. — Loss. — Truce 241 

CHAPTER   XIII. 

Peace  Negotiations. — President  Folk's  Commission. — Mexican  Conditions. 
— American  Ultimatum.— Failure  of  Negotiations. — Scott's  Notice  to 
Santa  Anna. — Trial  and  Execution  of  the  Deserters. — Description  of 
ChapuTtepec. — Of  Molino  del  Rey. — Mexican  Defences. — March  of 
Worth. — Strength  of  his  Corps. — Battle  of  Molino  del  Rey. — Mexican 
Less. — Evacuation  of  Molino  del  Rey. — Preparatious  for  the  Attack 
of  Chapultepec. — Erection  of  Batteries. — Storm  of  Chapultepec. — Ac 
tion  of  the  13th. — Capture  of  Mexico. — Entrance  into  the  City. — Scott's 
Address  to  the  Soldiers. — Insurrection  of  the  Leperos. — Appearance  of 
the  City-— Reflections 273 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

Siege  of  Puebla. — March  of  Santa  Anna. — Desertion  of  his  troops. — March 
of  Rea. — Battle  of  Haumantla. — Sauta  Anna's  resignation. — Pena  y 
Pena  President. — Negotiations  for  peace. — Treaty  signed. — Ratifica 
tions. — The  treaty. — Territory  acquired. — Losses  of  the  army. — Names 
of  officers  killed. — Conclusion 324 


*  V  E 


MEXICAN    WAR, 


CHAPTER  I. 

Origin  of  the  War  with  Mexico.— Settlement  of  Texas, — Declaration  of 
Independence. — Santa  Anna's  Treaty. — Movement  towards  Annexation. 
— Correspondence  of  Bocanegra. — Declaration  of  Almonte. — Mr.  Cal- 
houn's  reasons. — Lord  Aberdeen's  Declaration. — The  Tyler  Treaty. — 
The  Joint  Resolution. — Departure  of  Almonte. — General  Taylor  ordered 
to  Texas. — Strength  of  the  Army  at  Corpus  Christi. 

TILL  quite  recently,  the  immense  territory  extending 
from  the  Sabine  to  the  Rio  Grande  was  comparatively  un 
inhabited.  Comprehending  a  space  large  enough  for  an 
empire,  and  within  the  mildest  part  of  the  temperate  zone, 
it  was  yet  too  remote  from  the  inhabitants  of  ancient 
Mexico  on  one  hand,  or  from  those  of  the  northern  Atlan 
tic  States  on  the  other,  to  be  reached  and  cultivated  at  an 
earlier  period  by  the  adventurous  and  advancing  settlers  of 
America.  The  country  belonged  to  Mexico,  but  was  hardly 
possessed  by  her  people.  A  few  towns  immediately  east 
of  the  Rio  Grande,  and  an  occasional  village  or  settlement 
in  the  interior — such  as  Antonio  de  Bexar,  Goliad,  and 
Nacogdoches — were  the  only  marks  of  improvement 
which  indicated  the  civilization  of  the  white  man,  or  the 
dominion  of  Mexico.  Nor  did  the-;  aWn^jiiaL'inhalyitarHs 
appear  much  more  numerous.  ^.Th'e  Camariches  of  the 
northern  districts,  and  a  few  scattered  ^nd 


10  EMIGRATION  TO  TEXAS. 

wandered  over  the  vast  territories  of  uninhabited  Texas, 
but  offered  no  very  formidable  obstacle  to  the  progress 
of  civilization. 

Texas  was  in  this  almost  desolate  condition  when  ii 
attracted  the  roving  eye  of  land  speculation.  Certain 
persons  in  the  United  States  foresaw  the  rapid  and  inevit 
able  movement  of  the  United  States  of  the  North  towards 
the  Western  Ocean,  and  sought  to  enhance  their  fortunes 
by  obtaining  grants  of  Texan  lands  from  the  Mexican  gov 
ernment.  Among  these  was  Stephen  Austin,  who  obtained 
a  large  tract,  and  whose  name  has  since  been  attached 
both  to  a  county  and  a  town.  With  him,  and  with  others 
to  whom  Mexico  had  made  grants,  came  numerous  par 
ties  of  colonists  and  adventurers,  who  sought,  like  their 
leaders,  to  pursue  their  fortunes  and  avoid  their  adversi 
ties,  by  successful  enterprise  in  a  new  country,  and  by 
sharing  in  the  distribution  of  vast  bodies  of  unoccupied 
land.  The  number  of  these  adventurers  rapidly  increased, 
till  they  became  more  numerous  than  the  Mexicans  who 
previously  inhabited  the  country.  The  difference  oljace, 
religion,  and  laws,  was  soon  apparent  in  diversities  of 
sentiment  and  objects  between  the  old  and  new  inhabit 
ants.  The  Texan  of  the  United  States  brought  with 
him,  not  only  greater  energy  and  industry,  but  a  wild  and 
restless  ambition— a  more  intense  and  speculative  pursuit 
of  future  objects. 

Where  differences  so  deep  and  original  as  these  exist 
among  different  classes  of  people,  they  will  soon  become 
manifested  in  external  action.  The  new  inhabitants  soon 
stifced.  the  dir.ecti(>i}  pf:  all  public  affairs,  and  Texas  be 
came',  *in  fa'ct',  the*'p'os'session  of  these  adventurers  from  a 
ieEtiertiranof! those  ancient  citizens  to  whose 


CAUSES  LEADING  TO  INDEPENDENCE.        11 

government  it  professed  allegiance.  The  power  thus  ob 
tained  was  soon  manifested  in  other  acts.  It  is  not  in  the 
nature  of  things,  that  a  country  should  change  its  inhabit 
ants  and  not  also  change  its  government.  The  new  pos 
sessors  will  assume  the  laws  and  institutions  to  which 
their  habits  have  been  used  and  their  sentiments  assimi 
lated,  It  was  so  with  Texas.  No  sooner  did  the  settlers 
from  the  United  States  possess  the  power,  than  they 
looked  round  for  the  means  of  establishing  their  own 
forms  of  government. 

In  the  revolutions  of  Mexico,  so  rapid  and  often  so 
disastrous,  the  opportunities  for  change  could  never  be  long 
wanting.  In  the  case  of  Texas,  such  an  occasion  was 
offered  in  the  overthrow,  by  Santa  Anna,  of  the  Mex 
ican  Federal  Government.  This  powerful  chief  being 
invested  with  the  supreme  magistracy,  in  a  short  time 
after  assumed  absolute  power.  About  this  time,  the  peo 
ple  of  Texas  having  increased  largely  in  population  and 
resources,  petitioned  the  Mexican  Congress  for  admission 
into  the  confederation,  as  a  separate  State.  The  bearer 
of  this  petition,  and  a  commissioner  to  represent  their 
claims,  was  Stephen  Austin.  The  Congress  of  Mexico 
paid  no  attention  to  the  petition  ;  but  Austin  imprudently 
wrote  back  to  the  Texan  authorities,  advising  them  to 
organize  a  State,  without  waiting  for  the  consent  of  the 
government.  The  letter  was  intercepted,  and  Austin,  on 
his  return,  arrested,  carried  back  to  the  capital,  and  placed 
during  a  year  in  solitary  confinement.  The  people  of  the 
United  States  who  had  become  citizens  of  Texas,  were 
naturally  indignant  at  what  they  considered  an  outrage  on 
the  right  of  petition,  and  an  insult  to  the  dignity  of  their 
commissioner. 


12  WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 

Such  was  the  feeling  in  Texas,  when  Santa  Anna,  having 
completed  his  usurpation  of  the  supreme  power  and  de 
feated  the  Zacatecans,  who  opposed  him,  sent  General 
Cos  into  Texas  to  enforce  certain  requisitions  of  the  gov 
ernment.  One  of  these  was  the  execution  of  the  Act  of 
1830,  prohibiting  the  emigration  of  Americans  into  Texas. 
Another  was  the  surrender  of  Lorenzo  de  Zavala,  who 
had  become  a  refugee  in  Texas,  in  consequence  of  moving 
a  law,  in  the  Mexican  Congress,  directed  against  church 
property.  To  enforce  these  demands,  General  Cos  took 
possession  of  Antonio  de  Bexar.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Texans  prepared  for  an  armed  resistance,  and  on  the  28th 
of  September,  1835,  they  attacked  and  defeated  a  party  of 
Mexicans  at  the  town  of  Gonzales,  on  the  Rio  Guadalupe. 

Thus  was  commenced  the  war  and  revolution  of  Texas  : 
a  war  which  arose,  on  the  part  of  Mexico,  from  an  attempt 
to  enforce  the  authority  of  the  government  de  facto  (with 
out  reference  to  the  Constitution)  over  the  province  of 
Texas ;  and  on  the  side  of  Texas,  in  an  obvious  attempt 
to  make  that  province  virtually  independent  of  Mexico. 

On  the  3d  of  November,  1835,  the  delegates  of  Texas 
assembled  at  San  Felipe  de  Austin,  and  issued  a  solemn 
declaration  against  Santa  Anna  and  other  military  chief 
tains.  "  who  had  by  force  of  arms  overthrown  the  Federal 
Institutions  of  Mexico,  and  dissolved  the  social  compact 
which  existed  between  Texas  and  the  other  members  of 
the  Mexican  confederacy." 

The  war  thus  commenced  between  Texas  and  the 
mother  country  continued,  with  various  fortune,  till  the 
21st  of  April,  1836,  when  General  Santa  Anna  was  cap 
tured  at  the  battle  of  San  Jacinto,  and  the  Mexican  au 
thority  over  the  Texans  really  destroyed. 


CAPTURE  OF  SANTA  ANNA.  13 

On  the  2d  of  March  previously,  the  Texan  delegates 
assembled  at  Washington  on  the  Brazos,  made  a  formal 
declaration  of  independence,  signed  a  constitution,  and 
organized  a  government.  This  independence  Santa  Anna, 
a  captive  in  the  hands  of  the  Texan  army,  afterwards 
bound  himself  to  "  solemnly  acknowledge,  sanction,  and 
ratify  ;"  and  to  use  his  personal  and  official  powers  to  pro 
cure  without  delay  the  ratification  and  confirmation  of  that 
treaty  by  the  legitimate  government  of  Mexico. 

The  boundaries  of  Texas,  as  then  defined,  are  of  im 
portance  as  constituting  one  of  the  grounds  of  claim  on 
the  part  of  the  government  of  the  United  States  against 
Mexico.  They  were  declared  to  be  as  follows  : — 

"  Beginning  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande  ;  thence 
up  the  principal  stream  of  said  river  to  its  source  ;  thence 
due  north  to  the  42°  of  north  latitude  ;  thence  along  the 
boundary  line,  as  defined  in  the  treaty  between  the  United 
States  and  Spain,  (February,  1819,)  to  the  beginning." 

To  any  claim  of  boundary,  however,  resting  upon  this 
concession  of  Santa  Anna,  it  is  well  replied,  that  it  was 
made  when  he  was  under  constraint,  and  was  in  its  very 
terms  of  no  effect  till  ratified  by  the  legitimate  govern 
ment  of  Mexico.  Accordingly  when,  a  little  while  after 
wards,  Bustamente  became  president  of  Mexico,  he  re 
pudiated  this  treaty,  and  recommenced  the  war  with 
Texas.  This  war  was  continued,  in  desultory  and  pre 
datory  excursions,  on  both  sides,  till  Texas  was  finally 
annexed  to  the  United  States. 

While  things  were  in  this  state — the  mother  country 
contending  for  its  continued  dominion,  and  the  young 
province  for  absolute  independence — the  QUESTION  OF 
ANNEXATION  (as  it  is  politically  called)  arose  both  in 

B 


14  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS. 

the  United  States  and  Texas.  The  inhabitants  of  the 
latter,  we  have  said,  were  chiefly  citizens  of  the  United 
States — persons  whom  past  adversities  or  future  hopes 
had  impelled  to  this  new  region  in  pursuit  of  fortune  or 
adventure.  If  it  was  natural  for  them  thus  to  pursue 
these  new  objects,  it  was  equally  natural  that  they  should 
desire  to  remain  politically  and  socially  connected  with 
the  land  of  their  birth  and  the  home  of  their  associations. 
Accordingly,  as  early  as  the  4th  of  August,  1837,  soon 
after  she  declared  her  independence,  Texas  proposed  to 
annex  herself  to  the  United  States.1  The  then  president 
of  this  country,  Mr.  Van  Buren,  declined  the  terms,  for 
reasons  which  were  alike  honorable  to  his  sagacity  as  a 
map,  and  his  principles  as  a  statesman.  He  declared, 
that  so  long  as  we  were  bound  by  a  treaty  of  amity  and 
commerce  with  Mexico,  to  annex  Texas  would  necessa 
rily  involve  the  question  of  war  ;  and  that  a  disposition  to 
espouse  the  quarrel  with  Mexico  was  at  variance  with  the 
spirit  of  the  treaty,  and  with  the  policy  and  welfare  of  the 
United  States.2 

Texas  continued  negotiations  with  the  United  States, 
with  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Mexico — the  object  of 
which  was  to  procure  the  acknowledgment  of  her  inde 
pendence  by  Mexico,  or  her  protection  by  some  more 
powerful  government.  Thus  matters  continued — a  partial 
war  at  one  time,  and  a  series  of  negotiations  at  another — 
till  the  administration  of  President  Tyler  revived  the  plan 
of  annexation.  On  the  6th  of  October,  1843,  the  Hon. 
A.  P.  Upshur,  Secretary  of  State,  proposed  to  the  Texan 
envoy  the  renewal  of  negotiations  for  the  annexation  of 

1  Vide  State  Papers.  a  Idem. 


BOCANEGRA  S  LETTER.  15 

Texas  to  the  United  States ;  which  was  accepted  by  the 
Texan  executive. 

In  the  mean  while,  the  subject  had  been  discussed  in 
the  newspapers,  and  the  Mexican  government  availed  it 
self  of  this  information  to  make  a  formal  declaration  of  its 
views  on  this  important  point.  Mr.  Bocanegra,  the  Mex 
ican  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations,  addressed  a  note1 
(August  23,  1843)  to  Waddy  Thompson,  our  minister  in 
Mexico,  of  which  the  following  is  a  passage  : — 

"  And  if  a  party  in  Texas  is  now  endeavoring  to  effect 
its  incorporation  with  the  United  States,  it  is  from  a  con 
sciousness  of  their  notorious  incapability  to  form  and 
constitute  an  independent  nation,  without  their  having 
changed  their  situation,  or  acquired  any  right  to  separate 
themselves  from  their  mother  country.  His  Excellency 
the  Provisional  President,  resting  on  this  deep  conviction, 
is  obliged  to  prevent  an  aggression,  unprecedented  in  the 
annals  of  the  world,  from  being  consummated ;  and  if  it 
be  indispensable  for  the  Mexican  nation  to  seek  security 
for  its  rights  at  the  expense  of  the  disasters  of  war,  it 
will  call  upon  God,  and  rely  on  its  own  efforts  for  the 
defence  of  its  just  cause" 

This  declaration  was  a  notice  to  the  American  govern 
ment  of  the  effects  to  be  anticipated  from  the  annexation, 
and  fully  justified  the  sagacity  and  firmness  of  Mr.  Van 
Buren.  It  was  replied  to,  by  Mr.  Waddy  Thompson,  in 
a  haughty  note,  affirming  that  the  notice  of  the  Mexican 
minister  was  a  threat,  or  a  warning ;  but  silent  as  to  the 
attitude  really  assumed  by  the  United  States. 

A  short  time  subsequent  to  this  correspondence,  and 


1  State  Papers — Letter  of  Bocanegra. 


16 

as  if  to  prevent  any  misunderstanding  of  the  meaning  of 
Mexico,  General  Almonte,  Mexican  minister  at  Washing 
ton,  addressed  a  note  to  Mr.  Upshur,  Secretary  of  State, 
of  which  the  following  passage  is  a  part : — 

"  But  if,  contrary  to  the  hopes  and  wishes  entertained 
by  the  government  of  the  undersigned  for  the  preservation 
of  the  good  understanding  and  harmony  which  should 
reign  between  the  two  neighboring  and  friendly  republics, 
the  United  States  should,  in  defiance  of  good  faith,  and  the 
principles  of  justice  which  they  have  constantly  proclaim 
ed,  commit  the  unheard-of  act  of  violence  of  appropriating 
to  themselves  an  integrant  part  of  the  Mexican  territory, 
the  undersigned,  in  the  name  of  his  nation,  and  now  for 
them,  protests  in  the  most  solemn  manner  against  such 
an  aggression  ;  and  he  moreover  declares,  by  express  order 
of  his  government,  that  on  sanction  being  given  by  the 
Executive  of  the  Union  to  the  incorporation  of  Texas  into 
the  United  States,  he  will  consider  his  mission  ended, 
seeing  that,  as  the  Secretary  of  State  will  have  learned, 
the  Mexican  government  is  resolved  to  declare  war  as 
soon  as  it  receives  intimation  of  such  an  act."1 

Long  previous  to  actual  annexation,  it  will  be  observed, 
the  Mexican  government  had  officially  informed  the  Ex 
ecutive  of  the  United  States,  that  war  must  inevitably 
result  from  that  act.  It  cannot,  therefore,  be  said,  with 
any  regard  to  truth,  that  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  in  annexing  Texas,  did  not  have  reason  to  antici 
pate  that  result,  and  did  not  neglect  that  preparation  which 
such  anticipations  required  of  a  prudent  administration.2 


1  General  Almonte's  Letter,  dated  November  3d,  1843. 
9  In  fact  they  made  none  till  the  war  was  commenced. 


LORD  ABERDEEN'S  LETTER.  17 

The  plan  of  annexation,  notwithstanding  these  explicit 
declarations  of  the  Mexican  government,  was  anxiously 
and  sedulously  pursued  by  the  Executive  of  the  United 
States.  Mr.  J.  C.  Calhoun,  who  had  succeeded  Mr. 
Upshur1  as  Secretary  of  State,  signed  with  the  Ministers 
Plenipotentiary  of  Texas  (Messrs.  Van  Zandt  and  Hen 
derson)  a  Treaty  of  Annexation,  on  the  12th  of  April, 
1844.  In  the  same  month,  the  Secretary  of  State  (Mr. 
Calhoun)  advised  the  Charge  d'Affaires  in  Mexico,  "  that 
the  step  had  been  forced  on  the  government  cu  the 
United  States  in  self-defence,  in  consequence  of  the  poli 
cy  adopted  by  Great  Britain  in  reference  to  the  abolition 
of  slavery  ja.J'exas.''2  At  the  same  moment,  there  had 
been  presented  by  Mr.  Pakenham,  (British  minister,) 
and  was  on  file  in  the  Department  of  State,  a  solemn 
declaration  of  the  British  government,  by  Lord  Aberdeen, 
that  this'idea  of  British  interference  was  a  gross  mistake.3 
In  this  declaration,  Lord  Aberdeen  says, — 

"  With  regard  to  Texas,  we  avow  that  we  wish  to  see 
slavery  abolished  there,  or  elsewhere  ;  and  we  should  re 
joice,  if  the  recognition  of  that  country  by  the  Mexican 
government,  should  be  accompanied  by  an  engagement 
on  the  part  of  Texas  to  abolish  slavery,  and  under 
proper  conditions  throughout  the  republic.  But  although 
we  earnestly  desire  and  feel  it  to  be  our  duty  to  promote 
such  a  consummation,  we  shall  not  interfere  unduly,  or 
with  an  improper  assumption  of  authority  with  either 


1  Mr.  Upshur  was  killed  on  board  the  Princeton. 

2  State  Correspondence,  April,  1844. 

3  Lord    Aberdeen's  Letter  was  dated  December  26th,  1843  ;  and  pre 
sented  by  :Vlr.  Pakenham,  February  26th,  1844. 

b2  2 


JJ5  TREATY  REJECTED. 

party,  in  order  to  insure  the  adoption  of  such  a  course. 
We  shall  counsel,  but  we  shall  not  seek  to  compel  or  un 
duly  control  either  party" 

Did  the  President  and  Secretary  of  State  disbelieve 
this  declaration  ?  In  any  case,  upon  what  evidence  did 
the  Secretary  declare,  that  the  government  of  the  United 
States  was  forced  into  this  step,  in  consequence  of  the 
interference  of  Great  Britain  with  slavery  in  Texas  ? 
Upon  what  principle  of  the  Constitution  did  the  American 
government  interfere  with  Texas  for  such  a  cause  ? — 
The  plan  of  annexation,  however,  was  strenuously  pushed 
by  its  projectors. 

On  the  22d  of  April,  1844,  Mr.  Tyler  submitted  to  the 
Senate  a  Treaty  of  Annexation,  which  was  soon  after  re 
jected,  and  the  question  left  open  for  public  discussion.1 

In  consequence  of  the  election  of  President  Polk  in 
November,  1844,  and  the  apparent  approval  of  annexa 
tion  by  the  people  of  the  United  States,  Congress  on  the 
1st  of  March,  1845,  passed  what  is  called  the  JOINT 
RESOLUTION,  giving  its  consent  that  the  territory  "  right 
fully  belonging  to  the  Republic  of  Texas"  might  be 
erected  into  a  new  State  called  the  State  of  Texas  ;  sub 
ject,  however,  to  the  adjustment  by  this  government  of 
"  all  questions  of  boundary  that  may  arise  with  other 
governments." 

The  terms  of  this  Resolution  admit  that  Texas  might 
have  claimed  boundaries  which  were  not  rightfully  belong 
ing  to  her,  and  that  these  "  questions  of  boundary"  had  yet 
to  be  settled. 

To  the  terms  of  the  Joint  Resolution,  Texas  assented 


See  the  Public  Documents  of  1844 


GEN.  TAYLOR  ORDERED  TO  CORPUS  CHRISTI.     19 

by  her  ordinance  of  July  4th,  1845,  and  having  formed  her 
Constitution,  became  virtually  a  State  in  the  American 
Union.1  Two  days  after  this  (July  7th)  the  same  Con 
vention  requested  the  President  of  the  United  States  to 
occupy  the  ports  of  Texas,  and  send  an  army  to  their 
defence.  This  desire  the  President  of  the  United  States 
immediately  complied  with. 

GENERAL  ZACHARY  TAYLOR,  then  in  command  at  Camp 
Jessup,  was  ordered  to  move  his  forces  into  Texas,  weeks 
before  the  War  Department  had  received  information  of 
the  Texan  ordinance.  On  the  28th  of  June,  Mr.  Donel- 
son,  then  minister  to  Texas,  and  to  whom  General  Taylor 
was  referred  for  advice  upon  his  movements,  wrote  him 
that  he  had  best  move  his  forces  "  without  delay  to  the 
western  frontier  of  Texas,"  and  also  informing  him  that 
Corpus  Christi,  on  Aranzas  Bay,  was  the  best  point  for 
the  assembling  of  his  troops.  The  same  letter  also  ad 
mitted  that  the  country  between  the  Nueces  and  the  Rio 
Grande  was  in  dispute,  the  Texans  holding  Corpus 
Christi  and  the  Mexicans  Santiago,  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Rio  Grande? 

General  Taylor  proceeded  immediately  with  the  forces 
under  his  command  to  Aranzas  Bay,  and  in  the  beginning 
of  August,  1845,  had  taken  the  position  assigned  him  by  the 
government.  All  the  troops  in  the  west,  the  northwest,  and 
the  Atlantic  which  could  be  spared,  were  ordered  to  join 
him.  In  November,  1845,  by  the  report  of  the  Adjutant- 
General,  his  army  was  composed  as  follows  : — 3 


1  Documents  of  1845. 

1  Mr.  Donelson's  Letter  28th  of  Juue  1845. — Public  Documents. 

3  Adjutant-General's  Report,  November  26th,  1845. 


20  STRENGTH  OF    THE  ARMY. 

General  Staff      -  24 

2d  Regiment  of  Dragoons  -                  -  596 

1st        "         of  Artillery  -               <    -  236 

2d         "          "         "  -  233 

3d         "          "         "  \-  219 

4th       "          "         "  '*  235 

3d  Regiment  of  Infantry  -                  -  533 

4th        "          "         "  -  511 

5th        "          "        "  -  573 

7th        "          "         "  ...  442 

8th        "          "  -  447 

Aggregate  -  4,049 

This  was  General  Taylor's  army  in  November,  1845, 
when,  by  the  confession  of  the  government,  the  territory 
between  his  position  and  Santiago,  or  rather,  between  the 
Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande,  was  in  dispute,  and  the 
subject  of  negotiation  for  boundaries. 

What,  however,  was  at  this  moment  the  real  position 
of  affairs  in  regard  to  the  question  of  war  ?  Was  there  any 
room  to  doubt  that  war  was  the  necessary  consequence 
of  annexation  ?  Was  there  any  thing  to  justify  the  total 
neglect  of  all  preparation  for  so  serious  a  conflict,  as  war 
with  a  nation,  however  inferior,  of  seven  millions  of  people  ? 
The  facts,  as  we  have  reviewed  them,  are  simple  and 
brief. 

Mexico,  hearing  from  the  United  States  the  distant 
rumors  of  an  intended  annexation  of  Texas,  announces  by 
Mr.  Bocanegra  to  the  American  minister,  that  she  will 
resent  such  an  act  at  the  expense  of  the  disasters  of  war. 

In  the  same  year,  (1843,)  and  a  few  months  later,  the 
Mexican  minister,  General  Almonte,  reaffirms  the  same 


STATE  OF  THE  QUESTION.  21 

fixed  determination  of  his  government  in  a  letter  to  the 
American  Secretary  of  State. 

When  the  act  for  annexation  is  passed,  Almonte  de 
clares  in  his  final  note  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  that  it  is 
the  most  unjust  act  recorded  in  the  annals  of  history ; 
protests  against  it ;  declares  that  his  government  will  resist 
it  by  all  the  means  in  its  power;  and  demands  his  passports. 

The  diplomatic  correspondence  of  our  government 
shows,  that  it  apprehended  war — that  it  knew  well  the 
sole  cause  by  which  war  would  come — and  thad.in  the 
minds  of  the  President  and  his  cabinet,  the  annexation  of 
Texas,  and  its  disputed  boundaries,  was  the  sole  founda- , 
tion  for  any  rupture  with  Mexico. 

The  march  of  General  Taylor's  army  was  evidently 
and  declaredly1  intended  to  meet  the  contingencies  of 
such  a  rupture. 

The  most  remarkable  fact  in  this  transaction,  is  that, 
with  this  apprehension  of  war  vividly  impressed  upon 
the  mind  of  the  government,  the  President  should  never 
have  asked  Congress  for  one  dollar  of  money,  or  one 
company  of  soldiers  in  addition  to  the  provisions  of  the 
peace  establishment !  Upon  what  principle  was  it  as 
sumed,  that  an  entire  province  could  be  wrested  ;sjrom 
one  empire  and  give  no  cause  for  war  ?  Upon  what  idea 
of  prudence  or  sagacity  was  all  preparation  for  that' war 
neglected,  till  battles  were  already  fought,  and  the  op 
posing  nation  excited  by  all  the  worst  feelings  of  national 
and  martial  controversy  ? 

The  effect  of  this  neglect  we  shall  see  in  the  series  of 
subsequent  events. 

'     V'V  ft  ^-» 

1  See  Douelson's  Correspondence.  , 


22  WAR  INEVITABLE. 


CHAPTER  II. 

War  inevitable — General  Scott  at  Washington — Recommends  an  increase 
of  the  Army — Mission  of  Mr.  Slidell — Downfall  of  Herrera — Departure 
of  Slidell — General  Taylor  marches  from  Corpus  Christi — Arrives  at 
Point  Isabel — In  front  of  Metamoras — Capture  of  Captain  Thornton's 
party— March  of  General  Taylor  to  Point  Isabel— Battles  of  Palo  Alto 
and  Resaca  de  la  Palma— Taylor's  Official  Report. 

WE  have  traced  in  the  preceding  chapter  the  negotia 
tions  of  the  United  States  with  Mexico  and  Texas  to  that 
point,  in  which  the  Mexican  Secretary  for  Foreign  Af 
fairs,  and  the  Mexican  minister  at  Washington,  officially 
announced  that  the  annexation  of  Texas  to  the  United 
States  would  be  considered  just  cause  of  war,  and  the  lat 
ter  had  departed  from  Washington  with  hostile  declara 
tions.  That  this  declaration  was  believed,  and  that  war 
would  result  from  that  act,  the  American  Charge  d'Af- 
faiivs  in  Texas  (Mr.  Donelson)  shows  in  his  entire  cor 
respondence.  In  his  letter  of  June  4th,  1845,  to  the  Sec 
retary  of  State,  he  declares  his  full  belief  that  war  will 
occur,  although  he  chose  to  attribute  it  to  the  instigation 
of  the  British  minister,  Mr.  Elliott. 

Mr.  Donelson  makes  this  remarkable  announcement : — 
"  I  look  upon  war  with  Mexico  as  inevitable — a  war 
dictated  by  the  British  minister  here  for  the  purpose  of 
defeating  annexation,  and  intended  at  all  events  to  deprive 
both  Texas  and  the  United  States  of  all  claim  to  the 
country  between  the  Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande,  at  the 


WAR  INEVITABLE.  23 

time  the  right  of  Texas  to  the  protection  of  the  United 
States  arises  under  the  contingency  anticipated  by  you  at 
the  date  of  your  last  despatch  to  me." 

The  "  contingency"  here  spoken  of  by  the  Charge,  was 
stated  in  Mr.  Buchanan's  letter  of  May  23d,  1845,  and 
was  simply  the  acceptance,  by  Texas,  of  the  conditions  of 
annexation  stated  in  the  joint  resolution  of  Congress. 

The  question  of  "  boundaries"  was  by  that  resolution 
and  by  all  prior  negotiations,  left  open  for  future  discus 
sion.  Mr.  Buchanan,  therefore,  cautiously  uses  the  term 
"  state,"  in  reference  to  the  annexation  of  Texas,  and  tells 
Mr.  Donelson  (23d  of  May,  1845)  that,  in  the  event  of 
annexation,  the  President  will  deem  it  his  duty  to  "  em 
ploy  the  army  in  defending  that  state  against  the  attacks 
of  any  foreign  power."  It  was  the  state  of  Texas,  what 
ever  that  might  be,  which,  in  May,  1845,  the  President 
undertook  to  defend,  and  not  any  imaginary  boundary, 
or  supposed  claim  of  Texas  beyond  the  Nueces,  the  Rio 
Grande,  or  any  other  stream. 

Under  the  idea,  however,  as  expressed  in  his  letter  of 
the  4th  of  June,  that  war  was  inevitable,  Mr.  Donelson 
asks  the  government  for  an  army  to  defend  the  supposed 
frontier  of  Texas,  and  it  is  under  this  requisition  that  the 
corps  of  General  Taylor  was  ordered  to  Corpus  Christi, 
and  became,  in  another  year,  the  invading  army  of  Mex 
ico  !  The  cause  of  the  war — the  manner  in  which  it  was 
to  arise  and  to  be  carried  on,  are  projected  and  shadowed 
out  so  minutely  in  the  diplomatic  correspondence  of 
Messrs.  Buchanan  and  Donelson,  as  to  leave  the  historian 
of  these  events  no  doubtful  points  to  discuss.  If  they  are 
not  certain  and  fixed  on  the  map  of  Time,  in  vain  shall 
we  look  for  any  faithful  volume  of  human  transactions. 


24  OBJECTS  OF  THE  ARMY. 

What  was  in  prospect  for  the  army  when  arrived  in 
Texas,  and  its  purpose  there,  is  thus  stated  by  Mr.  Don- 
elson : — 

"  Under  such  circumstances,  the  officer  intended  for 
the  command  of  the  United  States  troops  on  the  Texan 
frontier  may  expect  to  find  a  large  force  of  the  enemy  there ; 
and  it  is  suggested  whether  that  officer  ought  not  at  once 
to  be  selected,  and  ordered  to  some  near  and  convenient 
point  for  the  purpose  of  communicating  with  me,  and 
providing  the  most  prompt  means  of  action  the  moment 
he  is  advised  of  the  decision  of  the  Convention  of  Texas 
on  the  terms  of  union  proposed  in  our  joint  resolution." 

The  requisition  of  Mr.  Donelson  was  complied  with. 
An  express  was  sent  to  General  Taylor,  at  Fort  Jessup  ; 
his  troops  were  ordered  into  Texas  ;  and  Captain  Stock 
ton  was  ordered  with  a  squadron  into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  ; 
both  with  the  avowed  object  of  repelling  the  attacks  of 
Mexico, — an  anticipated  consequence  of  annexation.1 

During  this  period  General  Scott  was  at  Washington, 
in  the  diligent  performance  of  his  military  duties  as  the 
commander  of  the  army,  without  taking  any  public  part 
in  the  political  discussions  of  the  day. 

The  commander  of  the  army,  even  on  the  peace  estab 
lishment  of  the  United  States,  must  necessarily  carry  on  an 
extensive  coirespondence,  and  have  the  oversight  of  many 
and  various  departments  of  the  public' service.  General 
Scott  found  ample  scope  for  his  official  talents  and  time,  in 
both  the  superintendence  and  the  anticipation  of  the  wants 
and  means  of  the  army.  At  the  time  General  Taylor  was 
despatched  to  the  frontier  of  Texas,  the  American  army 

1  Mr.  Buchanan's  letter  to  Mr.  Donelson,  dated  June  15th,  1845. 


INCREASE  OF  THE  ARMY.  25 

was  actually  of  less  numerical  strength  than  it  had  been 
in  any  year  since  1808  !  And  yet  the  official  documents 
prove  that  at  that  very  moment  of  time  the  government 
was  in  daily  expectation  of  war ;  and  yet  the  Executive 
did  not  ask  from  Congress  an  additional  regiment,  nor  did 
Congress  anticipate  the  need  of  additional  means  \l 

General  Scott,  however,  in  his  annual  report  upon  the 
state  of  the  army,  recommended,  what  the  other  depart 
ments  of  the  government  seem  strangely  to  have  over 
looked, — a  small  increase  of  the  army.  He  pointed  out  a 
very  easy  method  of  doing  this,  without  raising  additional 
regiments,  or  even  requiring  additional  officers.  During 
the  presidency  of  Mr.  Monroe,  and  while  Mr.  Calhoun 
was  Secretary  at  War,  (and,  indeed,  upon  his  recom 
mendation,)  the  plan  had  been  adopted  of  having  skeleton 
regiments,  in  which  all  the  officers  were  retained,  but  the 
number  of  privates  reduced  one-half.  The  reason  for 
this  was  very  strong.  It  was  that,  having  all  the  officers 
ready,  and  a  skeleton  of  the  regiment,  the  number  of  the 
aimy  might  be  doubled,  in  time  of  emergency,  by  new 
enlistments,  without  the  expense  of  permanent  mainten 
ance.  Accordingly,  the  regiments  of  artillery  and  infantry 
had  but  forty-two  privates  in  each  company,  when  the 
number  should  have  been  eighty-four.  The  Military 
Academy  had  furnished  a  large  number  of  valuable  offi 
cers,  many  of  whom  were  attached  to  the  regiments  by 
brevet. 

General  Scott  proposed  to  increase  the  army,  simply 
by  filling  up  these  skeleton  companies,  and  giving  em- 

1  The  President  twice  in  his  Message  (December,  1845)  alluded  to  the 
dunger  of  a  war  with  Mexico  ;  but  recommended  nothing  for  the  army 
C 


26  SCOTT'S  RECOMMENDATION. 

ployment  to  these  brevet  officers.  In  his  report  (Novem 
ber  20th,  1845)  he  says: 

"  By  adding  ten  privates  to  each  company  of  dragoons, 
now  fifty  privates  each,  and  twenty  privates  to  each  com 
pany  of  artillery  and  infantry,  now  forty-two  privates  each, 
of  the  present  establishment,  we  should  have  a  total  in 
crease  (by  this  plan)  for  twenty  companies  of  dragoons, 
forty  of  artillery,  and  eighty  of  infantry,  of  twenty-six 
hundred  privates — without  the  addition  of  a  regiment,  or 
of  one  non-commissioned  officer,  musician,  or  artificer. 
See  organization  (table)  of  the  regular  army  of  the  Uni 
ted  States,  Army  Register.  But,  in  this  case,  an  ad 
ditional  subaltern  (second  lieutenant)  to  each  company  of 
dragoons  and  infantry  (one  hundred)  would  be  necessary. 
There  are,  at  present,  about  ninety-five  brevet  second 
lieutenants  (graduates  of  the  Military  Academy — strangely 
called  supernumerary  by  act  of  April  29,  1812,  sec.  4) 
attached  to  -companies,  and  doing  duty  with  them.  These 
officers  would  be  absorbed,  by  promotion,  should  this 
second  plan  of  augmentation  be  carried  out,  and  the 
future  supernumerary  or  brevet  second  lieutenants  (grad 
uates  of  the  Academy)  be  kept  down,  for  a  series  of 
years,  to  a  small  number — not  more  than  sufficient  to  sup 
ply  three  officers  constantly  on  duty  with  each  company, 
and  to  give  others  for  staff  and  detached  duties  which  the 
progress  of  the  service  will,  in  five  or  seven  years,  cer 
tainly  demand." 

This  was  General  Scott's  recommendation  without 
looking  at  the  question  of  war  with  Mexico  ;  although  it 
now  appears  from  official  documents,  that  the  war  was 
then  in  the  contemplation  of  the  cabinet.  Had  the  Presi 
dent  recommended,  and  Congress  acceded  to  even  this 


MEXICANS  WILLING  TO  TREAT.  27 

small  increase  of  the  military  force,  it  may  be  doubted 
whether  the  invasion  of  Mexico,  and  the  sanguinary  bat 
tles  which  followed,  would  ever  have  occurred.  General 
Taylor's  army  would  have  been  increased  early  in  the 
spring,  and  the  Mexican  general  would,  not  improbably, 
have  refrained  from  an  attack,  to  which  he  was  tempted 
and  invited  by  the  weakness  of  the  American  force. 

In  the  autumn  previous  to  this  report,  but  after  General 
Taylor's  army  were  assembled  at  Corpus  Christi,  and 
while  war  was  apparently  inevitable,  the  President  again 
resorted  to  negotiation  by  means  of  an  indirect  cor 
respondence  with  Mr.  Black,  American  consul  at  Mex 
ico.  The  Mexican  government  was  inquired  of,1  whether 
they  would  receive  an  envoy,  "  intrusted  with  full 
powers  to  adjust  all  the  questions  in  dispute  between 
the  two  governments."  The  Mexican  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  (Manuel  De  La  Pena  Y.  Pena)  acceded 
to  this  proposition,  provided  the  mission  was  frank  and 
free,  without  the  appearance  of  coercion — and  that  the 
American  squadron,  then  off  Vera  Cruz,  was  recalled.2 
In  saying  this,  and  making  other  statements  to  the 
American  agents,  the  Mexican  cabinet  alleged,  that 
they  wished  to  avoid  irritation  in  the  people  of  Mexico ; 
and  in  fact,  intimated  that  the  existing  administration 
was,  as  to  this  point,  weak — and  feared  the  appearance 
of  yielding  too  readily  to  the  wishes  of  the  United 
States.  The  Mexican  government  desired  peace  ;  but 
feared  the  popular  excitement. 

The  cabinet  at  Washington  immediately  appointed  Mr. 

1  Mr.  Buchanan's  Letter  to  Mr.  Black,  September  17th,  1845. 
8  Mr.  Pena  Y.  Pena,  (October  18th,  1845,)  to  Mr.  Black. 


28  MR.  SLIDELL  NOT  RECEIVED. 

John  Slidell  envoy  to  Mexico.  He  arrived  at  Sacri- 
ficios  on  the  29th  of  November,1  and  hastened  to  the 
city  of  Mexico.  At  Puebla,  he  was  met  by  our  consul, 
(Mr.  Black,)  who  informed  him  that  the  Mexican  gov 
ernment  were  surprised  that  the  United  States  had  sent 
an  envoy  so  suddenly — that  they  were  not  prepared  to 
receive  him — that  he  was  not  expected  till  January — 
and  in  fine,  that  they  were  afraid  his  appearance  would 
prove  destructive  to  the  government,  and  thus  defeat 
the  intentions  of  peace.2  Mr.  Slidell  seems  not  to  have 
understood  the  obvious  position  of  the  Mexican  min 
ister,  nor  to  have  subjected  his  impatience,  in  any  degree, 
to  the  dictates  of  prudence.  He  hurried  on,  and  from 
the  6th  to  the  20th  of  December,  but  two  weeks,  ad 
dressed  three  imperative  notes  to  Mr.  Pena  Y.  Pena, 
demanding  the  consideration  of  his  credentials,  and  an 
answer  to  his  demand.  The  Mexican  administration 
was  in  instant  danger  of  dissolution,  and  desired  delay, 
that  they  might  better  secure  peace.  The  effect  of  Mr. 
Slidell's  imperative  haste  was,  to  defeat  the  peaceful 
intentions  of  the  Mexican  government,  and  hurry  it  to 
an  abrupt  denial  of  the  American  minister.  On  the  20th 
of  December,  twelve  days  from  the  date  of  his  first  note, 
Mr.  Slidell  was  officially  informed,  that  the  Mexican 
government  could  not  admit  him  "to  the  exercise  of 
the  functions  of  the  mission  conferred  on  him  by  the 
United  States  government."3  The  ground  of  the  re- 


1  Mr.  Black  to  Mr.  Buchanan,  December  18th,  1845. 
'  Mr.  Black's  Letter  to  Buchanan,  December  18th,  1845.    Slidell's  Let 
ter  to  Buchanan,  December  17th,  1845. 

s  M.  Pena  Y  Pena's  Letter  to  Slidell,  December  20th,  1845 


REASONS  GIVEN.  29 

fusal  was,  that  the  American  envoy  was  appointed  as  a 
general  and  ordinary  minister — when,  in  consequence  of 
the  interrupted  and  broken  relations  between  the  two 
nations,  he  should  have  been  appointed  a  commissioner 
to  settle  the  specific  differences  which  were  in  dispute 
between  the  countries.  The  diplomatic  correspondence, 
however,  proves  conclusively,  that  a  fear  of  impending 
revolution,  as  a  consequence  of  negotiating  with  the 
United  States,  was  hurried  to  a  premature  crisis  by  the 
untimely  importunities  of  Mr.  Slidell.  The  dreaded 
revolution  took  place,  and  in  nine  days  after,  (the  29th 
of  December,)  the  administration  of  President  Herrera 
was  overthrown.  His  successor,  PAREDES,  was  a  mili 
tary  chief— who,  on  the  2d  January,  (1846,)  was  ush 
ered  by  the  troops  into  the  capital  of  Mexico.  A  tempo 
rary  government  was  soon  formed,  of  which  General 
Almonte,  late  minister  to  the  United  States,  was  a  lead 
ing  member.1 

Mr.  Slidell  retired  to  Jalapa,  where  he  remained  till 
March,  when  under  instructions  from  the  Department  of 
State,  he  again  made  overtures  to  the  Mexican  govern 
ment.2  To  this  new  proposition,  the  Mexican  minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  (Mr.  Costillo  Y.  Lanzas)  again  re 
turned  an  unequivocal  denial.3  He  informed  the  Ameri 
can  envoy,  that  it  was  the  firm  intention  of  the  Mexican 
government  to  admit  only  a  plenipotentiary  from  the 
United  States,  clothed  "with  special  powers  to  treat 


1  Slidell  to  Buchanan,  January  14th,  1846. 
5  Slidell  to  Costillo  Y.  Lanzas,  March  1st,  1846. 
*  Costillo  Y.  Lanzas  to  Slidell,  March  12th,  1846. 
e2 


30        TROOPS  ORDERED  TO  THE  RIO  GRANDE. 

upon  the  question  of  Texas,  and  upon  this  alone  ;"  and 
that  upon  this  point  its  resolve  was  immutable.  When 
this  answer  was  returned,  the  reader  of  history  will  ob 
serve,  that  General  Taylor's  troops  had  already  taken 
position  on  the  Rio  Grande,  and  that  their  presence  there 
was  deemed,  in  Mexico,  a  new  wrong  and  injury1  to  that 
republic. 

This  letter  closed,  on  the  part  of  Mexico,  its  diplo 
matic  correspondence  with  the  United  States.  On  the 
21st  of  March,  Mr.  Costillo  Y.  Lanzas  enclosed  to  Mr. 
Slidell  his  passports  from  the  Mexican  territories. 

Long  before  this  final  refusal  of  the  Mexican  govern 
ment  to  receive  Mr.  Slidell,  the  President  of  the  United 
States  had  determined  to  take  the  initial,  and  advance 
his  troops  to  the  Rio  Grande.  On  the  20th  of  January, 
Mr.  Buchanan  informed  Mr.  Slidell,  that  the  President 
had  already  ordered  the  army  of  Texas  to  advance  and 
take  position  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rio  Grande,  and  a 
strong  fleet  to  assemble  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.2  This 
was  done  before  the  answer  of  Mr.  Pena  Y.  Pena  was 
known  at  Washington  ;  and  when  the  Mexican  govern 
ment  had  earnestly  desired  that  no  appearance  of  co 
ercion  should  be  allowed. 

The  order,  by  which  the  army  was  moved  from  Corpus 
Christi  to  the  Rio  Grande,  was  dated  January  13th, 
1846,  before  the  government  had  received  the  cor 
respondence  of  Slidell  with  Pena  Y.  Pena,  and  before 
it  knew  of  the  overthrow  of  Herrera,  and  the  accession 


1  General' Taylor's  Report,  March  8th,  1846. 
8  Buchanan  to  Slidell,  January  20th,  1846. 


GENERAL  TAYLOR'S  ORDERS.  31 

of  Paredes.1  It  suggested  to  General  Taylor  the 
"points  opposite  Metamoras  and  Mier,  and  the  vicinity 
of  Laredo,"  as  stations  for  the  American  army.2 

On  the  8th  of  March,  the  advance  column  of  the 
army  under  Colonel  Twiggs  commenced  its  march  from 
Corpus  Christi,3  and  on  the  18th,  the  whole  was  con 
centrated  near  the  banks  of  the  Arroyo  Colorado,  about 
thirty  miles  from  Metamoras.  Here  a  party  of  irregular 
Mexican  cavalry  (rancheros)  appeared  on  the  opposite 
banks,  and  signified  to  the  officer  making  a  reconnais 
sance,  that  an  attempt  to  pass  the  river  would  be  an  act 
of  hostility.4  Notwithstanding  this  notice,  the  army 
crossed  the  river  on  the  20th,  and  on  the  25th,  established 
its  position  at  Point  Isabel ;  the  buildings  of  which  the 
Mexican  prefect  attempted  to  burn,  as  he  left  the  place.5 
On  the  28th  of  March,  General  Taylor  took  his  posi 
tion  within  cannon  range  of  Metamo'ras.6  The  Mexican 
forces  in  the  town  commenced  preparing  batteries  to 
bear  on  the  American  camp ;  and  General  Taylor  also 
erected  batteries  to  command  Metamoras.  Such  was 
the  position  of  the  parties,  when  a  conference  was  held 
between  Generals  Worth  and  La  Vega  as  to  the  objects 


1  Public   Documents.     Secretary  Marcy's  Letter   to  General   Taylor, 
January  13th,  1^46. 

2  These  weie  Mexican  towns,  in  sight  of  which,  and  on  territory  claimed 
by  Mexico,  the  army  was  directed  to  take  post. 

8  General  Taylor's  Report,  March  8th,  1846. 

4  General  Taylor's  Letter,  21st  of  March,  1846 

6  General  Taylor's  Report,  March  25th. 

0  General  Taylor's  Report,  March  29th.  In  this  letter  he  states,  that, 
a  battery  of  four  pieces  had  been  so  mounted,  as  to  command  the  public 
square  of  Mttamoras 


32  WAR  UNAVOIDABLE. 

in  advancing  the  army.     The  conference  was  fruitless  of 
any  results. 

At  this  time,  it  was  obvious  to  all  intelligent  minds  that 
war  was  unavoidable.  The  crisis — to  which  the  annexa 
tion  of  Texas  clearly  pointed — had  come.  Mr.  Slidell 
had  received  his  final  rejection  from  Mr.  Costillo  Y.  Lan 
zas,  on  the  12th  of  March.  On  the  8th,  (four  days  before,) 
the  army  had  marched  from  Corpus  Christi  to  the  Rio 
Grande.  It  had  now  arrived  in  front  of  Metamoras, 
where  the  forces  of  Mexico  were  arrayed,  and  where  the 
declarations  of  officers,  the  armament  of  batteries,  and  all 
the  paraphernalia  of  martial  display,  indicated  an  instant 
conflict.  Notwithstanding  all  these  plain  indications  of 
war,  the  movements  of  the  administration  at  home  exhibit 
ed  no  symptoms  of  any  thing  but  unbroken  and  continued 
peace.  The  recommendations  of  General  Scott  for  an 
increase  of  the  army  were  disregarded.  The  President 
and  Congress  moved  placidly  on,  as  if  neither  arms  or 
money,  strength  or  blood  were  required  to  secure  its  easy 
victory  over  a  weak  and  effeminate  foe.  Some  prepara 
tions  had  heretofore  been  deemed  necessary  by  statesmen 
to  meet  the  exigencies  of  war,  even  with  very  inferior 
powers.  In  this  instance,  there  was  none.  The  official 
returns  show  that  one-half  the  entire  army  of  the  United 
States  was  in  the  corps  of  General  Taylor,  while  various 
military  posts  and  forts  in  the  northwest  and  on  the  At 
lantic,  were  entirely  deprived  of  their  garrisons  to  make 
up  the  forces  on  the  Rio  Grande.1  Even  this  army  was 
almost  totally  without  the  wagons,  animals,  and  drivers  ne 
cessary  for  common  field  transportation.  They  had  to  be 


Report  of  General  Scott     Public  Documents  of  1845. 


CAPTURE   OF  CAPTAIN  THORNTON.  33 

procured  in  the  heart  of  the  country,  at  places  near  two 
thousand  miles  from  the  scene  of  operations.1  The  march 
of  the  American  army  to  the  Rio  Grande — the  erection 
of  batteries  within  gunshot  of  Metamoras — the  appearance 
of  Mexican  parties  on  the  Arroyo  Colorado — the  notice 
by  them  that  the  passage  of  that  stream  by  the  American 
troops  would  be  considered  an  act  of  war — and  the  con 
centration  of  large  bodies  of  Mexican  troops,  known  to 
have  been  marched  to  that  vicinity — all  announced,  by  no 
uncertain  indications,  that  the  conflict  of  war  was  about 
to  commence,  and  the  annexation  of  Texas  to  be  followed 
by  its  natural  and  necessary  consequences. 

On  the  24th  of  April,  General  Arista  assumed  the  chief 
command  of  the  army  of  Mexico.  On  the  same  day 
General  Taylor  detached  a  party  of  63  dragoons  to  watch 
the  course  of  the  river  above  Metamoras.  This  party, 
under  the  command  of  Captain  Thornton,  were  watched 
by  the  Mexicans,  and  at  a  point  about  thirty  miles  from 
the  American  camp,  were  surprised  and  attacked.  After 
the  loss  of  sixteen  men  killed  and  wounded,  they  were 
compelled  to  surrender  to  the  superior  forces  of  the  Mex 
icans,  who  in  large  numbers  had  surrounded  them  in  a 
fenced  plantation  field.2  This  was  the  first  actual  fight 
of  the  war,  and  was  received  by  the  Mexicans  as  an  au 
gury  favorable,  but  fallacious  in  the  events  which  follow 
ed,  to  their  success.  General  Arista,  desirous  of  making 
a  favorable  impression,  treated  his  prisoners  with  distin 
guished  respect  and  kindness. 


1  See  the  Letter  of  Colonel  Cross,  dated  November  23d,  1845,  detailing 
the  fact,  that  the  army  had  no  means  of  field  transportation  whatever. — 
Public  Doc.  119,  29th  Congress. 

*  Captain  Hardee's  Report,  April  26th,  1846.— Pub.  Doc.  119. 
3 


34  ATTACK  ON  FORT  BROWN. 

Three  days  after  this  affair,  the  camp  of  Captain  Walk 
er's  Texan  Rangers  was  surprised,  and  several  killed  and 
wounded.1  This  was  between  Point  Isabel  and  Meta- 
moras.  In  the  mean  while,  it  was  ascertained  that  a  large 
body  of  the  Mexican  army  had  crossed  the  river  (Rio 
Grande)  above,2  and  that  another  corps  was  about  to  cross 
below.  General  Taylor  was  convinced  that  the  object  ol 
attack  was  Point  Isabel,  which  had  been  left  in  care  of  a 
small  detachment,  and  where  a  large  depot  of  provisions 
invited  the  enemy.  Leaving  an  unfinished  field-work, 
under  the  command  of  Major  Brown,  and  garrisoned  by 
the  7th  infantry,  with  Lowd's  and  Bragg's  companies  of 
artillery,  he  marched  for  Point  Isabel  on  the  1st  of  May, 
with  his  main  force,  and  arrived  on  the  next  day. 

The  departure  of  General  Taylor  with  his  army,  fur 
nished  the  enemy  in  Metamoras  with  the  opportunity  for  a 
safe  attack  on  Fort  Brown.  At  five  in  the  morning  of  the 
3d  of  May,  a  heavy  bombardment  was  commenced  from 
the  batteries  in  Metamoras,  and  continued  at  intervals  till 
the  10th,  when  the  gallant  defenders  of  the  fort  were  re 
lieved.  In  this  defence,  Major  Brown,  Captain  Hawkins, 
and  Captain  Mansfield  were  greatly  distinguished,  both 
for  skill  and  gallantry.  The  former  was  killed  by  a  shell, 
and  the  defence  was  vigorously  continued  by  Captain 
Hawkins.  Captain  Mansfield  was  an  engineer  officer, 
under  whose  direction  the  fort  was  built,  and  by  whose 
skilful  conduct  the  defences  were  increased  and  strength 
ened  during  the  siege.3 

The  siege  of  Fort  Brown  was  raised  by  the  arrival  of 

1  General  Taylor's  Report,  May  3d,  1846.  Captain  Walker  was  iiot 
present.  a  Same.— Pub.  Doc.  119. 

8   Ueports  oi  Major  Browu,  Captain  Hawkins,  and  General  Taylor. 


FORT  BROWN  RELIEVED.  35 

the  victorious  army  of  Taylor,  which  had  just  fought  the 
battles  of  Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  de  la  Palma.  It  appears 
that  General  Arista,  who  was  now  in  command  of  the 
Mexican  army,  had  assembled  in  all  about  eight  thousand 
men  at  Metamoras,  and  being  well  advised  of  the  strength 
of  the  American  forces,  thought  the  time  had  arrived  for 
a  decisive  blow.  The  capture  of  Captain  Thornton's 
party  had  also  emboldened  the  Mexican  troops.  Arista 
saw  that  Point  Isabel,  the  depot  of  large  quantities  of 
provisions  and  military  munitions,  was  comparatively  de 
fenceless.  To  take  this  place  would,  therefore,  both  cut 
off  the  supplies  of  Taylor's  army,  and  leave  it  isolated  in 
the  heart  of  the  enemy's  country.  The  plan  of  Arista 
was  to  cross  the  Rio  Grande,  get  in  the  rear  of  General 
Taylor's  army,  capture  Point  Isabel,  and  then  fall  on  the 
American  army.1  The  plan  was  judicious,  and  was  only 
prevented  from  being  carried  out,  by  the  accidental  infor 
mation  brought  to  General  Taylor  by  one  of  Thornton's 
party — sent  in  by  the  Mexican  commander  !2  The  rapid 
return  of  the  army  to  Point  Isabel  was  a  consequence  of 
this  information,  and  the  additional  fact  that  the  enemy 
was  preparing  to  cross  below.  Either  the  Mexican  army 
was  dilatory  in  its  movement,  or  the  body  detailed  to 
cross  below  was  unable  to  form  a  junction,  for  the  forces  of 
Taylor  reached  the  depot  at  Isabel  without  encountering 
the  enemy. 

Having  obtained  the  object  of  his  expedition,  and  gar 
risoned  the  depot  with  new  troops,  the  American  general 

1  This  is  an  inference  from  the  facts  stated  by  General  Taylor. 
a  General  Taylor  states  in  his  letter  of  May  3d,  that  in  consequence  of 
the  deficiency  in  light  troops,  he  was  "  kept  ignorant"  of  the   eueuiv's 


,'U)  BATTLE   OF  PALO  ALTO. 

commenced  his  return  to  Fort  Brown  on  the  7th  of  May, 
<\  week  after  his  departure.  The  army  was  accompanied 
by  a  train  of  wagons,  and  encamped  at  night  about  seven 
miles  from  Isabel.  The  next  day  (the  8th)  the  march 
was  resumed,  and  at  noon  the  enemy  was  discovered 
drawn  up  in  battle  array  upon  a  prairie  three  miles  from 
the  Palo  Alto.  The  army  was  halted,  and  the  men  re 
freshed  at  a  pool.  The  line  was  formed  in  two  wings. 
The  right,  commanded  by  Colonel  Twiggs,  was  composed 
of  the  5th  Infantry,  Colonel  Mclntosh  ;  3d  Infantry,  Cap 
tain  Morris  ;  4th  Infantry,  Major  Allen  ;  Ringgold's  Light 
Artillery ;  two  eighleen-pounders  under  Lt.  Churchill ; 
and  two  squadrons  of  Dragoons  under  Captains  Ker  and 
May.  The  left  wing,  under  the  command  of  Lt.  Colonel 
Belknap,  was  formed  by  a  battalion  of  Artillery,  Colonel 
Childs,  Captain  Duncan's  Light  Artillery,  and  the  8th 
Infantry,  under  Captain  Montgomery.  The  train  was  left 
in  the  rear,  protected  by  a  guard. 

At  two  P.  M.,  the  army  advanced  by  heads  of  columns, 
till  the  Mexican  cannon  opened  upon  them,  when  they 
were  deployed  into  line,  and  Ringgold's  Light  Artillery 
on  the  right,  poured  forth  its  rapid  and  deadly  fire  on  the 
enemy.  The  Mexican  cavalry,  mostly  Lancers,  were  on 
their  left,  arid  were  forced  back  by  the  destructive  dis 
charges  of  artillery.  To  remedy  this,  General  Arista  or 
dered  Torrejon,  general  of  cavalry,  to  charge  the  American 
right.  This  he  did,  but  was  met  by  the  Flying  Artillery, 
under  Lt.  Ridgely,  and  by  the  5th  Infantry.  The  Lan 
cers  were  again  driven  back.  At  this  period  the  prairie 
grass  was  set  on  fire,  and  under  cover  of  its  smoke  the 
Americans  advanced  to  the  position  just  occupied  by  the 
Mexican  cavalry.  Again  a  Mexican  division  of  Lancers 


MAJOR  RINGGOLD  WOUNDED.  37 

charged,  under  the  command  of  Col.  Montero,1  but  with 
as  little  success.  The  continuous  fire  of  artillery  disor 
dered  and  drove  back  the  enemy's  columns.  On  the  left 
wing  of  our  army,  attacks  of  the  Mexicans  were  met  by 
Duncan's  battery,  and  by  other  troops  of  that  division. 
The  combat  on  our  side  was  chiefly  carried  on  by  artil 
lery  ;  and  never  was  there  a  more  complete  demonstration 
of  the  superior  skill  and  energy  of  that  Arm  of  service,  as 
conducted  by  the  accomplished  graduates  of  West-Point. 
He  who  was  the  life  and  leader  of  the  Light  Artillery, 
— MAJOR  RINGGOLD — was  in  this  engagement  mortally 
wounded,  and  died  in  a  few  days. 

The  battle  terminated  with  the  possession,  by  the 
Americans,  of  the  field,  and  the  retreat  during  the  night 
of  the  Mexicans.  Arista,  dating  his  despatch,  says,  "  in 
sight  of  the  enemy,  at  night."  This  might  be  true  ;  but 
he  was  in  retreat,  and  took  a  new  position  several  miles 
off,  at  Resaca  de  la  Palma.  A  ravine  here  crossed  the 
road,  and  on  either  side  it  was  skirted  with  dense  thickets. 
This  ravine  was  occupied  by  the  Mexican  artillery.  The 
position  was  well  chosen  ;  and  with  troops  better  skilled 
in  the  use  of  artillery,  and  with  greater  energy  of  body, 
might  have  easily  been  defended. 

General  Taylor  had  encamped  on  the  field  of  battle, 
from  which  he  did  not  depart  till  two  p.  M.  the  next  day. 
In  two  hours,  the  American  army  carne  in  sight  of  the 
Mexican  array.  The  dispositions  of  our  troops  were  soon 
made.  A  battery  of  artillery,  under  Lt.  Ridgely,  moved 
up  the  main  road,  while  the-  3d,  4th,  and  5th  Regiments 
of  Infantry  deployed  on  either  flank  to  support  it  and  act 


1  Arista's  Despatch. 


3  BATTLE  OF  RESACA  DE  LA  PALMA. 

as  skirmishers.  The  action  commenced  by  the  fire  of  the 
Mexican  artillery,  which  was  returned  by  Ridgely's  bat 
tery  and  by  the  infantry  on  the  wings.  In  this  firing,  the 
Mexican  cannon  were  well  managed  by  Generals  La  Vega 
and  Requena,  and  the  effect  began  to  be  severely  felt  on 
the  American  lines.  It  was  necessary  to  dislodge  them  ; 
and  this  duty  was  assigned  to  Captain  May  of  the  Dra 
goons.  It  was  here  that  this  officer  became  so  distin 
guished.  The  charge  was  gallantly  made.  The  Dragoons 
cut  through  the  enemy.  The  artillerymen  were  dispersed, 
and  General  La  Vega  taken  prisoner.  The  Dragoons, 
however,  had  advanced  beyond  support,  and  in  turn  fell 
back  on  the  main  body.  The  regiments  of  infantry  now 
charged  the  Mexican  line,  and  the  battle  was  soon  ended. 
Their  columns,  now  broken  by  successive  charges,  were 
unable  to  bear  the  continued  and  well-directed  fire  poured 
upon  them  by  both  infantry  and  artillery.  They  fled  pre 
cipitately  from  the  field,  and  were  rapidly  pursued  by  the 
American  rearguard.  The  Mexicans  lost  many  prisoners, 
and  ceased  not  their  flight  till  they  either  crossed  or  were 
overwhelmed  in  the  waters  of  the  Rio  Grande.  In  these 
engagements  neither  cowardice  nor  feebleness  was  attribu 
ted  to  them.  They  fought  gallantly,  behaved  well,  and  were 
only  conquered  by  that  union  of  physical  strength,  and 
superior  skill,  with  which  some  nations  are  fortunately 
gifted,  by  the  natural  influence  of  climate  and  the  artificial 
developments  of  science. 

In  these  engagements  the  commander  of  the  American 
forces,  General  Zachary  Taylor,  displayed  the  utmost 
coolness  and  bravery — exposing  himself  in  the  most  dan 
gerous  positions,  and  encouraging  the  troops  by  his  heroic 
example.  After  the  battles  were  ended,  his  attention  to 


GEN.  TAYLOR'S  DESPATCHES.  39 

the  wounded  and  the  dying,  whether  friend  or  foe,  evinced 
that  sympathy  with  suffering  humanity  which  is  ever  in 
separable  from  true  courage. 

We  here  insert  the  official  report : 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  OCCUPATION,  ) 

Camp  at  Palo  Alto,  Texas,  May  9,  1846.  $ 

SIR  : — I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  I  was  met  near  this 
place  yesterday,  on  my  march  from  Point  Isabel,  by  the 
Mexican  forces,  and  after  an  action  of  about  five  hours,  dis 
lodged  them  from  their  position,  and  encamped  upon  the  field. 
Our  artillery,  consisting  of  two  18-pounders  and  two  light 
batteries,  was  the  arm  chiefly  engaged,  and  to  the  excellent 
manner  in  which  it  was  manoeuvred  and  served  is  our  suc 
cess  mainly  due. 

The  strength  of  the  enemy  is  believed  to  have  been  about 
six  thousand  men,  with  seven  pieces  of  artillery,  and  eight 
hundred  cavalry.  His  loss  is  probably  at  least  one  hundred 
killed.  Our  strength  did  not  exceed,  all  told,  twenty-three 
hundred,  while  our  loss  was  comparatively  trifling — four  men 
killed,  three  officers  and  thirty-seven  men  wounded,  several 
of  the  latter  mortally.  T  regret  to  say  that  Major  Ringgold, 
3d  artillery,  and  Captain  Paige.  4th  infantry,  are  severely 
wounded.  Lieut.  Luther,  2d  artillery,  slightly  so. 

The  enemy  has  fallen  back,  and  it  is  believed  has  repassed 
the  river.  I  have  advanced  parties  now  thrown  forward  in 
his  direction,  and  shall  move  the  main  body  immediately. 

In  the  haste  of  this  first  report,  I  can  only  say  that  the 
officers  and  men  behaved  in  the  most  admirable  manner 
throughout  the  action.  I  shall  have  the  pleasure  of  making 
8  more  detailed  report  when  those  of  the  different  commanders 
shall  be  received. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

Z.  TAYLOR, 
Brevet  Brigadier-general,  U.  S.  A.  Commanding. 


40  GEN.  TAYLOR'S  DESPATCHES. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  OCCUPATION,          } 

Camp  at  Resaca  de  la  Pahna,  3  miles  from  Matamoras,  > 

10  o'clock,  P.  M.— May  9,  1846.      ) 

SIR  : — I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  I  marched  with  the 
main  body  of  the  army  at  2  o'clock  to-day,  having  previously 
thrown  forward  a  body  of  light  infantry  into  the  forest, 
which  covers  the  Matamoras  road.  When  near  the  spot 
where  I  am  now  encamped,  my  advance  discovered  that  a 
ravine  crossing  the  road  had  been  occupied  by  the  enemy 
with  artillery.  I  immediately  ordered  a  battery  of  field 
artillery  to  sweep  the  position,  flanking  and  sustaining  it  by 
the  3d,  4th,  and  5th  regiments,  deployed  as  skirmishers  to  the 
right  and  left.  A  heavy  fire  of  artillery  and  of  musketry 
was  kept  up  for  some  time,  until  finally  the  enemy's  batteries 
were  carried  in  succession  by  a  squadron  of  dragoons  and  the 
regiments  of  infantry  that  were  on  the  ground.  He  was  soon 
driven  from  his  position,  and  pursued  by  a  squadron  of  dra 
goons,  battalion  of  artillery,  3d  infantry,  and  a  light  battery, 
to  the  river.  Our  victory  has  been  complete.  Eight  pieces 
of  artillery,  with  a  great  quantity  of  ammunition,  three 
standards,  and  some  one  hundred  prisoners  have  been  taken ; 
among  the  latter,  Gen.  La  Vega,  and  several  other  officers. 
One  general  is  understood  to  have  been  killed.  The  enemy 
has  recrossed  the  river,  and  I  am  sure  will  not  again  molest 
us  on  this  bank. 

The  loss  of  the  enemy  in  killed  has  been  most  severe. 
Our  own  has  been  very  heavy,  and  I  deeply  regret  to  report 
that  Lieut.  Inge,  2d  dragoons,  Lieut.  Cochrane,  4th  infantry, 
and  Lieut.  Chadbourne,  8th  infantry,  were  killed  on  the 
field.  Lieut.  Col.  Payne,  4th  artillery,  Lieut.  Col.  Mclntosh, 
Lieut.  Dobbins,  3d  infantry,  Capt.  Hooe,  and  Lieut.  Fowler, 
5th  infantry,  and  Capt.  Montgomery,  Lieuts.  Gates,  Selden, 
McClay,  Burbank  and  Jordan,  8th  infantry,  were  wounded. 
The  extent  of  our  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  is  not  yet  ascer 
tained,  and  is  reserved  for  a  more  detailed  report. 


41 

The  affair  of  to-day  may  be  regarded  as  a  proper  supple 
ment  to  the  cannonade  of  yesterday ;  and  the  two  taken  to 
gether,  exhibit  the  coolness  and  gallantry  of  our  officers  and 
men  in  the  most  favorable  light.  All  have  done  their  duty, 
and  done  it  nobly.  It  will  be  my  pride  in  a  more  circum 
stantial  report  of  both  actions,  to  dwell  upon  particular  in 
stances  of  individual  distinction. 

It  affords  me  peculiar  pleasure  to  report  that  the  field-work 
opposite  Matamoras  has  sustained  itself  handsomely  during  a 
cannonade  and  bombardment  of  168  hours.  But  the  pleasure 
is  alloyed  with  profound  regret  at  the  loss  of  its  heroic  and 
indomitable  commander,  Major  Brown,  who  died  to-day  from 
the  effect  of  a  shell.  His  loss  would  be  a  severe  one  to  the 
service  at  any  time,  but  to  the  army  under  my  orders,  it  is 
indeed  irreparable.  One  officer  and  one  non-commissioned 
officer  killed,  and  ten  men  wounded,  comprise  all  the  casual 
ties  incident  to  this  severe  bombardment. 

I  inadvertently  omitted  to  mention  the  capture  of  a  large 
number  of  pack  mules  left  in  the  Mexican  camp. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

Z.  TAYLOR, 
Brevet  Brigadier-general,  U.  S.  Army  Commanding. 

[ORDERS  No.  59.] 

1.  The  commanding  general  congratulates  the  army  under 
his  command  upon  the  signal  success  which  has  crowned  its 
recent  operations  against  the  enemy.  The  coolness  and 
steadiness  of  the  troops  during  the  action  of  the  8th,  and  the 
brilliant  impetuosity  with  which  the  enemy's  position  and  ar 
tillery  were  carried  on  the  9th,  have  displayed  the  best 
qualities  of  the  American  soldier.  To  every  officer  and 
soldier  of  his  command  the  general  publicly  returns  his 
thanks  for  the  noble  manner  in  which  they  have  sustained 
the  honor  of  the  service  and  of  the  country.  While  the  main 
body  of  the  army  has  been  thus  actively  employed,  the  gar- 
D2 


42  GEN.  TAYLOR'S  DESPATCHES. 

rison  left  opposite  Matamoras  has  rendered  no  less  distin 
guished  service  by  sustaining  a  severe  cannonade  and  bom 
bardment  of  many  successive  days.  The  army  and  the 
country,  while  justly  rejoicing  in  this  triumph  of  our  arms, 
will  deplore  the  loss  of  many  brave  officers  and  men  who  fell 
gallantly  in  the  hour  of  combat. 

2.  It  being  necessary  for  the  commanding  general  to  visit 
Point  Isabel  on  public  business,  Colonel  Twiggs  will  assume 
command  of  the  corps  of  the  army  near  Matamoras,  including 
the  garrison  of  the  field-work.  He  will  occupy  the  former 
lines  of  the  army,  making  such  dispositions  for  defence  and 
for  the  comfort  of  his  command  as  he  may  deem  advisable. 
He  will  hold  himself  strictly  on  the  defensive  until  the  return 
of  the  commanding  general. 

By  order  of  Brigadier-general  Taylor. 

W.  W.  J.  BLISS,  Act.  Adjutant  General. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OP  OCCUPATION, 

POINT  ISABEL,  Texas,  May  12,  1846. 

SIR  : — I  am  making  a  hasty  visit  to  this  place,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  having  an  interview  with  Commodore  Connor,  whose 
squadron  is  now  at  anchor  off  the  harbor,  and  arranging  with 
him  a  combined  movement  up  the  river.  I  avail  myself  of 
the  brief  time  at  my  command  to  report  that  the  main  body 
of  the  army  is  now  occupying  its  former  position  opposite 
Matamoras.  The  Mexican  forces  are  almost  disorganized, 
and  I  shall  lose  no  time  in  investing  Matamoras,  and  opening 
the  navigation  of  the  river. 

I  regret  to  report  that  Major  Ringgold  died  the  morning  of 
the  llth  inst.,  of  the  severe  wounds  received  in  the  action  of 
Palo  Alto.  With  the  exception  of  Capt.  Paige,  whose  wound 
is  dangerous,  the  other  wounded  officers  are  doing  well.  In 
my  report  of  the  second  engagement,  I  accidentally  omitted 
the  name  of  Lieut.  Dobbins,  3d  infantry,  among  the  officers 
slightly  wounded,  and  desire  that  the  omission  may  be  sup 
plied  in  the  despatch  itself.  I  am  under  the  painful  necessity 
of  reporting  that  Lieut.  Blake,  topographical  engineers,  after 
rendering  distinguished  service  in  my  staff  during  the  affair 


GEN.   TAYLOR  S  DESPATCHES.  43 

of  the  8th  inst.,  accidentally  shot  himself  with  a  pistol  on  the 
following  day,  and  expired  before  night. 

It  has  been  quite  impossible  as  yet  to  furnish  detailed  re 
ports  of  our  engagements  with  the  enemy,  or  even  accurate 
returns  of  the  killed  and  wounded.  Our  loss  is  not  far  from 
3  officers  and  40  men  killed,  and  13  officers  and  100  men 
wounded ;  while  that  of  the  enemy  has  in  all  probability  ex 
ceeded  300  killed  ;  more  than  200  have  been  buried  by  us 
on  the  two  fields  of  battle. 

I  have  exchanged  a  sufficient  number  of  prisoners  to  re 
cover  the  command  of  Captain  Thornton.  The  wounded 
prisoners  have  been  sent  to  Matamoras — the  wounded  officers 
on  their  parole.  General  La  Vega  and  a  few  other  officers 
have  been  sent  to  New  Orleans,  having  declined  a  parole, 
and  will  be  reported  to  Maj.  Gen.  Gaines.  I  am  not  con 
versant  with  the  usages  of  war  in  such  cases,  and  beg  that 
such  provision  may  be  made  for  these  prisoners  as  may  be 
authorized  by  law.  Our  own  prisoners  have  been  treated 
with  great  kindness  by  the  Mexican  officers. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

Z.  TAYLOR, 
Brevet  Brigadier-general,  U.  S.  A.  Commanding. 

The  RESULT  of  these  battles,  however,  was  fatal.  The 
Mexican  republic  lost  all  power,  either  present  or  future,  of 
retaining  one  foot  of  that  vast  territorial  empire  which  they 
once  held  east  of  the  Rio  Grande.  The  conquerors  were 
tempted,  in  the  flush  of  victory,  to  carry  their  arms  beyond 
that  melancholy  river  ; — to  seek  for  glory  in  conquests  ; 
— to  find  the  gratification  of  dominion  in  foreign  lands  ; — 
— to  indulge  the  rapacious  lust  of  power  ; — to  leave  fields 
fertile  in  blessings  for  others  fertile  only  in  blood  ; — and 
finally,  to  make  it  uncertain  whether  even  the  best  of  Re 
publics  can  resist  the  universal  tendency  of  man  to  build 
up  Empires — by  the  destruction  of  Justice. 


44  PRESIDENT'S  MESSAGE. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Action  of  Congress. — Declaration  of  the  President. — Legislation. — General 
Scott's  Views  of  the  War. — His  Comments  on  the  Plan  of  Campaign. 
— His  Correspondence  with  Secretary  Marcy. — The  Grounds  for  his 
Opinions. — Is  ordered  to  remain  at  Washington. 

THE  news  of  the  capture  of  Captain  Thornton's  party 
was  received  with  great  surprise  by  the  nation,  and  the 
government.  Notwithstanding  all  the  acts  of  the  United 
States  and  Mexico,  both  diplomatic  and  legislative,  during 
the  previous  four  years,  had  tended  to  this  and  no  other 
result ;  and  notwithstanding  General  Taylor  had  been 
ordered  to  the  Rio  Grande  with  four  thousand  regular 
troops,  yet  neither  people  nor  President  seem  to  have 
realized  that  war  was  actually  near  at  hand.  They  appear 
to  have  relied  upon  some  invisible  Providence  to  prevent 
a  catastrophe,  which  to  a  reasonable  mind,  and  especially 
to  one  imbued  with  the  spirit  of  a  statesman,  seemed 
inevitable.1 

The  intelligence  of  hostilities  on  the  Rio  Grande,  was 
therefore  received  with  astonishment,  and  for  a  time 
occasioned  a  powerful  excitement.  Congress  was  then  in 
session,  and  the  President  immediately  sent  in  an  ex 
traordinary  Message.2  In  this,  he  declared  that  the 


1  Mr.  Clay  declared  in  the  canvass  of  1844,  that  the  annexation  of 
Texas  was  equivalent  to  a  war  with  Mexico,  and  that  war  must  follow 
*  President's  Message,  dated  the  llth  of  May,  1846. 


PRESIDENT'S  MESSAGE.  45 

Mexican  government  had  "  at  last  invaded  our  territory, 
and  shed  the  blood  of  our  fellow-citizens  on  our  own  soil" 
In  the  same  Message,  and  in  the  paragraph  immediately 
following,  he  stated  that  Mr.  Slidell  was  sent  to  Mexico 
with  full  powers  to  adjust  all  the  questions  in  dispute  be 
tween  the  two  governments,  "  both  the  questions  of  the 
Texas  boundary,  and  of  indemnification  to  our  citizens." 
The  boundary  in  dispute  was  the  western  boundary  of 
Texas  only,  and  hence  this  was  a  clear  admission,  that 
the  territory  adjacent  was  in  dispute,  and  was  not  our 
soil,  till  the  question  of  boundary  was  settled. 

Congress,  however,  with  less  than  two  days'  delibera 
tion,  adopted  the  declaration  of  the  President,  and  de 
clared  that,  "  by  the  act  of  the  Republic  of  Mexico,  a 
state  of  war  exists  between  that  government  and  the 
United  States."  At  the  same  time,  that  body  authorized 
the  President  to  accept  the  services  of  fifty  thousand 
volunteers,  and  placed  ten  millions  of  dollars  at  his  dis 
posal.  The  intention  was  to  put  an  end  to  the  war,  by  a 
vigorous  effort  and  decisive  victories.  The  President 
declared  that  in  his  opinion,  "  the  immediate  appearance 
in  arms  of  a  large  and  overpowering  force,"  would  be  the 
best  means  of  producing  peace.1 

Just  two  days  before  this  declaration,  the  decisive 
battle  of  Resaca  de  la  Palma  had  been  fought,  and  the 
army  of  Arista  pursued  beyond  the  Rio  Grande.  We  are 
now  to  see  what  plans  the  government  had  formed  for  the 
further  prosecution  of  the  war. 


1  The  term  most  commonly  used  to  express  this  idea  was  "  to  conquer 
a  peace."  The  original  authorship  of  this  phrase  appears  to  belong  to  the 
poet  Coleridge. — See  Cottle's  Reminiscences. 


46  PLANS  FOR  THE   WAR. 

At  this  time,  General  Scott,  as  commander  of  the  army, 
was  stationed  at  Washington,  engaged  in  arranging  and 
superintending  the  various  staff  duties  of  the  army.  He 
would  be  naturally  consulted  on  the  plans  to  be  formed, 
and  the  means  to  execute  them.  This  was  the  case.  Im 
mediately  after  the  act  of  Congress  of  the  13th  of  May  was 
passed,  he  was  invited  to  call  upon  the  President,  who  in 
that  interview  informed  him  that  it  was  his  determination 
to  assign  him  the  command  of  the  army  in  Mexco.1  From 
that  moment,  he  was  busily  engaged  in  the  necessary 
arrangements  to  carry  into  effect  the  views  and  instruc 
tions  of  the  President.  He  was  employed  fourteen  hours 
a  day  in  all  those  various  duties  which  pertain  to  the 
movements,  supplies,  equipage,  direction,  and  objects  of 
the  army.  No  one  can  imagine  the  magnitude  of  these 
labors,  their  responsibility  or  importance,  who  does  not 
reflect,  that  the  geography,  climate,  military  armament, 
means  of  supply,  in  fine,  the  whole  detail  of  the  physical 
and  social  condition  of  Mexico,  were  almost  utterly  un 
known  in  the  United  States,  and  that  information  on  these 
topics  had  to  be  obtained  by  inquiry  and  study,  before 
even  a  general  of  the  army  could  make  prudent  military 
arrangements.  The  Rio  Grande  was  assumed  by  the 
government,  as  the  base  line  of  military  operations  from 
the  beginning.  Yet  this  river  was  itself  not  less  than 
seven  hundred  miles  from  the  Mississippi  river,  separated 
by  lands  so  unproductive,  and  so  sparsely  populated,  as  to 
be  incapable  of  supporting  either  man  or  beast  on  the 
extended  scale  required  by  the  operations  of  war.  x  The 


1   Marcy's  Letter  to  the   President,  published  iu  the  Public  Documents 
of  1846. 


WAR  RECOGNISED  BY  CONGRESS.  47 

Mississippi  then  became  the  true  and  real  base  of  supply 
and  movement,  and  New  Orleans  the  great  depot  for  pro 
visions  and  armament.  From  this  point,  General  Scott 
had  to  calculate  the  march  and  support  of  an  army  whose 
field  embraced  Texas  and  California,  the  Rocky  Moun 
tains  and  the  Sierra  Madre  ;  the  cold  regions  of  eternal 
snow,  and  those  sunburnt  climes  where  snow  was  never 
known!  To  prepare  the  clothing  and  guard  the  health 
of  troops  who  were  to  visit  regions  on  the  one  side  swept 
over  by  the  frosty  air  of  health,  and  on  the  other  filled 
with  the  pestilence  which  walketh  in  darkness  !  To  make 
these  plans  and  arrangements  required  skill,  sagacity, 
labor,  and  experience.  The  duties,  services,  and  know 
ledge  acquired  in  his  previous  life,  amply  qualified  General 
Scott  for  this  duty ;  and  that  he  performed  it  well,  is  now  uni 
versally  acknowledged  by  the  people  and  the  government. 

Congress  had  declared  that  *'  war  existed"  on  the  13th 
of  May.  The  armies  were  then  in  conflict  on  the  Rio 
Grande,  and  it  was  known  that  the  American  force  was 
much  inferior  in  number,  while  their  base  of  supply  was 
seven  hundred  miles  distant.  Not  a  moment  was  to  be 
lost.  The  plan  of  the  campaign  must  be  instantly  formed  ; 
the  volunteers  must  be  hurried  into  the  field  ;  and  what 
was  another  and  yet  greater  difficulty,  an  army  larger 
than  the  American  Republic  had  yet  raised  at  one  time, 
must  be  supplied  in  the  course  of  a  few  weeks,  with  the 
armament,  equipment,  provisions,  and  means  of  transporta 
tion  necessary  to  maintain  that  army  actively  in  the  field. 
This  was  the  task  which  now  devolved  on  the  executive 
officers  of  the  government,  and  especially  upon  those  of 
the  military  department. 

The  plan  of  the  campaign  in  Mexico  for  the  year  1846, 


48  PLAN   OF  THE   CAMPAIGN. 

seems  to  have  been  arranged  jointly,  by  consultations  be 
tween  the  President,  Secretary  at  War,  and  General  Scott. 
What  share  either  had  in  any  particular  plan,  we  have 
now  no  means  of  knowing.  The  fact  of  such  consulta 
tions  is  disclosed  in  the  correspondence  of  the  War  De 
partment.1 

Two  days  only  after  the  declaration  of  Congress,  the 
plan  of  the  campaign  had  been  completed — the  requisi 
tions  on  the  governors  of  states  determined  upon — and 
General  Scott  issued  to  the  chief  of  the  General  Staff  at 
Washington,  his  memoranda  relative  to  transportation. 
On  his  order,  the  immediate  movements  of  the  army 
depended.  The  following  extracts  are  taken  from  the 
"  Memoranda."'2 

"  An  army  of  some  twenty  odd  thousand  men,  reg 
ulars  and  volunteers,  including  the  troops  already  in 
Texas,  is  about  to  be  directed  against  Mexico,  in  several 
columns. 

"For  the  numbers  of  troops,  yet  to  be  sent  into 
Texas,  the  rendezvous  or  points  of  departure,  and  the 
routes  of  march  thither,  each  chief  of  the  General  Staff 
will  obtain  the  information  needful  to  his  particular  depart 
ment,  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  calls  upon  the  governors 
of  the  several  states,  and  from  the  Adjutant-General. 

"  Arms,  accoutrements,  ammunition,  and  camp  equip 
age,  must  be  thrown  in  advance  upon  the  several  rendez 
vous  or  points  of  departure,  unless  depots  or  arsenals 


1  Appendix  to  the  Congressional  Globe,  1845-6,  pages  649-51,  Message 
of  the  President,  Letters  of  Scott  and  Marcy. 

2  Public  Documents,  29th  Congress,  2d  Session,  number  119. 


INSTRUCTION  TO  CHIEFS  OF  THE  STAFF.  49 

should  be  in  the  routes  which  may  be  given  to  volun 
teers. 

"  Subsistence  will  also  be  thrown  in  advance  upon  the 
several  rendezvous  given,  and  as  far  as  practicable,  on 
the  several  routes  thence  to  be  given  to  both  regulars 
and  volunteers.  Hard  bread  and  bacon,  (side-pieces  or 
middlings,)  are  suggested  and  recommended  for  marches, 
both  on  account  of  health  and  comparative  lightness  of 
transportation.  On  many  of  the  routes,  it  is  supposed 
that  beef  cattle  may  be  obtained  in  tolerable  abundance. 

"  With  the  means  of  transportation  by  water  and  land, 
according  to  the  several  routes  to  be  given  to  the  troops, 
and  on  land,  whether  wagons  or  pack-mules,  or  both 
wheels  and  packs,  the  Quartermaster-General  will  charge 
himself  at  once,  and  as  fast  as  the  necessary  data  can 
be  settled  or  known. 

"  For  marches  by  land,  a  projet  for  the  means  of 
transportation,  by  company,  battalion,  or  regiment,  ac 
cording  to  route,  is  requested,  as  a  general  plan.  The 
means  of  transportation  on  and  beyond  the  Rio  Grande — 
using  for  the  latter  purpose  those  which  may  accompany 
the  troops — will  require  a  particular  study  ;  but  boats  for 
transporting  supplies  on  that  river,  should  be  early  pro 
vided — assuming  the  depth  of  water  to  a  certain  height 
(up  the  river)  at  three  or  three  and  a  half  feet,  and  to 
another  distance,  higher  up,  at  two  and  a  half  feet." 

This  "  Memoranda"  immediately  set  the  Staff  officers 
and  the  subordinates  in  motion,  and  notwithstanding  the 
government  had  provided  nothing  previously  for  the  ex 
traordinary  emergencies  of  war, — yet  so  well  skilled 
and  judicious  were  the  officers  of  the  Staff  of  the  army, 
that  it  may  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  remarkable  fea- 
E  4 


50 

tures  of  the  war — that  twenty  thousand  men  could  be 
put  in  motion,  fed,  equipped,  and  marched  with  so  much 
rapidity  and  effect  over  thousands  of  miles,  for  the  most 
part  of  barren  territory.1  These  "  Memoranda"  of  Scott 
were  dated  the  15th  of  May,  and  on  the  1st  of  August, 
all  the  foot  regiments  of  the  volunteer  army  had  been 
mustered  into  service,  marched  several  thousand  miles, 
and  assembled  on  the  Rio  Grande.2 

The  views  of  General  Scott  at  this  time,  as  to  the  num 
ber  of  the  army,  and  the  service  it  was  required  to  perform, 
in  order  to  conquer  a  peace,  were  fully  expressed  in  his 
letter  to  Secretary  Marcy,  dated  the  21st  of  May.3  In 
that  document  he  says,  and  it  was  admitted  by  the  Presi 
dent,  that  a  "special  army  of  some  thirty  thousand  regulars 
and  twelve  months'  volunteers,"  would  be  necessary  to 
march  against  Mexico  ;4  and  that  such  an  army  (espe 
cially  the  horse  regiments)  could  not  be  assembled  and 
ready  for  service  much  before  the  1st  of  September; 
that  in  the  mean  time,  (from  June  to  September,)  the 
rainy  season  occurred,  and  would  unfit  the  horses  in 
that  country  for  active  service ;  and  that  finally,  to  pro- 


1  The  extensive  correspondence  of  the  Quartermaster-General's  depart 
ment  proves,  that   much   was  due  to  the  energies   of  General  Jesup, 
Colonels  Hunt  and  Cross,  Majors  Whiting  and  Tompkins,  and  other  officers 
of  the  service. 

2  Public  Document  119,  2d  Session  of  29th  Congress;  Taylor's  Letter 
of  the  30th  July,  1846. 

3  Appendix  to  Congressional  Globe,  1845-6,  page  650. 

4  It  will  be  observed  here,  that  the  thirty  thousand  effective  men  re 
quired  by  Scott,  were  never  in  service  at  one  time  during  the  campaign 
of  r846.     The  regulars  were  less  than  7000,  and  the  twenty-four  regi 
ments  of  volunteers  made  but  18,000— in  all  25,000. 


SCOTT'S  VIEWS  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN.  51 

duce  a  peace  by  the  operations  of  war, — regular,  in 
cessant,  forward  movements  were  necessary.  Subse 
quent  events  proved,  that  each  and  all  these  positions 
were  strictly  correct.  The  army  was  not  ready  for  a 
march  against  Mexico  till  the  first  of  September ;  and 
because  it  was  not  kept  up  to  ihefull  amount  of  effective 
men  required,  (for  it  was  rapidly  diminished  by  sick 
ness,)  it  could  not  make  incessant,  forward  movements, 
and  thus  it  failed  of  obtaining  those  ends,  of  which  its 
energy  and  victories  were  fully  worthy.  In  no  part  of 
the  war  with  Mexico,  was  more  sagacity,  correct  infor 
mation,  and  sound  judgment  exhibited,  than  in  the  cor 
respondence  of  General  Scott  with  the  War  Department, 
and  the  chiefs  of  the  army,  in  May  and  June,  1846. 

In  the  mean  time,  an  unpleasant  controversy,  or  rather 
misunderstanding  occurred  between  General  Scott,  Sec 
retary  Marcy,  and  President  Polk.  The  effect  of  this 
misunderstanding,  was  to  deprive  the  army  for  a  time, 
of  the  experience  and  services  of  General  Scott  in  the 
field,  and  throw  a  most  undeserved  ridicule  on  his  name, 
— as  disgraceful  to  those  who,  for  political  purposes, 
were  engaged  in  its  dissemination,  as  it  was  entirely 
foreign  to  any  part  of  the  public  business,  or  any  con 
duct  of  its  distinguished  subject. 

On  the  20th  of  May,  Mr.  Dix,  a  senator  from  the 
state  of  New  York,  and  an  active  friend  of  the  Presi 
dent,  had  advocated  a  bill  before  the  Senate,  which  pro 
posed  to  authorize  the  appointment  of  two  additional 
major-generals,  giving  the  President  power  also  to  assign 
them  their  command  and  relative  rank.  The  effect  of 
this  measure,  if  adopted,  would  give  the  President  the 
power  of  appointing,  by  law,  some  new  or  junior,  or 


52  SCOTT'S  LETTERS. 

merely  political  general,  over  the  head  of  Scott.  That 
this  proposition,  coming  from  the  political  friends  of  the 
President,  should  excite  the  sensibilities  of  Scott,  with 
the  idea  that  he  was  to  be  supplanted  in  the  command 
of  the  army,  was  most  natural.  That  such  an  idea  was 
not  unjust  to  the  President  or  his  friends  in  Congress, 
was  sufficiently  shown  by  subsequent  events,  when  the 
attempt  was  openly  made  and  nearly  succeeded,1  to  ap 
point  a  lieutenant-general  to  the  command  of  the  Ameri 
can  army. 

About  the  same  time — although  but  one  week  after 
Congress  had  declared  that  "war  existed," — Scott  was  in 
formed  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  that  much  impatience 
was  already  felt,  that  he  had  not  placed  himself  on  the 
route  to  the  Rio  Grande.2  It  was  under  these  circum 
stances,  which  candor  will  admit,  were  well  calculated 
to  irritate  a  sensitive  mind — that  Scott,  in  one  of  his  com 
munications  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  wrote  the  following 
passage  : 

"  Not  an  advantageous  step  can  be  taken  in  a  forward 
march,  without  the  confidence  that  all  is  well  behind.  If 
insecure  in  that  quarter,  no  general  can  put  his  whole 
heart  and  mind  into  the  work  to  be  done  in  front.  I  am 
therefore  not  a  little  alarmed,  nay,  crippled  in  my  ener 
gies,  by  the  knowledge  of  the  impatience  in  question,  and 
1  beg  to  say  I  fear  no  other  danger. 

"  My  intentions  have  been,  after  making  alJ  preliminary 
arrangements  here,  to  pass  down  the  Ohio  and  the  Mis 
sissippi,  to  see,  or  to  assure  myself  by  correspondence, 


1  Proceedings  of  the  2d  Session  of  the  29th  Congress. 
a  Scott's  Letter  to  Marcy,  May  2lst,  1846. 


SCOTT  S  LETTERS.  53 

that  the  volunteers,  on  whom  we  are  mostly  to  rely  in  the 
prosecution  of  the  existing  war,  are  rapidly  assembling 
for  the  service  ;  to  learn  the  probable  time  of  their  readi 
ness  to  advance  upon  Mexico ,  to  ascertain  if  their  sup 
plies  of  every  kind  are  in  place,  or  are  likely  to  be  in 
place  in  sufficient  time  ;  to  hasten  one  and  the  other ;  to 
harmonize  the  movements  of  volunteers,  and  to  modify 
their  routes,  (if  necessary,)  so  that  all,  or  at  least  a  suffi 
cient  number,  shall  arrive  at  the  indicated  points  on  the 
Mexican  frontier  at  the  best  periods,  and  as  far  as  practi 
cable  about  the  same  time.  All  that  I  have  but  sketched, 
I  deem  to  be  not  only  useful  to  success,  but  indispensa 
ble.  As  a  soldier  I  make  this  assertion,  without  the  fear 
of  contradiction  from  any  honest  and  candid  soldier. 

"  Against  the  ad  captandum  condemnation  of  all  other 
persons,  whoever  may  be  designated  for  the  high  com 
mand  in  question,  there  can  be  no  reliance,  in  his  absence, 
other  than  the  active,  candid,  and  steady  support  of  his 
government.  If  I  cannot  have  that  sure  basis  to  rest 
upon,  it  will  be  infinitely  better  for  the  country,  (not  to 
speak  of  my  personal  security,)  that  some  other  command 
er  of  the  new  army  against  Mexico  should  be  selected. 
No  matter  who  he  may  be,  he  shall  at  least  be  judged  and 
supported  by  me,  in  this  office  and  everywhere  else,  as  J 
would  desire,  if  personally  in  that  command,  to  be  judged 
myself  and  supported. 

"  My  explicit  meaning  is,  that  I  do  not  desire  to  place 
myself  in  the  most  perilous  of  all  positions — a  fire  upon 
my  rear  from  Washington,  and  a  fire  in  front  from  the 
Mexicans"1 

1  Scott's  Letter,  21st  of  May,  1846. — Appendix  to  the  Congressional 
Globe,  p.  650. 
E2 


54  SCOTT'S  LETTERS. 

In  a  reply  to  this  communication,  Mr.  Marcy,  Secretary 
of  War,  in  a  letter  of  the  25th  of  May,1  assumed  that  this 
passage  referred  to  the  President  only,  said  that  the  coun 
try  would  feel  impatient  if  the  volunteers  were  to  remain 
inactive  on  the  Rio  Grande  till  the  1st  of  September,  and 
linally  concluded  by  informing  Scott  that  his  services 
would  be  confined  to  the  city  of  Washington,  and  to  the 
preparations  for  the  vigorous  prosecution  of  hostilities 
against  Mexico.2 

The  letter  of  Marcy,  dated  May  25th,  General  Scott 
did  not  receive  till  the  close  of  the  day,  and  it  was  imme 
diately  replied  to.  In  his  answer,  Scott  denied  that  he 
intended  to  charge  either  the  President  or  Secretary  with 
any  unworthy  motives  or  indirect  designs.  He  acknow 
ledged  the  courtesy  and  kindness  of  both,  but  explained 
that  he  meant  other  persons  in  high  quarters,  who  might 
be  willing  enough  either  to  misrepresent  him  to  the  Pres 
ident,  or  impair  his  public  influence.  He  also  asked  to 
be  ordered  to  the  army  on  "  the  following,  or  any  other 
day  the  President  might  designate." 

In  the  commencement  of  his  reply  to  Mr.  Marcy,  Scott 
had  used  an  expression  which  is  now  memorable  as  an 
example  of  the  ease  with  which  the  public  mind  may  be 
abused,  of  the  malignity  with  which  partisans  pursue 


1  Appendix  to  the  Congressional  Globe,  651. 

2  The  sufficient  answer  to  this  impatience,  and  the  crude  ideas  of  war 
formed  by  Mr.  Secretary  Marcy,  is  contained   in  the  fact— that  the  ad 
vance  of  the  army,  under  General  Worth,  did  not  leave  the  valley  of  the 
Rio  Grande  till  the  20th  of  August,  and  General  Taylor  could  not  leave 
Camargo  till  the  5th  of  September.     From   May  till  September  nothing 
was  done,  as  Scott  had  anticipated,  but  prepare  for  the  coming  cam 
paign. 


FINAL  RESULT.  55 

their  objects,  and  of  the  final  triumph  of  true  greatness 
over  all  the  malice  and  the  intrigues  of  jealous  or  hostile 
politicians. 

The  expression  was  caught  up,  and  repeated,  and  re 
turned,  in  squibs  and  witticisms,  by  hostile  newspapers 
and  by  doubtful  friends,  till,  for  a  time,  the  fame  of  the 
Hero  of  Niagara,  alike  dear  to  his  country  and  to  martial 
renown,  seemed  obscured  in  the  mists  of  folly  and  of 
prejudice.  Even  the  justice  of  the  country  seemed  about 
to  depart,  and  leave  to  a  ribald  ridicule  the  pen  of  history 
and  the  decrees  of  government. 

But  such  an  ingratitude  and  so  gross  a  malice  could 
not  endure.  The  same  administration,  which  had  thus 
coolly  confined  Scott  to  Washington,  was  compelled,  in 
its  necessities,  to  demand  his  services.  He  hurried  to 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and,  in  the  splendid  siege  of  Vera 
Cruz — the  storm  of  Cerro  Gordo— and  the  well-ordered 
and  successful  march  to  the  city  of  the  Montezumas — 
brushed  away  and  obliterated  forever  the  memory  of  the 
recent  past,  and  silenced  the  voice  of  ridicule  in  the  shouts 
of  applause.  The  once  celebrated  phrase  now  remains 
only  as  a  monument  to  the  folly  of  those  who  used  it  to 
pervert  the  sense  and  abuse  the  justice  of  the  people.  Tt 
points  a  moral,  if  it  does  not  adorn  a  tale. 


56  MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  ARMY. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Campaign  on  the  Rio  Grande  continued. — Movement  of  the  Army.- 
March  to  Monterey. — Battle  of  Monterey. — Armistice. — March  to  Sal- 
tillo. — Wool's  Corps. — Tampico. — Occupation  of  Victoria. — Conclusion 
of  the  Campaign. — General  Tayior's  Despatches. — Results. 

FROM  the  period  at  which  the  American  army  occupied 
Metamoras,  after  the  battle  of  Resaca  de  la  Palma,  both 
the  general  government  at  home,  and  the  officers  of  the 
army  on  the  Rio  Grande,  were  busied  with  preparations 
for  an  advance  into  the  interior  of  Mexico.  The  Rio 
Grande  was  assumed  as  the  military  base-line  of  opera 
tions,  although  the  real  base  was  necessarily  the  Missis 
sippi.  Quartermasters  and  Commissariat  Departments 
became  at  once  very  active  :l  wagons,  horses,  provisions, 
and  supplies  of  all  sorts  were  to  be  found  and  purchased 
chiefly  in  the  valley  of  the  Ohio ;  while  military  equip 
ments  were  to  be  furnished  from  the  Atlantic  arsenals. 
More  than  three  months  were  consumed  in  these  prepa 
rations.  In  the  mean  time,  the  Mexican  villages  of 
Reinosa,  Comargo,  Mier,  and  Revilla  surrendered,  and 
were  occupied.  Comargo,  a  town  about  one  hundred  and 
eighty  miles  above  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande,  was  the 
point  selected  as  the  depot  of  supplies.  Here  the  various 

1  It  is  due  to  General  Jessup — Quartermaster-general — to  say,  that  the 
official  correspondence  proves  that  he  was  most  assiduous,  industrious,  and 
successful  in  the  performance  of  the  very  responsible  duties  of  his  office. 


TAYLOR'S  FORCE.  57 

divisions  which  were  to  compose  the  particular  army  of 
General  Taylor  were  gradually  concentrated.  The  entire 
army  of  General  Taylor  consisted  of  about  nine  thousand 
men.  A  snail  portion  w.-.s  assigned  to  garrisons,  whi'e  the 
main  body,  numbering  six  thousand  six  hundred,  were  des 
tined  for  the  march  to  Monterey.1  On  the  20th  of  August 
General  Worth  began  his  march  for  Monterey,  the  capital 
of  New  Leon  ;  and  on  the  5th  of  September,  the  general- 
in-chief  left  Comargo,  leaving  that  town  garrisoned  by 
about  two  thousand  men.  Worth  reached  Ceralvo — about 


1  The  army  was  divided  into  three  divisions,  whose  component  parts 
were  as  follows, — as  determined  by  General  Taylor's  order  of  September 
3d,  1846,  and  variations  subsequently  made. 

1st  Division — Brigadier-general  Twiggs. 

2d  Dragoons,  (Captain  May,)  4  companies       .         .         .         250  men. 
Ridgeley's  and  Webster's  Batteries  .         .         .         .         110    " 

1st,  3d,  and  4th  Regiments  of  Infantry,  and  Bragg's  Battery  1,320    " 
Baltimore  Battalion  400    " 


Total        .        .  2,080 
2d  Division — Brigadier-general  Worth. 

Duncan's  and  Taylor's  Batteries 100  men. 

5th,  7th,  and  8th  Regiments  of  Infantry           .        .        .  1,500    " 

Blanchard's  Louisiana  Volunteers              ....  80    " 

Texas  Rangers — 2  companies 100    " 


Total         .         .  1,780 
3d  Division,  (Volunteers,)  Major-general  Butler. 

1st  Ohio  Regiment,  (Col.  Mitchell) 540  men 

1st  Kentucky,  (Col.  Ormsby) 540    " 

1st  Tennessee,  (Col.  Campbell)         .         .         .         .         .  540    « 

Mississippi  Regiment,  (Col.  Davis) 690    " 

Texas  Regiment,  (Col.  Hays) 500    " 

Total        .        .  2,810 
Total  of  the  army  (in  all)  6,670  effectives. 


58  TAYLOR  ADVANCES  TO  MONTEREY. 

seventy  miles — on  the  25th  of  August,  and  at  that  point 
sent  out  reconnoitring  parties,  who  discovered  strong 
bodies  of  the  enemy  in  front.  Being  reinforced,  he  ad 
vanced  to  the  village  of  Marin,  where  the  entire  army 
was  in  a  few  days  concentrated  under  the  command  of 
General  Taylor. 

Thft  city  of  Monterey  is  situated  in  the  valley  of  the 
San  Juan  ;  and  in  the  rear,  and  around  it,  rise  the  moun 
tain-ridges  of  the  Sierra  Madre.  In  the  rear  of  the  city, 
and  under  the  ridges  of  hills,  runs  the  river  San  Juan. 
On  the  east,  or  on  tne  left  of  the  road  approaching  from 
Marin,  the  river  makes  a  turn,  so  as  nearly  to  cover  that 
flank.  The  road  to  Cardereita  thence  crosses  the  river. 
On  the  opposite  side — the  right,  as  the  army  approached 
— lay  the  road  to  Saltillo,  up  the  valley  of  San  Juan.  In 
front,  the  road  from  Ceralvo  and  Marin  entered  the  town. 
On  the  heights,  in  rear  of  the  town  and  beyond  the  river, 
works  were  erected  which  commanded  the  valley  and  the 
approaches  from  the  north.  Above  the  Saltillo  road  was 
a  height  upon  which  was  the  Bishop's  Palace,  and  near  it 
other  heights,  all  fortified.  In  front  of  the  city  was  the 
Cathedral  Fort,  or  citadel,  which  was  regularly  fortified, 
and  about  two  thousand  yards  in  front  and  below  the 
Bishop's  Palace.  The  opposite  side  of  the  city,  to  the 
left,  as  the  Americans  approached,  were  forts  also  erected, 
and  there  were  barricades  in  the  streets  of  the  city. 

Both  the  natural  and  the  artificial  defences  of  Monterey 
seem  to  have  been  very  strong.  Notwithstanding  this, 
neither  the  extant  of  the  defences  nor  the  garrison  within 
them  seem  to  have  been  known  to  the  American  army 
previous  to  its  arrival  in  front  of  the  city. 

On  the  25th  of  August,  General  Taylor  writes  to  the 


REACHES  WALNUT  SPRINGS.  59 

War  Department1  that  he  had  intelligence  from  Monterey, 
by  a  confidential  messenger,  who  said  that  there  were 
"  at  Monterey  not  more  than  2000  or  2500  regular  troops, 
the  remnant  of  those  who  fled  from  Metamoras,  and  a 
considerable  number  of  the  militia  of  the  country  gathered 
,together,  many  of  them  forcibly.  Some  attempts  had 
been  made  to  fortify  the  city  by  the  erection  of  batteries 
which  command  the  approaches.  He  heard  of  no  rein 
forcements  in  rear."  On  the  17th  of  September,  from  the 
camp  near  Morin,  General  Taylor  writes  to  the  War  De 
partment — "  It  is  even  doubtful  whether  Ampudia  will 
attempt  to  hold  Monterey.  A  few  days  will  now  deter 
mine.  His  regular  force  is  small — say  3000 — eked  out 
perhaps  to  6000  by  volunteers,  many  of  them  forced."2 

These  statements  show  that  the  military  information 
of  the  army,  as  derived  from  scouts,  spies,  out-parties, 
and  correspondents,  was  very  scant.  The  army,  however, 
pressed  forward,  and  on  the  19th  of  September  arrived  at 
Walnut  Springs,  three  miles  from  Monterey,  having  met 
with  no  more  serious  resistance  than  that  of  skirmishing 
parties  of  Mexican  cavalry. 

Monterey  was  then  under  the  command  of  General 
Pedro  Ampudia,  and  the  garrison  under  his  command 
consisted  of  about  seven  thousand  regular  troops,  and  two 
or  three  thousand  irregulars.  Notwithstanding  this  strong 
garrison,  superior  in  numbers  to  the  American  army, 
General  Taylor  thought  it  possible  to  carry  the  place  by 
storm,  with  the  bayonet  and  the  artillery.  On  the  even 
ing  of  the  19th  a  reconnaissance  of  the  works  in  the  direc- 


1  Document  119  of  the  29th  Congress,  2d  Session,  page  130. 
1  Document  119,  page  139,  29th  Congress,  2d  Session 


60  BATTLE  OF  MONTEREY. 

tion  of  the  Saltillo  road  was  ordered,  and  this  important 
enterprise  was  ably  executed  by  Major  Mansfield  of  the 
engineer  corps.  A  reconnaissance  was  also  made  on  the 
ea^t  sice  of  the  town. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  20th  of  September,  General 
Worth,  with  his  division,  was  ordered  to  make  a  detour 
to  the  right — turn  the  hill  of  the  Bishop's  Palace — take  a 
position  on  the  Saltillo  road — and,  if  practicable,  carry 
the  enemy's  works  in  that  quarter.  This  movement  was 
executed  during  the  evening,  and  the  troops  remained 
upon  their  arms,  just  beyond  the  range  of  the  enemy's 
shot.  During  the  night  two  24-pounder  howitzers  and  a 
ten-inch  mortar  were  placed  in  battery  against  the  citadel. 
In  rear  of  this  battery  was  General  Butler's  Division. 

On  the  morning  of  the  21st  the  main  battle  came  on. 
Twiggs'  and  Butler's  Divisions,  supported  by  the  Light 
Artillery,  were  both  ordered  forward  ;  May's  Dragoons, 
and  Wood's  Texan  Cavalry,  were  detached  to  the  right,  to 
the  support  of  General  Worth.  A  column  of  six  hundred 
and  fifty  men,  with  Bragg's  Artillery,  was  ordered  to  the 
left,  to  attack  the  lower  part  of  the  town.  The  point  of 
attack  was  designated  by  Major  Mansfield,  who  accompa 
nied  the  party  in  its  advance.  The  front  defence  here 
was  a  redoubt,  into  the  rear  of  which,  in  spite  of  its  fire, 
the  column  rapidly  moved,  and  commenced  its  assault  on 
the  town.  Here  it  was  opposed  by  intrenched  streets 
and  barricaded  houses.  On  one  of  these  the  company 
of  Captain  Backus  succeeded  in  getting,  and  fired 
upon. the  redoubt.  Garland's  force,  however,  were  with 
drawn.  It  was  then  that  General  Taylor  ordered  up  the 
4th  Infantry,  and  the  Volunteer  regiments  from  Ohio, 
Tennessee,  and  Mississippi,  commanded  by  Colonels 


<     _ 

?    o 
•<  ^ 


BATTLE  OF  MONTEREY.  61 

Mitchell,  Campbell,  and  Davis.  The  two  last  regiments, 
with  three  companies  of  the  4th  regiment,  advanced 
against  the  redoubt.  The  last  companies  being  in 
front  were  received  with  a  deadly  fire,  which  killed  or 
disabled  one-third  of  the  men,  and  they  were  compelled 
to  retire.  The  brigade  of  General  Quitman  (Tennessee 
and  Mississippi)  pushed  on,  and  with  the  aid  of  Captain 
Backus's  company  (on  the  roof  of  a  house)  captured  the 
fort,  with  its  cannon  and  ammunition. 

In  the  mean  while  the  Ohio  regiment,  with  General 
Butler  and  Colonel  Mitchell,  entered  the  town  to  the  right, 
and  advanced  against  the  second  battery,  but  the  fire  was 
so  severe  that  the  regiment  was  withdrawn ;  General 
Butler,  who  had  advanced  with  it,  being  wounded.  The 
guns  of  the  first  battery  were  turned  upon  the  second, 
and  Colonel  Garland  was  again  ordered  forward  with  an 
other  column.  They  were  compelled  to  pass  several 
streets  trenched  and  barricaded,  and  after  another  severe 
contest  retired  in  good  order.  Up  to  this  time,  it  is  ob 
vious,  no  important  success  had  been  obtained  against  the 
lower  town.  The  Mexican  cavalry  had  also  made  several 
charges,  but  always  unsuccessfully.  On  the  same  day 
(the  2 1st)  Worth's  Division  had  advanced  to  the  right, 
defeated  the  enemy,  and  carried  several  fortified  heights. 
At  night  General  Taylor  ordered  a  large  part  of  Twiggs' 
and  Butler's  Divisions  back  to  Walnut  Springs — a  portion 
remaining  to  guard  the  battery  in  the  ravine,  while  Gar 
land's  command  held  the  captured  redoubt  on  the  enemy's 
extreme  right. 

At  dawn  of  the  22d,  Worth  and  his  Division,  which  had 
bivouacked  on  the  Saltillo  road,  recommenced  the  ad- 


62  SURRENDER  OF  THE  CITY. 

vance.  The  height  above  the  Bishop's  Palace  was 
stormed  and  taken  ;  when  the  Palace  and  the  guns  of 
both  were  turned  upon  the  enemy  below. 

The  guns  of  the  Citadel  continued,  during  this  day,  to 
fire  upon  the  American  positions  ;  but  General  Taylor 
made  no  important  movement  in  front.  The  turning  of 
the  enemy's  position  by  Worth,  and  the  capture  of  the 
Bishop's  Palace,  gave  a  new  face  to  affairs.  This  was 
the  key  to  Monterey,  and  General  Ampudia  concentrated 
his  troops  in  the  heart  of  the  city.  General  Taylor,  on 
the  morning  of  the  23d,  found  nearly  all  the  works  in  the 
lower  part  of  the  city  abandoned.  He  immediately  or 
dered  General  Quitman  to  enter  the  place ;  but  here  a 
new  resistance  was  made.  The  houses  were  fortified, 
and  our  troops  actually  dug  through  from  house  to  house  ! 
On  the  upper  side  of  the  city,  Worth's  Division  had  also 
gained  a  lodgment.  The  firing  continued  during  the  23d 
— the  Americans  having  possession  of  the  greater  part  of 
the  city,  and  the  Mexicans  confined,  in  their  defence, 
chiefly  to  the  Citadel  and  Plaza.  That  evening  (at  9 
p.  M.)  General  Ampudia  sent  in  propositions  to  General 
Taylor  which,  after  some  negotiation,  resulted  in  the  sur 
render  and  evacuation  of  Monterey.  The  main  part  of 
the  capitulation  was,  that  the  Mexican  troops  should  re 
tire  beyond  a  line  formed  by  the  Pass  of  Rinconada,  the 
city  of  Linares,  and  San  Fernando  de  Prezas  ;  and  that 
the  forces  of  the  United  States  would  not  advance  beyond 
that  line  before  the  expiration  of  eight  weeks,  or  until  the 
orders  or  instructions  of  the  respective  governments  should 
be  received. 

As  this  armistice  has  been  the  subject  of  much  com 
ment,  we  have  thought  best  to  insert  it  in  full. 


ARTICLES  OF  CAPITULATION.  63 

The  following  are  the  articles  of  capitulation  : 

ARTICLE  I.  As  the  legitimate  result  of  the  operations  before 
this  place,  and  the  present  position  of  the  contending  armies, 
it  is  agreed  that  the  city,  the  fortifications,  cannon,  the  muni 
tions  of  war,  and  all  other  public  property,  with  the  under 
mentioned  exceptions,  be  surrendered  to  the  commanding  gen 
eral  of  the  United  States  forces  now  at  Monterey. 

ART.  II.  That  the  Mexican  forces  be  allowed  to  retain  the 
following  arms,  to  wit :  the  commissioned  officers  their  side- 
arms,  the  infantry  their  arms  and  accoutrements,  the  cavalry 
their  arms  and  accoutrements,  the  artillery  one  field  battery, 
not  to  exceed  six  pieces,  with  twenty-one  rounds  of  ammuni 
tion. 

ART.  III.  That  the  Mexican  armed  forces  retire,  within 
seven  days  from  this  date,  beyond  the  line  formed  by  the  pass 
of  the  Rinconada,  the  city  of  Linares,  and  San  Fernando  de 
Presas. 

ART.  IV.  That  the  citadel  of  Monterey  be  evacuated  by 
the  Mexican,  and  occupied  by  the  American  forces,  to-mor 
row  morning  at  ten  o'clock. 

ART.  V.  To  avoid  collisions,  and  for  mutual  convenience, 
that  the  troops  of  the  United  States  will  not  occupy  the  city 
until  the  Mexican  forces  have  withdrawn,  except  for  hospital 
and  storage  purposes. 

ART.  VI.  That  the  forces  of  the  United  States  will  not  ad- 
vance  beyond  the  line  specified  in  the  2d  [3d]  article  before 
the  expiration  of  eight  weeks,  or  until  the  orders  or  instruc 
tions  of  the  respective  governments  can  be  received. 

ART.  VII.  That  the  public  property  to  be  delivered  shall 
be  turned  over  and  received  by  officers  appointed  by  the 
commanding  generals  of  the  two  armies. 

ART.  VIII.  That  all  doubts  as  to  the  meaning  of  any  of 
the  preceding  articles  shall  be  solved  by  an  equitable  con 
struction,  and  on  principles  of  liberality  to  the  retiring  army. 


64  ARMISTICE  DISAPPROVED. 

ART.  IX.  That  the  Mexican  flag,  when  struck  at  the  cita 
del,  may  be  saluted  by  its  own  battery. 
Done  at  Monterey,  Sept.  24,  1846. 

W.  J.  WORTH, 
Brigadier-general  U.  S.  A. 

S.  PINKNEY  HENDERSON, 
Major-general  commanding  the  Texan  volunteers. 

JEFFERSON  DAVIS, 
Col.  Mississippi  riflemen. 
MANUEL  M.  LLANO, 
ORTEGA, 
T.  REQUENA, 
PEDRO  AMPUDIA. 

Approved : 

Z.  TAYLOR, 
Major-general,  U.  S.  A.  Commanding. 

The  Mexicans  marched  out  with  their  arms,  and  the 
terms  were  unusually  favorable  to  them.  For  this  con 
cession  there  were  strong  reasons.  A  change  of  govern 
ment  had  just  taken  place  in  Mexico,  believed  to  be 
favorable  to  peace,  and  to  have  reduced  the  citadel  of 
Monterey  would  have  cost  the  lives  of  many  men.  Be 
sides  all  this,  the  American  army  had  but  a  short  supply 
of  provisions,  and  were  one  hundred  and  eighty  miles  dis 
tant  from  their  depot.  The  American  loss  in  this  battle 
was  (killed  and  wounded)  four  hundred  and  eighty-eight,1 
a  large  portion  of  whom  fell  in  the  attacks  of  the  21st  on 
the  lower  town. 

The  War  Department  did  not  choose  to  continue  the 
armistice  ;  but,  on  the  13th  of  October,  directed  General 


1  One  hundred  and  twenty  killed,  and  three  hundred  and  sixty-eight 
wounded. 


TAYLOR  b  REASONS  *OR  THE  ARMISTICE.       65 

Taylor  to  give  notice  that  the  armistice  should  cease,  and 
that  each  party  should  be  at  liberty  to  resume  hostilities. 
In  communicating  this  notice  to  General  Santa  Anna,  then 
in  command  of  the  Mexican  army,  General  Taylor  took 
occasion  to  suggest  the  idea  of  an  honorable  peace.  To 
this  the  Mexican  chief  replied, — "  You  should  banish 
every  idea  of  peace  while  a  single  North  American,  in 
arms,  treads  upon  the  territory  of  this  republic."1 

The  following  are  General  Taylor's  reasons  for  the 
armistice,  given  in  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War : 

"  In  reply  to  so  much  of  the  communication  of  the 
Secretary  of  War,  dated  October  13th,  as  relates  to  the 
reasons  which  induced  the  convention  resulting  in  the 
capitulation  of  Monterey,  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the 
following  remarks  : 

"  The  convention  presents  two  distinct  points.  First, 
the  permission  granted  the  Mexican  army  to  retire  with 
their  arms,  &c.  Secondly,  the  temporary  cessation  of 
hostilities  for  the  term  of  eight  weeks.  I  shall  remark  on 
these  in  order. 

"  The  force  with  which  I  marched  on  Monterey  was 
limited  by  causes  beyond  my  control  to  about  six  thou 
sand  men.  With  this  force,  as  every  military  man  must 
admit,  who  has  seen  the  ground,  it  was  entirely  impossible 
to  invest  Monterey  so  closely  as  to  prevent  the  escape  of 
the  garrison.  Although  the  main  communication  with  the 
interior  was  in  our  possession,  yet  one  route  was  open  to 
the  Mexicans  throughout  the  operations,  and  could  not  be 
closed,  as  were  also  other  minor  tracks  and  passes  through 
the  mountains.  Had  we,  therefore,  insisted  on  more 


!  Santa  Anna's  letter  to  General  Taylor,  November,  1846. 
F2  5 


66  TAYLOR'S  REASONS  FOR  THE  ARMISTICE. 

rigorous  terms  than  those  granted,  the  result  would  have 
been  the  escape  of  the  body  of  the  Mexican  force,  with  the 
destruction  of  its  artillery  and  magazines,  our  only  advantage 
being  the  capture  of  a  few  prisoners  of  war,  at  the  ex 
pense  of  valuable  lives  and  much  damage  to  the  city. 
The  consideration  of  humanity  was  present  to  my  mind 
during  the  conference  which  led  to  the  convention,  and 
outweighed  in  my  judgment  the  doubtful  advantages  to  be 
gained  by  a  resumption  of  the  attack  upon  the  town. 
This  conclusion  has  been  fully  confirmed  by  an  inspec 
tion  of  the  enemy's  position  and  means  since  the  surrender. 
It  was  discovered  that  his  principal  magazine,  containing 
an  immense  amount  of  powder,  was  in  the  cathedral, 
completely  exposed  to  our  shells  from  two  directions. 
The  explosion  of  this  mass  of  powder,  which  must  have 
ultimately  resulted  from  a  continuance  of  the  bombard 
ment,  would  have  been  infinitely  disastrous,  involving  the 
destruction  not  only  of  Mexican  troops,  but  of  non-com 
batants  and  even  our  own  people,  had  we  pressed  the 
attack. 

"  In  regard  to  the  temporary  cessation  of  hostilities,  the 
fact  that  we  are  not  at  this  moment,  within  eleven  days 
of  the  termination  of  the  period  fixed  by  the  convention, 
prepared  to  move  forward  in  force,  is  a  sufficient  explana 
tion  of  the  military  reasons  which  dictated  this  suspension 
of  arms.  It  paralyzed  the  enemy  during  a  period  when, 
from  the  want  of  necessary  means,  we  could  not  possibly 
move.  I  desire  distinctly  to  state,  and  to  call  the  attention 
of  the  authorities  to  the  fact,  that,  with  all  diligence  in 
breaking  mules  and  setting  up  wagons,  the  first  wagons  in 
addition  to  our  original  train  from  Corpus  Christi,  (and 
but  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  in  number^)  reached  my 


TAYLOR  S  REASONS  FOR  THE  ARMISTICE.       67 

headquarters  on  the  same  day  with  the  secretary's  com 
munication  of  October  13th,  viz.  the  2d  inst.  At  the 
date  of  the  surrender  of  Monterey,  our  force  had  not 
more  than  ten  days'  rations,  and  even  now,  with  all 
our  endeavors,  we  have  not  more  than  twenty-five.  THE 

TASK  OF  FIGHTING  AND  BEATING  THE  ENEMY  IS  AMONG 
THE  LEAST  DIFFICULT  THAT  WE  ENCOUNTER the  great 

question  of  supplies  necessarily  controls  all  the  operations 
in  a  country  like  this.  At  the  date  of  the  convention,  1 
could  not  of  course  have  foreseen  that  the  Department 
would  direct  an  important  detachment  from  my  command 
without  consulting  me,  or  without  waiting  the  result  of 
the  main  operation  under  my  orders. 

"  I  have  touched  the  prominent  military  points  involved 
in  the  convention  of  Monterey.  There  were  other  con 
siderations  which  weighed  with  the  commissioners  in 
framing  and  with  myself  in  approving  the  articles  of  the 
convention.  In  the  conference  with  General  Ampudia,  I 
was  distinctly  told  by  him  that  he  had  invited  it  to  spare 
the  further  effusion  of  blood,  and  because  General  Santa 
Anna  had  declared  himself  favorable  to  peace.  I  knew 
that  our  government  had  made  propositions  to  that  of 
Mexico  to  negotiate,  and  I  deemed  that  the  change  of 
government  in  that  country  since  my  last  instructions, 
fully  warranted  rne  in  entertaining  considerations  of  policy. 
My  grand  motive  in  moving  forward  with  very  limited 
supplies  had  been  to  increase  the  inducements  of  the 
Mexican  government  to  negotiate  for  peace.  Whatever 
may  be  the  actual  views  or  disposition  of  the  Mexican 
rulers  or  of  General  Santa  Anna,  it  is  not  unknown  to  the 
government  that  I  had  the  very  best  reason  for  believing 
the  statement  of  General  Ampudia  to  be  true.  It  was  my 


68 

opinion  at  the  time  of  the  convention,  and  it  has  not  been 
changed,  that  the  liberal  treatment  of  the  Mexican  army 
and  the  suspension  of  arms,  would  exert  none  but  a  favor 
able  influence  in  our  behalf. 

"  The  result  of  the  entire  operation  has  been  to  throw 
the  Mexican  army  back  more  than  three  hundred  miles  to 
the  city  of  San  Luis  Potosi,  and  to  open  the  country  to  us 
as  far  as  we  choose  to  penetrate  it  up  to  the  same  point. 

"  It  has  been  my  purpose  in  this  communication,  not  so 
much  to  defend  the  convention  from  the  censure  which  I 
deeply  regret  to  find  implied  in  the  secretary's  letter,  as  to 
show  that  it  was  not  adopted  without  cogent  reasons, 
most  of  which  occur  of  themselves  to  the  minds  of  all 
who  are  acquainted  with  the  condition  of  things  here. 
To  that  end  I  beg  that  it  may  be  laid  before  the  General- 
in-chief  and  Secretary  of  War." 

We  subjoin  the  official  report  of  General  Taylor  : 

HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  OCCUPATION,          ) 
Camp  before  Monterey,  Sept.  22,  1846.  j 

SIR  : — I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  the  troops  under  my 
command,  including  the  mounted  volunteers  from  Texas, 
marched  from  Marin  on  the  18th,  and  encamped  before  Mon 
terey  on  the  19th  inst.  It  was  immediately  discovered  that 
the  enemy  occupied  the  town  in  force,  and  had  added  greatly 
to  its  strength  by  fortifying  the  approaches  and  commanding 
heights.  A  close  reconnoissance  was  made  the  same  evening 
by  the  officers  of  engineers  and  topographical  engineers  on 
both  flanks  of  the  town,  and  it  was  determined,  from  the  in- 
formation  procured,  to  occupy  the  Saltillo  road  in  the  rear  of 
the  town,  carrying,  if  practicable,  the  several  fortified  emi 
nences  in  that  direction.  The  2d  division  of  regular  Droops 
and  a  portion  of  Col.  Hays'  regiment  of  mounted  volunteers 


TAYLOR'S  OFFICIAL  DESPATCHES.  69 

was  accordingly  detached  under  Brig.  General  Worth  on  this 
service,  at  noon  on  the  20th.  A  10-inch  mortar  and  two 
24-pounder  howitzers  were  placed  in  battery  during  the 
night,  to  play  upon  the  citadel  and  town.  At  7  o'clock  these 
guns  opened  and  continued  a  deliberate  fire,  which  was  re 
turned.  To  create  a  still  farther  diversion  in  favor  of  Gen. 
Worth's  movement,  the  remainder  of  the  force,  except  a  camp 
guard,  was  displayed  around  the  centre  and  left  of  the  town. 
The  infantry  and  one  battery  of  the  1st  division  made  a  strong 
demonstration  on  the  left,  and  soon  became  so  closely  engaged 
that  I  moved  forward  the  volunteer  division  under  Major- 
general  Butler  to  its  support,  leaving  one  battalion  (1st  Ken- 
tucky)  to  cover  the  mortar  battery.  A  close  contest  then 
ensued,  which  resulted  in  the  capture  of  one  strong  battery 
of  four  guns,  which  with  some  adjacent  defences  our  troops 
now  occupy.  A  garrison  was  left  to  hold  this  position,  and 
the  remainder  of  the  force  returned  to  camp. 

In  the  mean  time  General  Worth  had  engaged  the  enemy 
early  in  the  morning,  and  defeated  him  with  considerable 
loss.  In  the  course  of  the  day  two  of  the  batteries  in  rear  of 
the  town  were  carried  by  storming  parties  of  the  2d  division, 
and  a  third  was  carried  this  morning  at  dawn  of  day. — The 
Bishop's  Palace  occupied  the  only  remaining  height  in  rear  of 
the  town,  and  is  completely  commanded  by  the  works  already 
carried.  Gen.  Worth's  division  occupies  the  Saltillo  road, 
and  cuts  off  all  succor  or  support  from  the  interior.  I  must 
reserve  a  more  minute  report  of  the  important  operations  of 
yesterday,  until  those  of  the  different  commanders  are  render 
ed,  and  also  until  a  topographical  sketch  of  the  country  can 
be  prepared. 

I  regret  to  report  that  our  successes  have  not  been  obtain 
ed  without  severe  loss,  to  be  attributed  in  a  good  measure  to 
the  ardor  of  the  troops  in  pressing  forward.  No  returns  of 
killed  and  wounded  have  yet  been  received,  nor  is  it  known 


70  TAYLOR'S  OFFICIAL  DESPATCHES. 

what  corps  of  Gen.  Worth's  division  have  suffered  most.  In 
the  other  portion  of  the  army,  the  1st,  3d,  and  4th  regiments 
of  infantry,  and  regiment  of  Tennessee  volunteers,  have  sus 
tained  the  greatest  loss.  The  following  is  believed  to  be  an 
accurate  list  of  the  officers  killed  and  wounded  : 

KILLED. — 2d  infantry — Brevet  1st  Lieutenant  J.  S.  Woods, 
(serving  with  1st  infantry.)  3d  infantry — Capt.  L.  N.  Morris  ; 
Capt.  G.  P.  Field;  Brevet  Major  P.  F.  Barbour ;  1st  Lieut, 
and  Adjutant  D.  S.  Irwin  ;  2d  Lieut.  R.  Hazlitt.  4th  infantry 
— 1st  Lieut,  and  Adjutant  C.  Hoskins.  8th  infantry — Cap 
tain  McKavett.  Maryland  and  Washington  battalion  volun 
teers — Lieut.  Col.  W.  H.  Watson. 

VOLUNTEER  DIVISION. — Ohio  regiment — 1st  Lieut.  M.  Hett. 
Tennessee  regiment — Captain  W.  B.  Allen  ;  S.  M.  Putnam. 

WOUNDED. — Corps  of  Engineers — Brevet  Major  J.  K.  T. 
Mansfield,  slightly.  Corps  of  Topographical  Engineers — 
Capt.  W.  G.  Williams,  (in  hands  of  the  enemy.)  1st  infan 
try — Brevet  Major  J.  L.  Abercrombie,  slightly  ;  Capt.  J.  H. 
Lamotte,  severely;  1st  Lieut.  J.  C.  Terrett,  (in  hands  of  the 
enemy;)  2d  Lieut.  R.  Dilworth,  severely.  3d  infantry — 
Major  W.  W.  Lear,  severely  ;  Capt.  H.  Bainbridge,  slightly. 
5th  infantry — 1st  Lieut.  R.  H.  Graham,  severely.  5th 
infantry — 1st  Lieut.  N.  B.  Rossell,  slightly.  7th  infantry — 
2d  Lieut.  J.  H.  Potter,  severely.  8th  infantry — 2d  Lieut. 
George  Wainwright,  severely. 

VOLUNTEER  DIVISION. — General  Staff — Major-general  W. 
0.  Butler,  slightly.  Ohio  regiment — Colonel  A.  M.  Mitchell, 
slightly ;  Captain  James  George,  slightly ;  1st  Lieut,  and 
Adjutant  A.  W.  Armstrong,  very  severely ;  1st  Lieut.  N. 
Niles,  severely  ;  1st  Lieut.  L.  Motter,  slightly.  Mississippi 
regiment — Lieut.  Col.  A.  M.  McClung,  severely;  Captain 
R.  N.  Downing,  slightly;  1st  Lieut.  H.  F.  Cook,  slightly; 
2d  Lieutenant  R.  K.  Arthur,  do. 


TAYLOR  S  OFFICIAL  DESPATCHES.  71 

DIVISION  OF  TEXAS  MOUNTED  VOLUNTEERS. — 1st  regiment 
— Capt.  R.  A.  Gillespie,  mortally. 

I  need  hardly  add,  that  the  conduct  of  our  troops,  both 
regulars  and  volunteers,  throughout  the  operations,  has  been 
every  thing  that  could  be  desired.  The  part  which  each 
corps  contributed  to  the  successes  of  the  day  will  appear  more 
fully  in  future  reports.  To  Major-generals  Butler  and  Hen 
derson,  and  Brigadier-generals  Twiggs  and  Worth,  command 
ing  divisions,  I  must  express  my  obligations  for  the  efficient 
support  which  they  have  rendered — particularly  so  to  Brig 
adier-general  Worth,  whose  services,  from  his  detached  posi 
tion,  have  been  most  conspicuous. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

Z.  TAYLOR, 
Major-general,  U.  S.  A.  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  OCCUPATION,  ) 

Camp  before  Monterey,  Sept.  23,  1846.  \ 

SIR  : — I  have  the  gratification  to  report  that  the  Bishop's 
Palace  was  gallantly  carried  yesterday  by  the  troops  of  the  2d 
division.  In  the  course  of  the  night  the  batteries  below  the  town 
were,  with  one  exception,  abandoned  by  the  enemy,  and  this 
morning  were  occupied  by  our  troops.  To-day  the  3d  infan 
try  with  the  field  artillery  of  the  1st  division,  the  Mississippi 
and  Tennessee  regiments,  and  the  2d  regiment  of  Texas  rifle 
men,  (dismounted),  have  been  warmly  engaged  with  the 
enemy  in  the  town,  and  have  driven  him  with  considerable 
loss  to  the  plaza  and  its  vicinity,  which  is  yet  strongly  occu 
pied.  A  portion  of  the  2d  division  has  also  advanced  into  the 
town  on  the  right,  and  holds  a  position  there.  The  enemy 
still  maintains  himself  in  the  plaza  and  citadel,  and  seems 
determined  to  make  a  stubborn  resistance. 

I  am  particularly  gratified  to  report  that  our  successes  of 
yesterday  and  to-day,  though  disastrous  to  the  enemy,  have 
been  achieved  without  material  loss. 


72  TAYLOR'S  OFFICIAL  DESPATCHES. 

I  cannot  speak  in  too  high  terms  of  the  gallantry  and  per- 
severance  of  our  troops  throughout  the  arduous  operations  of 
the  last  three  days. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

Z.  TAYLOR, 
Major-general,  U.  S.  A.  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  OCCUPATION,          ) 
Camp  before  Monterey,  Sept.  25,  1846.  $ 

SIR  : — At  noon  on  the  23d  inst.,  while  our  troops  were 
closely  engaged  in  the  lower  part  of  the  city,  as  reported  in 
my  last  despatch,  I  received  by  a  flag  a  communication  from 
the  governor  of  the  state  of  New  Leon,  which  is  herewith 
enclosed,  (No  1.)  To  this  communication,  I  deemed  it  my 
duty  to  return  an  answer  declining  to  allow  the  inhabitants  to 
leave  the  city.  By  eleven  o'clock,  p.  M.  the  2d  division, 
which  had  entered  the  town  from  the  direction  of  the  Bishop's 
Palace,  had  advanced  within  one  square  of  the  principal 
plaza,  and  occupied  the  city  up  to  that  point.  The  mortar 
had,  in  the  mean  time,  been  placed  in  battery  in  the  cemetery, 
within  good  range  of  the  heart  of  the  town,  and  was  served 
throughout  the  night  with  good  effect. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  24th  I  received  a  flag  from 
the  town,  bearing  a  communication  from  Gen.  Ampudia, 
which  I  enclose,  (No.  2,)  and  to  which  I  returned  the  answer, 
(No.  3.)  I  also  arranged  with  the  bearer  of  the  flag  a  cessa 
tion  of  fire  until  12  o'clock,  which  hour  I  appointed  to  receive 
the  final  answer  of  Gen.  Ampudia  at  Gen.  Worth's  head 
quarters.  Before  the  appointed  time,  however,  Gen.  Ampudia 
had  signified  to  Gen.  Worth  his  desire  for  a  personal  inter 
view  with  me,  for  the  purpose  of  making  some  definite 
arrangement.  An  interview  was  accordingly  appointed  for 
~one  o'clock,  and  resulted  in  the  naming  of  a  commission  to 
draw  up  articles  of  agreement  regulating  the  withdrawal  of 
the  Mexican  forces  and  a  temporary  cessation  of  hostilities. 


TAYLOR'S  OFFICIAL  DESPATCHES.  73 

The  commissioners  named  by  the  Mexican  general-in-chief 
were  Generals  Ortega  and  Requena,  and  Don  Manuel  M. 
Llano,  Governor  of  New  Leon.  Those  named  on  the  Ameri 
can  side  were  Gen.  Worth,  Gen.  Henderson,  governor  of 
Texas,  and  Colonel  Davis,  of  the  Mississippi  volunteers.  The 
commission  finally  settled  upon  the  articles,  of  which  I  enclose 
a  copy,  (No  4,)  the  duplicates  of  which  (in  Spanish  and 
English)  have  been  duly  signed.  Agreeably  to  the  provis 
ions  of  the  4th  article,  our  troops  have  this  morning  occupied 
the  citadel. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  terms  granted  the  Mexican  garrison 
are  less  rigorous  than  those  first  imposed.  The  gallant  de 
fence  of  the  town,  and  the  fact  of  a  recent  change  of  govern 
ment  in  Mexico,  believed  to  be  favorable  to  the  interests  of 
peace,  induced  me  to  concur  with  the  commission  in  these 
terms,  which  will,  I  trust,  receive  the  approval  of  the  govern 
ment.  The  latter  consideration  also  prompted  the  convention 
for  a  temporary  cessation  of  hostilities.  Though  scarcely 
warranted  by  my  instructions,  yet  the  change  of  affairs  since 
those  instructions  were  issued  seemed  to  warrant  this  course. 
I  beg  to  be  advised,  as  early  as  practicable,  whether  I  have 
met  the  views  of  the  government  in  these  particulars. 

I  regret  to  report  that  Capt.  Williams,  Topographical 
Engineers,  and  Lieut.  Terrett,  1st  infantry,  have  died  of  the 
wounds  received  in  the  engagement  of  the  21st. — Capt.  Gat- 
lin,  7th  infantry,  was  wounded  (not  badly)  on  the  23d. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant. 

Z.  TAYLOR, 
Major-general,  U.  S.  A.  Commanding. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  army  had  been  transporting  its 
supplies,  opening  its  communications,  and  enjoying  the 
fine  fruits  and  climate  of  Monterey.  November  had  ar 
rived,  and  yet  General  Taylor  had  not  received  a  single 

G 


74  REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  CAMPAIGN. 

wagon  in  addition  to  those  with  which  he  had  left  Corpus 
Christi.1  On  the  2d  of  November  a  number  arrived,  and 
on  the  8th  a  general  order  announced  that  Saltillo,  the 
capital  of  the  State  of  Coahuila,  would  be  occupied  by  the 
United  States  troops.  On  the  12th,  the  division  under 
General  Worth  took  up  the  line  of  march  for  that  point, 
and  in  a  few  days  Saltillo  was  garrisoned  by  Worth's 
corps.  In  the  mean  time,  a  column  under  General  Wool, 
which  had  been  originally  intended  to  occupy  Chihuahua, 
changed  its  direction,  by  order  of  General  Taylor,  and 
advanced  to  the  town  of  Parras  ;  thence  it  soon  after  pro 
ceeded  to  join  General  Worth  at  Saltillo.  At  this  time, 
the  government  having  determined  to  occupy  Victoria, 
the  capital  of  the  Province  of  Tamaulipas,  a  division  of 
volunteers  under  General  Patterson  was  moved  from  the 
lower  Rio  Grande  in  that  direction  ;  and  the  brigade  of 
General  Quitman,  with  a  field  battery  from  General 
Taylor's  army,  marched  on  the  same  place,  and  occupied 
it  (Victoria)  on  the  29th  of  December  without  much  op 
position.  Tampico  was  captured  by  Commodore  Perry, 
and  garrisoned  by  the  land  forces. 

The  campaign  of  the  Rio  Grande  was  now  brought 
substantially  to  a  close.  It  commenced  in  March,  1846, 
by  the  march  of  General  Taylor  from  Corpus  Christi 
over  the  disputed  territory,  (between  the  Nueces  and  the 
Rio  Grande ;)  and  terminated  in  December  with  the 
military  occupation  of  the  Provinces  of  New  Mexico, 
New  Leon,  Coahuila,  and  Tamaulipas,  in  the  Mexican 
republic.  In  this  march  of  our  armies,  and  in  the 
battles  they  fought,  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  United 

1  General  Taylor's  letter  of  November  8th,  1846. 


REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  CAMPAIGN.  75 


States  had  signalized  themselves  for  courage,  energy,  and 
good  conduct.  They  shrank  from  no  duty  or  danger. 
They  failed  in  no  enterprise  or  conflict.  They  endured, 
without  complaint,  the  perils  of  a  climate  in  which  one- 
fifth  of  their  number  sank  to  the  grave  ;  and  they  bore 
with  equal  firmness  the  fatigues  of  marches  without  the 
proper  means  of  transportation.  This  martial  energy — 
this  firm  endurance — this  unconquerable  courage — this 
enterprise  in  war — and  this  sagacity  in  the  perception  and 
use  of  means,  thus  exhibited  on  an  extensive  scale  and  in 
a  foreign  country,  developed  new  features  in  the  American 
character — the  vast  capacity  of  the  country  for  war,  and 
the  restless  thirst  of  adventure  which  impelled  so  many 
to  volunteer  in  an  invasive  war.  This  development  of 
national  energy  was  the  only  apparent  advantage,  which 
was,  so  far,  gained  by  this  invasion.  The  plan  of  the 
campaign,  as  determined  by  the  War  Department,  though 
executed  with  great  military  skill  by  General  Taylor,  was 
necessarily  inconsequential ;  for  it  merely  caused  the  con 
quest  of  barren  territories,  at  the  distance  of  seven  hundred 
miles  from  the  enemy's  capital,  and  the  movement  of 
troops  from  a  base-line  nearly  as  far  from  our  country. 
It  led  to  no  results,  nor  to  any  valuable  purpose,  except 
that  of  maintaining  garrisons  in  a  barren  and  useless 
country. 


76  INVASION  OF  NORTHERN  MEXICO. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Government  Plan  to  invade  Northern  Mexico. — Assemblage  of  Troops  at 
Fort  Leavenworth. — Kearney's  March  to  Santa  Fe\ — Nature  of  the 
Country. — Retreat  of  the  Mexicans. — Arrival  at  Santa  Fe. — Kearney's 
Proclamation. — Kearney  departs  for  California. — Wool's  Expedition. — 
Assemblage  of  the  Troops  at  San  Antonia. — The  Object  of  the  Expe 
dition. — March  to  Monclova ;  to  Penas. — Wool  joins  Worth  at  Saltillo. 
Taylor's  March  to  Victoria. 

WHILE  General  Taylor  was  crossing  the  Rio  Grande, 
and  directing  his  columns  towards  Central  Mexico,  the 
cabinet  at  Washington  sent  two  other  columns  against  the 
northern  provinces,  under  the  command,  respectively,  of 
Generals  Kearney  and  Wool.  The  movements  of  these 
corps,  if  less  important  in  a  military  point  of  view,  were 
vastly  more  extensive  in  their  geographical  scope  and  re 
lations.  It  was  their  fortune  to  traverse  magnificent 
plains,  perform  rapid  and,  ia  modern  history,  unprece 
dented  marches,  and  conquer  to  the  dominion  of  the 
United  States  lands  unmeasured  and  almost  uninhabited. 

The  origin  of  these  expeditions  seems  to  have  been  an 
idea  entertained  by  the  administration,  that  the  States  of 
New  Mexico, — Chihuahua,  Durango,  and  others  in  the 
upper  portion  of  Mexico, — stood  ready  to  declare  them 
selves  independent,  and  that,  by  this  movement,  they 
would  be  at  once  detached  from  the  central  government. 
It  was  stated  by  some  letter-writers,  who  professed  ac 
quaintance  with  that  country,  that  those  States  were  ready 


TROOPS  COLLECTED.  77 

to  form  a  separate  and  independent  republic.  One  writer 
even  went  so  far  as  lo  declare  that  the  Mexicans  them 
selves,  in  these  provinces,  would  form  an  army  to  march 
against  the  central  government !  With  such  views,  the 
war  department  organized  a  corps,  called  the  Army  of  the 
West,1  which  was  intended  to  conquer  New  Mexico  by 
marching  into  Santa  Fe.  This  place,  though  very  unim 
portant  as  a  town,  was  a  point  of  concentration  for  the 
extensive  trade  which  flowed  through  it  from  Chihuahua 
on  the  southwest  and  St.  Louis  on  the  northeast.  Vast 
as  were  the  plains  and  uninhabited  regions  through  which 
this  trade  was  carried  on,  it  had  grown,  within  a  few 
years,  to  be  one  of  great  importance  in  magnitude  and 
value.  On  the  16th  of  May,  1846,  at  the  very  time  Con 
gress  recognised  the  existence  of  the  war,  a  company  of 
Mexican  traders  arrived  at  St.  Louis,  through  Santa  Fe, 
from  Chihuahua,  with  no  less  than  three  hundred  and 
fifty  thousand  dollars  in  specie,  to  expend  for  wares  and 
merchandise  in  the  United  States.  The  annual  trade 
from  Santa  Fe  with  St.  Louis,  Pittsburg,  and  Philadel 
phia,  was  supposed  to  be,  in  amount,  from  one  to  two 
millions  of  dollars.  That  trade  has  been  cut  off  by  the 
events  of  the  war. 

The  forces  which  were  to  compose  the  Army  of  the 
West, — almost  wholly  of  Volunteers, — commenced  as 
sembling  at  Fort  Leaven  worth  early  in  June,  1846.  Col. 
Kearney  received  his  orders  in  May,2  and  the  Missouri 
Volunteers  were  mustered  into  service  before  the  end  of 
June,  and  on  the  30th  of  June  the  entire  force  had  de 
parted.  The  corps  of  Kearney  was  composed  thus  :— 


1  Lieut.  Emory's  Journal.  '  Niles's  Register,  70,  p.  228 

G2 


78  AMOUNT  OP  THE  FORCE. 

Colonel  Price's  Regiment,  -         -       800  men. 

Doniphan's  "  -       800     " 

Major  Clarke's  Battalion,  -         -       400     " 

Sumner's  Dragoons,      -  -       200     " 

Mormon  Battalion,  -       500     " 

Total  force,  -         -  2,700     " 

A  large  part  of  this  force  were  mounted  men,  accom 
panied,  however,  by  a  regiment  of  infantry,  a  body  of 
artillery,  and  a  train  of  wagons.  The  point  of  departure 
was  Fort  Leavenworth,  on  the  Missouri  river,  and  the 
point  to  be  reached  (Santa  Fe)  was  one  thousand  miles 
distant.  For  a  greater  part  of  that  distance,  from  the 
Missouri  to  Bent's  Fort  on  the  Arkansas,  the  road  lay 
over  vast  plains,  which  had  for  ages  been  the  pasturage 
of  the  buffalo,  or  the  hunting-ground  of  the  Indian.  Short 
dry  grass,  or  sometimes  barren  ground,  with  skirts  of  trees 
in  the  valleys  of  the  streams,  made  nearly  the  whole  land 
scape  ;  while  occasionally  a  buffalo  in  the  distance,  a 
prairie-wolf  in  the  trail,  or  the  carcass  of  some  unfortu 
nate  horse  given  to  the  wild  birds  or  wilder  beasts,  gave 
variety  to  this  desolate  scene.  Bent's  Fort,  the  lonely 
plantation  of  Mr.  Bonny,  and  the  meeting  of  a  party  of 
traders,  were  the  only  signs  of  civilization.  Beyond  the 
Arkansas,  and  on  the  head-waters  of  the  Cimarou  and 
Canadian  rivers,  the  country  grows  mountainous,  and  the 
pine,  spruce,  and  other  evergreens  begin  to  give  verdure 
to  the  summits.  In  passing  a  dividing  ridge  of  these 
streams,  the  army  was  charmed  with  one  of  those  splen 
did  mountain-scenes  which  frequently  occur  in  extraor 
dinary  sublimity  on  the  spurs  of  the  Cordilleras.  It  was 
the  passage  of  the  Raton,  a  branch  of  the  great  Aztec 


COL.   KEARNEY   LEAVES  BENT  S  FORT.  !& 

mountains,  which  made  the  eastern  ridge  of  the  Rio 
Grande.  By  barometrical  observations,  the  summit  was 
7000  feet  in  height.  Towards  the  northwest,  the  lofty 
top  of  Pike's  peak  was  visible,  and  around  it  other  peaks 
whose  white  limestone  cliffs  looked  like  snow-banks  in  the 
sunbeams.  Above,  the  rocky  tops  of  the  Raton  rose  in 
perpendicular  ledges,  and  assumed  the  form  of  castles  in 
the  air,  while  all  around  nature  exhibited  a  wide  landscape 
of  wild,  various,  and  beautiful  appearances.1 

Such  scenery  in  this  desolate  region  was,  however, 
uncommon.  The  weary  soldier  had  to  pass  many  a  day's 
journey  without  water  for  his  thirst,  or  grass  for  his  beast. 
For  twenty  miles,  in  some  cases,  no  spring  was  to  be 
found.  An  eye-witness  relates,  that  in  going  from  the 
valley  of  the  Canadian,  a  traveller  might  pass  a  good  day's 
journey  without  meeting  with  either  wood,  water,  or  grass. 
Such  was  the  unfruitful  and  uninviting  country  through 
which  it  was  deemed  necessary  to  march  an  army  of  the 
United  States  for  the  conquest  of  Mexico  ! 

On  the  3d  of  August  Kearney  left  Bent's  Fort  on  the 
Arkansas,  and  in  ten  days  approached  the  Mexican  settle 
ments.  Governor  Armijo  had  previously  received  intima 
tions  of  his  approach,  and,  according  to  the  accounts  of 
traders,  had  gathered  from  the  adjacent  provinces  a  for 
midable  force.  On  the  16th  of  August  he  marched  out 
of  Santa  Fe,  and  took  post  at  a  remarkably  strong  posi 
tion.  It  was  an  eminence  commanding  a  defile  of  not 
more  than  forty  feet  in  width,  through  which  lay  the  road 
to  Santa  Fe.  Such  a  position,  with  good  troops,  might 
be  deemed  almost  impregnable.  Such  was  not  the  result. 

»  Lt.  Emory's  Journal.— Niles's  Register,  71,  p.  138 


80  SANTE  FE  CAPTURED. 

Governor  Armijo  held  a  council  of  war.  His  second  in 
command,  and  other  officers,  advised  him  against  defence. 
The  advice  was  followed.  The  Mexican  army  retreated, 
and  Arrnijo  left  the  province  for  Chihuahua  with  a  hundred 
dragoons.  In  the  mean  while  Kearney  had  arrived  at  San 
Miguel,  and  assured  the  alarmed  alcaldes,  padres,  and  other 
influential  persons,  that  he  should  protect  them  in  their 
persons,  property,  religion,  arid  liberty.  On  the  18th  of 
August  he  passed  through  the  same  defile  the  Mexicans 
had  just  left  undefended,  and  in  a  few  hours  entered  Santa 
Fe.  Marching  with  his  troops  to  the  palace,  or  govern 
or's  house,  Kearney  hoisted  the  standard  of  the  Union, 
and  firing  a  salute  of  cannon  said,  "  There,  my  guns  pro 
claim  that  the  flag  of  the  United  States  floats  over  the 
capital."1  On  the  next  day  (Aug.  19th)  the  general  ad 
dressed  the  people,  proclaimed  that  the  American  army 
came  to  establish  free  government,  offered  the  people 
protection,  and  absolved  them  from  their  allegiance  to 
their  former  government ! 

Thus  in  about  fifty  days  an  army  (which  had  been  col 
lected  in  less  than  a  month)  had  traversed  nearly  a  thou 
sand  miles  of  uninhabited  wastes,  and  proclaimed  the 
conquest  of  New  Mexico,  containing  a  surface  of  eighty 
thousand  square  miles,  though  inhabited  by  only  eighty 
thousand  people.  Considered  as  a  march  for  both  infantry 
and  artillery,  this  was  a  remarkable  achievement.  The 
result  was,  however,  as  unsatisfactory  to  the  performers 
as  it  was  fruitless  of  military  results.  Santa  Fe  offered 
neither  the  splendor  nor  pleasures  of  a  rich  and  voluptuous 
city.  It  was  a  poor  town,  badly  built,  inhabited  by  a  half- 


1  Journal  of  an  officer. — Niles,  71,  p.  83. 


FACE  OF  THE  COUNTRY.  81 

civilized  people,  in  the  midst  of  a  barren  and  uninhabited 
country.  One  of  the  travellers  in  this  expedition  thus 
writes  : — "  This  is  the  most  miserable  country  I  have  eve: 
seen.  The  houses  the  people  live  in  are  built  of  mud, 
one  story  high,  and  have  no  flooring.  They  sleep  on  the 
ground,  and  have  neither  beds,  tables,  nor  chairs."1 

This  account  probably  refers  to  the  mass  of  the  people, 
and  not  the  richer  class.  The  mud  spoken  of  is  un- 
burnt  brick.  When  the  American  officers  visited  the 
church,  they  found  it  without  seats,  except  one  long  bench 
for  the  chief  men.2 

A  few  villages  and  well-cultivated  fields  lay  within  a 
few  miles  of  Santa  Fe,  and  the  banks  of  the  Rio  Grande 
below  occasionally  presented  a  town.  But,  for  the  most 
part,  a  country  without  resources,  and  a  people  without 
civilization,  were  the  tempting  prospect  which  New  Mexico 
offered  to  her  Anglo-Saxon  invaders. 

On  the  31st  of  August,  two  weeks  after  his  arrival  at 
Santa  Fe,  Kearney  organized  an  expedition  of  nine  hun 
dred  men  to  scour  the  banks  of  the  Rio  Grande  below. 
This  work  was  done  without  a  combat,  and  without  any 
other  result  than  the  march. 

In  the  mean  while  General  Kearney,  acting,  as  he  de 
clared,  by  authority  and  under  the  instructions  of  the  ex 
ecutive  administration  of  the  United  States,  a£sumed  to 
direct  the  civil  affairs  of  New  Mexico,  and  even  to  declare 
the  assent  of  the  American  nation  to  the  incorporation  of 
New  Mexico  with  the  United  States,  and  to  absolve  its 
citizens  from  all  allegiance  to  the  Mexican  government  !3 

Niles,  71,  p.  80.  2  Diary  of  an  officer,  pp.  91,  92  ;— of  Niles  71. 

9  Kearney's  Proclamation  may  be  found  in  the  appendix  to  Young's 
History  of  Mexico. 


82 

These  occurrences  are  so  remarkable  in  American  con 
stitutional  history,  that  they  have  attracted  no  small  atten 
tion  from  the  gravest  and  most  intelligent  minds.  The 
first  in  this  series  of  novel  proceedings  in  military  history 
took  place  at  the  town  of  San  Miguel,  a  few  miles  from 
Santa  Fe,  on  the  16th  of  August.  Summoning  the  al 
calde  and  the  people  of  the  village  into  his  presence,  the 
commander  of  the  American  army  informed  them  that 
they  were  absolved  from  all  allegiance  to  the  Mexican 
government,  and  that  the  alcalde  must  swear  allegiance 
to  the  United  States  !  After  some  demur,  that  officer 
complied,  on  condition  that  his  religion  was  protected. 
The  oath  was  then  administered  in  this  form : — "  You 
swear  that  you  will  bear  true  allegiance  to  the  govern 
ment  of  the  United  States  of  America,  and  that  you  will 
defend  her  against  all  her  enemies  and  opposers,  in  the 
name  of  the  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Ghost.  Amen." 

On  the  22d  of  August,  in  Santa  Fe,  General  Kearney 
issued  a  proclamation,  entitled,  "  From  the  Army  of  the 
West  to  the  Inhabitants  of  New  Mexico."1  This  proc 
lamation  was  so  extraordinary,  that  some  paragraphs  may 
be  noted  for  the  very  novel  ideas  they  brought  before  the 
minds  of  the  American  people.  In  this  he  first  announces 
his  intention  to  hold  the  department,  with  its  "  original 
boundaries,  (on  both  sides  the  Del  Norte,)  as  a  part  of  the 
United  States,  and  under  the  name  of  the  Territory  of 
INew  Mexico/' 

He  next  informs  the  people  that  "it  is  the  wish  and  in 
tention  of  the  United  States  to  provide  for  New  Mexico 
a  free  government,  with  the  least  possible  delay,  similar 


Idem. 


ESTABLISHES  CIVIL  GOVERNMENT.  83 

to  those  in  the  United  States  ;  and  the  people  of  New 
Mexico  will  then  be  called  upon  to  exercise  the  rights  of 
freemen  in  electing  their  own  representatives  to  the  terri 
torial  legislature." 

The  most  extraordinary  passage  of  this  proclamation  is 
the  following : — 

"  The  undersigned  hereby  absolves  all  persons  residing 
within  the  boundary  of  New  Mexico  from  further  alle 
giance  to  the  republic  of  Mexico,  and  hereby  claims  them 
as  citizens  of  the  United  States.  Those  who  remain  quiet 
and  peaceable  will  be  considered  as  good  citizens,  and 
receive  protection  ;  those  who  are  found  in  arms,  or  in 
stigating  others  against  the  United  States,  will  be  consid 
ered  as  traitors,  and  treated  accordingly." 

Neither  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  nor  the 
people  by  act  of  Congress,  or  by  vote,  had  provided  any 
means  or  expressed  any  wish  for  the  annexation  of  New 
Mexico.  The  laws  of  nations  were  equally  silent  as  to 
any  mode  by  which  the  allegiance  of  a  citizen  can  be  ab 
solved  by  any  act  of  a  military  commander.  Nor  had  the 
laws  of  the  United  States  provided  any  way  by  which  a 
foreign  citizen  could  become  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  except  by  naturalization.  The  conquest  of  New 
Mexico  has  opened,  therefore,  a  new  field  for  legal  inves 
tigation,  as  well  as  a  new  chapter  in  constitutional  history 

One  month  after  these  proceedings,  (on  the  25th  of  Sep 
tember,)  when  the  sparse  population  of  that  country  seemed 
quiet,  and  the  army  found  no  other  motives  for  activity 
than  such  as  the  amusements  of  Santa  Fe  afforded,  Gen 
eral  Kearney  left  that  place,  and  with  four  hundred  dra 
goons  departed  for  California.  He  took  the  old  Copper 
mine  route,  down  the  Rio  Grande  to  Sorotto,  arid  thence 


84  ARMY  OF  THE  CENTRE. 

to  the  Pacific.  On  the  20th  of  October,  three  hundred 
miles  west  of  Santa  Fe,  he  was  informed  by  a  returning 
party  that  Fremont  had  already  taken  possession  of  Cali 
fornia.  He  then  sent  Major  Sumner  back  with  the  largest 
part  of  the  dragoons,  and  taking  only  one  hundred  with 
himself,  pursued,  with  this  small  force,  the  daring  enter 
prise  of  crossing  the  deserts  and  mountains  of  Western 
America  in  the  cold  season. 

Thus  was  effected  the  conquest  of  the  province  of  New 
Mexico  by  the  troops  of  the  United  States  :  bloodless  in 
its  achievement,  and  fruitless  of  any  immediate  results, 
but  illustrating  the  energy  of  the  American  people  in  the 
collection  and  movement  of  troops,  and  the  celerity  with 
which  the  great  western  plains  may  be  traversed  by  mili 
tary  forces. 

At  the  same  time  that  the  cabinet  at  Washington  formed 
the  plan  of  moving  a  column  on  Santa  Fe,  they  also  or 
ganized  another  against  the  Central  States  of  Mexico. 
This  was  called  the  "  Army  of  the  Centre,"  and  was  di 
rected  to  march  on  Chihuahua,  the  capital  of  the  province 
of  that  name,  and  supposed  to  be  the  centre  of  much  of  the 
Mexican  strength  and  wealth.  The  object  of  this  expe 
dition,  like  that  of  Kearney,  was  to  detach  the  northern 
and  northwestern  from  the  central  government  of  Mexico, 
and  thus  induce  that  government  to  make  peace  by  cut 
ting  off  its  resources. 

The  "  Army  of  the  Centre"  was  placed  under  the  com 
mand  of  Brigadier-general  John  E.  Wool,  one  of  the  small 
but  gallant  band  who,  by  their  heroic  stand  upon  the 
heights  of  Queenstown,  had,  even  in  defeat,  shed  lustre 
upon  the  American  arms,  and  acquired  a  lasting  distinc 
tion  for  themselves.  This  army  was  thus  composed  : — 


STRENGTH  OF  WOOL'S  COMMAND.  85 

OFFICERS    OF    THE    STAFF. 

General  John  E.  Wool — Commander. 
Colonel  Churchill — Inspector-general. 
Captain  Cross — Quartermaster. 
Captain  W.  D.  Fraser — Engineer. 

REGULAR    TROOPS. 

5  companies  U.  S.  Dragoons — Col.  Harney,        300  men. 

1  company  Artillery — Captain  Washington,  -      100     " 

2  companies  U.  S.  6th  Infantry — Capt.Bonne- 

ville,  -      100     " 

VOLUNTEERS. 

1  regiment  of  Arkansas  Cavalry — Col.  Yell,  -  750  " 

2  regiments  of  Illinois  Infantry — Col.  Hardin,  1,600  " 
1  company  Kentucky  Cavalry — Capt.  Wil 
liams,  90  " 

Total  forces  -  2,940     " 

These  troops  were  directed  by  the  War  Department  to 
assemble  at  Antonio  de  Bexar,  on  the  river  Antonio,  and 
thence  proceed  to  Chihuahua  by  Presidio  Rio  Grande. 
At  the  time  the  orders  for  their  assembling  were  given, 
these  troops  were  in  different  parts  of  the  United  States, 
remote  from  each  other  and  remote  from  the  point  of  ren 
dezvous.  Their  marches,  and  the  celerity  and  exactness 
of  their  movement  and  assembling,  are  among  the  remark 
able  incidents  of  the  war  with  Mexico.  The  Illinois  regi 
ments  proceeded  by  water,  in  steamboats,  down  the  Mis 
sissippi,  and  by  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  to  Lavaca  on  Mata- 
ijorda  Bay.  Here  they  commenced  their  march  to  San 
Antonio. 

H 


86  CONCENTRATES  AT  SAN   ANTONIO. 

The  Illinois  regiments  arrived  at  Pallida  Creek,  twelve 
miles  from  Lavaca,  on  the  7th  of  August,  and  on  the 
llth  commenced  their  march  to  Antonio  de  Bexar.  The 
route  to  Antonio  was  through  a  dry  prairie,  crossing  the 
head-streams  of  the  Antonio  and  the  river  Guadaloupe, 
along  whose  banks  alone  the  thirsty  and  tired  soldier 
might  expect  to  find  water  and  shade.  A  writer,  who  was 
a  member  of  the  Illinois  troops,  thus  speaks  of  this  tedious 
march:  "Heat — heat — heat;  rain — rain — rain;  mud — 
mud — mud,  intermingled  with  spots  of  sand  and  gravel, 
form  the  principal  features  of  the  route  from  Levacca  to 
San  Antonio.  Loaded  wagons  of  course  move  slowly 
over  the  roads,  and  our  troops  were  moreover  scourged 
on  the  route  by  the.  mumps  and  the  measles."1 

These  regiments  arrived  at  Antonio  de  Bexar  (the  place 
of  rendezvous)  before  the  1st  of  September:  so  did  all 
the  corps  who  were  to  assemble  there.  The  movement 
of  these  bodies  was  quite  remarkable.  Captain  Wash 
ington  with  the  regular  artillery  had  gone  from  Carlisle 
Barracks,  Pennsylvania,  two  thousand  miles,  and  arrived 
on  the  31st  of  August.  Major  Bonneville  made  eight 
hundred  miles  in  six  weeks  with  the  infantry,  and  arrived 
on  the  27th  of  August.  Colonel  Yell,  with  the  Arkansas 
cavalry,  arrived  from  Washington,  Arkansas,  on  the  28th. 
Thus,  after  these  immense  marches,  did  the  troops  of 
Wool's  army  concentrate,  with  remarkable  precision,  at 
the  place  of  rendezvous,  prepared  to  march  into  the  terri 
tories  of  Mexico. 

The  extent  of  these  marches  and  the  extreme  barren 
ness  of  the  country  through  which  the  route  lay,  after 


1  "  Rondenac"  to  the  National  Intelligencer. — Niles's  Register,  71,  p.  90. 


MARCH  UPON  CHIHUAHUA.  87 

leaving  the  Mississippi,  made  this  expedition  one  of  great 
expense  and  difficulty  in  its  transportation.  The  real  base 
line  upon  which  an  army  operates,  is  that  which  contains 
the  depots  of  subsistence.  In  this  instance,  as  throughout 
the  war  with  Mexico,  those  depots  were  on  the  Missis 
sippi  river  and  the  cities  of  the  Atlantic  coast.  The  same 
writer  whom  we  have  quoted  says,  "  Forage  and  subsist 
ence  for  the  entire  army  are  derived  from  New  York, 
Baltimore,  and  New  Orleans.  The  transportation  by 
water,  therefore,  exceeds  thousands  of  miles,  while  the 
total  of  land  transportation  may  be  found  among  the  hun 
dreds.  The  bare  cost  of  bringing  a  bushel  of  corn  from 
Lavaca  to  this  place  (Antonio)  is  $1.20,  and  other  sup 
plies  in  proportion."  This  fact  at  once  illustrates  the  ex 
pense  which  invariably  attends  the  march  of  an  army 
through  barren  countries. 

Assembled  at  Antonio,  the  army  was  now  ready  to 
commence  its  march  against  Chihuahua.  But  with  what 
object  1  The  declared  object  was  to  aid  in  establishing 
the  independence  of  the  northern  States,  and  thus  act 
against  the  central  government  of  Mexico.  But  was  this 
a  probable  result  ?  The  same  writer  already  quoted  per 
tinently  asks,  "  Are  the  people  of  the  United  States  pur 
suing  a  war  of  conquest,  of  propagandism,  or  of  necessity? 
Do  they  hope  to  convert  provinces  to  their  political  faith 
by  sending  forth  among  them  an  armed  soldiery  to  quicken 
their  conclusions,  and  give  energy  to  their  admiration  ? 
Are  they  desirous,  by  a  grand  military  display,  to  exhibit 
to  the  Mexicans  the  vast  superiority  of  their  free  institu 
tions  over  their  more  humble  neighbors  ?  Do  they  hope, 
by  a  series  of  marches  and  counter-marches,  by  glittering 
bayonets  and  flashing  sabres,  by  waving  banners  and  the 


88  WHAT  WERE  THE   OBJECTS. 

clangor  of  martial  music,  to  intimidate  a  people  too  proud 
to  work  and  almost  too  poor  to  be  pitied  ?  Do  they  wish, 
by  a  lavish  expenditure  of  public  funds,  to  bribe  a  whole 
nation  to  throw  off  its  allegiance  ?  Are  we  to  plant  our 
flags  at  Presidio  Rio  Grande, — beat  our  drums  at  San 
Fernando,  Santa  Rosa,  and  Monclova, — carry  the  tramp 
of  our  war-steeds  through  Baria,  Saledo,  San  Carlos,  and 
Chericotti,  and  let  the  thunders  of  our  artillery  roll  within 
the  walls  of  Chihuahua  merely  to  demonstrate  the  mili 
tary  prowess  of  a  great  nation,  and  the  inherent  energies 
of  a  free  people  ?  So  far  as  can  be  seen  or  known  at 
present,  these  are  the  sole  objects  of  the  expedition,  con 
ceived  in  folly,  and  which  has  already  cost  millions  of  the 
national  treasury,  although  it  has  not  yet  passed  the 
threshold."1 

The  language  of  this  writer,  although  strong,  was  pro 
phetic.  The  expedition  pursued  the  route,  and  was  at 
tended  with  no  other  results  than  those  which  these  ques 
tions  indicate.  Early  in  September,  the  division  of  Wool 
took  up  its  line  of  march  from  San  Antonio  for  the  Pre 
sidio  Rio  Grande,  passing,  in  most  of  the  distance,  over 
the  same  dry  and  uninviting  plains  as  those  which  the 
Illinois  Regiments  had  passed  from  Lavaca  to  San  Anto 
nio.  Crossing  the  Rio  Grande  at  the  Presidio,  General 
Wool  and  his  corps  pushed  on  by  long  and  wearisome 
inarches  to  the  village  of  Santa  Rosa.  Here  it  was  discov 
ered  that  the  geographical  knowledge  of  the  War  Depart 
ment  was  by  no  means  equal  to  its  martial  energies. 
Looking  to  the  west  for  the  road  to  Chihuahua  the  army 
beheld  in  front  the  lofty  mountain-range  of  the  Sierra 


1  Letter  of  "  Rondenac"  to  the  National  Intelligencer. 


ARRIVED  AT  SIERRA  GORDA.  89 

Gorda,  lifting  their  summits  four  thousand  feet  above  the 
level  of  the  plains  !  The  officer  of  Topographical  En 
gineers  in  vain  looks  for  a  single  defile  through  which  the 
urmy  may  pass  to  the  west.1  It  is  compelled  to  turn 
south  towards  Saltillo.  On  the  29th  of  October,  six 
weeks  after  leaving  the  Rio  Grande,  it  reaches  Monclova, 
one  of  the  principal  towns  of  Coahuila.  Here  the  troops 
were  received  in  a  friendly  manner,  the  Prefect  content 
ing  himself  simply  with  a  protest  against  the  occupation 
of  the  Mexican  country.  For  a  month  the  army  con 
tinued  to  enjoy  the  Mexican  hospitalities  as  if  no  hostili 
ties  interrupted  the  harmony  of  the  respective  nations. 
The  soldiers  of  Wool's  corps  acted  as  the  armed  watch 
men  of  Coahuila.  The  robber  and  the  savage  alike  fled 
from  the  drum-beat  of  the  guard  and  the  echoes  of  the 
bugle.  The  discipline  of  the  army  was  equal  to  its  en 
ergy  ;  and  the  inhabitants  around  slept  peacefully  while 
the  conquering  invader  unfurled  his  flag  along  the  base  of 
the  Sierra  Gorda. 

At  length  General  Wool,  writing  to  General  Taylor,  in 
quired — "  What  is  to  be  gained  by  going  to  Chihuahua  ?" 
General  Taylor,  then  about  to  occupy  the  state  of  Ta- 
maulipas  by  marching  to  Victoria,  replied,  that  he  (Wool) 
should  abandon  the  expedition  to  Chihuahua,  and  advance 
with  his  column  to  Parras,  a  place  still  further  to  the 
south,  and  not  very  distant  from  Saltillo.  Here  the  army 
remained  for  a  short  time,  till,  in  the  month  of  December, 
it  joined  the  division  of  Worth,  in  the  town  of  Saltillo. 
The  object  of  the  enterprise, — the  conquest  of  Chihuahua, 


Report  of  Captain  Hughes,  of  the  Topographical  Corps,  February, 

1847. 

H2 


90  GENERAL  WOOL  MARCHES  TO  PARRAS. 

— had  previously  been  abandoned  ;  but  this  division,  which 
had  so  far  been  employed  only  in  marches,  was  soon  to 
appear,  under  the  able  Wool  and  the  veteran  Taylor,  vic 
torious  on  the  bloody  and  memorable  field  of  Buena 
Vista.1 

The  march  of  Wool,  like  that  of  Kearney,  was  re 
markable  for  the  steadiness  and  celerity  with  which  new 
troops,  of  all  the  different  arms,  traversed  vast  deserts 
uninhabited,  and  unsupplied,  except  by  provisions  brought 
from  the  interior  of  the  United  States.  By  the  route  pur 
sued  it  was  seven  hundred  miles  from  San  Antonio  de 
Bexar  to  Saltillo,  and  this  distance,  deducting  the  period 
at  Moriclova  and  Parras,  was  performed  in  about  six 
weeks. 

General  Wool  arrived  just,  in  time  at  Saltillo  to  meet 
the  intentions  of  General  Taylor,  and  prepare  for  the 
events  which  followed. 

The  commander  on  the  Rio  Grande  had  proceeded  with 
a  large  body  of  troops  to  meet  another  corps,  under  Gen 
eral  Patterson,  marching  from  Matamoras  to  occupy  Vic 
toria,  the  capital  of  the  state  of  Tamaulipas.  At  Monte- 
morlos,  sixty-eight  miles  from  Monterey,  Taylor  was  in 
formed  that  Santa  Anna  was  about  to  move  on  Saltillo, 
with  a  view  to  attack  Worth.  This  recalled  him,  with 
the  regulars,  to  Monterey.  Generals  Patterson  and  Quit- 
man  proceeded  to  Victoria,  and  ultimately  to  Tampico, 
where  they  made  a  portion  of  the  army  of  Scott,  and 
took  part  in  the  brilliant  and  successful  siege  and  cap 
ture  of  Vera  Cruz. 


1  The  Illinois  Regiments,  the  Arkansas  Regiment,  and  Washington's 
Artillery,  were  in  the  battle  of  Buena  Vista,  and  constituted  one-third  oi 
Taylor's  army. 


EXPEDITION  OF  CAPTAIN  FREMONT.  91 


CHAPTER   VI. 

Expedition  of  Captain  Fremont. — Arrives  at  Monterey,  California. — Sus 
picions  of  Governor  de  Castro. — Fremont  takes  position. — Returns  by 
Oregon. — Returns  again  to  Monterey. — Is  threatened  by  De  Castro. — 
Declares  War. — Capture  of  Mexicans. — Sails  from  Monterey  to  Diego. 
— Capture  of  the  City  of  Angels. — Conquest  of  California. — Object  of 
the  Government. — Marcy's  Letter  to  Stevenson. — Marcy's  Orders  to 
Kearney. — Scott's  Orders. — Insurrection  in  New  Mexico. — Murder  of 
Bent. — Battle  of  Canada. — Battle  of  Pueblo  de  Taos. — Insurrection  in 
California. — March  of  Doniphan. — Battle  of  Brozitos. — Capture  of  El 
Paso. — Battle  of  Sacramento. — Capture  of  Chihuahua. — March  to  Sal- 
tillo. — Arrival  at  New  Orleans. — March  of  Gilpin  to  the  Rocky  Moun 
tains. 

IN  the  autumn  of  1845,  Captain  Fremont,  of  the  To 
pographical  Corps  of  Engineers,  set  out  with  an  armed 
party  of  men,  prepared  for  hunting  and  Indian  warfare,  to 
cross  the  mountains  and  penetrate  the  interior  of  Califor 
nia.  This  officer  had  been  greatly  distinguished  in  a  pre 
vious  expedition  for  bold  enterprise,  scientific  attainments, 
and  interesting  researches  amidst  the  wilderness  of  Rocky 
Mountains.  The  ostensible  object  of  his  present  journey 
was  to  seek  a  new  route  to  Oregon,  further  south  than  the 
one  heretofore  travelled  by  emigrants,  and  to  seek  also 
scientific  discoveries  amidst  these  unknown  and  unde- 
scribed  regions  of  the  west.  His  well-known  love  of 
science,  and  his  hitherto  scrupulous  conduct,  afford  strong 
presumption  that  such  was  the  real  purpose  of  his  mission. 

He  pursued  his  journey,  undisturbed  by  any  extraor 
dinary  events,  till,  on  the  29th  of  January,  1846,  he  ar- 


ARRIVES  AT  MONTEREY. 

rived  in  the  neighborhood  of  Monterey,  California.  To 
avoid  suspicion,  or  collision,  he  left  his  party  about  one 
hundred  miles  from  Monterey,  and  proceeded  alone  to  that 
place  to  explain  the  object  of  his  visit.  Here  he  proceed 
ed  to  the  house  of  the  American  consul,  (Mr.  Larkin,) 
and  then  called  upon  the  governor,  De  Castro.  The 
governor  complained  that  he  (Fremont)  was  bringing  an 
armed  force  into  the  province  with  hostile  views.  To 
this  Captain  Fremont  replied,  that  he  was  not  even  an 
officer  of  the  line,  but  belonged  to  the  Topographical 
Corps,  and  that  his  object  was  to  survey  a  new  route  to 
Oregon  in  a  more  southerly  direction,  his  visit  being 
peaceful,  and  that  he  desired  to  winter  in  the  valley  of 
the  San  Joaquin.  To  this  the  governor  assented.  Cap 
tain  Fremont  then  returned  and  brought  his  men  nearer  to 
the  town,  when  he  was  informed  that  the  governor  was 
raising  troops  to  attack  him,  and  warned  by  Mr.  Larkin 
(the  consul)  of  his  danger.  Thus  warned,  he  took  post, 
with  his  small  party  of  sixty  men,  on  the  summit  of  the 
Sierra,  at  a  point  about  thirty  miles  from  Monterey,  and 
overlooking  that  town.  Here,  in  the  clear  sky  of  the  Pa 
cific,  and  on  this  height,  he  could  observe  De  Castro  pre 
paring  his  men  to  march  upon  the  American  camp.  Here 
he  hoisted  the  flag  of  the  United  States,  and  informed  the 
Mexican  that  he  wrould  defend  the  post  to  the  last.  His 
intention  was,  if  attacked  and  defeated,  there  to  die  with 
his  companions  on  the  spot  where  they  had  hoisted  the 
flag,  and  leave  to  their  country  to  avenge  their  death  and 
vindicate  their  conduct.1  This  fate  was  fortunately  avoid- 


1   Benton'i  Letter  to  the  President,  published  in  the  '•  Uiiicm,"  Novem 
ber  9th,  1846. 


FREMONT  DEPARTS  FOR  OREGON.  99 

ed.N  De  Castro  marched  out,  but  did  not  attack  them. 
Fremont,  finding  himself  not  attacked,  marched  out  of  his 
position  on  the  10th  of  March,  by  the  valley  of  San  Joa- 
quin,  and  commenced  his  march,  by  slow  degrees,  towards 
Oregon.  On  the  following  morning  De  Castro  took  pos 
session  of  his  camp,  and  finding  some  old  vessels  or 
other  camp  luggage,  boasted  of  the  flight  of  the  Ameri 
cans  ! 

On  the  1st  of  April  Fremont  had  reached  lat.  40°  in 
the  valley  of  the  Sacramento.  On  the  14th  of  May  he 
was  on  the  direct  route  to  Oregon.  On  the  15th  he  ar 
rived  at  the  Great  Tlamath  Lake.  Here  he  found  the 
mountains  of  the  Sierra  Nevada  in  front  covered  with 
snow,  and  himself  and  party  surrounded  by  hostile  In 
dians.  In  this  condition  of  affairs  he  determined  to  re 
turn  back  by  the  river  Sacramento.  On  his  arrival  at  the 
Bay  of  Francisco,  he  learns  that  Governor  de  Castro  is  at 
Zanona,  on  the  opposite  side,  preparing  an  expedition 
against  the  American  settlers.  Under  all  the  circumstan 
ces  of  the  case  he  determined,  on  the  6th  day  of  June, 
to  overturn,  if  possible,  the  Mexican  government  in  Cali 
fornia.  At  that  time  the  war  with  Mexico  actually  exist 
ed,  and  two  battles  had  been  fought  on  the  Rio  Grande  ; 
but  with  this  fact  Captain  Fremont  was  not  acquainted. 
He  formed  his  judgment  on  the  circumstances  around 
him,  and  not  on  any  of  the  previous  events  connected 
with  military  operations.1 

A  party  of  De  Castro's  men  having  crossed  the  Bay, 
Fremont's  men  captured  fourteen,  with  two  hundred 
mules.  On  the  1st  of  June  he  surprised  and  took  the 


Colonel  Beaton's  Lettei  to  the  President. 


94  RETURNS  AND  TAKES  ZANONA. 

military  post  at  Zanona.  Colonel  Vallejo  and  several 
officers  were  taken,  with  nine  cannon,  and  two  hundred 
and  fifty  stand  of  arms.  From  this  he  proceeded  to  the 
Rio  de  los  Americanos  for  assistance.  There  lie  heard 
that  De  Castro  was  about  to  attack  his  little  garrison  ot 
only  fourteen  men,  at  Zanona.  On  the  23d  of  June  he 
started  with  ninety  mounted  riflemen  to  their  aid.  Riding 
night  and  day  he  arrived  on  the  25th,  a  distance  of  eighty 
miles.  De  Castro's  vanguard  of  seventy  men  was  at 
tacked  and  defeated  by  twenty  Americans.  About  this 
time  two  Americans  were  taken  by  Torre,  the  comman 
der  of  the  Mexican  party,  and  cut  to  pieces.  In  return, 
Fremont  took  and  shot  three  of  Torre's  men. 

On  the  4th  of  July  Fremont  assembled  the  Americans 
in  that  neighborhood  at  Zanona,  and  after  making  a  speech, 
he  and  his  companions  declared  the  Independence  of  Cali 
fornia.  A  few  days  after  this  news  came  from  Commo 
dore  Sloat,  that  the  American  flag  was  hoisted  at  Monte 
rey.  Fremont  then  set  out  with  one  hundred  and  sixty 
riflemen  in  pursuit  of  De  Castro,  who  was  retreating  with 
four  hundred  men.  From  this  he  is  recalled  by  Commo 
dore  Sloat.  On  his  return  to  Monterey  he  found  Stockton 
in  command,  who  was  preparing  a  new  expedition  by 
water.  By  sailing  down  the  coast  he  thought  he  might 
cut  off  De  Castro's  retreat,  who  was  moving  southward 
ly  to  the  lower  posts.1  On  the  26th  of  July  Fremont 
sailed  in  the  sloop-of-war  Cyane,  with  one  hundred  and 
sixty  riflemen  and  seventy  marines,  the  object  being  the 
port  of  San  Diego,  which  it  was  supposed  would  oe 
reached  in  time  to  cut  offDe  Castro. 


Colonel  Beaton's  Letter. 


CALIFORNIA  CONQUERED.  95 

At  this  time  Governor  de  Castro  was  encamped  at. 
Mera,  three  miles  from  Ciudad  de  los  Angelos.  In  a  few 
days  after  the  departure  of  PVemont,  Stockton  sailed 
in  the  frigate  Congress  for  the  position  of  De  Castro. 
When  the  latter  heard  of  the  approach  of  the  American 
forces,  he  broke  up  his  camp  and  proceeded  to  Mexico, 
while  his  officers  and  men  were  scattered  in  different  di 
rections.  On  the  13th  of  August,  1846,  Stockton  being 
joined  by  Captain  (now  Colonel)  Fremont,  with  Mr.  Lar- 
kin,  late  American  consul,  entered  the  City  of  Angels,  the 
capital  of  the  Californias.1  Thus  was  completed,  in  a 
brief  campaign,  and  with  scarcely  any  bloodshed,  the  con 
quest  of  the  Californias. 

On  the  coast,  the  squadron  under  Commodore  Sloat 
had  taken  the  initial,  and  on  the  6th  of  July,  1846,  had 
hoisted  the  flag  of  the  United  States  at  Monterey.  On 
the  22d  of  July,  Commodore  Stockton  assumed  the  com 
mand  of  the  naval  forces,  and  he,  with  Fremont,  com 
pleted,  as  we  have  seen,  the  overturn  of  the  Mexican 
government  in  California.  General  Kearney  did  not  ar 
rive  from  his  overland  journey  till  these  transactions  were 
completed.  Since  then,  controversies  have  arisen  between 
the  distinguished  commanders  on  that  station — Fremont 
and  Kearney — in  relation  to  their  respective  duties  and 
commands.  The  events  in  which  they  were  engaged  have 
become  memorable  from  their  connection  with  the  first 
footsteps  and  conquering  march  of  that  great  nation  which 
claims  from  destiny  the  dominion  of  the  North  American 
continent.  In  the  traceway  of  these  wild  wilderness  paths, 
some  historian  of  after  times  may  discover  the  steps  by 


1   Niles's  Register,  71,  p.  1?5. 


96  THE  PRESIDENT'S  VIEWS. 

which  a  nation,  ascended  to  imperial  grandeur  and  liberty, 
pursued  the  stream  of  civilization  round  the  earth. 

The  object  of  the  American  government,  so  far  as  the 
President  can  control  its  operations,  is  discovered  in  the 
instructions  to  its  officers.  While  disclaiming  conquest 
as  the  motive  or  object  of  the  war,  the  executive  of  the 
United  States  furnished  recorded  proof  that  permanent 
conquest  was  intended  to  be  its  result.  In  the  summer 
of  1846,  a  regiment  of  volunteers  was  raised  in  the  city 
of  New  York,  commanded  by  Colonel  J.  D.  Stevenson. 
The  object  of  this  regiment  was  for  some  time  unknown 
to  the  public.  It  was  at  length  embarked  for  California. 
In  the  correspondence  of  the  War  Department  subse 
quently  published,  a  letter  from  the  Secretary  (Marcy) 
disclosed  the  intentions  of  the  President.  Speaking  of 
the  composition  of  this  regiment,  the  Secretary  says  : — 
"  The  President  expects,  and  indeed  requires,  that  great 
care  should  be  taken  to  have  it  composed  of  suitable  per 
sons — I  mean  of  good  habits  ;  as  far  as  practicable  of 
various  pursuits,  and  such  as  would  be  likely  to  remain,  at 
the  end  of  the  war,  either  in  Oregon  or  in  any  other  ter 
ritory  in  that  region  of  the  globe  which  may  then  be  a 
part  of  the  United  States."1  This  regiment,  then,  were 
to  act  as  pioneers  in  the  work  of  conquest  and  coloniza 
tion. 

The  directions  given  by  Secretary  Marcy  to  General 
Kearney,  in  forming  the  new  government,  assimilate  them 
selves  to  this  purpose.  In  his  letter  of  the  3d  June,  1846, 
he  says — "  You  will  establish  temporary  civil  govern 
ments  therein,  abolishing  all  arbitrary  restrictions  that  may 


1  Appendix  to  the  Congressional  Globe,  1845-6,  p.  80y. 


INSTRUCTIONS  OF  THE  SECRETARY.  97 

exist,  so  far  as  it  can  be  done  with  safety."  You  may 
"  continue  existing  officers,  if  they  will  take  the  oath  of 
allegiance  to  the  United  States.'* — "Assure  them  it  is  the 
wish  and  design  of  the  United  States  to  provide  for  them 
a  free  government." — "  They  will  then  be  called  upon  to 
exercise  the  rights  of  freemen."1 

At  this  time  Mexico  was  a  free  country,  so  far  as  a 
written  republican  Constitution  could  make  her  so.  To 
offer  the  people  of  that  country  freedom,  then,  could  have 
no  possible  meaning,  unless  it  was  meant  to  bring  it 
within  the  limits  of  the  peculiar  government  of  the  United 
States.  Much  less  could  any  other  construction  be  put 
upon  the  phrase — "  called  upon  to  exercise  the  rights  of 
freemen." 

The  oath  of  allegiance,  too,  which  by  the  laws  of  na 
tions  could  not  be  deprived  of  its  legal  virtue  by  any  action 
of  a  foreign  nation,  and,  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  could  not  be  made  void  in  this  country,  except  by 
an  act  of  naturalization,  was  thus,  by  the  order  of  a  Pres 
ident,  to  be  made  void  by  a  compulsory  oath  to  the  United 
States  !  The  novelty  of  such  a  doctrine,  if  not  its  utter 
contempt  of  the  civil  law  of  this  country  and  the  public 
law  of  nations,  attracted  the  attention  of  grave  statesmen 
and  of  earnest  patriots.  It  was  sought,  by  the  friends  of 
the  President,  to  explain  the  meaning  of  these  documents, 
so  that  they  might  not  appear  in  opposition  to  the  theory 
and  Constitution  of  American  government ;  but,  however 
explained,  these  orders  and  proclamations  yet  remain 
among  the  most  extraordinary  movements  of  an  extraor 
dinary  war.2 

1  Marcy's  Letter,  3d  June,  1846. 

a  General  Scott,  in  his  official  orders,  while  complying  with  the  geu- 

i  7 


98  MEASURES  TEND  TO  INSURRECTION. 

The  conquest  of  New  Mexico,  which  we  have  seen  com 
pleted  under  General  Kearney,  though  apparently  blood 
less,  was  yet  to  be  attended  by  conflicts,  if  less  sanguinary, 
yet  more  interesting  than  the  common  events  of  war.  On 
the  19th  of  January,  1847,  a  violent  and  totally  unexpected 
insurrection  against  the  American  authorities  took  place  at 
Taos,  in  New  Mexico.  The  origin  and  progress  of  this 
outbreak  appears,  by  evidence  subsequently  given,  to  have 
been  this  : — In  pursuance  of  the  principles  stated  in  the 
proclamations  before  referred  to,  and  of  orders  expressly 
given  by  the  President,  Kearney  had  proceeded  to  organize 
a  civil  government.  He  had  appointed  a  governor,  sheriff, 
district  attorney,  and  other  functionaries  ;  as  if  the  general 
of  an  army,  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  could  have 
any  other  than  military  authority,  or  become  by  any  means 
the  source  of  a  civil  authority  which,  in  the  very  nation  he 
represented,  could  be  conferred  only  through  the  laws. 
These  civil  functionaries,  thus  appointed,  went  quietly  to 
work,  as  if  they  were  in  one  of  the  States  of  the  Ameri 
can  Union :  unconscious  that  the  passions  of  a  hostile 
people,  the  jealousy  of  displaced  officers,  or  the  violation 


eral  direction  of  the  President  to  occupy  the  country,  seems  to  have  dis 
creetly  avoided  in  his  language  the  absurdity  involved  in  these  proclama 
tions,  and  in  the  order  of  Marcy  on  which  they  were  founded.  In  Scott's 
Order  to  Kearney,  dated  November  3d,  1846,  he  says: — "  You  will  erect 
and  garrison  durable  defences  for  holding  the  bays  of  Monterey  and  San 
Francisco,  together  with  such  other  important  points  in  the  same  province 
as  you  may  deem  it  necessary  to  occupy" — "  You  will  not,  however,  for 
mally  declare  the  province  to  be  annexed.  Permanent  incorporation  of 
the  territory  must  depend  on  the  government  of  the  United  States."  Ir, 
this  language  General  Scott  avoids  the  absurdities  of  the  proclamation, 
and  recognises  the  fundamental  distinction  between  the  orders  of  the  Pres 
ident  and  the  ipgisiaiion  of  Congress. 


INSURRECTION  AT  TAGS.  99 

of  national  usages,  could  arouse  the  indignation  of  the  in 
vaded  people,  or  expose  them  to  more  than  common  dan 
gers  !  They  were  mistaken  in  fact,  as  they  were  incautious 
in  conduct.  The  displaced  officers  and  the  national  pride 
occasioned  a  conspiracy  to  overthrow  the  American  power 
in  New  Mexico.  It  appears  from  testimony  that  Thomas 
Cortez,  Diego  Archillette,  Pino,  Armijo,  and  others  formed 
a  plan  for  a  general  insurrection  and  overthrow  of  the 
Americans  on  Christmas  night.  This  failed,  or  rather, 
was  postponed.  On  the  15th  of  January,  however,  a 
tragedy  occurred  which  startled  the  Americans,  both  in 
NewMexico  and  in  the  United  States.  On  that  night,  Gov 
ernor  Charles  Bent,  with  Elliott  the  sheriff,  and  twenty- 
three  others,  were  murdered  in  the  town  of  San  Fernando 
de  Taos.  Seven  others  were  killed  at  Turley's,  eight 
miles  from  Taos,  in  the  valley  of  the  Moro.1  In  a  short 
time  the  insurrection  became  general,  and  Col.  Sterling 
Price,  who  commanded  the  troops  at  Santa  Fe,  learned 
that  a  strong  body  of  Mexicans  and  Indians  were  advan 
cing  against  the  place.  Mustering  nearly  four  hundred 
troops — cavalry,  infantry,  and  artillery — he  marched  out 
to  meet  them  on  the  23d  of  January.  He  found  them 
posted,  in  a  strong  position,  on  the  heights  and  in  houses 
below,  in  front  of  the  village  of  Covoda.  The  battle  com 
menced  with  a  cannonade  and  general  firing,  which  lasted 
for  an  hour  and  a  half.  Colonel  Price  then  ordered  a 
general  discharge  upon  the  houses  and  lines  of  the  enemy. 
They  were  soon  dispersed  in  every  direction.2  The  Mex 
ican  force  engaged  was  supposed  to  be  fifteen  hundred 

1  Lt.  Abort's  Letter  of  February  20th,  in  the  Union. 

2  Colonel  Price's  Despatch,  15th  February,  1847. 


100  ATTACK  ON  PUEBLO  DE  TAGS. 

men.  Their  loss  was  thirty-six.  That  of  the  Americans 
two  killed  and  six  wounded. 

On  the  27th  of  January  Colonel  Price  marched  lo  Lu- 
ceros,  on  the  Rio  Grande,  and  on  the  29th  to  La  Joya,  a 
strong  pass,  situated  in  a  canon,  or  deep  pass  of  the  moun 
tains,  w"here  the  men  could  scarcely  move  abreast.  Along 
the  slopes  of  the  mountains  the  enemy  were  posted,  and 
there  they  were  attacked  by  a  detachment  under  Captain 
Burgwin  of  one  hundred  and  eighty  men,  who,  after  a  short 
conflict,  dislodged  them,  with  the  loss  to  the  Mexicans  of 
twenty  killed  and  sixty  wounded.1  On  the  1st  of  Febru 
ary  the  main  body  of  the  forces,  under  Colonel  Price, 
reached  the  top  of  the  Taos  mountain,  which  was  cov 
ered  with  snow  two  feet  deep.  On  the  2d  they  quartered 
at  Rio  Chiciti.  On  the  3d  they  entered  the  town  of  Don 
Fernando  de  Taos,  which  was  the  scene  of  the  massacre 
of  Governor  Bent  and  party.  The  Mexican  village  was 
abandoned  by  the  enemy,  who  had  taken  post  at  the  In 
dian  town  of  Pueblo  de  Taos.  This  was  a  strongly-for 
tified  post.  The  key  to  the  position  was  a  large  church, 
and  twb  large  buildings  ascending  in  a  pyramidal  form,  six 
or  seven  stories  high,  and  pierced  with  embrasures  for 
rifles.  Around  these  was  a  wall,  and  within  them  the 
enemy  had  taken  post.  The  Americans  brought  up  a  six- 
pounder  and  a  howitzer,  with  which  they  battered  the 
church  and  walls  for  two  hours  ;  but  their  ammunition- 
wagons  not  having  come  up,  they  retreated  to  Fernando. 

On  the  morning  of  the  4th,  at  nine  A.  M.,  the  Americans 
again  advanced,  determined  to  take  the  place.  The  six- 
pounder  and  two  howitzers,  commanded  by  Lieutenant 

1  Colonel  Price's  Despatch,  15th  February,  1847. 


PUEBLO  DE  TAGS  TAKEN.  101 

Dyer,  of  the  Ordnance,  were  brought  to  bear  against  the 
church  on  one  side,  and  two. howitzers  on  another  side. 
After  battering  for  two  hours  a  charge  was  made  by  Cap 
tain  Burgwln,  of  the  Dragoons,  witn  two  companies  hi  one 
line,  and  Captain  Angrecy,  with  three  companies  in  an 
other  line.1  In  this  assault  Captain  Burgwin,  a  lieiftsjiant 
of  volunteers,  and  several  dragoons"  J#4i£  killed.  T^he 
church  walls  were  still  impenetrated  by  /die •  ,AflifteV$. 
Ladders  were  made,  and  a  small' tiole  •  cut  'with'*  axe's';' 
through  that,  fire  was  thrown  into  the  church.  A  new  as 
sault  was  made  upon  the  church  door,  which  failed,  with 
loss.2  The  six-pounder  was  then  run  up,  at  half-past 
three  p.  M.,  within  sixty  yards,  and  a  breach  made  large 
enough  to  admit  four  men  abreast.  A  storming  party 
then  entered  the  church,  which  was  found  full  of  smoke. 
The  enemy  still  occupied  the  two  large  buildings ;  but 
early  next  morning,  the  aged  men  and  women,  bearing 
their  children,  images,  and  crosses,  came  out  to  meet  the 
army,  begging  for  mercy.  The  request  was  granted.  In 
this  battle  the  Americans  were  about  four  hundred  and 
fifty ;  the  Mexicans  about  six  hundred.  The  Ameri 
can  loss  was  fifty-four  killed  and  wounded ;  that  of 
the  Mexicans  one  hundred  and  fifty-two  killed  and 
many  wounded.  Taken,  as  a  whole,  the  short  cam 
paign  of  Colonel  Price,  with  Captain  Burgwin  and  others, 
from  the  20th  of  January  to  the  5th  of  February,  1847, 
was  one  of  the  best  exhibitions  of  military  gallantry  which 
has  occurred  in  the  minor  parts  of  the  war.  Marching 
in  midwinter  over  snow-covered  ground,  they  three  times 


1  Letter  of  Lieutenant  A.  B.  Dyer. 

8  Colonel  Price's  Report,  15th  February,  1847. 


102  DIFFICULTIES  IN  CALIFORNIA. 

engaged  the  enemy ;  and  in  the  lust  conflict,  stormed  and 
carried  a  very  strong  military  position  against  superior 
numbers. 

During  the  winter  of  1846-7  the  Californians,  either  not 
properly  understanding  or  not  impressed  with  the  value  of 
an  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  government  of  the  United 
State?,  also  rose:  i$  .'insurrection.  At  the  City  of  Angels, 
and  other  points',  the  flag  of  the  United  States  was  torn 
.3ewny,-afid;that  of.  ]Vf«xicp  hoisted  in  its  place.  In  No 
vember,  1846,  an  action  occurred  at  Domingos  Rancho, 
between  a  party  from  the  United  States  frigate  Savannah 
and  a  portion  of  the  Californians.  The  latter  were  forti 
fied,  and  supported  by  artillery.  They  gained  an  advan 
tage  over  the  sailors,  who  were  on  foot,  which  raised  their 
courage  and  excited  their  hopes.  In  December,  Commo 
dore  Stockton,  having  landed  at  Diego,  advanced  to  the 
City  of  Angels,  and  again  re-established  the  American 
dominion. 

Soon  after  this  a  battle  occurred  between  the  Ameri 
cans  under  General  Kearney  and  the  Mexicans  at  San 
Gabriel.  In  this  engagement  the  Mexicans  were  defeat 
ed  with  loss ;  but  on  the  American  side  several  were 
killed,  and  General  Kearney  wounded. 

In  New  Mexico  and  California,  the  inhabitants  appear 
to  have  been  much  more  interested  in  regaining  their 
country  by  popular  insurrection,  than  they  had  been  in 
defending  it  against  the  advance  of  the  invaders.  Either 
they  had  been  at  first  surprised,  and  yielded  to  an  unex 
pected  necessity,  or  the  American  army,  and  the  new 
governments  instituted  among  them  had  not  impressed  their 
minds  with  an  idea  of  superiority  and  excellence.  Both  may 
in  some  measure  have  been  true.  But  the  lesson  taught 


103 

by  these  insurrections  is,  that  the  Mexican  inhabitants  of 
New  Mexico  and  California  remain  under  the  dominion  of 
the  United  States  only  as  a  conquered  people  ;  not  from 
any  adhesion  to  oaths  of  allegiance,  or  to  any  admiration 
for  the  free  institutions  which  were  proclaimed  among 
them. 

In  the  interval  between  the  conquest  of  New  Mexico 
by  Kearney,  and  the  march  of  Scott  from  Vera  Cruz, 
there  occurred,  in  the  northern  provinces  of  Mexico,  one 
of  those  military  adventures  which  convert  the  realities 
of  history  into  the  brilliant  and  enticing  scenes  of  romance. 
This  was  the  march  of  Colonel  Doniphan's  corps  through 
the  wild  and  unknown  regions  of  Northern  Mexico. 
When  the  American  army,  under  Kearney,  had  reached 
Santa  Fe,  it  was  already  nine  hundred  miles  from  the 
point  of  its  departure.  The  great  part  of  this  distance 
had  been  passed  over  vast  prairie  plains,  over  arid  deserts, 
in  the  valleys  of  streams,  where  no  town  or  habitation  was 
seen,  and  over  hills  like  the  Raton,  from  whose  lofty 
summit  no  sign  of  civilization  could  be  seen,  and  the  dis 
tant  horizon  was  limited  only  by  the  towering  peaks  of 
the  Rocky  Mountains.  At  Santa  Fe  there  was  but  little 
real  interruption  to  this  wilderness  prospect.  New  Mex 
ico  contained  fifty  thousand  square  miles,  but  only  one 
hundred  thousand  inhabitants.  The  States  of  Chihuahua, 
Durango,  and  Coahuila,  below,  scarcely  contained  a 
greater  population  in  proportion.  Here  and  there  a  Mex 
ican  town  appeared,  and  at  intervals  spots  of  beautiful 
culture,  of  vineyards  and  fruits  ;  but,  for  the  most  part, 
there  were  uninhabited  regions,  unknown  to  the  Ameri 
cans,  and  almost  untrodden  by  travellers. 

In  the  early  part  of  December  Colonel  Doniphan  left 


104  DONIPHAN  MARCHES  FOR  CHIHUAHUA. 

Santa  Fe  with  eight  hundred  men,  in  three  divisions,  des 
tined  for  Chihuahua.  The  object  of  the  expedition  was 
to  join  General  Wool  in  the  heart  of  Northern  Mexico. 
Wool,  as  has  been  detailed,  marched  with  what  was 
called  the  Army  of  the  Centre  from  San  Antonio  de 
Bexar  for  Chihuahua.  The  latter  point  he  never  reach 
ed  ;  but  Colonel  Doniphan  now  supposed  him  either  at 
Chihuahua  or  on  his  route.  Doniphan,  accordingly, 
marched  south  to  form  a  junction.  On  the  21st  of  De 
cember  his  corps  reached  Brozitos,  and  the  troops  were 
dispersed  getting  wood,  when  a  large  force  of  the  enemy, 
supposed  to  be  a  thousand  strong,  appeared  in  sight. 
The  Americans  immediately  formed  in  line.  The  Mex 
icans  were  composed  of  Lancers  and  Infantry.  A  Mex 
ican  officer  rode  out  on  a  fine  charger,  displaying  a  black 
flag.  Their  column  immediately  charged,  and  were  re 
ceived  by  the  Americans  with  a  well-directed  fire  of  rifles. 
This  determined  the  engagement.  The  Mexicans  fled. 
Doniphan  then  pursued  his  march  at  his  leisure. 

On  the  27th  of  December  Doniphan's  corps  entered 
El  Paso  del  Norte  without  opposition.  This  is  a  consid 
erable  town  on  the  Rio  del  Norte,  or  rather  Rio  Grande, 
the  former  being  the  name  of  that  river  in  New  Mexico. 
This  town  contains  about  five  thousand  inhabitants ;  but 
there  are  about  eleven  thousand  settled  along  the  river  for 
twenty-fcve  miles.  It  is  on  the  road  to  Chihuahua,  and 
at  one  of  the  principal  crossings  of  the  Rio  Grande. 

Here  Colonel  Doniphan  was  compelled  to  wait  for  re 
inforcements,  and  also  to  hear  from  General  Wool.  The 
Americans  were  surrounded  with  a  hostile  population, 
and  continually  expecting  an  attack.  One  who  was  pres 
ent  writes,  "  Here  we  have  spent  a  month  in  anxiety, 


HALTS  AT  EL  PASO  DEL  NORTE.-  105 

drudgery,  and  toil."1  Nothing,  however,  was  heard  from 
Wool  ;  and  it  was  long  before  reinforcements  arrived. 
At  length,  on  the  1st  of  February,  Captain  Weightrnan 
arrived  with  the  Artillery,  and  Doniphan's  comrrand  was 
increased  to  the  amount  of  about  nine  hundred  men. 

In  the  latter  part  of  February  he  set  out  from  El  Paso, 
and  on  the  23d  the  American  forces  were  at  Carmen,  one 
hundred  miles  from  Chihuahua.  In  the  mean  time,  Gen 
eral  Heredia,  who  commanded  the  Mexican  forces  in 
Chihuahua,  having  heard  of  the  approach  of  the  Ameri 
can  army,  despatched  General  Cande  with  eight  hundred 
cavalry  to  watch  the  Americans.  On  the  21st  General 
Heredia  himself  took  position  with  additional  troops  near 
the  Sacramento  river,  and  awaited  the  approach  of  Colo 
nel  Doniphan. 

The  forces  of  Heredia  were  thus  composed  : — 

Conde's  Cavalry 

7th  Regular  Infantry  - 

Chihuahua  Battalion   - 

National  Guards 

Dragoons  - 

Ten  pieces  of  artillery 

Corps  of  other  cavalry 

Total  of  Heredia's  army       -       1575     " 

Many  of  these  troops  were  the  new  levies  of  the  country 
— National  Guards  and  Volunteers. 2 

On  the  28th  of  February  the  American  army  discovered 

J  Letter  in  the  Missouri  Republican. 

3  General  Jose  Heredia's  Report,  March  2d,  1847,  in  the  "  Union," 
April  jyth. 


106  BATTLE   OF  SACRAMENTO. 

the  enemy  intrenched  near  the  Rancho  Sacramento,  on 
the  river  Sacramento.  The  position  was  a  very  strong 
one.  It  was  in  a  valley  about  four  miles  in  width,  having 
a  range  of  mountains  on  each  side.  The  Rio  Sacramen 
to,  and  Arroyo  Seco,  both  crossed  the  valley  here  ;  and 
the  main  road  to  Chihuahua,  pursuing  the  valley,  crosses 
the  Sacramento  at  the  Rancho  Sacramento.  The  Mexi 
can  intrenchments  were  on  a  ridge  between  these  streams, 
and  completely  commanding  the  road.  Their  right  rested 
on  the  Cerro  Frijoles,  with  high  precipitous  sides,  on 
which  was  a  battery  commanding  the  surrounding  coun 
try  and  the  pass  leading  to  Chihuahua,  through  the  Arroyo 
Seco.  On  their  left  was  the  Cerro  Sacramento,  a  pile  of 
immense  volcanic  rocks,  surmounted  by  a  battery  which 
commanded  the  main  road  to  Chihuahua.1 

A  passage  was  found  practicable  across  the  Arroyo 
Seco,  within  reach  of  the  enemy's  fire  ;  and  the  Ameri 
can  column  having  reached  the  ground  between  the  Seco 
and  Sacramento,  commenced  deploying  towards  the  table 
land  occupied  by  the  Mexicans.  The  column  of  General 
Conde's  cavalry,  opposed  to  the  American  right,  now  com 
menced  a  charge,  which  was  returned  by  the  fire  of  the 
Artillery  Battery,  consisting  of  six  pieces,  under  the  com 
mand  of  Major  Clark.  At  the  third  fire  the  enemy's  cav 
alry  gave  way  and  dispersed.2  They  fell  back  to  the 
Mexican  camp,  and  rallied  behind  a  redoubt.  This  the 
Americans  attacked  with  artillery,  Captain  Weightman 
rapidly  advancing  with  two  howitzers,  supported  by  Cap 
tain  Reed's  company  of  horse,  and  then  by  Lieulenanl- 


1  Report  of  Major  Clark  to  Colonel  Doniphan,  March  2d,  1847 
9  Heredia's  Report. 


MEXICANS   DEFEATED.  107 

colonel  Mitchell,  delivering  his  fire  with  great  effect,  the 
enemy  were  driven  from  the  redoubt.  The  Mexicans 
were  pursued  towards  the  mountains  by  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Mitchell,  Lieutenant-colonel  Jackson,  and  Major 
Gilpm,  accompanied  by  Weightman  with  his  section  of 
howitzers.  In  the  mean  time  the  Mexicans  had  carried 
their  cannon  to  the  Cerro  Sacramento,  to  cover  their  re 
treat.  The  fire  of  the  American  artillery  soon  silenced 
these,  and  the  Rancho  Sacramento  was  then  attacked. 
At  length  the  Mexicans  were  driven  from  their  last  posi 
tion,  and  the  victory  was  complete.1  The  Mexicans  lost 
one  hundred  men  and  ten  pieces  of  artillery. 

Colonel  Doniphan  and  his  little  army  entered  the  city 
of  Chihuahua,  the  fruit  of  this  victory,  in  divisions,  on  the 
1st  and  2d  of  March.  This  town  is  the  capital  of  one  of 
the  most  important  States  of  Mexico,  and  contains  more 
than  forty  thousand  inhabitants.  It  lies  on  a  branch  of 
the  Conchas  river,  two  hundred  and  fifty  miles  south  of 
El  Paso.  On  the  east  lies  the  Rio  Grande,  and  on  the 
west  the  lofty  summits  of  the  Sierra  Madre.  The 'coun 
try  is  diversified  with  mountains  and  vales.  The  army 
passed  rugged  cliffs  of  basaltic  rock  on  one  side,  and  on 
the  other  fields  rich  with  the  finest  wheat.  In  the  clear 
atmosphere  of  this  elevated  region,  the  mountain-tops 
would  .seem,  in  the  distance,  blue  as  the  skies  above  ;  or, 
near  by,  would  darkly  frown  in  the  cold  gray  aspect  of 
its  granite  rock.-,  Chihuahua,  too,  is  the  centre  of  rich 
and  various  mines.  Not  more  than  twelve  miles  from  it 
are  silver  mines  supposed  to  be  the  richest  in  Mexico. 
These  mines  are  generally  owned  by  private  companies, 

1  Clark's  Report. 


108          DONIPHAN  OCCUPIES  CHIHUAHUA. 

composed  of  English  or  Spanish  proprietors.  At  Chi 
huahua,  in  this  rich  country  and  pleasant  climate,  the 
army  of  Doniphan  rested  in  the  bright  days  of  spring. 
They  had  departed  so  far  from  the  American  lines  of  in 
telligence,  as  to  be  ignorant  of  the  situation  or  place  of  the 
American  forces.  The  expedition  had  been  planned  with 
the  idea  that  the  corps  of  Doniphan  would  find  the  army 
of  Wool  at  Chihuahua  ;  but  that  army  was  not  there. 
The  reason  we  have  already  seen.  Wool  had  encountered 
beyond  Monclova  the  lofty  ridges  of  the  Sierra  Madre,  and 
been  compelled  to  change  his  course  to  the  south,  and 
eventually  to  Saltillo.1  After  waiting  in  vain  for  any  ap 
pearance  of  Wool,  and  having  remained  six  weeks  at  Chi 
huahua,2  the  army  at  last  took  its  line  of  march.  Colonel 
Doniphan  moved  his  corps  from  Chihuahua  in  three  divis 
ions,  on  the  25th,  26th,  and  28th  of  April.  Marching 
southwardly,  through  Cerro  Gordo,  Mapimi,  and  Parras, 
they  reached  Saltillo,  three  hundred  and  fifty  miles  fur 
ther,  on  the  22d  of  May,  1847.  Remaining  but  three 
days,  on  the  25th  day  of  May  they  marched  to  Monterey. 
Pursuing  their  journey  with  rapid  steps,  they  descended 
the  Rio  Grande,  navigated  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  arrived 
at  New  Orleans  on  the  15th  of  June.  Here  the  volunteers 
were  mustered  out  of  the  service  of  the  United  States, 
embarked  on  steamboats,  and  were  soon  returned  to  their 
homes  in  Missouri.  In  a  little  more  than  a  year,  this 
corps  of  volunteers,  mustered  from  private  life,  had,  by 
land  and  by  water, — over  mountain-tops  and  sandy  plains, — 

1  See  Chapter  5th. 

2  For  a  full  and  most  interesting  account  of  Doniphan's  expedition,  see 
"  Doniphan's   Expedition,"  by  J.  T.  Hughes.     Published  by  J.  A.  James 
&.  Co.,  Cincinnati. 


RETURNS  TO  THE  UNITED  STATES.         109 

in  snow  and  in  rain,  and  in  hot  deserts, — amidst  the  homes 
of  civilization  and  the  wilds  of  savages, — amidst  the  fires 
of  battle,  the  sports  of  the  camp,  and  the  adventures  of 
the  wild  wilderness,  pursued  their  unchecked  career  for 
five  thousand  miles  !  Nor  was  this  all.  One  detachment 
of  this  same  corps,  previous  to  the  departure  of  the  main 
body  from  Santa  Fe,  had  inarched  another  thousand  miles 
in  still  wilder  scenes  and  greater  adventure.  This  was 
the  detachment  of  Lt.  Col.  Gilpin,  who  was  sent  out 
towards  the  Rocky  Mountains  to  overawe  the  Navajos 
Indians.  This  was  a  tribe  which,  unlike  most  tribes  of 
Indians,  lived  in  the  pastoral  state,  and  inhabited  the  great 
unknown  country  lying  between  New  Mexico  and  the  Col 
orado  of  the  south.  General  Kearney  had  promised  the 
New  Mexicans  protection  from  the  incursions  of  this  tribe. 
To  carry  out  this  intention,  Gilpin's  detachment  was  sent 
into  their  country.  This  command  actually  crossed  the 
Rocky  Mountains,  and  descended  into  the  valley  of  the 
Colorado  of  the  south.  Their  march  was  full  of  new 
scenery,  new  dangers,  and  new  adventures.  Tribes  of 
Indians  unknown  to  the  people  of  the  United  States  were 
found  and  observed.  The  grizlybear,  supposed  to  inhabit 
chiefly  the  polar  regions,  was  here  found  a  common  tenant 
of  the  mountains.  After  this  party  had  thus  pursued  its 
novel  and  most  interesting  march  through  the  spurs  and 
rivers,  and  wild  tribes  and  wilder  animals  of  the  Rocky 
Mountains,  it  returned  in  time  to  join  the  long  and  adven 
turous  march  of  Doniphan  to  Chihuahua  and  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico.1 


1  See  the  "  Expedition  of  Doniphan,"  by  J.  T.  Hughes,  mentioned  be 
fore.     The  narrative  of  Mr.  Hughes  may  be  relied  upon  for  accuracy,  and 
is  a  graphic  account  of  these  remarkable  adventures. 
K 


1  10  SCOTT  ORDERED  TO  MEXICO. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

General  Scott  ordered  to  Mexico. — Letter  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to 
General  Taylor. — Letter  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  General  Scott. — 
General  Scott  leaves  Washington. — His  Letter  to  General  Taylor. — 
Plan  of  appointing  a  Lieutenant-General. — Scott  reaches  the  Rio 
Grande. — Condition  of  things  there. — Withdraws  a  part  of  Taylor's 
Troops  in  compliance  with  the  Orders  of  the  War  Department. 

ON  the  18th  of  November,  General  Scott  was  directed 
by  the  Secretary  of  War  to  hold  himself  in  readiness  to 
assume  the  command  of  the  army  destined  to  make  a  de 
scent  on  Vera  Cruz.  The  purpose  of  organizing  a  force 
for  this  object  was  communicated  to  General  Taylor  in  a 
letter  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  dated  Washington,  Oct. 
22,  1846: 

"  I  informed  you  in  my  last  despatch,  that  in  connec 
tion  with  an  invasion  of  Tamaulipas  and  attack  on  Tam- 
pico,  an  expedition  against  Vera  Cruz  was  then  under 
advisement.  Upon  a  more  full  consideration  of  the  sub 
ject,  it  is  believed  that  Vera  Cruz  may  be  taken,  and 
having  possession  of  that  city,  the  castle  of  San  Juari  de 
Ulloa  might  possibly  be  reduced  or  compelled  to  surren 
der.  If  the  expedition  could  go  forth  without  the  object 
being  known  to  the  enemy,  it  is  supposed  that  four  thou 
sand  troops  would  be  sufficient  for  the  enterprise,  re 
ceiving  as  they  would  the  co-operation  of  our  naval  force 
in  the  gulf ;  but  at  least  fifteen  hundred  or  two  thousand  of 
them  should  be  of  the  regular  army,  and  under  the  command 


SCOTT  ORDERED  TO    MEXICO.  Ill 

of  officers  best  calculated  for  such  an  undertaking.  In 
looking  at  the  disposition  of  the  troops,  it  appears  to  be 
scarcely  possible  to  get  the  requisite  number  of  regulars 
without  drawing  some  of  those  now  with  you  at  Monterey,  or 
on  the  way  to  that  place.  Should  you  decide  against  hold 
ing  military  possession  of  any  place  in  Coahuila  or  Chi 
huahua,  and  order  the  troops  under  General  Wool  to  join 
you,  it  is  presumed  that  the  requisite  force  for  the  expe 
dition  to  Vera  Cruz  could  be  detached  without  interfering 
with  your  plans  of  operation. 

"  You  will  therefore,  unless  it  materially  interferes  with 
your  own  plan  of  operations,  or  weakens  you  too  much  in 
your  present  position,  make  the  necessary  arrangements 
for  having  four  thousand  men,  of  whom  fifteen  hundred  or 
two  thousand  should  be  regular  troops,  ready  to  embark 
for  Vera  Cruz,  or  such  other  destination  as  may  be  given 
them,  at  the  earliest  practicable  period.  The  place  of 
embarkation  will  probably  be  the  Brazos  Santiago,  or  in 
that  vicinity." 

On  the  23d  of  November  General  Scott  received  the 
following  order  from  the  Secretary  of  War  : — 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  WASHINGTON,  ) 
November  23d,  1846.          $ 

SIR — The  President,  several  days  since,  communicated  in 
person  to  you  his  orders  to  repair  to  Mexico,  to  take  the  com 
mand  of  the  forces  there  assembled,  and  particularly  to  organ 
ize  and  set  on  foot  an  expedition  to  operate  on  the  Gulf  coast, 
if,  on  arriving  at  the  theatre  of  action,  you  shall  deem  it  to  be 
practicable.  'It  is  not  proposed  to  control  your  operations  by 
definite  and  positive  instructions,  but  you  are  left  to  prosecute 
them  as  your  judgment,  under  a  full  view  of  all  the  circum 
stances,  shall  dictate.  /The  work  is  before  you,  and  the 


]  12  MAKES  THE  ARRANGEMENTS. 

means  provided,  or  to  be  provided,  for  accomplishing  it,  are 
committed  to  you,  in  the  full  confidence  that  you  will  use 
them  to  the  best  advantage. 

The  objects  which  it  is  desirable  to  obtain  have  been  in 
dicated,  and  it  is  hoped  that  you  will  have  the  requisite  force 
to  accomplish  them. 

Of  this  you  must  be  the  judge,  when  preparations  are 
made,  and  the  time  for  action  arrived. 

Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 
W.  L.  MARCY, 

Secretary  of  War. 
GENERAL  WINFIELD  SCOTT. 

General  Scott  immediately  made  all  the  arrangements 
to  carry  the  plan  into  full  effect.  The  requisite  number 
of  transports  were  to  be  provided,  surf-boats  for  the  land 
ing  of  the  troops  constructed,  a  train  of  siege  ordnance 
was  to  be  collected  and  sent  forward,  and  ten  new  regi 
ments  were  to  be  added  to  the  line  of  the  army,  at  the 
earliest  possible  moment  after  the  meeting  of  Congress. 
In  a  very  few  days  all  the  preliminary  arrangements  were 
completed,  and  General  Scott  left  Washington  on  the 
24th  November,  in  the  full  belief  that  he  enjoyed  the  con 
fidence  of  the  government,  and  that  the  conduct  of  the 
war,  under  general  instructions,  had  been  entirely  confided 
to  his  discretion  and  judgment. 

The  only  reluctance  which  he  felt  in  accepting  the  high 
trusts  confided  to  him  by  the  President,  arose  from  an  un 
willingness  to  interfere,  in  the  slightest  degree,  with  the 
command  of  an  old  friend  and  brother  soldier ;  and  this 
feeling  was  strongly  expressed  to  General  Taylor  in  a  let 
ter  written  from  New  York,  November  25th,  1846. 


SCOTT'S  LETTER  TO  GENERAL  TAYLOR.       113 

"  I  left  Washington  late  in  the  day  yesterday,  and  ex 
pect  to  embark  for  New  Orleans  the  30th  inst.  By  the 
12th  of  December  I  may  be  in  that  city,  at  Point  Isabel 
the  17th,  and  Camargo,  say  the  23d  —  in  order  to  be  with 
in  easy  corresponding  distance  from  you.  It  is  not  prob 
able  that  I  may  be  able  to  visit  Monterey,  and  circum 
stances  may  prevent  your  coming  to  me.  I  shall  much 
regret  not  having  an  early  opportunity  of  felicitating  you 
in  person  upon  your  many  brilliant  achievements  ;  but  we 
may  meet  somewhere  in  the  interior  of  Mexico. 

"  I  am  not  coming,  my  dear  general,  to  supersede  you 
in  the  immediate  command  on  the  line  of  operations  ren 
dered  illustrious  by  you  and  your  gallant  army.  My  pro 
posed  theatre  is  different.  You  may  imagine  it  ;  and  I 
wish  very  much  that  it  were  prudent,  at  this  distance,  to 
tell  you  all  that  I  expect  to  attempt  or  hope  to  execute. 
I  have  been  admonished  that  despatches  have  been  lost, 
and  I  have  no  special  messenger  at  hand.  Your  imagi 
nation  will  be  aided  by  the  letters  of  the  Secretary  of 
War,  conveyed  by  Mr.  Armistead,  Major  Graham,  and 
Mr.  M'Lane. 

"  But,  my  dear  general,  I  shall  be  obliged  t.o  take  from 
you  most  of  the  gallant  officers  and  men,  (regulars  and 
volunteers,)  whom  you  have  so  long  and  so  nobly  com 
manded.  I  am  afraid  that  I  shall,  by  imperious  neces 
sity  —  the  approach  of  yellow  fever  on  the  Gulf  coast  —  re 
duce  you,  for  a  time,  to  stand  on  the  defensive.  This 
will  be  infinitely  painful  to  you,  and,  for  that  reason,  dis 
tressing  to  me.  But  I  rely  upon  your  patriotism  to  sub 
mit  to  the  temporary  sacrifice  with  cheerfulness.  No 
man  can  better  afford  to  do  so.  Recent  victories  place 
you  on  the  high  eminence  ;  and  I  even  flatter  myself  that 
K2  8 


1 14  SCOTT'S  LETTER  TO  GENERAL  TAYLOR. 

any  benefit  that  may  result  to  me,  personally,  from  the 
unequal  division  of  troops  alluded  to,  will  lessen  the  pain 
of  your  consequent  inactivity. 

"  You  will  be  aware  of  the  recent  call  for  nine  regi 
ments  of  new  volunteers,  including  one  of  Texas  horse. 
The  President  may  soon  ask  for  many  more  ;  and  we  are 
not  without  hope  that  Congress  may  add  ten  or  twelve  to 
the  regular  establishment.  These,  by  the  spring,  say 
April,  may,  by  the  aid  of  large  bounties,  be  in  the  field — 
should  Mexico  not  earlier  propose  terms  of  accommoda 
tion  ;  and,  long  before  the  spring,  (March,)  it  is  probable 
you  will  be  again  in  force  to  resume  offensive  operations. 

"  It  was  not  possible  for  me  to  find  time  to  write  from 
Washington,  as  I  much  desired.  I  only  received  an  inti 
mation  to  hold  myself  in  preparation  for  Mexico,  on  the 
18th  instant.  Much  has  been  done  towards  that  end,  and 
more  remains  to  be  executed. 

"  Your  detailed  report  of  the  operations  at  Monterey, 
and  reply  to  the  Secretary's  despatch,  by  Lieutenant 
Armistead,  were  both  received  two  days  after  I  was  in 
structed  to  proceed  south." 

Before  ordering  General  Scott  to  Mexico,  as  subse 
quently  appeared  by  the  statements  of  Senator  Benton, 
the  President  had  decided  to  create  the  office  of  lieuten 
ant-general,  and  thus  supersede,  not  only  the  scar-marked 
hero  of  Chippewa  and  Niagara,  but  also  to  tear  the  fresh 
laurels  of  Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  de  la  Palma  from  the 
brow  of  the  gallant  Taylor.  After  this  plan  had  been 
finally  arranged,  the  President  sent  for  General  Scott,  and 
confided  to  him  the  command  of  the  army  in  Mexico,  and 
gave  to  him  the  most  solemn  assurance  of  his  confidence 
and  support. 


SCOTT  SAILS  FOR  NEW  ORLEANS.  115 

Immediately  on  the  opening  of  Congress  the  project  of 
creating  a  higher  military  grade  was  brought  forward,  and 
the  friends  of  generals  Scott  and  Taylor  saw  with  alarm, 
that  a  plan  was  maturing  by  which  they  were  both  to  be 
degraded  to  subordinate  stations,  and  the  entire  direction 
of  affairs  in  Mexico  confided  to  other  and  untried  hands. 
The  friends  of  General  Scott  now  saw  that  his  apprehen 
sions  of  an  attack  "  from  the  rear,"  and  which  had  been 
frankly  expressed  in  his  former  letters,  were  indeed  but 
too  well  founded  ;  and  that  notwithstanding  the  assurance 
given  on  his  departure  from  Washington  for  the  army,  of 
the  full  and  cordial  support  of  the  government,  the  plan 
of  wresting  from  him  the  command,  at  the  earliest  pos 
sible  day,  was  then  matured,  and  ready  for  speedy  execu 
tion.  In  view  of  all  the  circumstances,  it  is,  perhaps,  not 
uncharitable  to  suppose  that  he  was  selected  for  that  com 
mand,  for  the  purpose  of  stirring  up  a  spirit  of  rivalry  be 
tween  his  friends  and  those  of  General  Taylor,  and  thus 
affording  a  plausible  pretext  for  superseding  them  both. 

On  the  30th  of  November  General  Scott  sailed  from 
New  York,  in  the  fullest  confidence  that  the  government 
was  acting  in  good  faith,  and  that  every  means  would  be 
furnished  him  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  Little  did 
he  then  suppose,  that  before  he  could  reach  the  theatre  of 
active  operations  the  government  which  had  selected  and 
sent  him,  would  attempt  to  degrade  him  in  the  eyes  of 
the  world,  by  declaring,  in  effect,  that  he  was  unfit  for 
the  very  place  to  which  he  had  been  so  recently  ap 
pointed. 

With  the  generous  confidence  of  a  brave  soldier,  who 
had  often  met  the  enemy  in  deadly  conflict,  he  received 
through  the  President  the  plighted  faith  of  the  nation  that 


116         SCOTT  REACHES  THE  RIO  GRANDE. 

all  was  right.  The  President  saw  him  depart  in  the  ful 
ness  of  this  confidence,  and  yet  before  he  reached  the 
army,  the  proposition  to  supersede  him  was  already  there. 
Yes,  the  very  army  into  which  he  was  to  breathe  the  in 
spiration  of  hope — which  he  was  to  train  and  prepare  for 
the  deadly  conflicts  that  awaited  them — was  informed,  in 
advance,  that  the  President  had  no  confidence  in  their 
commander-in-chief. 

General  Scott  reached  the  Rio  Grande  about  the  first 
of  January.  Early  in  the  month  it  became  evident  that 
some  of  the  principal  arrangements  for  the  attack  on  Vera 
Cruz  were  not  likely  to  be  carried  out  by  the  government. 
The  bill  for  raising  the  ten  additional  regiments  was  lost 
sight  of  by  the  administration,  in  the  desire  to  carry  their 
favorite  project  of  placing  a  political  partisan  at  the  head 
of  the  army ;  arid  this  bill,  which  ought  to  have  been 
passed  in  the  first  week  of  the  session,  was  not  finally 
disposed  of  till  a  day  or  two  before  the  adjournment. 

What  was  the  condition  of  things  in  Mexico  at  this 
critical  period  ? 

Santa  Anna,  with  a  force  of  twenty-two  thousand  men, 
was  at  San  Luis  Potosi,  a  fortified  city  containing  sixty 
thousand  inhabitants,  and  about  equally  distant  from  Mon 
terey,  Vera  Cruz,  and  Mexico. 

General  Taylor  was  in  the  vicinity  of  Monterey,  in  the 
command  of  a  force  of  about  eighteen  thousand  men,  oc 
cupying  the  long  line  from  Saltillo  to  Camargo,  and  thence 
to  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande,  where  General  Scott 
had  just  arrived  with  a  small  force,  for  the  purpose  of  at 
tacking  Vera  Cruz  as  soon  as  possible.  He  well  knew 
that  the  vomilo  makes  its  appearance  there  in  the  early 
spring,  and  that  delay  would  be  fatal.  The  transports. 


ARRANGEMENTS  FOR  THE   CAMPAIGN.  117 

stores,  and  munitions,  were  beginning  to  arrive.  What 
was  to  be  done  ?  Was  the  expedition  against  Vera  Cruz 
to  be  abandoned,  or  was  General  Scott  to  go  forward  and 
do  the  best  he  could  under  circumstances  so  discouraging  ? 
He  adopted  the  latter  alternative.  He  reviewed  all  the 
disposable  forces  within  his  command,  and  carefully 
weighed  chances  and  probabilities.  He  forwarded  to 
General  Taylor  a  full  plan  of  his  proposed  operations. 
By  the  capture  and  assassination  of  Lieutenant  Ritchie, 
the  bearer  of  these  despatches,  the  plans  were  fully  dis 
closed  to  Santa  Anna,  and  he  became  apprized  that  Vera 
Cruz  was  to  be  the  main  point  of  attack.  At  Vera  Cruz, 
and  its  immediate  vicinity,  there  were  six  or  seven  thou 
sand  men,  and  a  much  larger  number  could  be  collected 
from  the  adjoining  country  on  a  short  notice.  Would 
Santa  Anna  break  up  his  camp  at  San  Luis  Potosi,  and 
march  on  Vera  Cruz — fill  the  city  and  castle  with  his 
best  troops,  and  oppose  the  landing  of  General  Scott  with 
a  selected  army  of  forty  thousand  men  ?  Or,  was  he  like 
ly  to  abandon  the  town  and  castle  to  their  fate,  thus  leav 
ing  open  the  road  to  Mexico,  and  march  with  his  whole 
force  against  General  Taylor,  over  a  desert  of  one  hun 
dred  and  fifty  miles,  with  a  certainty  of  having  to  encoun 
ter  his  enemy  either  in  the  defiles  of  the  mountains  or 
from  behind  the  impregnable  battlements  of  Monterey  ? 

Under  such  circumstances  it  became  the  duty  of  Gen 
eral  Scott  so  to  divide  the  forces  of  the  Rio  Grande  as 
would  be  most  likely  to  meet  any  contingency  that  might 
arise.  He  collected  the  regular  infantry — for  these  might 
be  necessary  to  carry  with  the  bayonet  the  fortified  city 
and  castle  of  Vera  Cruz.  He  left  within  the  limits  of 
General  Taylor's  command,  about  ten  thousand  volun- 


118  DIVISION   OF  THE  FORCES. 

teers  and  several  companies  of  the  best  artillery  of  the 
regular  army.  These  General  Taylor  might  have  con 
centrated  at  Monterey,  and  General  Scott  suggested  to 
him,  in  his  instructions,  to  do  so,  if  it  became  necessary. 
With  this  comparatively  small  force,  General  Taylor  not 
only  maintained  all  the  posts  within  his  command,  but 
with  the  one  half  of  it  achieved  the  memorable  victory  of 
Buena  Vista. 

General  Scott  assigned  twelve  thousand  men  to  the  ex 
pedition  against  Vera  Cruz,  and  had  Santa  Anna  concen 
trated  his  forces  at  that  point,  the  disparity  of  numbers 
would  have  been  much  greater  than  at  Buena  Vista. 
These  remarks  are  not  made  for  the  purpose  of  comparing 
the  skill,  or  the  conduct,  or  the  claims  to  public  gratitude 
of  the  two  distinguished  generals  who  have  so  well  fulfil 
led  every  trust  reposed  in  them  by  their  country  ;  but  sim 
ply  to  show  that  in  the  disposition  of  the  forces  made  by 
General  Scott,  he  did  not  take  a  larger  portion  for  his  own 
command  than  the  interests  of  the  service  imperatively 
demanded. 


GENERAL  TAYLOR' S  MOVEMENTS.         119 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

General  Taylor's  Movements. — Taylor's  Position. — Santa  Anna's  Ad 
vance. — Importance  of  the  event. — Battle  of  Buena  Vista. — Retreat  of 
the  Mexicans. — Taylor's  Official  Account. — Santa  Anna's  Report. 

IN  pursuance  of  orders  from  the  War  Department, 
General  Taylor,  in  the  month  of  November,  ordered  the 
divisions  of  Generals  Twiggs,  Quitman,  and  Pillow  from 
Monterey  to  Victoria,  for  the  purpose  of  joining  at  Tam- 
pico  the  expedition  against  Vera  Cruz.  In  the  latter  part 
of  December,  General  Patterson's  division  left  Matamoras 
for  the  same  destination,  by  the  route  through  Victoria ; 
while  General  Worth's  division  proceeded  from  Saltillo  to 
Comargo,  thence  to  Matamoras,  and  joined  General  Scott 
at  the  Brazos. 

At  Victoria,  on  the  30th  of  December,  1846,  General 
Taylor  received  information  of  Scott's  departure  for  Mex 
ico.  Santa  Anna,  in  the  mean  time,  was  at  San  Luis 
Potosi,  with  an  army  of  twenty-two  thousand  men. 

In  the  latter  part  of  January,  1 847,  General  Taylor  left 
Victoria  and  established  his  headquarters  at  Monterey, 
and  early  in  February  his  whole  force  at  this  point,  inclu 
ding  the  volunteers  who  had  recently  joined  him,  amounted 
to  between  six  and  seven  thousand  men. 

{Soon  after  reaching  Monterey,  he  received  intelligence 


120  GENERAL    TAYLOR'S    POSITION. 

that  a  party  of  dragoons  under  Colonel  May  had  been 
surprised  at  Encarnacion,  in  the  early  part  of  February, 
and  that  Cassius  M.  Clay  and  Majors  Borland  and 
Gaines  were  taken  prisoners  by  General  Minon,  at  the 
head  of  fifteen  hundred  men.  These  circumstances 
induced  General  Taylor  to  believe  that  Santa  Anna  in 
tended  advancing  with  his  whole  army,  and  he  determined 
to  proceed  at  once  to  Saltillo  and  give  him  battle. 

Leaving  a  force  of  fifteen  hundred  men,  he  departed 
from  Monterey  on  the  31st  of  January,  and  reached  Sal 
tillo  on  the  2d  of  February.  Having,  in  the  mean  time, 
been  reinforced  by  five  hundred  men,  his  effective  force 
was  about  five  thousand.  On  the  4th  of  February  he 
advanced  to  Agua  Nueva,  a  strong  position  on  the  road 
leading  from  Saltillo  to  San-  Luis.  Here  he  remained 
until  the  21st,  when  he  received  intelligence  that  Santa 
Anna  was  advancing  with  his  whole  army.  Having 
carefully  examined  the  strong  mountain-passes,  he  de 
cided  that  Buena  Vista,  a  strong  mountain-pass  eleven 
miles  nearer  Saltillo,  was  the  most  favorable  point 
to  make  a  stand  against  a  force  so  overwhelming.  He 
therefore  fell  back  to  that  place  ;  and  having  formed  his 
army  in  order  of  battle,  calmly  awaited  the  approach  of 
the  enemy. 

The  position  of  the  American  army  at  this  moment 
was  most  critical.  The  regular  troops  had  been  with 
drawn,  with  the  exception  of  four  companies  of  artillery, 
and  even  these  had  been  filled  up  by  new  levies.  The 
volunteers,  of  which  the  army  was  mainly  composed, 
had  received  some  instruction  in  the  regular  duties  of 
the  camp,  but  had  not  attained  that  perfection  in  disci 
pline  which  gives  confidence  in  military  operations. 


CHOOSES  HIS  BATTLE-GROUND.  121 

The  army  of  Santa  Anna  was  admirably  equipped. 
It  was  composed  of  the  flower  of  the  Mexican  nation, 
and  numbered  more  than  four  to  one  of  the  army  which 
it  came  to  conquer.  Hope  and  dire  necessity  both 
urged  them  to  victory.  Those  who  remembered  that 
the  American  arms  had  triumphed  at  Palo  Alto,  Resaca 
de  la  Palma,  and  Monterey,  well  knew  that  the  regular 
soldiers,  who  had  contributed  so  largely  to  those  victories, 
had  been  ordered  to  distant  fields  of  operations  ;  and  that 
even  courage  and  enthusiasm,  without  discipline,  are  un 
availing  against  multiplied  numbers. 

The  commander,  Santa  Anna,  had  well  considered  the 
advantages  he  would  derive  from  this  movement,  if  suc 
cessful,  and  all  the  chances  were  in  his  favor.  Could 
he  have  driven  General  Taylor  from  his  position  at  Buena 
Vista,  he  would  have  swept  down  to  Comargo,  and  over 
the  whole  valley  of  the  Rio  Grande.  All  the  munitions 
of  war,  provisions,  camp  equipage,  and  public  property 
of  every  description  would  have  fallen  into  his  hands, 
and  the  American  troops  would  have  been  driven  from 
every  inch  of  ground  which  they  occupied  in  the  Mexican 
territory. 

If  defeated,  Santa  Anna  well  knew  that  his  moral 
power  over  his  army  would  be  broken.  The  desert  in 
his  rear,  and  over  which  he  had  just  passed,  could  not 
be  traversed  by  a  retreating  and  dispirited  army  without 
great  loss  and  suffering.  The  fate  of  his  country  seemed 
suspended  on  the  issue  of  a  single  battle.  His  own  fame, 
his  place  in  history,  were  both  to  be  decided  in  the  com 
ing  conflict. 

On  the  22d  of  February,  a  day  memorable  in  American 
history,  General  Taylor  saw  the  Mexican  host  approach 
L 


PLAN    OF    THE    BATTLE 

OF 


Mexican     cnoe  Infantry,  £j  Cavalry,  t  Artillery,  moring  to  the  attack. 
United  States  =  infantry,  &  Cavalry,  f  Artillery,  receiving  the  attack. 


By  Lieut,  Col.  Mansfield,  Corp.  Engineers. 


IMPORTANCE    OF    THE    RESULT.  123 

the  narrow  mountain-pass  which  he  had  selected  as  the 
Thermopylae  of  his  army. 

The  position  of  the  two  armies  at,  and  soon  after  the 
commencement  of  the  battle,  is  shown  by  the  map.  The 
enemy's  right,  opposite  to  our  left,  is  concentrated  in  col 
umns  of  attack  behind  a  spur  of  the  mountain,  and  his 
riflemen  are  on  the  side  of  the  inaccessible  mountain  firing 
across  a  deep  gully  at  our  riflemen  on  the  same  moun 
tain.  A  small  eminence  and  spur  of  the  mountain  be 
tween  them  is  unoccupied  by  either  party.  On  our  ex 
treme  left  is  the  2d  Indiana  regiment,  supported  by  three 
pieces  of  artillery,  one  of  which  was  lost  in  the  onset  of 
the  morning ;  next,  is  the  2d  Illinois  regiment,  with  a 
piece  of  artillery  on  either  flank  ;  next,  two  pieces  of  ar 
tillery  and  a  squadron  of  dragoons  ;  next,  two  pieces  of 
artillery  and  the  2d  Kentucky  foot ;  next,  four  companies 
of  the  1st  Illinois  regiment  on  a  spur  of  the  plateau,  at 
the  foot  of  which  is  a  parapet  across  the  road,  behind 
which  are  four  pieces  of  artillery  and  two  companies  of 
the  1st  Illinois  regiment.  A  little  to  the  rear  is  the  3d  In 
diana  regiment  on  an  eminence,  behind  which  is  a  squad 
ron  of  dragoons  ;  and  still  further  to  the  rear,  near  the 
rancho  of  Buena  Vista,  is  the  1st  Mississippi  regiment, 
and  one  piece  of  artillery  just  arrived  from  Saltillo  under 
General  Taylor.  In  rear  of  our  extreme  left,  on  the  edge 
of  the  plateau,  are  the  Kentucky  and  Arkansas  cavalry. 

General  Taylor,  in  reviewing  his  army,  could  not  but 
recollect  that  the  troops  which  formed  his  first  encamp 
ment  at  Corpus  Christi,  and  had  shared  with  him  the 
toils  and  triumphs  of  the  campaign  of  1846,  were  not 
in  his  line  of  battle.  New  men  had  come  to  replace 
them.  Would  these,  as  those,  stand  firm  amid  sheets  of 


124  AMERICAN    ARMY    VICTORIOUS. 

flame,  the  roar  of  artillery,  and  the  impetuous  rush  of  the 
charge  ?  Were  they  worthy  successors  of  the  old  guards, 
who  would  die  at  their  posts,  facing  the  enemy  ?  These 
are  questions  which  must  have  agitated  the  mind  of  the 
commander  on  the  eve  of  that  great  battle.  Fortunately 
for  the  country  they  have  been  all  rightly  answered.  His 
own  great  example  appears  to  have  supplied  the  want  of 
discipline,  and  inspired  the  troops  with  heroic  enthusiasm. 
The  volunteer  is  changed  into  the  regular  soldier ;  the 
citizen  of  yesterday  becomes  the  veteran  of  to-day  ;  and 
the  American  arms  are  everywhere  triumphant. 

The  solid  Mexican  phalanx  of  twenty-two  thousand 
men,  armed  and  equipped  for  victory,  have  melted  away 
before  the  steady  fire  of  the  artillery,  and  the  deadly  aim 
of  the  American  rifle.  When  the  last  struggle  for  victory 
is  made,  and  Santa  Anna  rallies  his  broken  columns  for  a 
final  charge  ;  when  the  American  regiments  occupying 
the  advance  yield  to  superior  numbers  and  fall  back  in 
confusion  on  the  reserves,  and  the  day  seems  lost ;  the 
commanding  general  hurries  to  the  point  where  the  battle 
is  to  be  decided,  orders  the  artillery  to  face  about  and 
unlimber,  and  gives  the  emphatic  order,  "  A  little  more 
grape,  Captain  Bragg  !"  This  saves  the  day.  The  Mex 
ican  columns  now  waver  and  halt.  The  curtains  of  night 
close  down  over  the  battle-field  ;  the  wounded  and  the 
dying  rest  in  their  gory  bed  ;  and  the  wearied  officer  and 
exhausted  soldier  sink  together  to  repose. 

The  importance  of  this  victory  to  the  American  arms 
cannot  be  exaggerated.  It  secured  the  whole  frontier  of 
the  Rio  Grande,  and  struck  terror  and  dismay  into  the 
hearts  of  the  Mexican  nation.  It  was,  in  fact,  the  first 
great  turning  point  of  the  war. 


GENERAL    TAYLOIl's    OFFICIAL    REPORT.  125 

To  the  commander,  General  Taylor,  the  thanks  of  the 
country  have  been  tendered  in  many  ways  for  his  signal 
ability,  courage,  and  steadiness  under  circumstances  so 
critical  and  trying.  The  general  himself,  with  a  magna 
nimity  and  modesty  equalled  only  by  his  merits,  has 
expressed  his  obligations  to  those  wrho  acted  under  him, 
of  all  grades  of  service.  To  them  he  has  said  that  the 
country  owes  much.  Their  patient  endurance  of  fatigue 
and  privation  ;  their  cheerful  submission  to  the  rigorous 
discipline  of  the  camp  ;  their  noble  bearing  in  the  hour 
of  danger ;  their  gallant  conduct  on  the  battle-field,  gave 
to  the  army  its  efficiency  and  ensured  its  final  triumph. 

The  following  is  General  Taylor's  official  Report : 


"  HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  OCCUPATION,  ) 
"  Agua  Nueva,  March  6th,  1847.        } 


"  To  THE  HON.  SECRETARY  OF  WAR  : 

"SiR: — I  have  the  honor  to  submit  a  detailed  report 
of  the  operations  of  the  forces  under  my  command, 
which  resulted  in  the  engagement  of  Buena  Vista,  the 
repulse  of  the  Mexican  army,  and  the  reoccupation  of 
this  position. 

"  The  information  which  reached  me  of  the  advance 
and  concentration  of  a  heavy  Mexican  force  in  my  front, 
had  assumed  such  a  probable  form  as  to  induce  a  special 
examination  far  beyond  the  reach  of  our  pickets  to  ascer 
tain  its  correctness.  A  small  party  of  Texan  spies,  under 
Major  McCullough,  despatched  to  the  hacienda  of  Encar- 
nacion,  thirty  miles  from  this,  on  the  route  to  San  Luis 
Potosi,  had  reported  a  cavalry  force  of  unknown  strength 

L2 


126  TAYLORS   OFFICIAL  DESPATCH. 

at  that  place.  On  the  20th  of  February,  a  strong  recon- 
noissance,  under  Lieutenant-colonel  May,  was  despatched 
to  the  hacienda  of  Hecliondo,  while  Major  McCullough 
made  another  examination  of  Encarnacion.  The  result 
of  these  expeditions  left  no  doubt  that  the  enemy  was  in 
large  force  at  Encarnacion,  under  the  orders  of  General 
Santa  Anna,  and  that  he  meditated  a  forward  movement 
and  attack  upon  our  position. 

"  As  the  camp  of  Agua  Nueva  could  be  turned  on 
either  flank,  and  as  the  enemy's  force  was  greatly  supe 
rior  lo  our  own,  particularly  in  the  arm  of  cavalry,  I  de 
termined,  after  much  consideration,  to  take  up  a  position 
about  eleven  miles  in  rear,  and  there  await  the  attack. 
The  army  broke  up  its  camp  and  marched  at  noon  on  the 
21st,  encamping  at  the  new  position  a  little  in  front  of  the 
hacienda  of  Buena  Vista.  With  a  small  force  I  proceed 
ed  to  Saltillo,  to  make  some  necessary  arrangements  for 
the  defence  of  the  town,  leaving  Brigadier-General  Wool 
in  the  immediate  command  of  the  troops. 

"  Before  these  arrangements  were  completed,  on  the 
morning  of  the  22d,  I  was  advised  that  the  enemy  was  in 
sight,  advancing.  Upon  reaching  the  ground  it  was  found 
that  his  cavalry  advance  was  in  our  front,  having  marched 
from  Encarnacion,  as  we  have  since  learned,  at  eleven 
o'clock  the  day  previous,  and  driving  in  a  mounted  force 
left  at  Agua  Nueva  to  cover  the  removal  of  public  stores. 
Our  troops  were  in  position,  occupying  a  line  of  remark 
able  strength.  The  road  at  this  point  becomes  a  narrow 
defile,  the  valley  on  its  right  being  rendered  quite  imprac 
ticable  for  artillery  by  a  succession  of  deep  and  impassa 
ble  gullies,  while  on  the  left  a  succession  of  rugged  ridges 
and  precipitous  ravines  extends  far  back  towards  the  moun 


127 

tain  which  bounds  the  valley.  The  features  of  the  ground 
were  such  as  nearly  to  paralyze  the  artillery  and  cavalry 
of  the  enemy,  while  his  infantry  could  not  derive  all  the 
advantage  of  its  numerical  superiority.  In  this  position 
we  prepared  to  receive  him.  Captain  Washington's  bat 
tery  (Fourth  artillery)  was  posted  to  command  the  road, 
while  the  First  and  Second  Illinois  regiments,  under 
Colonels  Hardin  and  Bissell,  each  eight  companies,  (to 
the  latter  of  which  was  attached  Captain  Conner's  com 
pany  of  Texas  volunteers,)  and  the  Second  Kentucky, 
under  Colonel  McKee,  occupied  the  crests  of  the  ridges 
on  the  left  and  in  rear.  The  Arkansas  and  Kentucky 
regiments  of  cavalry,  commanded  by  Colonels  Yell 
and  H.  Marshall,  occupied  the  extreme  left  near  the 
base  of  the  mountain,  while  the  Indiana  brigade,  under 
Brigadier-General  Lane,  (composed  of  the  Second  and 
Third  regiments,  under  Colonels  Bowles  and  Lane,)  the 
Mississippi  riflemen,  under  Colonel  Davis,  the  squadrons 
of  the  First  and  Second  dragoons,  under  Captain  Steene 
and  Lieutenant-colonel  May,  and  the  light  batteries  of 
Captains  Sherman  and  Bragg,  Third  artillery,  were  held 
in  reserve. 

"  At  eleven  o'clock  I  received  from  General  Santa  An 
na  a  summons  to  surrender  at  discretion,  which,  with  a 
copy  of  my  reply,  I  have  already  transmitted.  The  ene 
my  still  forebore  his  attack,  evidently  waiting  for  the  arri 
val  of  his  rear  columns,  which  could  be  distinctly  seen  by 
our  look-outs  as  they  approached  the  field.  A  demonstra 
tion  made  on  his  left  caused  me  to  detach  the  Second 
Kentucky  regiment  and  a  section  of  artillery  to  our  right, 
in  which  position  they  bivouacked  for  the  night.  In  the 
mean  time  the  Mexican  light  troops  had  engaged  ours  on 


128  TAYLOR'S  OFFICIAL  DESPATCH. 

the  extreme  left,  (composed  of  parts  of  the  Kentucky  and 
Arkansas  cavalry  dismounted,  and  a  rifle  battalion  from  the 
Indiana  brigade  under  Major  Gorman,  the  whole  command 
ed  by  Colonel  Marshall,)  and  kept  up  a  sharp  fire,  climbing 
the  mountain  side,  and  apparently  endeavoring  to  gain  our 
flank.  Three  pieces  of  Captain  Washington's  battery  had 
been  detached  to  the  left,  and  were  supported  by  the 
Second  Indiana  regiment.  An  occasional  shell  was  thrown 
by  the  enemy  into  this  part  of  our  line,  but  without  effect. 
The  skirmishing  of  the  light  troops  was  kept  up  with  tri 
fling  loss  on  our  part  until  dark,  when  I  became  convinced 
that  no  serious  attack  would  be  made  before  the  morning, 
and  returned,  with  the  Mississippi  regiment  and  squadron 
of  Second  dragoons,  to  Saltillo.  The  troops  bivouacked 
without  fires,  and  laid  upon  their  arms.  A  body  of  cav 
alry,  some  fifteen  hundred  strong,  had  been  visible  all  day 
in  rear  of  the  town,  having  entered  the  valley  through  a 
narrow  pass,  east  of  the  city.  This  cavalry,  commanded 
by  General  Minon,  had  evidently  been  thrown  in  our  rear 
to  break  up  and  harass  our  retreat,  and  perhaps  make 
some  attempt  against  the  town,  if  practicable.  The  city 
was  occupied  by  four  excellent  companies  of  Illinois  vol 
unteers,  under  Major  Warren,  of  the  First  regiment.  A 
field-work,  which  commanded  most  of  the  approaches, 
was  garrisoned  by  Captain  Webster's  company,  First 
artillery,  and  armed  with  two  twenty-four  pound  how 
itzers,  while  the  train  and  head-quarter  camp  was  guarded 
by  two  companies  of  Mississippi  riflemen,  under  Captain 
Rogers,  and  a  fieH-piece,  commanded  by  Captain  Shover, 
Third  artillery.  Having  made  these  dispositions  for  the 
protection  of  the  rear,  I  proceeded  on  the  morning  of  the 
23d  to  Buena  Vista,  ordering  forward  all  the  other  avail- 


TAYLOR'S  OFFICIAL  DESPATCH.  129 

able  troops.     The  action  had  commenced  before  my  arri 
val  on  the  field. 

"  During  the  evening  and  night  of  the  22d,  the  enemy 
had  thrown  a  body  of  light  troops  on  the  mountain  side, 
with  the  purpose  of  outflanking  our  left ;  and  it  was 
here  that  the  action  of  the  23d  commenced  at  an  early 
hour.  Our  riflemen,  under  Colonel  Marshall,  who  had 
been  reinforced  by  three  companies  under  Major  Trail, 
Second  Illinois  volunteers,  maintained  their  ground  hand 
somely  against  a  greatly  superior  force,  holding  themselves 
under  cover,  and  using  their  weapons  with  deadly  effect. 
About  eight  o'clock,  a  strong  demonstration  was  made 
against  the  centre  of  our  position,  a  heavy  column  moving 
along  the  road.  This  force  was  soon  dispersed  by  a  few 
rapid  and  well-directed  shots  from  Captain  Washington's 
battery.  In  the  mean  time  the  enemy  was  concentrating 
a  large  force  of  infantry  and  cavalry  under  cover  of  the 
ridges,  with  the  obvious  intention  of  forcing  our  left, 
which  was  posted  on  an  extensive  plateau.  The  Second 
Indiana  and  Second  Illinois  regiments  formed  this  part  of 
our  line,  the  former  covering  three  pieces  of  light  artil 
lery,  under  the  orders  of  Captain  O'Brien — Brigadier- 
General  Lane  being  in  the  immediate  command.  In 
order  to  bring  his  men  within  effective  range,  General 
Lane  ordered  the  artillery  and  Second  Indiana  regiment 
forward.  The  artillery  advanced  within  musket-range  of 
a  heavy  body  of  Mexican  infantry,  and  was  served  against 
it  with  great  effect,  but  without  being  able  to  check  its 
advance.  The  infantry  ordered  to  its  support  had  fallen 
back  in  disorder,  being  exposed,  as  well  as  the  battery, 
not  only  to  a  severe  fire  of  small-arms  from  the  front,  but 
also  to  a  murderous  cross-fire  of  grape  and  canister,  from 


130  TAYLOR'S  OFFICIAL  DESPATCH. 

a  Mexican  battery  on  the  left.  Captain  O'Brien  found  it 
impossible  to  retain  his  position  without  support,  but  was 
only  able  to  withdraw  two  of  his  pieces,  all  the  horses  and 
cannoniers  of  the  third  piece  being  killed  or  disabled. 
The  Second  Indiana  regiment,  which  had  fallen  back  as 
stated,  could  not  be  rallied,  and  took  no  farther  part  in  the 
action,  except  a  handful  of  men,  who,  under  its  gallant 
colonel,  Bowles,  joined  the  Mississippi  regiment,  and  did 
good  service,  and  those  fugitives  who,  at  a  later  period  in 
the  day,  assisted  in  defending  the  train  and  depot  at  Buena 
Vista.  This  portion  of  our  line  having  given  way,  and  the 
enemy  appearing  in  overwhelming  force  against  our  left 
flank,  the  light  troops  which  had  rendered  such  good  ser 
vice  on  the  mountain  were  compelled  to  withdraw,  which 
they  did,  for  the  most  part,  in  good  order.  Many,  how 
ever,  were  not  rallied  until  they  reached  the  depot  at 
Buena  Vista,  to  the  defence  of  which  they  afterwards  con 
tributed. 

"  Col.  BisselPs  regiment,  (Second  Illinois,)  which  had 
been  joined  by  a  section  of  Captain  Sherman's  battery, 
had  become  completely  outflanked,  and  was  compelled  to 
fall  back,  being  entirely  unsupported.  The  enemy  was 
now  pouring  masses  of  infantry  and  cavalry  along  the  base 
of  the  mountain  on  our  left,  and  was  gaining  our  rear  in 
great  force.  At  this  moment  I  arrived  upon  the  field. 
The  Mississippi  regiment  had  been  directed  to  the  left 
before  reaching  the  position,  and  immediately  came  into 
action  against  the  Mexican  infantry  which  had  turned  our 
flank.  The  Second  Kentucky  regiment,  and  a  section 
of  artillery  under  Captain  Bragg,  had  previously  been  or 
dered  from  the  right  to  reinforce  our  left,  and  arrived  at  a 
most  opportune  moment.  That  regiment,  and  a  portion 


131 

of  the  First  Illinois,  under  Colonel  Hardin,  gallantly  drove 
the  enemy,  and  recovered  a  portion  of  the  ground  we  had 
lost.  The  batteries  of  Captains  Sherman  and  Bragg  were 
in  position  on  the  plateau,  and  did  much  execution,  not 
only  in  front,  but  particularly  upon  the  masses  which  had 
gained  our  rear.  Discovering  that  the  enemy  was  heavily 
pressing  upon  the  Mississippi  regiment,  the  Third  In 
diana  regiment,  under  Colonel  Lane,  was  despatched  to 
strengthen  that  part  of  our  line  which  formed  a  crotchet 
perpendicular  to  the  first  line  of  battle.  At  the  same  time 
Lieutenant  Kilburn,  with  a  piece  of  Captain  Bragg's  bat 
tery,  was  directed  to  support  the  infantry  there  engaged. 
The  action  was  for  a  long  time  warmly  sustained  at  that 
point — the  enemy  making  several  efforts  both  with  in 
fantry  and  cavalry  against  our  line,  and  being  always  re 
pulsed  with  heavy  loss.  I  had  placed  all  the  regular 
cavalry  and  Captain  Pike's  squadron  of  Arkansas  horse 
under  the  orders  of  Brevet  Lieutenant-colonel  May,  with 
directions  to  hold  in  check  the  enemy's  column,  still  ad 
vancing  to  the  rear  along  the  base  of  the  mountain,  which 
was  done  in  conjunction  with  the  Kentucky  and  Arkansas 
cavalry,  under  Colonels  Marshall  and  Yell. 

"  In  the  mean  time  our  left,  which  was  still  strongly 
threatened  by  a  superior  force,  was  farther  strengthened 
by  the  detachment  of  Captain  Bragg's  and  a  portion  of 
Captain  Sherman's  batteries  to  that  quarter.  The  con 
centration  of  artillery-fire  upon  the  masses  of  the  enemy 
along  the  base  of  the  mountain,  and  the  determined  resist 
ance  offered  by  the  two  regiments  opposed  to  them,  had 
created  confusion  in  their  ranks,  and  some  of  the  corps 
attempted  to  effect  a  retreat  upon  their  main  line  of  battle. 
The  squadron  of  the  First  dragoons,  under  Lieutenant 


132  TAYLOR'S  OFFICIAL  DESPATCH. 

Rucker,  was  now  ordered  up  the  deep  ravine  which  these 
retreating  corps  were  endeavoring  to  cross,  in  order  to 
charge  and  disperse  them.  The  squadron  proceeded  to  the 
point  indicated,  but  could  not  accomplish  the  object,  being 
exposed  to  a  heavy  fire  from  a  battery  established  to  cover 
the  retreat  of  those  corps.  While  the  squadron  was  de 
tached  on  this  service,  a  large  body  of  the  enemy  was  ob 
served  to  concentrate  on  our  extreme  left,  apparently  with 
the  view  of  making  a  descent  upon  the  hacienda  of  Buena 
Vista,  where  our  train  and  baggage  were  deposited. 
Lieutenant-colonel  May  was  ordered  to  the  support  of 
that  point,  with  two  pieces  of  Captain  Sherman's  battery 
under  Lieutenant  Reynolds.  In  the  mean  time,  the  scat 
tered  forces  near  the  hacienda,  composed  in  part  of  Majors 
Trail  and  Gorman's  commands,  had  been  to  some  extent 
organized  under  the  advice  of  Major  Munroe,  chief  of  ar 
tillery,  with  the  assistance  of  Major  Morrison,  volunteer 
staff,  and  were  posted  to  defend  the  position.  Before  our 
cavalry  had  reached  the  hacienda,  that  of  the  enemy  had 
made  its  attack  ;  having  been  handsomely  met  by  the  Ken 
tucky  and  Arkansas  cavalry  under  Colonels  Marshall  and 
Yell.  The  Mexican  column  immediately  divided,  one 
portion  sweeping  by  the  depot,  where  it  received  a  de 
structive  fire  from  the  force  which  had  collected  there, 
and  then  gaining  the  mountain  opposite,  under  a  fire  from 
Lieutenant  Reynolds'  section,  the  remaining  portion  re 
gaining  the  base  of  the  mountain  on  our  left.  In  the 
charge  at  Buena  Vista,  Colonel  Yell  fell  gallantly  at  the 
head  of  his  regiment ;  we  also  lost  Adjutant  Vaughan,  of 
the  Kentucky  cavalry — a  young  officer  of  much  promise. 
Lieutenant-colonel  May,  who  had  been  rejoined  by  the 
squadron  of  the  First  dragoons  and  by  portions  of  the 


TAYLOR'S  OFFICIAL  DESPATCH.  133 

Arkansas  and  Indiana  troops,  under  Lieutenant-colonel 
Roane  and  Major  Gorman,  now  approached  the  base  of 
.  the  mountain,  holding  in  check  the  right  flank  of  the  ene 
my,  upon  whose  masses,  crowded  in  the  narrow  gorges 
and  ravines,  our  artillery  was  doing  fearful  execution. 

"  The  position  of  that  portion  of  the  Mexican  army 
which  had  gained  our  rear  was  now  very  critical,  and  it 
seemed  doubtful  whether  it  could  regain  the  main  body. 
At  this  moment  I  received  from  General  Santa  Anna  a 
message  by  a  staff  officer,  desiring  to  know  what  I  want 
ed.  I  immediately  despatched  Brigadier-general  Wool 
to  the  Mexican  general-in-chief,  and  sent  orders  to  cease 
firing.  Upon  reaching  the  Mexican  lines,  General  Wool 
could  not  cause  the  enemy  to  cease  their  fire,  and  accord 
ingly  returned  without  having  an  interview.  The  extreme 
right  of  the  enemy  continued  its  retreat  along  the  base  of 
the  mountain,  and  finally,  in  spite  of  all  our  efforts,  effect 
ed  a  junction  with  the  remainder  of  the  army. 

"  During  the  day,  the  cavalry  of  General  Minon  had 
ascended  the  elevated  plain  above  Saltillo,  and  occupied 
the  road  from  the  city  to  the  field  of  battle,  where  they 
intercepted  several  of  our  men.  Approaching  the  town, 
they  were  fired  upon  by  Captain  Webster,  from  the  re 
doubt  occupied  by  his  company,  and  then  moved  off  to 
wards  the  eastern  side  of  the  valley,  and  obliquely  towards 
Buena  Vista.  At  this  time,  Captain  Shover  moved  rapid 
ly  forward  with  his  piece,  supported  by  a  miscellaneous 
command  of  mounted  volunteers,  and  fired  several  shots 
at  the  cavalry  with  great  effect.  They  were  driven  into 
the  ravines  which  lead  to  the  lower  valley,  closely  pursued 
by  Captain  Shover,  who  was  farther  supported  by  a  piece 
of  Captain  Webster's  battery,  under  Lieutenant  Donald- 
M 


134  TAYLOR'S  OFFICIAL  DESPATCH. 

son,  which  had  advanced  from  the  redoubt,  supported  by 
Captain  Wheeler's  company  of  Illinois  volunteers.  The 
enemy  made  one  or  two  efforts  to  charge  the  artillery,  but 
was  finally  driven  back  in  a  confused  mass,  and  did  not 
again  appear  upon  the  plain. 

"  In  the  mean  time,  the  firing  had  partially  ceased  upon 
the  principal  field.  The  enemy  seemed  to  confine  his 
efforts  to  the  protection  of  his  artillery,  and  I  had  left  the 
plateau  for  a  moment,  when  I  was  recalled  thither  by  a 
very  heavy  musketry  fire.  On  regaining  that  position,  I 
discovered  that  our  infantry  (Illinois  and  Second  Ken 
tucky)  had  engaged  a  greatly  superior  force  of  the  ene 
my — evidently  his  reserve — and  that  they  had  been  over 
whelmed  by  numbers.  The  moment  was  most  critical. 
Captain  O'Brien,  with  two  pieces,  had  sustained  this 
heavy  charge  to  the  last,  and  was  finally  obliged  to  leave 
his  guns  on  the  field — his  infantry  support  being  entirely 
routed.  Captain  Bragg,  who  had  just  arrived  from  the 
left,  was  ordered  at  once  into  battery.  Without  any  in 
fantry  to  support  him,  and  at  the  imminent  risk  of  losing 
his  guns,  this  officer  came  rapidly  into  action,  the  Mexi 
can  line  being  but  a  few  yards  from  the  muzzle  of  his 
pieces.  The  first  discharge  of  canister  caused  the  enemy 
to  hesitate  ;  the  second  and  third  drove  him  back  in  dis 
order  and  saved  the  day.  The  Second  Kentucky  regi 
ment,  which  had  advanced  beyond  supporting  distance  in 
this  affair,  was  driven  back  and  closely  pressed  by  the 
enemy's  cavalry.  Taking  a  ravine  which  led  in  the 
direction  of  Captain  Washington's  battery,  their  pursuers 
became  exposed  to  his  fire,  which  soon  checked  and  drove 
them  back  with  loss.  In  the  mean  time  the  rest  of  our 
artillery  had  taken  position  on  the  plateau,  covered  by  the 


TAYLOR'S  OFFICIAL  DESPATCH.  135 

Mississippi  and  Third  Indiana  regiments,  the  former  of 
which  had  reached  the  ground  in  time  to  pour  a  fire  into 
the  right  flank  of  the  enemy,  and  thus  contribute  to  his 
repulse. 

"  In  this  last  conflict  we  had  the  misfortune  to  sus 
tain  a  very  heavy  loss.  Colonel  Hardin,  First  Illinois, 
and  Colonel  McKee  and  Lieutenant-colonel  Clay,  Second 
Kentucky  regiment,  fell  at  this  time,  while  gallantly  lead 
ing  their  commands. 

"  No  farther  attempt  was  made  by  the  enemy  to  force 
our  position,  and  the  approach  of  night  gave  an  opportu 
nity  to  pay  proper  attention  to  the  wounded,  and  also  to 
refresh  the  soldiers,  who  had  been  exhausted  by  incessant 
watchfulness  and  combat.  Though  the  night  was  severe 
ly  cold,  the  troops  were  compelled  for  the  most  to  bivouac 
without  fires,  expecting  that  morning  would  renew  the 
conflict.  During  the  night  the  wounded  were  removed  to 
Saltillo,  and  every  preparation  made  to  receive  the  enemy, 
should  he  again  attack  our  position.  Seven  fresh  com 
panies  were  drawn  from  the  town,  and  Brigadier-general 
Marshall,  with  a  reinforcement  of  Kentucky  cavalry  and 
four  heavy  guns,  under  Captain  Prentiss,  First  artillery, 
was  near  at  hand,  when  it  was  discovered  that  the  enemy 
had  abandoned  his  position  during  the  night.  Our  scouts 
soon  ascertained  that  he  had  fallen  back  upon  Agua  Nueva. 
The  great  disparity  of  numbers,  and  the  exhaustion  of  our 
troops,  rendered  it  inexpedient  and  hazardous  to  attempt 
pursuit.  A  staff  officer  was  despatched  to  General  Santa 
Anna,  to  negotiate  an  exchange  of  prisoners,  which  was 
satisfactorily  completed  on  the  following  day.  Our  own 
dead  were  collected  and  buried,  and  the  Mexican  wound 
ed,  of  which  a  large  number  had  been  left  upon  the  field, 


136  TAYLOR'S  OFFICIAL  DESPATCH. 

were  removed  to  Saltillo,  and  rendered  as  comfortable  as 
circumstances  would  permit. 

"  On  the  evening  of  the  26th,  a  close  reconnoissance 
was  made  of  the  enemy's  position,  which  was  found  to  be 
occupied  only  by  a  small  body  of  cavalry,  the  infantry  and 
artillery  having  retreated  in  the  direction  of  San  Luis 
Polosi.  On  the  27th,  our  troops  resumed  their  former 
camp  at  Agua  Nueva,  the  enemy's  rear-guard  evacuating 
the  place  as  we  approached,  leaving  a  considerable  number 
of  wounded.  It  was  my  purpose  to  beat  up  his  quarters 
at  Encarnacion  early  the  next  morning,  but  upon  exami 
nation,  the  weak  condition  of  the  cavalry  horses  rendered 
it  unadvisable  to  attempt  so  long  a  march  without  water. 
A  command  was  finally  despatched  to  Encarnacion,  on 
the  1st  of  March,  under  Colonel  Belknap.  Some  two 
hundred  wounded,  and  about  sixty  Mexican  soldiers  were 
found  there,  the  army  having  passed  on  in  the  direction 
of  Matehuala,  with  greatly  reduced  numbers,  and  suf 
fering  much  from  hunger.  The  dead  and  dying  were 
strewed  upon  the  road  and  crowded  the  buildings  of  the 
hacienda. 

"  The  American  force  engaged  in  the  action  of  Buena 
Vista  is  shown,  by  the  accompanying  field  report,  to  have 
been  three  hundred  and  thirty-four  officers,  and  four  thou 
sand  four  hundred  and  twenty-five  men,  exclusive  of  the 
small  command  left  in  and  near  Saltillo.  Of  this  number, 
two  squadrons  of  cavalry  and  three  batteries  of  light  artil 
lery,  making  not  more  than  four  hundred  and  fifty-three 
men,  composed  the  only  force  of  regular  troops.  The 
strength  of  the  Mexican  army  is  stated  by  General  Santa 
Anna,  in  his  summons,  to  be  twenty  thousand ;  and  that 
estimate  is  confirmed  by  all  the  information  since  obtained. 


TAYLOR'S  OFFICIAL  DESPATCH.  137 

Our  loss  is  two  hundred  and  sixty-seven  killed,  four  hun 
dred  and  fifty-six  wounded,  and  twenty-three  missing.  Of 
the  numerous  wounded,  many  did  not  require  removal  to 
the  hospital,  and  it  is  hoped  that  a  comparatively  small 
number  will  be  permanently  disabled.  The  Mexican  loss 
in  killed  and  wounded  may  be  fairly  estimated  at  one 
thousand  and  five  hundred,  and  will  probably  reach  two 
thousand.  At  least  five  hundred  of  their  killed  were  left 
upon  the  field  of  battle.  We  have  no  means  of  ascertain 
ing  the  number  of  deserters  and  dispersed  men  from  their 
ranks,  but  it  is  known  to  be  very  great. 

"  Our  loss  has  been  especially  severe  in  officers,  twen 
ty-eight  having  been  killed  upon  the  field.  We  have  to 
lament  the  death  of  Captain  George  Lincoln,  assistant 
adjutant-general,  serving  in  the  staff  of  General  Wool — a 
young  officer  of  high  bearing  and  approved  gallantry,  who 
fell  early  in  the  action.  No  loss  falls  more  heavily  upon 
the  army  in  the  field  than  that  of  Colonels  Hard  in  and 
McKee,  and  Lieutenant-colonel  Clay.  Possessing  in  a 
remarkable  degree  the  confidence  of  their  commands,  and 
the  last  two  having  enjoyed  the  advantage  of  a  military 
education,  I  had  looked  particularly  to  them  for  support 
in  case  we  met  the  enemy.  I  need  not  say  that  their  zeal 
in  engaging  the  enemy,  and  the  cool  and  steadfast  courage 
with  which  they  maintained  their  positions  during  the 
day,  fully  realized  my  hopes,  and  caused  me  to  feel  yet 
more  sensibly  their  untimely  loss. 

"  I  perform  a  grateful  duty  in  bringing  to  the  notice  of 
the  government  the  general  good  conduct  of  the  troops. 
Exposed  for  successive  nights,  without  fires,  to  the  se 
verity  of  the  weather,  they  were  very  prompt  and  cheer 
ful  in  the  discharge  of  every  duty  ;  and  finally  displayed 

M2 


138  TAYLOR'S  OFFICIAL  DESPATCH. 

conspicuous  steadiness  and  gallantry  in  repulsing,  at  great 
odds,  a  disciplined  foe.  While  the  brilliant  success 
achieved  by  their  arms  releases  me  from  the  painful  ne 
cessity  of  specifying  many  cases  of  bad  conduct  before 
the  enemy,  I  feel  an  increased  obligation  to  mention  par 
ticular  corps  and  officers,  whose  skill,  coolness,  and  gal 
lantry  in  trying  situations,  and  under  a  continued  and 
heavy  fire,  seem  to  merit 'particular  notice. 

"  To  Brigadier-general  Wool  my  obligations  are  espe 
cially  due.  The  high  state  of  discipline  and  instruction 
of  several  of  the  volunteer  regiments  was  attained  under 
his  command,  and  to  his  vigilance  and  arduous  service 
before  the  action,  and  his  gallantry  and  activity  on  the 
field,  a  large  share  of  our  success  may  justly  be  attribu 
ted.  During  most  of  the  engagement  he  was  in  immedi 
ate  command  of  the  troops  thrown  back  on  our  left  flank. 
I  beg  leave  to  recommend  him  to  the  favorable  notice  of 
the  government.  Brigadier-general  Lane  (slightly  wound 
ed)  was  active  and  zealous  throughout  the  day,  and  dis 
played  great  coolness  and  gallantry  before  the  enemy. 

"  The  services  of  the  light  artillery,  always  conspicu 
ous,  were  more  than  usually  distinguished.  Moving-rap- 
idly  over  the  roughest  ground,  it  was  always  in  action  at 
the  right  place  and  the  right  time,  and  its  well-directed 
fire  dealt  destructi'on  in  the  masses  of  the  enemy.  While 
I  recommend  to  particular  favor  the  gallant  conduct  and 
valuable  services  of  Major  Munroe,  chief  of  artillery,  and 
Captains  Washington,  Fourth  artillery,  and  Sherman  and 
Bragg,  Third  artillery,  commanding  batteries,  I  deem  it 
no  more  than  just  to  mention  all  the  subaltern  officers. 
They  were  nearly  all  detached  at  different  times,  and 
in  every  situation  exhibited  conspicuous  skill  and  gallantry. 


TAYLOR'S  OFFICIAL  DESPATCH.  139 

Captain  O'Brien,  Lieutenants  Brent,  Whiting,  and  Couch, 
Fourth  artillery,  and  Bryan,  topographical  engineers, 
(slightly  wounded,)  were  attached  to  Captain  Washing 
ton's  battery.  Lieutenants  Thomas,  Reynolds,  and 
French,  Third  artillery,  (severely  wounded,)  to  that  of 
Captain  Sherman  ;  and  Captain  Shover  and  Lieutenant 
Kilburn,  Third  artillery,  to  that  of  Captain  Bragg.  Cap 
tain  Shover,  in  conjunction  with  Lieutenant  Donaldson, 
First  artillery,  rendered  gallant  and  important  service  in 
repulsing  the  cavalry  of  General  Minon.  The  regular 
cavalry,  under  Lieutenant-colonel  May,  with  which  was 
associated  Captain  Pike's  squadron  of  Arkansas  horse, 
rendered  useful  service  in  holding  the  enemy  in  check 
and  in  covering  the  batteries  at  several  points.  Captain 
Steene,  First  dragoons,  was  severely  wounded  early  in 
the  day,  while  gallantly  endeavoring,  with  my  authority, 
to  rally  the  troops  which  were  falling  to  the  rear. 

"  The  Mississippi  riflemen,  under  Colonel  Davis,  were 
highly  conspicuous  for  their  gallantry  and  steadiness,  and 
sustained  throughout  the  engagement  the  reputation  of 
veteran  troops.  Brought  into  action  against  an  immensely 
superior  force,  they  maintained  themselves  for  a  long 
time  unsupported  and  with  heavy  loss,  and  held  an  im 
portant  part  of  the  field  until  reinforced.  Colonel  Davis, 
though  severely  wounded,  remained  in  the  saddle  until 
the  close  of  the  action.  His  distinguished  coolness  and 
gallantry  at  the  head  of  his  regiment  on  this  day,  entitle 
him  to  the  particular  notice  of  the  government.  The 
Third  Indiana  regiment,  under  Colonel  Lane,  and  a  frag 
ment  of  the  Second,  under  Colonel  Bowles,  were  asso 
ciated  with  the  Mississippi  regiment  during  the  greater 
portion  of  the  day,  and  acquitted  themselves  creditably 


140 

in  repulsing  the  attempts  of  the  enemy  to  break  that  por 
tion  of  our  line.  The  Kentucky  cavalry,  under  Colonel 
Marshall,  rendered  good  service  dismounted,  acting  as 
light  troops  on  our  left,  and  afterwards,  with  a  portion  of 
the  Arkansas  regiment,  in  meeting  and  dispersing  the 
column  of  cavalry  at  Buena  Vista.  The  First  and  Sec 
ond  Illinois,  and  the  Kentucky  regiments,  served  immedi 
ately  under  my  eye,  and  I  bear  a  willing  testimony  to  their 
excellent  conduct  throughout  the  day.  The  spirit  and 
gallantry  with  which  the  First  Illinois  and  Second  Ken 
tucky  engaged  the  enemy  in  the  morning,  restored  confi 
dence  to  that  part  of  the  field,  while  the  list  of  casualties 
will  show  how  much  these  three  regiments  suffered  in 
sustaining  the  heavy  charge  of  the  enemy  in  the  afternoon. 
Captain  Conner's  company  of  Texas  volunteers,  attached 
to  the  Second  Illinois  regiment,  fought  bravely,  its  cap 
tain  being  wounded  and  two  subalterns  killed.  Colonel 
Bissell,  the  only  surviving  colonel  of  these  regiments, 
merits  notice  for  his  coolness  and  bravery  on  this  occa 
sion.  After  the  fall  of  the  field-officers  of  the  First  Illi 
nois  and  Second  Kentucky  regiments,  the  command  of 
the  former  devolved  upon  Lieutenant-colonel  Weather- 
ford  ;  that  of  the  latter,  upon  Major  Fry. 

"  Regimental  commanders  and  others  who  have  ren 
dered  reports,  speak  in  general  terms  of  the  good  con 
duct  of  their  officers  and  men,  and  have  specified  many 
names,  but  the  limits  of  this  report  forbid  a  recapitulation 
of  them  here.  I  may,  however,  mention  Lieutenants 
Rucker  and  Campbell  of  the  dragoons,  and  Captain  Pike, 
Arkansas  cavalry,  commanding  squadrons ;  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Field,  Kentucky  cavalry ;  Lieutenant-colonel 
Roane,  Arkansas  cavalry,  upon  whom  the  command  de- 


TAYLOR'S  OFFICIAL  DESPATCH. 

Volvud  after  the  fall  of  Colonel  Yell ;  Major  Bradford, 
Captain  Sharpe,  (severely  wounded,)  and  Adjutant  Grif 
fith,  Mississippi  regiment ;  Lieutenant-colonel  Hadden, 
Second  Indiana  regiment,  and  Lieutenant  Robinson,  aid- 
de-camp  to  General  Lane  ;  Lieutenant-colonel  Weather- 
ford,  First  Illinois  regiment ;  Lieutenant-colonel  Morrison, 
Major  Trail,  and  Adjutant  Whiteside,  (severely  wounded,) 
Second  Illinois  regiment ;  and  Major  Fry,  Second  Ken 
tucky  regiment,  as  being  favorably  noticed  for  gallantry 
and  good  conduct.  Major  McCulloch,  quartermaster  in 
the  volunteer  service,  rendered  important  services  before 
the  engagement,  in  the  command  of  a  spy  company,  and 
during  the  affair  was  associated  with  the  regular  cavalry. 
To  Major  Warren,  First  Illinois  volunteers,  I  feel  much 
indebted  for  his  firm  and  judicious  course,  while  exer 
cising  command  in  the  city  of  Saltillo. 

"  The  medical  staff,  under  the  able  direction  of  Assist 
ant-surgeon  Hitchcock,  were  assiduous  in  attention  to  the 
wounded  on  the  field,  and  in  their  careful  removal  to  the 
rear.  Both  in  these  respects,  and  in  the  subsequent  or 
ganization  and  service  of  the  hospitals,  the  administration 
of  this  department  was  every  thing  that  could  be  wished. 

"  Brigadier-general  Wool  speaks  in  high  terms  of  the 
officers  of  his  staff,  and  I  take  pleasure  in  mentioning 
them  here,  having  witnessed  their  activity  and  zeal  upon 
the  field.  Lieutenant  and  Aid-de-camp  McDowell,  Colo 
nel  Churchill,  inspector-general,  Captain  Chapman,  as 
sistant-quartermaster,  Lieutenant  Sitgreaves,  topograph 
ical  engineers,  and  Captains  Howard  and  Davis,  volun 
teer  service,  are  conspicuously  noticed  by  the  General  for 
their  gallantry  and  good  conduct.  Messrs.  March,  Ad- 
dicks,  Potts,  Harrison,  Burgess,  and  Dusenbery,  attached 


142  TAYLOR'S  OFFICIAL  DESPATCH. 

in  various  capacities  to  General  Wool's  headquarters,  are 
likewise  mentioned  for  their  intelligent  alacrity  in  convey 
ing  orders  to  all  parts  of  the  field. 

"  In  conclusion,  I  beg  leave  to  speak  of  my  own  staff, 
to  whose  exertions  in  rallying  troops  and  communicating 
orders  I  feel  greatly  indebted.  Major  Bliss,  assistant- 
adjutant-general,  Captain  J.  H.  Eaton,  and  Lieutenant  R. 
S.  Garnett,  aids-de-camp,  served  near  my  person,  and 
were  prompt  and  zealous  in  the  discharge  of  every  duty. 
Major  Munroe,  besides  rendering  valuable  service  as  chief 
of  artillery,  was  active  and  instrumental,  as  were  also 
Colonels  Churchill  and  Belknap,  inspectors-general,  in 
rallying  troops  and  disposing  them  for  the  defence  of  the 
train  and  baggage.  Colonel  Whiting,  quartermaster- 
general,  and  Captain  Eaton,  chief  of  the  subsistence  de 
partment,  were  engaged  with  the  duties  of  their  depart 
ments,  and  also  served  in  my  immediate  staff  on  the  field. 
Captain  Sibley,  assistant-quartermaster,  was  necessarily 
left  with  the  headquarter  camp  near  town,  where  his  ser 
vices  were  highly  useful.  Major  Mansfield  and  Lieuten 
ant  Benham,  engineers,  and  Captain  Linnard  and  Lieu 
tenants  Pope  and  Franklin,  topographical  engineers,  were 
employed  before  and  during  the  engagement  in  making 
reconnoissances,  and  on  the  field  were  very  active  in  bring 
ing  information  arid  in  conveying  my  orders  to  distant 
points.  Lieutenant  Kingsbury,  in  addition  to  his  proper 
duties  as  ordnance  officer,  Captain  Chilton,  assistant- 
quartermaster,  and  Majors  Dix  and  Coffee,  served  also  as 
extra  aids-de-camp,  and  were  actively  employed  in  the 
transmission  of  orders.  Mr.  Thomas  L.  Crittenden,  of 
Kentucky,  though  not  in  service,  volunteered  as  my  aid- 
de-camp  on  this  occasion,  and  served  with  credit  in  that 


SANTA  ANNA'S  ACCOUNT.  143 

capacity.  Major  Craig,  chief  of  ordnance,  and  Surgeon 
Craig,  medical  director,  had  been  detached  on  duty  from 
headquarters,  and  did  not  reach  the  ground  until  the  morn 
ing  of  the  24th — too  late  to  participate  in  the  action,  but 
in  time  to  render  useful  services  in  their  respective  de 
partments  of  the  staff." 

In  this  battle 'the  American  afrms  acquired  new  glory, 
and  the  commanding  general  won  imperishable  laurels. 
His  cool  courage — his  presence  at  every  point  where  duty 
called  him — his  self-possession  and  apparent  confidence 
in  the  final  result,  inspired  a  heroic  ardor,  and  contributed 
largely  to  those  daring  and  sustained  efforts  which  finally 
turned  back  and  overwhelmed  the  Mexican  hosts. 

We  here  add  Santa  Anna's  final  report : 

"  In  my  despatch  from  the  battle-field  of  Angostura, 
dated  the  23d,  I  promised  to  give  you  details  of  the  ac 
tion  of  the  23d,  so  soon  as  I  should  effect  the  movement 
which  our  entire  lack  of  water  and  of  all  supplies  made 
indispensable.  In  those  engagements  the  army  and  the 
nation  have  restored  the  lustre  of  their  arms,  by  over 
coming  obstacles  inconceivable  to  all  save  those  who  wit 
nessed  them.  These  arose,  not  only  from  the  difficulties 
of  this  contest,  and  of  our  own  situation,  but  also  from 
the  rigor  of  the  season,  and  the  exhaustion  of  the  country 
along  an  almost  desert  route  of  over  fifty  leagues,  that 
was  destitute  of  good  water,  and  of  all  save  the  most  lim 
ited  supplies. 

"  The  supreme  government  was  informed  by  commu 
nications  made  before  my  leaving  San  Luis,  that  the  army 
under  my  command  would  not  commence  its  operations 
till  the  end  of  winter,  as  I  knew  by  experience  the  severe 
climate  of  the  region,  which  was  also  scant  of  habitations, 


SANTA  ANNA'S  ACCOUNT. 

provisions,  shelter,  and  even  of  fuel.  I  therefore  resolved 
1.0  go  on  organizing,  drilling,  arming,  and  clothing  the 
army  ;  and,  in  a  word,  to  put  into  a  military  shape  the 
forces  which  had  just  been  assembled.  My  intentions, 
however,  could  not  be  maturely  realized. 

"  The  want  of  pecuniary  resources  embarrassed  all  my 
dispositions.  The  soldiers,  though  well  disposed  to  com 
bat  with  the  enemy,  had  been  badly  supplied  for  a  month, 
and  would  soon  have  been  in  want  even  of  food,  but  that 
the  exertions  of  the  commanders  of  corps  prevented  that 
destitution  from  driving  them  from  their  ranks.  While 
those  meritorious  men  were  suffering  all  kinds  of  priva 
tion,  certain  writers,  from  ignorance,  want  of  reflection, 
parly  spirit,  or,  perhaps,  from  mistaken  patriotism,  were 
zealously  engaged  in  thwarting  the  plans  which  might 
otherwise  have  proved  successful.  This  they  did  by  unjust 
charges  against  the  army  and  particular  individuals,  whom 
they  abused  for  not  marching  to  the  conflict,  accusing 
them  of  want  of  decision,  and  asserting  that  the  position 
of  the  army  at  San  Luis  was  more  threatening  to  our  lib 
erties  than  to  the  enemy.  In  the  clubs  of  that  capital 
they  labored  with  assiduity  to  make  the  army  the  instru 
ment  of  a  revolt ;  but  I  frustrated  their  intrigues  by  time 
ly  steps.  There  was  one  writer  who  had  the  audacity  to 
intimate  that  I  was  in  collusion  with  the  enemy.  Yes,  I, 
to  whom  they  may  attribute  errors,  but  whose  whole  pre 
vious  course  has  shown  the  most  elevated  patriotism  ! 
Traitors  are  they,  who  seek  not  only  to  traduce  me,  but, 
by  their  detraction  of  the  army,  to  unnerve  its  vigor  for 
the  service  of  the  country.  It  seems  as  if  a  fatality  di 
rects  the  destinies  of  this  nation,  and  interdicts  a  unanim 
ity  of  the  public  will  for  its  defence  ;  and  from  this  fatal 


SANTA  ANNA'S  ACCOUNT.  145 

blindness,  the  moment  when  every  heart  and  every  aspi 
ration  should  be  directed  to  one  object,  is  the  very  junc 
ture  when  division  and  distrust  are  disseminated.  Behold 
me,  then,  compelled  by  every  circumstance  to  change  my 
plans.  Desertion  had  already  commenced  to  a  shameful 
extent  ;  and  I  was  fully  persuaded  that  if  the  scarcity 
should  continue,  the  army  would  be  dishonorably  frittered 
away.  I  therefore  resolved  that,  if  annihilated,  it  should 
be  with  glory.  Having  no  supplies,  I,  to  obtain  them, 
compromited  my  private  fortune  and  the  credit  of  myself 
and  friends.  All  this  procured  me  the  sum  of  one  hun 
dred  and  eighty  thousand  dollars,  with  which  I  was  able 
to  furnish  the  needful  supplies  to  the  army  for  twelve 
days.  I  knew  well  the  country  we  had  to  cross,  and  the 
necessity  there  would  be  for  carrying  provisions ;  and  I 
sympathized  in  anticipation  with  the  soldier  for  what  he 
would  endure  from  the  rigor  of  the  season  ;  but  to  render 
good  service  to  the  country,  and  save  its  honor,  I  had  to 
overlook  all  this. 

"  The  army  moved  from  San  Luis  by  brigades,  so  as  to 
render  available  the  scanty  resources  afforded  by  the 
country  we  were  to  cross.  The  force  consisted  of  thir 
teen  thousand  four  hundred  and  thirty-two  infantry,  divi 
ded  into  twenty-eight  battalions ;  four  thousand  three 
hundred  and  thirty-eight  cavalry,  in  thirty-nine  squadrons  ; 
and  a  train  of  artillery  of  three  twenty-four  pounders,  three 
sixteen-pounders,  five  twelve-pounders,  five  eight-pound 
ers,  and  a  seven-inch  howitzer,  all  served  by  four  hundred 
and  thirteen  artillerymen — the  total  being  eighteen  thou 
sand  one  hundred  and  thirty-three  men.  Of  this  force  there 
remained  behind,  the  garrison  of  the  works  at  San  Luis, 
and  others  which  I  allotted  to  the  towns  on  the  route  ;  as 
N  10 


146  SANTA  ANNA'S  ACCOUNT. 

also  two  squadrons  to  escort  our  small  and  only  reserve 
of  ammunition  ;  a  brigade  of  infantry,  of  two  battalions, 
under  General  Don  Ciriaco  Vasquez,  which  remained  as 
a  corps  of  reserve  in  Matehuala,  and  of  observation  upon 
Tula ;  as  also  a  brigade  of  cavalry,  under  General  Don 
Jose  Urrea.  The  latter  was  intended  to  pass  Tula,  and 
move  through  Tamaulipas  to  the  neighborhood  of  Monte 
rey,  so  as  to  call  the  enemy's  attention  to  that  quarter. 
The  point  of  concentration  for  the  brigades  ought  neces 
sarily  to  be  near  this  place,  so  that  in  the  region  through 
which  they  had  to  move,  many  troops  might  not  be  at 
once  thrown  together.  I  therefore  fixed  on  the  hacienda 
of  Encarnacion  for  that  point,  it  being,  as  I  calculated, 
the  last  stage  but  one  of  rny  march.  I  there  held  a  review 
of  the  army,  which  had  already  lost  a  thousand  men  by 
sickness  and  desertion.  The  former  was  caused  by 
the  scantiness  and  bad  quality  of  food,  and  still  more  of 
water,  which  was  brackish  as  well  as  scarce,  as  also  by 
snow-storms  and  the  exposure  of  the  troops,  who  had  al 
ways  to  be  in  bivouac  and  without  fuel.  These  snow 
storms  obliged  me  to  suspend  the  march  two  days,  till  the 
weather  became  more  settled  ;  for  the  cold  had  already 
caused  the  death  of  several  men  and  horses,  and  I  felt 
bound  by  every  means  to  diminish  the  losses  we  were  in 
curring.  These  hardships  will  account  for  the  number  of 
desertions  which  occurred  up  to  our  arrival  at  Encarna 
cion,  and  which  afterwards  even  increased.  It  must  also 
be  remembered,  that  almost  the  whole  army  had  been  re 
cently  formed,  and,  as  is  well  known,  of  men  taken  by  vio 
lence  from  their  homes. 

"  We*  had  advices  that  the  enemy  were  fortified  in  the 
hacienda  of  Agua   Nueva,   with   six   thousand   men   and 


SANTA  ANNA'S  ACCOUNT.  147 

thirty  pieces,  resolved  to  defend  the  defiles  known  by  the 
names  of  the  passes  of  Canero  and  Agua  Nueva.  The 
Americans  did  not  know  the  precise  point  on  which  our 
march  was  directed  ;  for,  though  they  exchanged  some 
shots  with  our  advance  in  Encarnacion,  and  had  frequent 
small  skirmishes  with  us  in  the  above  passes,  they  sup 
posed  our  troops  to  be  scouting-parties  of  the  first  brigade 
of  cavalry,  under  Don  Jose  V.  Minon,  whom  I  had  ad 
vanced  as  far  as  the  hacienda  of  Potosi.  These  were  the 
impressions  when  I  made  my  dispositions. 

"  It  was  my  intention  to  place  my  forces  between  the 
enemy  and  Saltillo,  so  as  to  oblige  him  to  fight  under  the 
disadvantage  of  having  his  communication  cut  off,  or,  if 
he  would  not  leave  his  works,  to  enable  me  to  besiege  him 
in  Agua  Nueva.  The  plan  might  be  carried  out  in  three 
different  ways.  One  was  by  marching  twenty  leagues  by 
the  direct  road  ;  another  by  moving  to  the  right  by  La 
Hedionda,  so  as  to  occupy  Buena  Vista  ;  and  the  third, 
by  moving  to  the  left  by  La  Punta  de  Santa  Elena,  so  as 
to  occupy  the  hacienda  of  La  Banqueria,  and  thereafter 
the  road  to  Saltillo.  The  two  last  movements  were  at  this 
time  impracticable,  for  they  would  either  of  them  require 
three  or  four  days'  march,  while  we  were  without  provis 
ions,  forage,  or  water.  I  therefore  resolved  to  operate 
by  the  direct  road,  force  the  positions,  and,  after  passing 
the  last  defile,  make  a  diversion  by  the  left,  and  occupy 
the  rancho  of  Encantada,  with  the  view  of  obtaining 
water,  none  of  which  was  to  be  had  for  more  than  eighteen 
leagues.  All  this  was  favored  by  the  enemy's  ignorance 
of  our  march  ;  but  misfortune  still  followed  us.  A  de 
serter  from  the  regiment  of  Coraceros,  a  native  of  Saltillo, 
named  Francisco  Valdes,  passed  over  from  Encarnacion 


148 

to  the  enemy,  and  gave  him  information  of  the  movement. 
The  execrable  treason  of  this  infamous  wretch  frustrated 
the  best  combinations. 

"  On  the  21st,  at  noon,  I  ordered  the  march  to  com 
mence,  the  four  light  battalions,  under  General  Don  Pe 
dro  Ampudia,  forming  the  vanguard.  I  had  not  hesitated 
to  allow  that  general,  and  other  officers  who  had  been 
court-martialed  for  the  affair  of  Monterey,  to  participate 
in  these  operations,  not  only  because  I  did  not  consider 
them  culpable,  but  also  on  account  of  the  zeal  they  mani 
fested.  This  brigade  was  followed  by  one  of  artillery,  of 
sixteen-pounders,  with  the  regiments  of  engineers  and 
their  train,  and  those  by  the  park  of  the  regiment  of  hus 
sars.  Then  came  the  First  division,  commanded  by  Gen 
eral  Don  Manuel  Lombardini,  with  four  twelve-pounders 
and  the  park.  The  Second  division,  under  General  Don 
Francisco  Pacheco,  followed  next,  with  four  eight-pound 
ers  and  their  park  ;  after  these  the  whole  of  the  cavalry, 
under  Don  Julian  Juvera ;  and  then  the  remainder  of  the 
general  park  and  baggage,  the  rear  being  covered  by  a 
brigade  of  cavalry  under  General  Don  Manuel  Andrade. 

"  In  this  order  of  march  the  troops  were  ordered  to 
make  the  first  fourteen  leagues,  between  Encenada  and  a 
plain  called  De  la  Guerra,  which  is  in  front  of  the  first  de 
file  called  the  Pass  of  the  Pinones  ;  and  to  pass  the  night 
on  that  plain  in  the  same  order  of  column.  The  troops 
having  eaten  their  rations,  order  was  given  for  carrying 
water,  as  none  could  be  met  with  till  the  day  following, 
after  having  overcome  the  enemy  at  Agua  Nueva,  three 
leagues  beyond  the  aforesaid  pass.  I,  with  my  staff  and 
the  regiment  of  engineers,  occupied  the  front,  a  little  be 
hind  the  light  troops.  On  arriving  at  the  plain  De  la 


149 

Guerra,  I  continued  the  march  in  order  to  pass  the  defile 
of  Pinones,  which  was  accomplished ;  and  I  ordered  the 
light  brigade  to  take  a  position  in  the  pass  of  Carnero, 
where  it  had  a  skirmish  with  an  advance  of  the  enemy. 
Under  these  dispositions  we  passed  the  night. 

"  At  dawn  on  the  22d  the  army  continued  its  march, 
with  the  idea  of  carrying  by  force  of  arms  the  pass  of 
Agua  Nueva,  which  1  supposed  would  be  defended  by  the 
enemy  ;  but  I  found  to  my  surprise  that  it  had  been  aban 
doned.  I  then  concluded  that  the  American  forces  had 
retired  to  their  fortifications  in  the  hacienda,  to  concen 
trate  their  defence  under  cover  of  the  intrenchments, 
which  I  had  heard  they  had  there  thrown  up.  Under  this 
idea  I  continued  the  march,  in  order  to  turn  by  the  right 
to  the  rancho  of  Encantada,  which,  as  I  have  before  men 
tioned,  is  on  the  Saltillo  road,  being  between  that  city  and 
Agua  Nueva,  and  four  or  five  leagues  from  each.  Till 
that  time  no  one  had  appeared  to  give  me  information, 
nor  did  any  one  after,  except  a  servant  from  Agua  Nueva, 
who  told  me  that  the  enemy  had  been  evacuating  his  po 
sition  since  the  day  previous,  and  falling  back  towards 
Saltillo ;  and  that  on  that  same  morning,  the  hacienda 
had  been  wholly  abandoned,  by  the  retreat  of  a  small 
detachment  which  escorted  a  large  quantity  of  munitions. 
By  this  movement  my  first  plans  and  dispositions,  founded 
on  an  expected  resistance,  were  rendered  abortive  ;  but  I 
still  did  not  despair  of  a  successful  result,  for  I  had  in 
anticipation  directed  General  Minon,  with  his  cavalry 
brigade,  twelve  hundred  strong,  to  occupy,  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  22d,  the  hacienda  of  Buena  Vista,  distant  three 
short  leagues  from  Saltillo.  This  force  might  arrest  the 
enemy's  march,  or,  at  least,  make  a  diversion  that  would 


150  SANTA  ANNA'S  ACCOUNT. 

give  time  for  the  army  to  come  up.  I  therefore  continued 
my  march,  without  losing  more  time  than  would  allow  the 
soldiers  to  drink  water  on  the  road.  The  light  brigade 
came  within  sight  of  the  enemy's  rear-guard,  and  I  order 
ed  them  to  charge  in  conjunction  with  the  hussar  regi 
ment.  I  had  reason  to  believe  the  enemy  were  making  a 
precipitate  retreat,  as  they  left  several  articles  on  the  road, 
such  as  carts,  forge  implements,  extra  wheels,  and  other 
things,  which  we  gathered  while  marching.  In  conse 
quence  of  the  different  reports  I  received,  I  ordered  the 
cavalry  to  advance ;  I  thought  we  would  be  able  to  reach 
their  rear-guard,  and  placed  myself  at  the  head  of  those 
troops. 

"  On  arriving  at  a  place  called  Angostura,  I  found  the 
main  body  of  the  enemy  awaiting  me  in  position.  The 
road  from  the  pass  of  Pinones  to  Saltillo  runs  between 
two  chains  of  mountains,  which  form  that  pass  and  those 
of  Carnero  and  Agua  Nueva.  The  ridges  open  beyond 
the  hacienda  and  approach  each  other  again  at  Angostura, 
where  the  road  turns  to  the  right.  At  this  place  there  is 
a  succession  of  ridges,  which  run  out  towards  the  line  of 
our  route,  and  at  right  angles  with  it,  and  between  them 
are  ravines  which  form  the  drains  of  the  mountains  on  the 
right.  They  are  more  or  less  passable,  but  all  very  diffi 
cult.  The  enemy's  position  was  in  front  and  in  rear  of 
the  road,  his  right  and  front  being  covered  by  ravines  that 
were  impassable,  even  for  infantry,  and  a  battery  of  four 
pieces  being  planted  on  the  highest  point.  His  battalions 
were  formed  on  the  heights  with  two  other  batteries,  one 
of  which  was  in  a  low  part  of  the  road,  between  two  hills  ; 
and,  to  my  view,  their  forces  appeared  to  be  about  eight 
thousand  men,  with  twenty  pieces  ;  but  the  prisoners  taken 


151 

from  them  report  twenty-six  pieces,  and  upwards  of  eight 
thousand  combatants. 

"I  reconnoitred  the  position  and  situation  of  the  ene 
my,  and  ordered  the  director  of  engineers,  General  Don 
Ignacio  de  Mora  y  Villamil,  to  do  the  same.  After  ascer 
taining  the  force  of  the  invader,  it  was  necessary  either  to 
await  the  infantry,  to  take  position,  or  to  fight,  as  might 
seem  most  advisable.  At  this  interval,  I  observed  that 
the  enemy  had  neglected  to  occupy  a  height  on  his  left 
flank ;  and,  without  losing  a  moment,  I  ordered  General 
Ampudia's  light  brigade  to  take  possession  of,  "and  hold  it 
at  every  cost.  As  the  brigade  came  up,  I  formed  them 
in  two  lines  on  a  rising  ground  that  fronted  the  enemy, 
there  being  another  eminence  between  our  two  positions  : 
the  first  division  of  infantry  was  under  the  command  of 
General  Lombardini,  and  the  second  under  the  command 
of  General  Pacheco.  I  directed  that  General  Mora  y 
Villamil,  in  conjunction  with  the  commanding  general  of 
artillery,  Don  Antonio  Corona,  should  find  a  position  for 
a  battery  of  sixteen-pounders,  to  be  sustained  by  the  regi 
ment  of  engineers.  Two  other  batteries,  of  twelve  and 
eight-pounders,  were  located  by  me.  The  cavalry,  com 
manded  by  General  Juvera,  were  placed  on  the  right  of 
our  rear,  and  on  our  left  flank.  The  regiment  of  hussars 
was  also  posted  in  the  rear,  and  on  the  left  flank  aforesaid 
was  a  height  which  I  ordered  the  battalion  of  Leon  to  oc 
cupy.  The  general  park  was  in  the  rear,  covered  by  the 
brigade  of  General  Andrade,  and  between  this  park  and 
the  lines  of  battle  I  took  my  own  position. 

"  The  making  of  these  dispositions,  as  may  be  sup 
posed,  occupied  some  time,  for  the  troops  arrived  at  their 
positions  after  a  march  of  more  than  twenty  leagues.  It 


152 

was  therefore  not  an  hour  for  combat,  and  the  army  lay 
on  its  arms.  The  enemy,  however,  so  soon  as  he  per 
ceived  that  we  had  occupied  the  height  that  flanked  his 
left  and  our  right,  despatched  two  battalions  to  dislodge 
us,  which  led  to  a  warm  engagement,  that  lasted  all  the 
afternoon  and  till  after  dark,  when  he  was  repulsed  with  a 
loss  of  four  hundred  men,  according  to  the  report  of  the 
prisoners.  Ours  was  much  less,  as  we  had  the  advantage 
of  the  ground. 

"  At  dawn  on  the  23d  I  mounted  my  horse  ;  the  enemy 
had  not  changed  his  previous  dispositions,  and  was  ready 
to  receive  us.  I  observed  but  one  difference,  which  was, 
that  on  his  right,  and  at  some  distance  from  his  position, 
he  had  formed  two  bodies  of  infantry,  with  a  battery  of 
four  pieces,  as  if  with  the  intent  of  threatening  our  left 
flank  ;  but  I  at  once  believed  this  to  be  a  mere  demon 
stration,  for  he  would  never  have  left  in  his  rear  the  diffi 
cult  ground  which  gave  strength  to  that  position,  being  the 
web  of  impassable  ravines  before  referred  to.  I,  there 
fore,  gave  no  attention  to  this  disposition  of  his  forces,  and 
resolved  to  move  mine  by  the  right.  With  this  intention, 
I  advanced  the  divisions  of  General  Lombardini  and  Gen 
eral  Pacheco  in  that  direction.  I  ordered  General  Don 
Manuel  Micheltorena  to  plant  the  battery  of  eight-pound 
ers  on  our  right  flank,  so  as  to  rake  obliquely  the  enemy's 
line,  and  to  remain  with  the  staff,  of  which  he  was  chief, 
and  await  my  orders.  I  directed  that  General  Ampudia, 
with  the  light  brigade,  should  charge  by  our  left  flank  on 
the  enemy's  right,  and  that  General  Mora  y  Villamil  should 
form  a  column  of  attack  composed  of  the  regiment  of  en 
gineers,  the  12th  battalion,  the  fijo  de  Mexico,  and  the 
companies  of  Puebla  and  Tampico,  commanded  by  Colonel 


SANTA  ANNA  S  ACCOUNT.  153 

Don  Santiago  Blanco.  At  the  same  time,  I  directed  Gen 
eral  Corona,  commanding  the  artillery,  to  place  the  bat 
tery  of  twelve-pounders  in  a  more  commanding  position, 
while  the  3d  division  remained  in  reserve  under  Brevet 
General  Don  Jose  Maria  Ortega. 

"  So  soon  as  the  enemy  perceived  our  movements,  he 
commenced  the  action  at  all  points,  attacked  our  troops 
with  intrepidity,  and  maintained  the  conflict  with  great 
vigor.  Our  men  received  them  with  proper  energy,  dri 
ving  back  and  following  up  the  assailants.  At  this  time 
my  horse  was  disabled  by  a  grape-shot,  and  it  was  some 
time  before  I  could  mount  another.  As  the  enemy  had 
yielded  ground,  I  ordered  the  cavalry  to  advance  and 
charge,  which  was  done  with  vigor.  Suitable  orders  had 
been  sent  to  the  generals  of  division  and  brigade,  among 
the  rest  to  General  Don  Angel  Guzman ;  but,  though  the 
officers  and  troops  acted  with  great  resolution,  it  was  im 
possible  to  overcome  the  difficulties  of  the  ground ;  and 
after  a  struggle  which  did  them  honor,  they  were  obliged 
to  fall  back  to  their  positions.  After  various  alternations, 
the  same  occurred  with  the  infantry. 

"  The  battle,  which  commenced  at  seven  in  the  morn 
ing,  was  prolonged  for  many  hours,  our  loss  every  moment 
accumulating.  Many  officers  and  soldiers  had  already 
been  killed,  and  a  number  of  commanders  and  distin 
guished  officers  wounded,  among  whom  were  General 
Lornbardini,  Lieutenant-colonels  Brito,  Galloso,  and  others. 
Among  the  slain  were  Lieutenant-colonels  Asonos,  Berra, 
and  other  meritorious  officers,  whose  loss  the  country 
will  ever  lament.  The  enemy  maintained  his  ground 
with  the  utmost  obstinacy,  insomuch  that  some  of  our 
troops  faltered  in  their  attacks,  and  many  of  the  raw  re- 


154  SANTA  ANNA'S  ACCOUNT. 

emits  dispersed.  This,  however,  ought  to  exalt  the  merit 
of  those  whose  intrepidity  was  never  paralyzed,  and  may 
also  be  cited  to  show  how  hotly  contested  was  the  action. 
"  Things  were  in  this  situation  when  I  concluded  to 
make  the  final  effort.  With  this  view  I  ordered  that  a 
battery  of  twenty-four  pounders  should  be  mounted  ;  that 
the  column  of  attack  then  posted  on  our  left  flank,  where 
it  had  no  object  of  operation,  should  be  transferred  to  our 
right,  and  there  be  joined  by  the  remains  of  the  Eleventh 
regiment,  the  battalion  of  Leon,  and  the  reserves,  all  under 
the  command  of  Brevet-General  Don  Francisco  Perez.  I 
executed  this  in  person,  and  afterwards  sent  for  General 
Mora  y  Villamil,  and  made  him  acquainted  with  my  final 
disposition.  I  had  already  directed  Generals  Perez  and 
Pacheco,  each  with  his  command,  to  be  prepared  for  an 
extreme  struggle,  and  had  ordered  the  battery  of  eight- 
pounders  to  advance  and  take  the  enemy's  line  in  flank. 
The  charge  was  made  with  daring  valor,  and  was  resisted 
with  animated  vigor,  with  a  fire  so  heavy  and  rapid  as  to 
cause  admiration  ;  but  the  Americans  could  not  sustain 
themselves — they  were  driven  back  and  overcome,  with 
the  loss  of  three  pieces  of  cannon  and  as  many  stands  of 
colors.  I  sent  two  of  the  latter  to  the  government  with 
my  last  despatch  ;  the  other,  which  I  then  omitted  to  no 
tice,  will  be  presented  to  the  honorable  congress  of  the 
State  of  San  Luis  Potosi,  as  a  testimonial  of  the  army's 
gratitude  for  the  patriotic  services  they  had  rendered,  and 
the  generous  sacrifices  they  had  made  for  its  benefit.  We 
moreover  captured  a  travelling  forge,  and  some  smaller 
articles,  which  I  will  not  enumerate.  Our  cavalry,  which 
so  bravely  executed  the  order  to  charge,  reached  the  en 
emy's  rearmost  positions  ;  but,  owing  to  the  nature  of  the 


SANTA  ANNA'S  ACCOUNT.  155 

ground  and  the  fatigue  of  the  men  and  horses,  I  did  not 
think  it  prudent  to  attempt  to  dislodge  them  from  those. 
The  battle  closed  at  six  in  the  evening,  our  troops  being 
then  formed  on  the  ground  which  the  Americans  had  oc 
cupied.  Our  last  effort  would  have  been  decisive,  if  Gen 
eral  Minon  had  done  his  part  by  attacking  the  enemy  in 
the  rear ;  but  he  omitted  to  do  it,  and  I  am  under  the 
painful  necessity  of  subjecting  his  conduct  to  a  court 
martial,  that  he  may  explain  it.  An  action  thus  contested 
necessarily  involved  considerable  loss.  Ours  in  killed 
and  wounded  amounted  to  more  than  fifteen  hundred 
men,  and  that  of  the  enemy  was  much  greater,  for  we 
had  time  to  take  a  view  of  the  great  number  of  their 
dead. 

"  The  plans  of  these  two  actions,  and  of  the  route  from 
Agua  Nueva  to  Saltillo,  and  the  reports  of  the  generals  of 
the  division  and  brigade,  which  I  send  with  this  to  your 
excellency,  will  give  the  supreme  government  an  idea  of 
such  details  as  I  have  not  dwelt  on,  without  making  this 
report  more  diffuse  ;  but  this  will  still  serve  to  attest  the 
bravery  of  our  troops,  and  the  glory  acquired  by  the  na 
tion  during  these  days  of  action. 

"  In  the  order  of  the  day,  I  expressed,  as  in  duty  bound, 
my  satisfaction  with  the  conduct  of  the  officers,  command 
ers  of  corps,  and  generals,  and  gave  them  thanks  for  it 
in  the  name  of  the  republic.  I  could  wish  to  announce 
in  this  report  the  names  of  many  commanding  officers, 
that  their  memory  may  be  engraved  on  the  gratitude  of  the 
nation,  not  only  for  their  resolute  and  honorable  deport 
ment  in  both  actions,  but  for  the  constancy  with  which 
they  have  overcome  so  many  privations,  sufferings,  and 
fatigues,  and  given  therein  an  example  both  of  civic  and 


156 

military  worth.  Anxious  to  do  this  justice,  J  adopt  as  my 
own  the  authorship  of  those  eulogies  which  the  generals 
of  brigade  and  division  have  bestowed  on  their  subordi 
nates.  I  would,  moreover,  place  in  view  of  the  govern 
ment,  the  merit  manifested  by  the  director-general  of  en 
gineers,  Don  Ignacio  Mora  y  Villamil,  who  fulfilled,  to 
my  entire  satisfaction,  all  the  duties  I  assigned  to  him,  for 
which  I  consider  him  worthy  of  the  highest  praise,  and  of 
such  remuneration  as  the  supreme  government  may  be 
pleased  to  award  to  his  distinguished  services.  General 
Ampudia,  to  whom,  from  the  favorable  opinion  which  I 
had  of  him,  I  intrusted  the  command  of  the  four  light 
battalions,  acquitted  himself  with  gallantry.  General 
Lombardini,  who  commanded  the  First  division  of  in 
fantry,  conducted  himself  with  valor,  and  was  wounded. 
General  Pacheco,  commanding  the  Second  division  of 
infantry,  came  up  to  my  orders  and  his  duties,  and  fought 
to  my  satisfaction.  General  Juvera  comported  himself 
honorably,  and  had  his  horse  killed  under  him.  Brevet- 
General  Torrejon  received  a  contusion,  and  General  Guz 
man  displayed  the  gallantry  for  which  he  was  already 
distinguished,  and  was  wounded.  Brevet-General  Mi- 
cheltorena,  as  head  of  the  staff,  duly  performed  all  that 
belonged  to  his  station  ;  and  I  also  confided  to  his  special 
charge  the  battery  of  eight-pounders,  which  was  the  most 
in  advance.  General  Perez  acted  as  might  be  expected 
from  his  accustomed  gallantry,  and  for  this  I  intrusted  to 
his  command  the  troops  I  have  before  mentioned,  with 
which  he  contributed  to  disorder  the  line  of  the  enemy  at 
five  in  the  evening.  I  would  also  commend  General  Or 
tega,  who  commanded  the  Third  division  of  foot,  and 
performed  his  duties  to  my  satisfaction,  as  also  Brevet 


157 

general  Uraga,  and  Generals  Parrodi,  Portilla,  Vasquez, 
Jauregui,  Terres,  and  Sanchez. 

"  It  is  entirely  due  to  the  commanding  general  of  artil 
lery,  Don  Antonio  Corona,  that  I  should  commend  him 
for  carrying  out  my  dispositions,  as  might  be  expected 
from  him,  and  for  laboring  assiduously  at  San  Luis,  in 
the  heaviest  duties  of  his  branch  of  service  ;  and  it  is 
a  pleasing  duty  for  me  to  laud  the  merit  acquired  by 
Colonel  Banencli,  and  Colonel  Brito,  who  was  wounded  ; 
Colonel  Aldrade,  of  the  hussars,  who,  to  my  satisfaction, 
evinced  his  usual  bravery ;  Colonel  S.  Blanco,  who  com 
manded  a  column  of  attack  on  the  left,  and  acted  well, 
and  Colonel  M.  Blanco — both  of  the  last  being  of  the  en 
gineers — as  also  Colonel  Obando,  of  the  flying  artillery, 
and  Colonel  Garay. 

"  The  report  of  the  killed  and  wounded,  which  I  also 
send,  will  show  what  has  been  our  loss.  I  should  be 
lacking  in  justice,  and  not  express  my  own  feelings,  were 
I  not  most  earnestly  to  request  that  attention  be  paid,  as 
is  by  law  provided,  to  the  cases  of  the  widows,  orphans, 
and  such  of  the  wounded  as  may  be  permanently  dis 
abled. 

"  The  formidable  position  which  the  enemy  occupied, 
was  all  that  saved  him ;  the  victory  would  otherwise 
have  been  decisive,  notwithstanding  his  obstinate  resist 
ance.  Still  this  triumph  will  have  favorable  results  to  the 
national  cause,  as  it  will  show  to  every  one  what  can  be 
accomplished  when  all  hearts  are  united,  and  with  one 
aim. 

"  The  army  has  done  more  than  could  be  expected  un 
der  the  laws  of  nature.     It  had  just  been  formed,  and  as 
yet  had  not  acquired  discipline  or  military  habits  ;  yet  in 
o 


158  SANTA  ANNA'S  ACCOUNT. 

marching  to  the  combat,  it  overcame  difficulties  which 
might  have  subdued  the  stoutest  heart.  After  a  march 
of  twenty  leagues,  sixteen  of  them  without  water,  and 
without  other  food  than  a  single  ration,  which  was  dealt 
out  at  Encarnacion,  it  endured  the  fatigue  of  combat  for 
two  days,  and  finally  triumphed.  With  all  this,  its  physi 
cal  powers  were  exhausted.  My  knowledge  of  this,  and 
the  duty  I  felt  in  attending  to  such  a  number  of  wounded, 
constrained  me,  after  remaining  a  few  hours  on  the  field 
of  battle,  to  fall  back  upon  Agua  Nueva,  for  the  relief  and 
refreshment  of  the  troops. 

"  From  the  impression  we  had  made  on  the  enemy, 
he  did  not  appear  before  us  for  three  days.  The  bearer 
of  a  flag  of  truce,  however,  arrived  with  a  proposition 
from  General  Taylor  for  an  exchange  of  prisoners,  and 
for  our  sending  for  the  wounded  who  had  remained  on 
the  field.  He  also  expressed  to  me  the  desire  which 
the  Americans  felt  for  the  re-establishment  of  peace.  I 
replied,  in  order  that  he  might  say  the  same  to  his  gen 
eral,  that  we  sustained  the  most  sacred  of  causes — the 
defence  of  our  territory,  and  the  preservation  of  our  na 
tionality  and  rights  ;  that  we  were  not  the  aggressors, 
and  that  our  government  had  never  offended  that  of  the 
United  States.  /  observed,  that  we  could  say  nothing  of 
peace  while  the  Americans  were  on  this  side  of  the  Bravo, 
or  occupied  any  part  of  the  Mexican  territory,  or  block 
aded  our  ports ;  and  that  we  were  resolved  to  perish  or 
vindicate  our  rights  ;  that  fortune  might  not  be  always 
favorable  to  the  enemy,  and  their  experience  of  the  22d 
and  23d  should  convince  them  that  it  could  change  ;  I 
added,  that  the  Americans  waged  against  us  a  war  of 
vandalism,  whose  excesses  outraged  those  sentiments  of 


SANTA  ANNA  S  ACCOUNT.  159 

humanity  which  one  civilized  nation  ought  to  evince  to 
wards  another ;  and  that  if  he  would  go  outside  of  the 
apartment  he  would  still  see  smoking,  which  was  the  fact, 
the  dwellings  of  Agua  Nueva,  recently  a  flourishing, 
though  a  small  settlement ;  that  the  same  vestiges  of 
desolation  marked  the  route  of  his  retreat ;  and  that  if  he 
would  go  a  little  farther  on,  to  Catana,  he  would  hear  the 
moans  of  the  widows  and  orphans  of  innocent  victims 
who  had  been  sacrificed  without  necessity. 

"  With  respect  to  the  wounded,  whom  I  was  invited 
to  send  for,  I  replied  that  there  could  be  none  save  those 
who  had  been  too  much  hurt  to  rise  from  the  field,  or 
those  most  in  the  advance,  who  had  remained  in  the 
ravines  ;  and  that  as  I  had  not  means  for  their  convey 
ance,  the  enemy  might  take  them  to  Saltillo,  under  the 
protection  of  the  laws  of  nations.  As  for  the  prisoners 
which  he  offered  to  exchange,  I  told  him  I  did  not  know 
who  they  could  be,  unless  it  were  some  of  our  dispersed 
troops,  or  some  who,  from  the  fatigue  of  the  two  pre 
vious  days,  had  remained  asleep  when  we  moved.  In 
answer  to  the  courtesy  the  enemy's  general  had  shown 
with  respect  to  our  wounded,  I  consented,  in  the  name  of 
the  nation,  to  release  all  the  prisoners  we  had — those 
taken  both  in  the  battle  and  at  Encarnacion.  At  the  same 
time  I  allowed  the  bearer  of  the  flag,  who  was  a  superior 
officer,  of  prepossessing  appearance  and  manners,  to  take 
the  bandage  from  his  eyes,  and  informed  him  that  it  was 
for  him  personally  that  the  honor  of  this  concession  was 
meant.  I  did  it  also  that  he  might  see  our  camp  and  our 
troops. 

"  As  I  have  said  in  the  preceding  paragraph,  we  re 
mained  at  the  hacienda  three  days  ;  but  the  only  supply 


160 

we  could  obtain  was  ninety  beeves,  and  these  were  con 
sumed  on  the  25th.  The  horses  were  also  without  for 
age,  and  notwithstanding  all  the  efforts  or  provisions  that 
I  could  make,  many  of  the  wounded  had  been  but  once 
attended  to,  arid  some  not  at  all.  From  the  rigor  of  the 
climate,  the  badness  and  scantiness  of  the  sustenance,  the 
entire  want  of  bread,  and  the  bad  quality  of  the  water 
used  in  our  former  bivouacs,  a  bowel  complaint  had  bro 
ken  out  in  the  army,  and  rendered  ineffective  at  least 
one-half  of  it.  I  knew  that  a  retrograde  movement  to  our 
former  positions  had  become  inevitable  ;  but  though  every 
thing  around  me  proclaimed  this  necessity,  my  feelings 
revolted  against  it,  solely  because  I  foresaw  that  from  ig 
norance,  malice,  or  presumption,  the  countermarch  would 
be  condemned,  and  that  those  who  did  not  witness  our 
situation  would  imagine  the  possibility  of  the  army's  con 
tinuing  its  operations. 

"  Six  days  before,  when  the  troops  had  not  suffered  so 
much,  nor  fought  for  two  successive  days,  nor  been  em 
barrassed  with  sick  and  wounded,  but  were  still  sound  in 
morale  and  in  health,  I  had  not  deemed  it  prudent  to 
augment  the  labors  and  difficulties  of  the  army  by  moving 
to  the  right  or  to  the  left ;  how  then  would  it  have  been 
possible  to  go  on  operating  after  all  that  subsequently 
occurred  ?  But  let  detractors  say  what  they  will,  the 
army  as  well  as  myself  will  always  answer  by  an  appeal 
to  our  conduct,  our  wishes,  and  the  notorious  impossibil 
ity  of  carrying  them  out.  Notwithstanding  my  conviction, 
I  wished  to  hear  the  opinion  of  the  generals  and  some  of 
the  commanders  of  corps,  and  to  ascertain  if  they  could 
point  out  any  resource  which  had  not  occurred  to  me. 
Without  disclosing  my  own  ideas  on  the  subject  I  lis- 


SANTA  ANNA  S  ACCOUNT.  161 

ened  to  theirs,  and  they  all  unanimously,  and  each  one  by 
.his  opinion  separately  expressed,  showed  and  demon 
strated  in  various  ways,  that  however  good  their  will  to 
remain,  the  countermarch  of  the  army  had  become  in 
dispensable,  but  that  this  necessity  was  not  forced  upon 
as  by  the  enemy.  It  was  not  till  I  had  heard  their 
opinions  that  I  announced  my  own  accordant  resolution, 
and  the  proceedings  of  the  council  being  drawn  up,  I 
had  the  honor  of  remitting  them  to  your  excellency  on 
the  25th. 

"  On  the  26th,  after  I  had  ordered  General  Minon  to 
follow  the  movement,  the  army  commenced  its  retreat 
with  the  view  of  occupying  the  first  peopled  localities, 
where  resources  might  be  obtained,  such  as  Vanegas 
Catorce,  El  Cadral,  and  Matehuala,  as  also  Tula ;  but  I 
doubt  if  in  those  places  proper  attention  can  be  given  to 
the  sick  and  wounded — or  the  losses  we  have  sustained 
m  those  laborious  movements  be  remedied. 

"  The  nation,  for  which  a  triumph  has  been  gained 
at  the  cost  of  so  many  sufferings,  will  learn  that,  if  we 
were  able  to  conquer  in  the  midst  of  so  many  embar 
rassments,  there  will  be  no  doubt  as  to  our  final  success 
in  the  struggle  we  sustain,  if  every  spirit  but  rallies  to 
he  one  sacred  object  of  common  defence.  A  mere  de- 
ermined  number  of  men  will  not,  as  many  imagine,  suf 
fice  for  the  prosecution  of  war :  it  is  indispensable  that 
hey  be  armed,  equipped,  disciplined,  and  habituated,  and 
lhat  a  systematized  support  for  such  an  organized  force 
be  provided.  We  must  bear  in  mind  that  we  have  10 
combat  in  a  region  deficient  of  all  resources,  and  that 
every  thing  for  subsistence  has  to  be  carried  along  with 
the  soldiery :  the  good-will  of  a  few  will  not  suffice,  bu 


162  SANTA  ANNA'S  ACCOUNT. 

the  co-operation  of  all  is  needed  ;  and  if  we  do  not  cast 
aside  selfish  interests,  and  petty  passions,  we  can  expect 
nothing  but  disaster.  The  army,  and  myself  who  have 
led  it,  have  the  satisfaction  of  knowing  that  we  have  de 
monstrated  this  truth." 


ARMY  ADVANCES  TO  LOBOS.  163 


CHAPTER  IX. 

Advance  of  the  Army  to  Lobos ;  thence  to  Antonio  Lizardo. — Siege  and 
Capture  of  Vera  Cruz. — Official  Despatches. — March  to  the  Interior. — 
Battle  of  Cerro  Gordo. — Official  Despatches. —  apture  of  Puebla. 

GENERAL  Scott  having  been  joined  by  the  troops  from 
the  Upper  Rio  Grande,  halted  for  a  few  days  at  the  mouth 
of  the  river.  Every  thing  being  in  readiness,  they  were 
taken  on  board  transports,  and  proceeded  to  join  others 
who  had  made  their  rendezvous  at  the  island  of  Lobos, 
about  125  miles  north  and  west  of  the  city  of  Vera  Cruz. 
The  troops  being  thus  collected,  the  whole  armament  pro 
ceeded  to  Antonio  Lizardo. 

On  the  morning  of  the  7th  of  March,  General  Scott,  in 
a  steamer,  with  Commodore  Connor,  reconnoitred  the 
city,  for  the  purpose  of  selecting  the  best  landing-place 
for  the  army.  The  spot  selected  was  the  shore  west  of 
the  island  of  Sacrificios.  The  anchorage  was  too  narrow 
for  a  large  number  of  vessels,  and  on  the  morning  of  the 
9th  of  March  the  troops  were  removed  from  the  transports 
to  the  ships  of  war.  The  fleet  then  set  sail — General 
Scott  in  the  steamship  Massachusetts,  leading  the  van. 
As  he  passed  through  the  squadron,  his  tall  form,  con 
spicuous  on  the  deck,  attracted  the  eyes  of  soldier  arid 
of  sailor  ;  a  cheer  burst  spontaneously  forth,  and  from  ves 
sel  to  vessel  was  echoed,  and  answered  through  the  line. 
The  voices  of  veterans,  and  of  new  recruits — of  those 
who  had  been  victorious  at  Monterey,  and  of  those  who 


164  TROOPS  LAND  AT  SACRIFICIOS. 

hoped  for  victories  in  the  future — were  mingled  in  loud 
acclamation  for  him,  whose  character  inspired  confidence, 
and  whose  actions  were  already  embodied  in  the  glorious 
history  of  their  country  ! 

Near  Sacrificios  the  landing  commenced.  It  must  be 
observed  at  this  point,  that  every  man  expected  to  be  met 
at  the  landing ;  for  such,  in  military  judgment,  should 
have  been  the  course  of  the  enemy,  and  such  would  have 
been  the  case  had  the  landing  been  made  at  the  point 
where  the  enemy  expected  it,  and  where  his  forces  were 
collected.  Preparations  were  therefore  made  for  any  pos 
sible  contingency.  Two  steamers  and  five  gunboats,  ar 
ranged  in  line,  covered  the  landing.  Five  thousand  five 
hundred  troops  embarked  in  sixty-seven  surf-boats.  The 
signal-gun  was  fired.  The  seamen  bent  to  their  oars,  and 
in  a  magnificent  semicircle  the  boats  swept  rapidly  to 
wards  the  beach.  Every  man  is  anxious  to  be  first.  They 
plunge  into  the  water  before  they  reach  the  shore  !  they 
rush  through  the  sand-hills  !  and  with  loud  shouts  they 
press  forward  !  They  wave  the  flag  of  their  country  in 
the  land  of  the  Aztecs  !  Where  are  their  comrades  ?  They 
also  soon  embark — they  hurry  through  the  water — they 
land  in  safety — they  rejoin  their  companions — they  return 
shout  for  shout,  to  friends  in  the  vessels  and  friends  on 
shore.  Safely,  but  hurriedly,  they  then  pass  through  this 
exciting  crisis. 

In  the  meanwhile,  the  sun  shines  down  in  the  brilliance 
of  his  light,  the  waters  are  but  just  ruffled  by  a  breeze, 
while  tbe  deep  waves  are  calm  and  the  sky  serene.  Full 
in  view  lies  the  city  of  Vera  Cruz,  and  near  is  the  re 
nowned  castle  of  San  Juan  d'Ulloa  !  The  harbor  is  crowd 
ed  with  foreign  vessels,  and  decks  and  rigging  are  filled 


REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  LANDING.          165 

wii.li  wondering  spectators  !  Never,  says  one,  shall  I  for 
get  the  excitement  of  that  scene  ! 

The  first  division  of  troops  had  landed  a  little  before 
sunset,  the  second  and  third  followed  in  succession,  and 
before  ten  o'clock  the  whole  army  (numbering  twelve 
thousand  men)  was  landed,  without  the  slightest  accident 
and  without  the  loss  of  a  single  life  ! 

Thus,  at  the  distance  of  more  than  three  hundred  years, 
was  renewed  the  landing  and  march  of  Cortez  !  Both 
were  brilliant,  and  remarkable  in  history  and  conduct. 
The  Spanish  hero  came  to  encounter  and  subdue,  on  un 
known  shores,  the  Aztectic- American  civilization.  The 
Anglo-American  came  to  meet  and  prevail  against  the 
Spanish-Aztec  combination.  Both  came  with  inferior 
numbers,  to  illustrate  the  higher  order  and  vastly  superior 
energies  of  moral  power.  Both  came  agents  controlled 
by  an  invisible  spirit,  in  carrying  forward  the  drama  of 
Divine  Providence  on  earth.  In  vain  do  we  speculate  as 
to  the  end  ;  it  will  be  revealed  only  when  the  last  curtain 
is  drawn  from  the  deep,  mysterious  Future. 

The  landing  at  Vera  Cruz,  as  a  military  operation,  de 
serves  a  credit  which  is  seldom  awarded  to  bloodless 
achievements.  It  is  common  to  measure  military  opera 
tions  by  the  current  of  blood  which  has  flowed.  But 
why  ?  Is  he  not  the  best  general  who  accomplishes  the 
greatest  results  with  the  least  loss  ?  Or  must  we  adopt 
the  savage  theory,  that  the  greatest  inhumanity  is  the 
greatest  heroism  ?  Mere  animal  bravery  is  a  common 
quality.  Why,  then,  should  the  exhibition  of  so  common 
a  quality,  in  an  open  battle,  give  distinction,  when  it  is 
skill  only  that  is  valuable,  and  science  only  that  is  un 
common  ?  This  skill  and  science  were  exhibited  in  a 


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OPINIONS  OF  THE  PRESS.  16? 

most  singular  and  felicitous  manner,  in  the  pre-arrange- 
ments,  combinations,  and  success,  which  attended  the 
landing  of  the  American  army  under  the  walls  of  Vera 
Cruz.  \ 

Of  this  landing,  as  compared  with  a  similar  one  by  the 
French  at  Algiers,  the  New  Orleans  Bulletin,  of  March 
27th,  makes  the  following  correct  and  interesting  re 
marks  : 

"  The  landing  of  the  American  army  at  Vera  Cruz  has 
been  accomplished  in  a  manner  that  reflects  the  highest 
credit  on  all  concerned,  and  the  regularity,  precision,  and 
promptness  with  which  it  was  effected,  has  probably  not 
been  surpassed,  if  it  has  been  equalled  in  modern  war 
fare. 

"  The  removal  of  a  large  body  of  troops  from  numer 
ous  transports  into  boats  in  an  open  sea — their  subsequent 
disembarkation  on  the  sea-beach,  on  an  enemy's  coast, 
through  a  surf,  with  all  their  arms  and  accoutrements, 
without  a  single  error  or  accident,  requires  great  exertion, 
skill,  and  sound  judgment. 

"The  French  expedition  against  Algiers,  in  1830,  was 
said  to  be  the  most  complete  armament  in  every  respect 
that  ever  left  Europe  ;  it  had  been  prepared  with  labor, 
attention,  and  experience,  and  nothing  had  been  omitted 
to  ensure  success,  and  particularly  in  the  means  and 
facilities  for  landing  the  troops.  This  disembarkation 
look  place  in  a  wide  bay,  which  was  more  favorable  than 
an  open  beach  directly  on  the  ocean,  and  (as  in  the  pres 
ent  instance)  without  any  resistance  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy — yet,  only  nine  thousand  men  were  landed  the 
first  day,  and  from  thirty  to  forty  lives  were  lost  by  acci 
dents,  or  upsetting  of  boats  ;  whereas,  on  the  present  oc- 


168  VERA   CRUZ   INVESTED. 

casion,  twelve  thousand  men  were  landed  in  one  day, 
without,  so  far  as  we  have  heard,  the  slightest  accident  or 
the  loss  of  a  single  life." 

No  troops  of  the  enemy  made  direct  opposition  to  the 
American  army  on  reaching  the  beach,  but  the  guns  of 
the  castle  and  city  kept  up  a  constant  firing  with  round- 
shot  and  thirteen-inch  shells.  The  several  corps  imme 
diately  occupied  the  lines  of  investment  to  which  they 
had  been  respectively  assigned  by  General  Scott's  orders.1 
These  orders  pointed  out  the  most  minute  particulars,  and 
were  based  on  prior  information,  obtained  by  the  engi 
neer  and  topographical  departments,  and  carefully  ana 
lyzed  and  thoroughly  studied,  by  the  commander-in-chief. 
This  information  was  so  accurate,  and  so  well  understood 
by  the  commander,  the  engineers,  and  the  chief  of  the 
staff,  that  they  made  no  mistakes.  They  found  all  as 
they  anticipated  :  their  arrangements  resulted  as  they  in 
tended,  and  the  regiments  and  companies  took  their  re 
spective  places  as  quietly  and  orderly  as  if  they  were 
parading  on  the  green  banks  of  the  Potomac  !  Parties  of 
the  enemy  appeared,  and  skirmishes  took  place,  but  noth 
ing  seriously  interrupted  the  progress  of  investment.  On 
the  12th  instant,  the  entire  army  had  completely  occupied 
its  positions.2 

All  this  was  not  done  without  labor,  fatigue,  and  expo 
sure  of  the  severest  kind.  The  carts,  horses,  and  mules, 
except  a  very  few,3  had  not  yet  arrived.  Innumerable 


1  General  Orders,  No.  47. 

-J  General  Scott's  Official  Report,  dated  12th  of  March,  1847. 
3  There  had  then  arrived  but  fifteen  carts  and  one  hundred  draught- 
horses. 


SIEGE   CARRIED  ON.  169 

bills  of  loose  sand,  and  almost  impassable  thickets  of  chap- 
paral,  covered  the  ground  of  operations.  Through  these, 
l>y  their  own  hands,  and  on  their  backs,  soldiers,  both 
regular  and  volunteer,  dragged  their  provisions,  their 
equipments,  and  munitions  of  war,  under  the  rays  of  a  sun 
already  hot  in  a  tropical  climate.  The  sands  of  this  pecu 
liar  region  are  so  light,  that  during  the  existence  of  a 
"  norther,"  (a  so-called  wind  of  the  Gulf,)  if  a  man  would 
lie  down  for  an  hour  or  two,  he  would  inevitably  be  buried 
in  the  floating  drifts  !  He  must  therefore,  at  this  season, 
seek  shelter  in  chapparals.  In  such  circumstances — un 
der  the  distant  fire  of  the  enemy's  fortresses,  and  in  the 
midst  of  sharp  skirmishes — the  investment  was  completed. 
The  lines  of  siege  were  five  miles  in  length,  and  on  that 
whole  distance  provisions  must  be  carried  and  commu 
nications  kept  up  with  depots,  and  with  ships  at  sea.  In 
this  the  officers  and  seamen  of  the  navy  co-operated  with 
those  of  the  army  in  the  most  gallant  and  skilful  manner. 

During  this  part  of  the  siege  a  "  norther"  prevailed, 
which  rendered  it  impossible  to  land  heavy  ordnance.  On 
the  17th  a  pause  occurred  in  the  storm,  and  ten  mortars, 
four  twenty-four-pound  guns,  and  some  howitzers  were 
landed.  On  the  night  of  the  18th  the  trenches  were 
opened,  and,  the  engineers  with  the  sappers  and  miners 
leading  the  way,  the  army  gradually  closed  in  nearer  the 
city. 

On  the  22d  of  March — seven  of  the  ten-inch  mortars 
being  in  battery,  and  other  works  in  progress — General 
Scott  summoned  the  governor  of  Vera  Cruz  to  surrender 
the  city.  The  governor,  who  was  also  governor  of  the 
castle,  chose  to  consider  the  summons  to  surrender  that, 
as  well  as  the  city,  and  rejected  the  proposition.  On  the 
p 


170  A   TRUCE  ASKED  FOR. 

return  of  the  flag,  the  mortar-battery,  at  the  distance  of 
eight  hundred  yards  from  the  city,  opened  its  fire  on  the 
city,  and  continued  to  fire  during  the  day  and  night. 

On  the  24th  the  batteries  were  reinforced  with  twenty- 
four-pounders  and  paixhan  guns.  On  the  25th  all  the 
batteries  were  in  "  awful  activity."  Terrible  was  the 
scene !  The  darkness  of  night  was  illuminated  with 
blazing  shells  circling  through  the  air.  The  roar  of  artil 
lery  and  the  heavy  fall  of  descending  shot  were  heard 
through  the  streets  of  the  besieged  city.  The  roofs  of 
buildings  were  on  fire.  The  domes  of  churches  rever 
berated  with  fearful  explosions.  The  sea  was  reddened 
writh  the  broadsides  of  ships.  The  castle  of  San  Juan 
returned,  from  its  heavy  batteries,  the  fire,  the  light,  the 
smoke,  the  noise  of  battle.  Such  was  the  sublime  and 
awfully  terrible  scene,  as  beheld  from  the  trenches  of  the 
army,  from  the  22d  to  the  25th  of  March,  when  the  accu 
mulated  science  of  ages,  applied  to  the  military  art,  had, 
on  the  plains  of  Vera  Cruz,  aggregated  and  displayed  the 
fulness  of  its  destructive  power. 

On  the  evening  of  the  25th  instant,  the  consuls  of  Eu 
ropean  powers  residing  in  Vera  Cruz,  made  application, 
by  memorial,  to  General  Scott  for  a  truce,  to  enable  them 
and  the  women  and  children  of  the  city  to  retire.  To 
this  General  Scott  replied — that  a  truce  could  only  be 
granted  on  application  of  General  Morales,  the  governor, 
with  a  view  to  surrender;1  that  safeguards  had  already 
been  sent  to  the  foreign  consuls,  of  which  they  had  refu 
sed  to  avail  themselves  ;  that  the  blockade  had  been  left 
open  to  consuls  anoS  neutrals  to  the  22d  proximo  ;  and 


Scott's  Official  Report  of  March  25,  1847. 


OVERTURES  FOR  SURRENDER. 

that  the  case  of  women  and  children,  with  their  hardships 
and  distresses,  had  been  fully  considered  before  one  gun 
was  fired. 

The  memorial  represented  that  the  batteries  had  already 
a  terrible  effect  on  the  city — and  by  this,  and  other  evi 
dence,  it  was  now  clear  that  a  crisis  had  arrived.  The 
city  must  either  be  surrendered,  or  it  must  be  consigned 
to  inevitable  and  most  melancholy  destruction. 

Accordingly,  early  on  the  morning  of  the  26th  of  March, 
General  Landero,  on  whom  the  command  had  been  de-. 
volved  by  General  Morales,  made  overtures  of  surrender. 
Arrangements  had  been  made  by  Scott  for  carrying  the 
city  by  assault  on  that  very  day.  The  proposition  of  the 
Mexican  general  made  this  unnecessary,  and  Generals 
Worth  and  Pillow,  with  Colonel  Totten,  that  distinguished 
officer  of  the  engineer  corps,  who  had  conducted  the  siege, 
were  appointed  commissioners  on  the  part  of  the  Ameri 
can  army,  to  treat  with  others  appointed  by  the  governor 
of  Vera  Cruz.  Late  on  the  night  of  the  27th  the  articles 
of  capitulation  were  signed  and  exchanged. 

On  the  29th  of  March  the  official  despatch  of  General 
Scott  announced  that  the  flag  of  the  United  States  floated 
over  the  walls  of  Vera  Cruz  and  the  castle  of  San  Juan 
d'Ulloa.  The  regular  siege  of  the  city  had  continued 
from  the  day  of  investment,  the  12th  of  March,  to  the  day 
the  articles  of  capitulation  were  signed,  the  27th,  making 
a  period  of  fifteen  days,  in  which  active,  continuous,  and 
vigorous  operations  were  carried  on.  During  this  time 
our  army  had  thrown  three  thousand  ten-inch  shells,  two 
hundred  howitzer  shells,  one  thousand  paixhan  shot,  and 
two  thousand  five  hundred  round-shot,  weighing  on  the 
whole  about  half  a  million  of  pounds  !  Most  effective 


172  CITY  AND  CASTLE  SURRENDER. 

and  most  terrible  was  the  disaster  and  destruction  they 
caused  within  the  walls  of  the  city,  whose  ruins  and  whose 
mourning  attested  both  the  energy  and  the  sadness  of  war. 

By  some  it  was  thought  strange  that  the  governor  of 
Vera  Cruz  should  have  surrendered  so  soon  ;  but,  on  a 
full  exhibition  of  the  facts  of  the  siege,  surprise  gives 
place  to  admiration  at  the  progress,  power,  and  develop 
ment  of  military  science.  The  thirty  years  which  had 
elapsed  since  the  fall  of  Napoleon,  had  not  been  idly 
passed  by  military  men.  They  had  acquired  and  sys 
tematized  new  arts  and  new  methods  in  the  art  of  war. 
Nor  were  American  officers  inattentive  to  this  progress. 
They  had  shared  in  it  all,  and  when  the  siege  of  Vera 
Cruz  was  undertaken,  this  new  power  and  method  were 
fully  displayed.  The  city  was  environed  with  cords  of 
strength,  in  which  all  its  defences  must  be  folded  and 
crushed.  The  result  was  inevitable.  The  officers  of 
Vera  Cruz  saw  this,  and  although  the  castle  of  San  Juan 
might  have  held  out  a  few  days  longer,  for  what  purpose 
would  it  have  been  ?  There  is  no  rule  of  military  science 
which  requires  fighting  when  fighting  is  useless.  There 
is  no  law  of  humanity  which  would  not  be  violated  by  the 
wanton  exposure  of  towns  and  inhabitants  when  defence 
was  impossible.  The  surrender  was,  therefore,  alike  just 
to  victors  and  defenders,  both  of  whom  had  arrived  at  an 
inevitable  end, — the  result  of  progress  in  high  civilization, 
and  of  the  highest  military  skill  and  accomplishments. 

By  the  terms  of  capitulation,  all  the  arms  and  munitions 
of  war  were  given  up  to  the  United  States  ;  five  thousand 
prisoners  surrendered  on  parole  ;  near  five  hundred  pieces 
of  fine  artillery  were  taken  ;  the  best  port  of  Mexico  cap 
tured  and  possessed  ;  and  the  famed  castle  of  San  Juan, 


REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  EVENT.  17o 

said  to  be  impregnable,  and  which  had  been  refitted  and 
equipped  in  the  best  possible  manner,  yielded  its  defences 
to  the  superior  skill  and  energy  of  the  Anglo-Americans. 
At  10  A.  M.,  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  that  people,  who 
centuries  before  had,  with  a  small  band,  marched  through 
the  Aztec  empire,  and,  with  the  pride  of  power,  supplant 
ed  its  ancient  dominion,  struck  their  flags  and  quietly  sub 
mitted  to  another  and  a  newer  race,  who  had  come  over 
the  Atlantic  later  than  themselves,  but  who  had  imbibed 
other  principles,  and  been  impelled  by  stronger  energies, 
in  the  colder  regions  of  the  north.  On  the  castle  of  San 
Juan,  on  the  forts  of  Santiago  and  Conception,  the  banner 
of  the  American  Union  gracefully  ascended,  and,  amidst 
the  shouts  and  cheers  of  warriors  on  sea  and  shore,  bent  its 
folds  to  the  breeze,  and  looked  forth  over  the  Mexican  Gulf. 
In  this  great  and  successful  enterprise,  the  American 
arms  met  with  but  little  loss.  Two  officers,1  (valuable, 
however,  to  their  corps  and  country,)  with  a  few  soldiers, 
were  all  the  deaths.  So  great  a  result,  obtained  with  so 
little  loss,  may  be  sought  in  vain  among  the  best  cam 
paigns  of  the  best  generals  of  modern  times.  There  are 
those  who  think  victory  brightest  when  achieved  in  the 
carnival  of  death,  and  the  laurel  greenest  which  is  plucked 
from  a  crimson  tree.  But  this  is  not  the  estimate  of  the 
humane,  the  honorable,  or  the  intelligent.  They,  in  this 
age  of  the  world,  will  deem  that  achievement  greatest 
which  costs  the  least,  where  skill  has  been  substituted  for 
death,  arid  science  for  the  brave  but  often  wasted  energy 
of  bodily  force. 


1  Captains  Alburtis  and  Viuton,  both  distinguished  officers,  were  killed, 
with  several  private  soldiers. 


174 

Some  incidents  of  this  siege  are  related,  which  illus 
trate  the  character  of  General  Scott  and  the  nature  of  the 
war.  On  one  occasion,  when  the  general  was  walking 
along  the  trenches,  the  soldiers  would  frequently  rise  up 
and  look  over  the  parapet.  The  general  cried  out, 
"  Down — down,  men  ! — don't  expose  yourselves."  "  But, 
general,"  said  one,  "  you  are  exposed."  "  Oh  !"  said 
Scott,  "generals,  now-a-days,  can  be  made  out  of  any 
body,  but  men  cannot  be  had." 

Something  has  been  severely  said,  as  to  the  loss  of 
women  and  children  by  the  bombardment  of  the  city  ;  but 
this  is  unjustly  said.  Scott,  as  appears  by  the  official 
papers,  gave  ample  notice  of  the  danger  to  consuls,  neu 
trals,  and  non-combatants  in  the  city,  and  ample  time  for 
them  to  remove.  That  they,  or  at  least  many  of  them, 
did  not  avail  themselves  of  that  notice,  was  their  own 
fault ;  and,  by  the  laws  of  war,  it  was  both  unnecessary 
and  impossible  that  the  siege  should  be  delayed,  or  given 
up,  on  account  of  the  inhabitants  within,  who  had  long 
known  that  the  United  States  army  would  land  there, 
and  who  had  received  from  the  commander  full  notice  of 
danger. 

We  add  General  Scott's  official  despatches. 


HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 
Camp  Washington,  before  VERA  CRUZ 
March  12th,  1847 


uz,  > 


SIR  : — The  colors  of  the  United  States  were  triumphantly 
planted  ashore,  in  full  view  of  this  city  and  castle,  and  under 
the  distant  fire  of  both,  in  the  afternoon  of  the  9th  inst. 
Brevet  Brigadier-general  Worth's  brigade  of  regulars  led  the 
descent,  quickly  followed  by  the  division  of  United  States 
volunteers  under  Major-general  Patterson,  and  Brigadier- 


GEN.  SCOTT'S  DESPATCHES.  175 

general  Twiggs'  reserve  brigade  of  regulars.  The  three 
lines  successively  landed  in  sixty-seven  surf-boats,  each  boat 
conducted  by  a  naval  officer,  and  rowed  by  sailors  from  Com 
modore  Connor's  squadron,  whose  lighter  vessels  flanked  tlie 
boats  so  as  to  be  ready  to  protect  the  operation  by  their  cross 
fire.  The  whole  army  reached  the  shore  in  fine  style,  and 
without  direct  opposition,  (on  the  beach,)  accident,  or  loss, 
driving  the  enemy  from  the  ground  to  be  occupied. 

The  line  of  investment,  according  to  General  Orders,  No. 
47,  was  partially  taken  up  the  same  night;  but  has  only  been 
completed  to-day,  owing  to  the  most  extraordinary  difficulties  : 
1.  The  environs  of  the  city,  outside  of  the  fire  of  its  guns  and 
those  of  the  castle,  are  broken  into  innumerable  hills  of  loose 
sand,  from  20  to  250  feet  in  height,  with  almost  impassable 
forests  of  chapporal  between ;  and,  2.  Of  all  our  means  of 
land-transportation — wagons,  carts,  pack-saddles,  horses,  and 
mules,  expected  to  join  us  from  Tampico  and  the  Brazos, 
weeks  ago — but  15  carts  and  about  100  draught-horses  have 
yet  arrived.  Three  hundred  pack-mules  are  greatly  needed 
to  relieve  the  troops  in  taking  subsistence  alone,  along  the 
line  of  investment  of  more  than  five  miles,  as,  at  present,  our 
only  depot  is  south  of  the  city.  On  the  cessation  of  the  pres 
ent  raging  Norther,  which  almost  stifles  the  troops  with  sand, 
sweeping  away  hills  and  creating  new,  I  hope  to  establish  a 
second  depot  north  of  the  city,  which  will  partially  relieve  the 
left  wing  of  the  army. 

In  extending  the  line  of  investment  around  the  city,  the 
troops  for  three  days  have  performed  the  heaviest  labors  in 
getting  over  the  hills  and  cutting  through  the  intervening 
forests — all  under  the  distant  fire  of  the  city  and  castle,  and 
in  the  midst  of  many  sharp  skirmishes  with  the  enemy.  In 
these  operations  we  have  lost  in  killed  and  wounded  several 
valuable  officers  and  men.  Among  the  killed  I  have  to  re 
port,  Brevet  Capt.  Alburtis,  of  the  United  States  2d  Infantry, 


176          GEN.  SCOTT'S  DESPATCHES  CONTINUED. 

much  distinguished  in  the  Florida  war,  and  a  most  excellent 
officer.  He  fell  on  the  llth  inst.  ;  and  Lieut.  Col.  Dickenson, 
of  the  South  Carolina  Regiment,  was  badly  wounded  in  a 
skirmish  the  day  before.  Two  privates  have  been  killed  in 
these  operations,  and  four  or  five  wounded.  As  yet  I  have 
not  been  able  to  obtain  their  names. 

As  soon  as  the  subsistence  of  the  troops  can  be  assured, 
and  their  positions  are  well  established,  I  shall,  by  an  or- 
ganized  movement,  cause  each  brigade  of  regulars  and  volun 
teers  to  send  detachments,  with  supports,  to  clear  its  front, 
including  sub-bourgs,  of  the  enemy's  parties,  so  as  to  oblige 
them  to  confine  themselves  within  the  walls  of  the  city. 

I  have  heretofore  reported  that  but  two-sevenths  of  the 
siege-train  and  ammunition  had  reached  me.  The  remainder 
is  yet  unheard  of.  We  shall  commence  landing  the  heavy 
metal  as  soon  as  the  storm  subsides,  and  hope  that  the  five- 
sevenths  may  be  up  in  time. 

The  city  being  invested,  would,  no  doubt,  early  surrender, 
but  for  the  fear  that,  if  occupied  by  us,  it  would  immediately 
be  fired  upon  by  the  castle.  I  am  not  altogether  without 
hope  of  finding  the  means  of  coming  to  some  compromise 
with  the  city  on  this  subject. 

So  far,  the  principal  skirmishing  has  fallen  to  the  lot  of 
Brigadier-general  Pillow's  and  Quitman's  brigades.  Both 
old  and  new  volunteer  regiments  have  conducted  themselves 
admirably.  Indeed,  the  whole  army  is  full  of  zeal  and 
confidence,  and  cannot  fail  to  acquire  distinction  in  the  im 
pending  operations. 

To  Commodore  Connor,  the  officers  and  sailors  o£  his 
squadron,  the  army  is  indebted  for  great  and  unceasing 
assistance,  promptly  and  cheerfully  rendered.  Their  co-opera 
tion  is  the  constant  theme  of  our  gratitude  and  admiration.  A 
handsome  detachment  of  marines,  under  Capt.  Edson,  of  that 
corps,  landed  with  the  first  line,  and  is  doing  duty  with  the  army. 


GEN.  SCOTT'S  DESPATCHES  CONTINUED.       177 

March  13. — The  enemy,  at  intervals,  continues  the  fire  of 
heavy  ordnance,  from  the  city  and  castle,  upon  our  line  of 
investment,  both  by  day  and  night,  but  with  little  or  no 
effect. 

The  norther  has  ceased,  which  has  renewed  our  com 
munication  with  the  store-ships  at  anchor  under  Sacrificios. 
We  shall  immediately  commence  landing  the  few  pieces  of 
heavy  ordnance,  with  ordnance  stores,  at  hand,  and  hope 
soon  to  have  the  necessary  draught- mules  to  take  them  to 
their  positions.  Any  farther  delay  in  the  arrival  of  those 
means  of  transportation  will  be  severely  felt  in  our  operations. 

I  have  the  honor  to  remain,  sir,  with  high  respect,  your 

most  obedient  servant, 

WINFIELD  SCOTT. 
Hon.  WM.  L.  MARCY,  Secretary  of  War. 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,      ) 

Camp  Washington,  before  Vera  Cruz,  > 

March  23,  1847.       ) 

SIR  : — Yesterday,  seven  of  our  10-inch  mortars  being  in 
battery,  and  the  labors  for  planting  the  remainder  of  our 
heavy  metal  being  in  progress,  I  addressed,  at  two  o'clock, 
p.  M.  a  summons  to  the  Governor  of  Vera  Cruz,  and  within 
the  two  hours  limited  by  the  bearer  of  the  flag,  received  the 
Governor's  answer.  Copies  of  the  two  papers  (marked  respec 
tively  A  and  B)  are  herewith  enclosed. 

It  will  be  perceived  that  the  Governor,  who,  it  turns  out, 
is  the  commander  of  both  places,  chose,  against  the  plain 
terms  of  the  summons,  to  suppose  me  to  have  demanded  the 
surrender  of  the  castle  and  of  the  city ;  when  in  fact,  from 
the  non-arrival  of  our  heavy  metal — principally  mortars — I 
was  in  no  condition  to  threaten  the  former. 

On  the  return  of  the  flag  with  that  reply,  I  at  once  order 
ed  the  seven  mortars,  in  battery,  to  open  upon  the  city. 
In  a  short  time  the  smaller  vessels  of  Commodore  Perry's 
squadron — two  steamers  and  five  schooners — according  to 
12 


ITS 

previous  arrangement  with  him,  approached  the  city  within 
about  a  mile  and  an  eighth,  whence,  being  partially  covered 
from  the  castle — an  essential  condition  to  their  safety — they 
also  opened  a  brisk  fire  upon  the  city.  This  has  been  con 
tinued  uninterruptedly  by  the  mortars,  and  only  with  a  few 
intermissions,  by  the  vessels,  up  to  9  o'clock  this  morning, 
when  the  Commodore,  very  properly,  called  them  oft'  from  a 
position  too  daringly  assumed. 

Our  three  remaining  mortars  are  now  (12  o'clock,  A.  M.) 
in  battery,  and  the  whole  ten  in  activity.  To-morrow,  early,  if 
the  city  should  continue  obstinate,  batteries  Nos.  4  and  5  will  be 
ready  to  add  their  fire  :  No.  4,  consisting  of  four  24-pounders 
and  two  8-inch  Paixhan  guns,  and  No.  5  (naval  battery)  ot 
three  32-pounders  and  three  8-inch  Paixhans — the  guns,  offi 
cers,  and  sailors,  landed  from  the  squadron— our  friends  of 
the  navy  being  unremitting  in  their  zealous  co-operation,  in 
every  mode  and  form. 

So  far,  we  know  that  our  fire  upon  the  city  has  been 
highly  effective,  particularly  from  the  batteries  of  10-inch 
mortars,  planted  at  about  800  yards  from  the  city.  In 
cluding  the  preparation  and  defence  of  the  batteries,  from 
the  beginning — now  many  days — and  notwithstanding  the 
heavy  fire  of  the  enemy,  from  city  and  castle,  we  have  only 
had  four  or  five  men  wounded  and  one  officer  and  one  man 
killed,  in  or  near  the  trenches.  That  officer  was  Captain 
John  R.  Vinton,  of  the  United  States  third  artillery,  one 
of  the  most  talented,  accomplished,  and  effective  members  of 
the  army,  and  who  was  highly  distinguished  in  the  brilliant 
operations  at  Monterey.  He  fell  last  evening  in  the  trenches, 
where  he  was  ori  duty  as  field  and  commanding  officer,  uni 
versally  regretted.  1  have  just  attended  his  honored  remains 
to  a  soldier's  grave — in  full  view  of  the  enemy  and  within 
reach  of  his  guns. 

Thirteen    of    the    long-needed    mortars — leaving   twenty- 


GEN.  SOOTT's  DESPATCHES  CONTINUED.  179 

seven,  besides  heavy  guns,  behind — have  arrived,  and  two 
of  them  landed.  A  heavy  norther  then  set  in  (at  meridian) 
that  stopped  that  operation,  and  also  the  landing  of  shells. 
Hence  the  fire  of  our  mortar  batteries  has  been  slackened, 
since  two  o'clock  to  day,  and  cannot  be  reinvigorated  until 
we  shall  again  have  a  smooth  sea.  In  the  mean  time  I  shall 
leave  this  report  open  for  journalizing  events  that  may  occur 
up  to  the  departure  of  the  steam  ship-of-war,  the  Princeton, 
with  Com.  Connor,  who,  I  learn,  expects  to  leave  the  an- 
chorage  of  Sacrificios,  for  the  United  States,  the  25th  inst. 

March  24. — The  storm  having  subsided  in  the  night,  we 
commenced  this  forenoon,  as  soon  as  the  sea  became  a  little 
smooth,  to  land  shot,  shells,  and  mortars. 

The  naval  battery  No.  5,  was  opened  with  great  activity, 
under  Capt.  Aulick,  the  second  in  rank  of  the  squadron,  at 
about  10  A.  M.  His  fire  was  continued  to  2  o'clock,  p.  M., 
a  little  before  he  was  relieved  by  Capt.  Mayo,  who  landed 
with  a  fresh  supply  of  ammunition,  Capt.  A.  having  ex 
hausted  the  supply  he  had  brought  with  him.  He  lost  four 
sailors,  killed,  and  had  one  officer,  Lieut.  Baldwin,  slightly  hurt. 

The  mortar  batteries,  Nos.  1,  2,  and  3,  have  fired  but  lan 
guidly  during  the  day  for  want  of  shells,  which  are  now  go 
ing  out  from  the  beach. 

The  two  reports  of  Col.  Bankhead,  chief  of  artillery,  both 
of  this  date,  copies  of  which  I  enclose,  give  the  incidents  of 
those  three  batteries. 

Battery  No.  4,  which  will  mount  four  24-pounders  and 
two  8-inch  Paixhan  guns,  has  been  much  delayed  in  the 
hands  of  the  indefatigable  engineers  by  the  norther  that  filled 
up  the  work  with  sand  nearly  as  fast  as  it  could  be  opened 
by  the  half-blinded  laborers.  It  will,  however,  doubtless  be 
in  full  activity  early  to-morrow  morning. 

March  25. — The  Princeton  being  about  to  start  for  Phila 
delphia,  I  have  but  a  moment  to  continue  this  report. 


180  GEN.  SCOTT'S  DESPATCHES  CONTINUED. 

All  the  batteries,  Nos.  1,  2,  3,  4,  and  5,  are  in  awful  ac 
tivity  this  morning.  The  effect  is,  no  doubt,  very  great,  and 
I  think  the  city  cannot  hold  out  beyond  to-day.  To-morrow 
morning  many  of  the  new  mortars  will  be  in  a  position  to  add 
their  fire,  when,  or  after  the  delay  of  some  twelve  hours,  if 
no  proposition  to  surrender  should  be  received,  I  shall  or 
ganize  parties  for  carrying  the  city  by  assault.  So  far  the 
defence  has  been  spirited  and  obstinate. 

I  enclose  a  copy  of  a  memorial  received  last  night  signed 
by  the  consuls  of  Great  Britain,  France,  Spain,  and  Prussia, 
within  Vera  Cruz,  asking  me  to  grant  a  truce  to  enable  the 
neutrals,  together  with  Mexican  women  and  children,  to  with 
draw  from  the  scene  of  havoc  about  them.  I  shall  reply,  the 
moment  that  an  opportunity  may  be  taken,  to  say — 1.  That 
a  truce  can  only  be  granted  on  the  application  of  Gov. 
Morales,  with  a  view  to  surrender.  2.  That  in  sending 
safeguards  to  the  different  consuls,  beginning  so  far  back  as 
the  13th  inst.,  I  distinctly  admonished  them — particularly  the 
French  and  Spanish  consuls — and  of  course,  through  the  two, 
the  other  consuls,  of  the  dangers  that  have  followed.  3.  That 
although  at  that  date  I  had  already  refused  to  allow  any  per 
son  whatsover  to  pass  the  line  of  investment  either  way,  yet 
the  blockade  had  been  left  open  to  the  consuls  and  other 
neutrals  to  pass  out  to  their  respective  ships  of  war  up  to  the 
22d  instant ;  and,  4.  I  shall  enclose  to  the  memorialists  a  copy 
of  my  summons  to  the  Governor,  to  show  that  I  had  fully 
considered  the  impending  hardships  and  distresses  of  the 
place,  including  those  of  women  and  children,  before  one 
gun  had  been  fired  in  that  direction.  The  intercourse  be 
tween  the  neutral  ships  of  war  and  the  city  was  stopped  at  the 
last-mentioned  date  by  Commodore  Perry,  with  my  concur 
rence,  which  I  placed  on  the  ground  that  that  intercourse 
could  not  fail  to  give  to  the  enemy  moral  aid  and  comfort. 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  memorial,  that  our  batteries  have 


GEN.  SCOTT'S  DESPATCHES  CONTINUED.  ,    18] 

already  had  a  terrible  effect  on  the  city,  (also  known  through 
other  sources,)  and  hence  the  inference  that  a  surrender  must 
soon  be  proposed.  In  haste, 

I  have  the   honor  to  remain,  sir,  with  respect,  your  most 

obedient  servant, 

WINFIELD  SCOTT. 
Hon.  WM.  L.  MARCV,  Secretary  of  War. 

HKADUUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,  ) 

VEKA  CRUZ,  March  29,  1847.  $ 

SIR — The  flag  of  the  United  States  of  America  floats 
triumphantly  over  the  walls  of  this  city  and  the  castle  of  San 
Juan  d'Ulloa. 

Our  troops  have  garrisoned  both  since  10  o'clock  :  it  is  now 
noon.  Brig.  Gen.  Worth  is  in  command  of  the  two  places. 

Articles  of  capitulation  were  signed  and  exchanged  at  a 
late  hour  night  before  last.  I  enclose  a  copy  of  the  docu 
ment. 

I  have  heretofore  reported  the  principal  incidents  of  the 
siege  up  to  the  25th  instant.  Nothing  of  striking  interest  oc 
curred  till  early  in  the  morning  of  the  next  day,  when  I  re 
ceived  overtures  from  General  Landero,  on  whom  General 
Morales  had  devolved  the  principal  command.  A  terrible 
storm  of  wind  and  sand  made  it  difficult  to  communicate 
with  the  city,  and  impossible  to  refer  to  Commodore  Perry.  I 
was  obliged  to  entertain  the  proposition  alone,  or  to  continue 
the  fire  upon  a  place  that  had  shown  a  disposition  to  surrender ; 
for  the  loss  of  a  day,  or  perhaps  several,  could  not  be  per 
mitted.  The  accompanying  papers  will  show  the  proceedings 
and  results. 

Yesterday,  after  the  norther  had  abated,  and  the  commis 
sioners  appointed  by  me  early  the  morning  before  had  again 
met  those  appointed  by  General  Landero,  Commodore  Perry 
sent  ashore  his  second  in  command,  Captain  Aulick,  as  a 
commissioner  on  the  part  of  the  navy.  Although  not  included 
Q 


182  GEN.  SCOTT'S  DESPATCHES  CONTINUED. 

in  my  specific  arrangement  made  with  the  Mexican  com- 
mander,  I  did  not  hesitate,  with  proper  courtesy,  to  desire 
that  Captain  Aulick  might  be  duly  introduced  and  allowed  to 
participate  in  the  discussions  and  acts  of  the  commissioners 
who  had  been  reciprocally  accredited.  Hence  the  preamble 
to  his  signature.  The  original  American  commissioners 
were,  Brevet  Brigadier-general  Worth,  Brigadier-general 
Pillow,  and  Colonel  Totten.  Four  more  able  or  judicious 
officers  could  not  have  been  desired. 

I  have  to  add  but  little  more.  The  remaining  details  of  the 
siege — the  able  co-operation  of  the  United  States  squadron, 
successively  under  the  command  of  Commodores  Connor 
and  Perry — the  admirable  conduct  of  the  whole  army, 
regulars  and  volunteers — I  should  be  happy  to  dwell  upon  as 
they  deserve ;  but  the  steamer  Princeton,  with  Commodore 
Connor  on  board,  is  under  way,  and  I  have  commenced 
organizing  an  advance  into  the  interior.  This  may  be  delay 
ed  a  few  days,  waiting  the  arrival  of  additional  means  of 
transportation.  In  the  mean  time,  a  joint  operation,  by  land 
and  water,  will  be  made  upon  Alvarado.  No  lateral  expe 
dition,  however,  shall  interfere  with  the  grand  movement  to 
wards  the  capital. 

In  consideration  of  the  great  services  of  Col.  Totten,  in  the 
siege  that  has  just  terminated  most  successfully,  and  the  im 
portance  of  his  presence  at  Washington,  as  the  head  of  the 
engineer  bureau,  I  intrust  this  despatch  to  his  personal  care, 
and  beg  to  commend  him  to  the  very  favorable  consideration 
of  the  department. 

I  have  the  honor  to  remain,  sir,  with  high  respect,  your 

most  obedient  servant, 

WINFIELD  SCOTT. 
Hoii.  WM.  L.  MARCY,  Secretary  of  War 

The  following  were  the  terms  of  capitulation  finally  agreed 
upon : — 


GEN.  SCOTT'S  DESPATCHES  CONTINUED.  183 

Generals  W.  J.  Worth  and  G.  J.  Pillow,  and  Col.  J.  G. 
Totten,  chief  engineer,  on  the  part  of  Major-general  Scott, 
general-in-chief  of  the  armies  of  the  United  States  ;  and  Col. 
Jose  Gutierrez  de  Villanueva,  Lieut.  Colonel  of  the  engineers, 
Manuel  Robles,  and  Col.  Pedra  de  Herrera,  commissioners 
appointed  by  General  of  brigade  Don  Jose  Juan  Landero, 
commanding  in  chief,  Vera  Cruz,  the  castle  of  San  Juan 
d'Ulloa  and  their  dependencies — for  the  surrender  to  the  arms 
of  the  United  States  of  the  said  forts,  with  their  armaments, 
munitions  of  war,  garrisons,  and  arms. 

1.  The  whole  garrison,  or  garrisons,  to  be  surrendered  to 
the  arms  of  the  United  States,  as  prisoners  of  war,  the  29th 
inst.,  at  10  o'clock,  A.  M.  ;   the  garrisons  to  be  permitted  to 
march  out  with  all  the  honors  of  war,  and  to  lay  down  their 
arms  to  such  officers  as  may  be  appointed  by  the  general-in- 
chief  of  the  United  States,  and  at  a  point  to  be  agreed  on  by 
the  commissioners. 

2.  Mexican  officers  shall  preserve  their  arms  and  private 
effects,  including  horse  and  horse  furniture,  and  to  be  allowed, 
regular  and  irregular  officers  and  also  to  rank  and  file,  five 
days  to  retire  to  their  respective  homes,  on  parole,  as  herein 
after  prescribed. 

3.  Coincident  with  the  surrender,  as  stipulated  in  article 
one,  the  Mexican  flags  of  the  various  forts  and  stations  shall 
be  struck,  saluted  by  their  own  batteries;  and,  immediately 
thereafter,  forts  Santiago  and  Conception  and   the  castle  of 
San  Juan  d'Ulloa,  occupied  by  the  forces  of  the  United  States. 

4.  The  rank  and  file  of  the  regular  portion  of  the  prisoners 
to  be  disposed  of,  after  surrender  and  parole,  as  their  general- 
in-chief  may  desire,  and  the  irregular  to  be  permitted  to  re 
turn  to  their  homes.     The  officers,  in  respect  to  all  arms  and 
descriptions  of  force,  giving  the   usual  parole,  that  the  said 
rank  and  file,  as  well  as  themselves,  shall  not  serve  again 
until  duly  exchanged. 


184  ARMY  ADVANCES   INTO  THE  INTERIOR. 

5.  All  the  materiel  of  war,  and  all  public  property  of  every 
description  found  in  the  city,  the  castle  of  San  Juan  d'Ulloa, 
and  their  dependencies,  to  belong  to  the  United  States  ;   but 
the  armament  of  the  same  (not  injured  or  destroyed  in  the 
further  prosecution  of  the  actual  war)  may  be  considered  as 
liable  to  be  restored  to  Mexico  by  a  definitive  treaty  of  peace. 

6.  The  sick  and  wounded   Mexicans  to  be  allowed  to  re 
main  in  the  city,  with  such  medical  officers  of  the  army  as 
may  be  necessary  to  their  care  and  treatment. 

7.  Absolute   protection   is  solemnly  guarantied  to  persons 
in  the  city,  and  property,  and  it  is  clearly  understood  that  no 
private  building  or  property  is  to   be  taken  or  used  by  the 
forces  of  the   United  States,  without   previous  arrangement 
with  the  owners,  and  for  a  fair  equivalent. 

8.  Absolute   freedom  of  religious  worship  and  ceremonies 
is  solemnly  guarantied. 

We  must  now  resume  the  march  of  Scott's  army  to  the 
capital  of  Mexico.  Worth  is  appointed  (for  the  time) 
governor  of  Vera  Cruz.  The  army  is  organized  for  an 
advance  on  the  Jalapa  road — but  wagons  are  wanting. 
Eight  thousand  men  are  to  be  thrown  forward  into  the 
heart  of  Mexico.  Quantities  of  ammunition,  provisions, 
cannon,  arms,  are  to  be  carried.  Yet  the  wagons, 
horses,  and  mules  which  are  to  do  this  service,  are  not  yet 
arrived.  A  little  while  since,  and  they  were  two  thousand 
miles  off,  in  the  heart  of  the  United  States.  But  they  will 
come.  They  are  descending  the  Ohio  and  the  Missis 
sippi.  They  will  be  here.  One  by  one,  dozen  by  dozen, 
they  arrive.  On  the  8th  of  April,  ten  days  after  the  sur 
render  of  Vera  Cruz,  the  veteran  Twiggs,  with  his  heroic 
division,  takes  the  Jalapa  road.  Other  divisions  rapidly 
follow.  In  three  days  they  reach  the  foot  of  the  moun- 


REACHES  CERRO  GORDO.  185 

tains,  from  whose  heights  may  be  seen  the  splendid  vision 
of  Orizaba,  and  its  snow-crowned  tops,  along  whose  ridges 
the  road  continues  to  the  ancient  capital  of  the  Montezu- 
mas  ;  and  from  whose  almost  impregnable  summits  looks 
down  Santa  Anna  with  fifteen  thousand  men.  The  Mex 
ican  chief,  defeated  at  Buena  Vista,  had  rapidly  traversed 
the  interior  provinces  with  the  greater  part  of  his  army, 
and  now  sought  to  defend  the  heights  of  Cerro  Gordo, 
formidable  by  nature,  with  batteries  and  intrenchments. 

Here  Twiggs  makes  a  reconnoissance  on  the  12th,  and 
determines  to  attack  the  enemy  next  morning.  In  the 
meanwhile  Patterson  arrives  with  volunteers,  and  delays 
the  attack  till  the  arrival  of  the  general-in-chief.  Scott 
makes  a  new  reconnoissance,  and  perceives  that  an  attack 
in  front  would  be  in  vain,  for  the  batteries  there  are  com 
manded  by  the  still  higher  ones  on  the  summits  of  Cerro 
Gordo.  He  orders  a  road  to  be  cut  to  the  right  of  the 
American  army,  but  to  the  left  of  Cerro  Gordo,  which 
winds  round  the  base  of  the  mountains  and  ascends  them 
in  the  rear  of  the  Mexican  forts,  there  rejoining  the  Jalapa 
road,  and  behind  the  whole  Mexican  position.  The  labor, 
the  skill,  the  courage  of  American  soldiers  accomplish  it. 
For  three  days  the  Mexicans  do  not  discover  it.  It  is 
nearly  done  on  the  17th,  when  they  fire  with  grape  and 
musketry  on  the  working  parties.  Twiggs  again  advan 
ces  to  the  storm.  He  carries  the  hill  below  Cerro  Gordo, 
but  above  the  new  road.  All  is  safe  now,  and  all  is  ready 
for  the  coming  battle.  On  the  17th  of  April  Scott  issues 
his  celebrated  order,  dated  Plan  del  Rio.  It  details,  with 
prophetic  accuracy,  the  movements  of  the  following  day — 
the  positions,  the  attack,  the  battle,  the  victory,  and  the 
hot  pursuit,  tili  the  spires  of  Jalapa  should  appear  m 
Q2 


186  GENERAL  SCOTT's  ORDER. 

sight.     It  is  an  order  most  remarkable  in  history.     Here 
it  is  : — 

GENERAL  ORDERS,  No.  111. 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,  > 
Plan  del  Rio,  April  17,  1847.    $ 

The  enemy's  whole  line  of  intrenchments  and  batteries 
will  be  attacked  in  front,  and  at  the  same  time  turned,  early 
in  the  day  to-morrow — probably  before  ten  o'clock,  A.  M. 

The  second  (Twiggs')  division  of  regulars  is  already  ad- 
vanced  within  easy  turning  distance  towards  the  enemy's 
left.  That  division  has  instructions  to  move  forward  before 
daylight  to-morrow,  and  take  up  a  position  across  the  national 
road  in  the  enemy's  rear,  so  as  to  cut  off  a  retreat  towards 
Xalapa.  It  may  be  reinforced  to-day,  if  unexpectedly  at 
tacked  in  force,  by  regiments — one  or  two  taken  from  Shields' 
brigade  of  volunteers.  If  not,  the  two  volunteer  regiments 
will  march  for  that  purpose  at  daylight  to-morrow  morning, 
under  Brigadier-general  Shields,  who  will  report  to  Brigadier- 
general  Twiggs,  on  getting  up  with  him,  or  the  general-in- 
chief,  if  he  be  in  advance. 

The  remaining  regiment  of  that  volunteer  brigade  will  re 
ceive  instructions  in  the  course  of  this  day. 

The  first  division  of  regulars  (Worth's)  will  follow  the 
movement  against  the  enemy's  left  at  sunrise  to-morrow 
morning. 

As  already  arranged,  Brigadier-general  Pillow's  brigade 
will  march  at  six  o'clock  to-morrow  morning  along  the  route 
he  has  carefully  reconnoitred,  and  stand  ready  as  soon  as  he 
hears  the  report  of  arms  on  our  right,  or  sooner  if  circum 
stances  should  favor  him,  to  pierce  the  enemy's  line  of  bat 
teries  at  such  point — the  nearer  the  river  the  better — as  he 
may  select.  Once  in  the  rear  of  that  line,  he  will  turn  to 
the  right  or  left,  or  both,  and  attack  the  batteries  in  reverse  ; 


ITS   FULFILMENT.  187 

or,  if  abandoned,  he  will  pursue  the  enemy  with  vigor  until 
further  orders. 

Wall's  field  battery  and  the  cavalry  will  be  held  in  reserve 
on  the  national  road,  a  little  out  of  view  and  range  of  the 
enemy's  batteries.  They  will  take  up  that  position  at  nine 
o'clock  in  the  morning. 

The  enemy's  batteries  being  carried  or  abandoned,  all  our 
divisions  and  corps  will  pursue  with  vigor. 

This  pursuit  may  be  continued  many  miles,  until  stopped 
by  darkness  or  fortified  positions  towards  Xalapa.  Conse 
quently,  the  body  of  the  army  will  not  return  to  this  encamp 
ment,  but  be  followed  to-morrow  afternoon,  or  early  the  next 
morning,  by  the  baggage  trains  of  the  several  corps.  For 
this  purpose,  the  feebler  officers  and  men  of  each  corps  will 
be  left  to  guard  its  camp  and  effects,  and  to  load  up  the  lat 
ter  in  the  wagons  of  the  corps.  A  commander  of  the  pres 
ent  encampment  will  be  designated  in  the  course  of  this  day. 

As  soon  as  it  shall  be  known  that  the  enemy's  works  have 
been  carried,  or  that  the  general  pursuit  has  been  com 
menced,  one  wagon  for  each  regiment  and  one  for  the  cavalry 
will  follow  the  movement,  to  receive,  under  the  directions  of 
medical  officers,  the  wounded  and  disabled,  who  will  be 
brought  back  to  this  place  for  treatment  in  general  hospital. 

The  Surgeon-general  will  organize  this  important  service 
and  designate  that  hospital,  as  well  as  the  medical  officers  to 
be  left  at  it. 

Every  man  who  marches  out  to  attack  or  pursue  the  ene 
my,  will  take  the  usual  allowance  of  ammunition,  and  sub 
sistence  for  at  least  two  days. 

By  command  of  Maj.  Gen.  Scott, 

H.  L.  SCOTT,  A.  A.  A.  General. 

The  order  thus  given  was  realized  to  the  letter,  with 
the  exception  that  General  Pillow's  brigade  was  repulsed 


A.  American  army 

B.  Battery,  (American.) 

C.  Cerro  Gordo  &  Towei 

D.  Twiggs'  march. 

a,  a,  $c.  Mexican  batteries. 
4,  b.  Pillow's  brigade. 
N.  R.  National  road. 
d.  Gen.  Shields'  brigade. 
G.  Hill  stormed  by  <M  inf. 

F.  8  in.  howitzer,  (Amer.) 
2J.2J 


BATTLE  OF  CERRO  GORDO.  189 

in  the  attack  on  the  batteries  in  front.  They  were,  how 
ever,  taken,  and  their  garrisons  made  prisoners,  by  the 
advanced  corps  of  the  army,  at  the  close  of  the  battle. 
In  each  particular — of  march,  battle,  victory,  and  pursuit 
—the  order  of  Scott  was  prophetically  correct.  It  proves 
the  confidence  of  the  commander  in  the  indomitable  en 
ergy  of  his  troops.  On  the  night  of  that  day,  (the  17th,) 
the  enemy's  position  appears  almost  impregnable.  On 
their  right  rolls  a  deep  river.  Along  its  side  rises  a  chain 
of  mountains  one  thousand  feet  in  height.  On  these, 
heavy  batteries  frown  down  on  all  below.  Over  all  rises 
the  summit  and  tower  of  Cerro  Gordo.  Winding  among 
the  gorges  of  these  mountains,  and  at  last  turning  between 
the  highest  battery  and  the  river  below,  is  the  National 
road,  by  which  only  the  American  army  must  pass.  The 
Anglo-American  soldier  looks  out  from  his  camp  at  Plan 
del  Rio,  and  sees  this  deep  river  on  the  side,  this  rampart 
of  mountains  in  front,  the  high  batteries  beyond,  and 
knows  that  the  Mexican  chief,  with  fifteen  thousand  men, 
is  encamped  on  these  mountains  thus  strongly  defended. 
How  shall  he  be  attacked  ?  The  general  order  points  out 
each  step  in  the  way. 

On  the  night  of  the  17th,  a  thousand  men  of  Twiggs' 
division  are  detailed  on  their  route  to  plant  an  American 
battery  on  the  captured  hill  below  Cerro  Gordo.  A  heavy 
twenty-four-pounder  was  brought  up,  and  two  twenty- 
four-pound  howitzers.  These  were  dragged  by  main 
force  up  the  hill,  hundreds  of  feet  high,  in  a  night  of  total 
darkness.  A  fire  is  built  below,  and  the  officers  and  men 
are  told  to  take  the  cannon  straight  up.  They  are  already 
fatigued,  exhausted,  and  parched  with  thirst :  but  they 
stop  not  for  these.  They  are  divided  into  two  parties,  of 


190  BATTLE  CONTINUED. 

five  hundred  men  each,  for"  relief.  They  drag  the  pieces 
up  with  the  hands.  Here  they  stop,  block  up,  and  chain 
the  wheels,  till  they  are  relieved  by  the  other  division. 
Again  they  go  on,  and  again  they  relieve.  Thus  they  go 
on  from  seven  in  the  evening  till  three  in  the  morning. 
The  ground  is  covered  with  exhausted  soldiers,  some  to 
sleep  and  some  to  rest.  But  the  cannon  are  carried  up. 
The  morning  finds  them  on  the  hill,  and  as  the  rosy  light 
blushes  in  the  heavens,  the  soft  music  of  the  Mexican 
reveillee  is  heard  summoning  their  men  to  the  muster. 
The  batteries  and  encampments  are  revealed.  The  fine 
body  of  Mexican  lancers,  in  splendid  uniforms,  and  with 
an  unfurled  standard,  are  moving  along.  Here  battalions 
of  artillery,  and  there  a  dense  column  of  infantry,  arrest 
the  attention.  Below  and  above  are  batteries  darkly 
threatening  to  open  their  fire.  This  captured  position 
thus  commands  all  the  defences  but  Cerro  Gordo.  But 
that  is  above.  That  can  fire  down  upon  every  position 
which  could  be  taken.  It  is  plain,  then,  that  the  fort  of 
Cerro  Gordo  is  the  key  position  of  all  the  rest.  This 
the  discriminating  eye  of  military  science  had  clearly 
seen.  Scott  sees  it,  and  has  prepared  for  it.  Hence  the 
new  road  was  made,  winding,  as  you  see,  around  the 
base  of  the  mountain  to  our  right,  but  to  the  left  of  Cerro 
Gordo,  so  that  this  citadel  of  the  Mexican  camp  may  be 
stormed  from  the  flank,  and  the  retreat  of  the  troops  by 
the  National  road  cut  oft*.  Hence,  Pillow's  brigade  is  to 
attack  their  batteries  on  the  front  hill  rampart,  and  either 
lake  them,  or  divert  their  attention  from  our  flank  move 
ment.  Hence,  the  night  work  of  our  men,  so  that  our 
new  hill-fort  may  command  these  batteries  of  the  enemy, 
and  at  the  right  moment  compel  their  surrender.  All  is 


BATTLE  CONTINUED.  191 

well  done.  All  is  ready.  The  night-watch  is  past. 
Twiggs'  division,  which  has  rested  on  its  arms,  is  rousing 
itself  at  the  first  light.  The  gallant  artillerymen  and  en 
gineers  on  the  hill  cut  away  the  light  brush  in  front  of 
their  guns,  and  now  the  heavy  cannon  begin  their  fire  on 
the  hill  batteries.  Their  thunder  tones  are  echoed  from 
the  mountain  sides,  and  returned  from  the  pieces  of  the 
enemy.  The  division  of  Twiggs  is  marching.  The  vol 
unteers  of  Shields  are  hurrying  on  to  seize  the  Jalapa 
road  in  rear  of  Santa  Anna.  Cerro  Gordo  now  opens  its 
plunging  fire  on  Twiggs,  and  the  issue  has  come.  Cerro 
Gordo  must  be  stormed.  The  storm  is  led  by  the  gallant 
Harney.  They  fight  under  the  eye  of  Scott.  Here  march 
the  rifles,  the  1st  artillery,  the  7th  infantry  ;  and  near  them, 
and  with  them  storming  the  heights,  are  the  2d  and  the 
3d  infantry,  and  the  4th  artillery.  These  are  the  regulars 
of  Twiggs,  and  here  they  march  up  the  rocky  ascent,  so 
steep  that  they  must  climb  as  they  go,  and  with  no  cover 
ing  but  the  very  steepness  of  the  hill.  They  recede  a 
plunging  fire  in  front  and  a  rolling  fire  on  the  flanks — but, 
on  they  go.  On — on,  Harney  leads  his  men.  The  front 
rank  melts  away  before  the  shot ;  but  they  stop  not  till 
.the  hill  is  gained,  and  then  a  long  and  loud  shout  echoes 
from  the  mountain  sides — Cerro  Gordo  is  gained  I  Vas- 
quez,  the  Mexican  general,  is  killed  in  the  fortress.  Now 
the  flags  of  the  1st  artillery  and  7th  infantry  are  planted 
on  the  batteries,  and  now  Sergeant  Henry  hauls  down  the 
national  standard  of  Mexico.  The  Anglo-American  again 
unfurls  the  flag  of  his  country,  and  again  renews  the  vic 
tories  of  Cortez.  But  where  are  the  volunteers  ?  Yet 
further  to  the  right,  and  hastening  to  the  Jalapa  road, 
They  storm  a  fort  in  front — the  heroic  Shields  is  shot 


192  RESULT  OF  THE  BATTLE. 

through  the  lungs — but  the  fort  is  taken — the  road  is 
gained — and  the  flying  army  of  Santa  Anna  is  pursued  in 
all  directions. 

On  the  river  batteries  in  front,  Pillow's  attack  is  not 
.successful.  The  batteries  enfilade  our  men,  and  after 
bravely  fighting,  they  are  drawn  back ;  but  their  effort  is 
not  lost.  The  corps  of  General  La  Vega  is  kept  errF 
ployed  till  Cerro  Gordo  has  fallen.  Then  he  surrenders, 
with  three  thousand  men  prisoners  of  war.  Santa  Anna, 
with  Almonte,  Canalizo,  and  eight  thousand  have  escaped, 
leaving  carriages  and  baggage  behind,  and  are  now  on  the 
road  to  Jalapa.  The  sun  is  at  noon,  and  the  battle  is  end 
ed  ;  but  the  pursuit  continues.  The  reserve  division  of 
Worth  comes  up,  passes  Twiggs,  and  hurries  rapidly  on 
after  the  confused  and  flying  Mexicans  ;  nor  does  he  stop 
till  Jalapa  appears  in  sight ! 

On  the  19th  of  April,  from  Plan  del  Rio,  Scott  an 
nounces  to  the  War  Department,  that  he  is  embarrassed 
wit!*  the  results  of  victory  !  Three  thousand  prisoners, 
forty-three  pieces  of  bronze  artillery  manufactured  at  Se 
ville,  five  thousand  stand  of  arms,  five  generals,  with  the 
munitions  and  materials  of  an  army,  captured  in  a  single 
battle,  are  the  fruits  of  victory,  and  demand  the  earnest 
care  of  the  conquering  general !  The  men  must  be  pa 
roled  ;  the  small-arms  must  be  destroyed  ;  we  have  not 
men  to  take  care  of  them. 

Such  was  THE  BATTLE  OF  CERRO  GORDO.  In  the  skill 
with  which  it  was  planned,  in  the  formidable  defences  to 
be  surmounted,  in  the  heroism  of  the  attack,  and  in  the 
magnitude  of  results,  with  which  of  American  battles  will 
it  not  compare  ?  There  were  almost  impassable  obsta 
cles,  surmounted  by  skill ;  there  were  almost  impregnable 


ACCOUNT  OF  AN    EYE-WITNESS.  193 

batteries,  stormed  by  valor  ;  there  were  thousands  of  pris 
oners  captured,  and  an  army  destroyed  ;  there  was  a  road 
to  the  capital  laid  open,  and  towns  and  cities  taken  in  the 
long  vista  of  a  victorious  march  !  The  Mexican  empire 
lies  under  the  feet  of  the  conqueror,  and  again  is  the  Aztec 
compelled  to  witness  the  triumphs  of  power,  and  utter  by 
the  ruins  of  the  Past,  the  mournings  of  the  Present ! 

Look  around  you  upon  the  battle-field,  now  that  the 
dark  chariot  of  war  has  driven  by  !  Hear  the  description 
of  one  who  has  been  to  look  upon  the  dead. 

"  A  dragoon  we  encountered  on  the  way  kindly  offered 
to  be  our  guide,  and  from  him  we  learned  the  positions  of 
the  different  armies,  their  divisions  and  subdivisions.  As 
winding  around  the  hills  by  the  National  road,  the  ene 
my's  intrenchments,  their  barricaded  heights,  strong  forts, 
and  well-defended  passes  came  in  view,  we  halted,  and 
gazed  for  several  moments  in  mute  amazement.  No  one, 
from  reading  the  newspaper  accounts  or  the  reports  of  the 
generals,  can  form  a  proper  idea  of  the  advantages  pos 
sessed  by  the  enemy  in  his  chosen  position.  The  battle, 
I  knew  it  had  been  fought  and  won  by  our  troops  ;  yet  it 
seemed,  in  its  bare,  still  reality,  a  dream.  I  could  not 
shake  off  this  feeling  as  I  rode  along  the  enemy's  lines  of 
intrenchments,  entered  his  dismantled  forts  and  maga 
zines,  and  looked  from  his  chosen  heights  upon  the  paths 
up  which  our  troops  rushed  into  the  jaws  of  death.  * 

"  Passing  down  the  ravine  where  the  National  Guard 
had  three  times  attempted  to  dislodge  the  mounted  rifle 
men,  who,  supported  by  the  howitzer  battery,  literally 
rained  death  among  their  ranks,  I  was  obliged  to  turn 
back  and  retrace  my  steps.  The  gorge  was  choked  up 
with  the  mangled  bodies  of  the  flower  of  the  Mexican  ar- 
R  13 


194  BATTLE  CONTINUED. 

my.  The  wolf-dog  and  the  buzzard  howled  and  screamed 
as  I  rode  by,  and  the  stench  was  too  sickening  to  be  en 
dured.  Returning  to  the  National  road,  we  passed  a  large 
number  of  cannon  taken  by  our  troops,  and  saw  piles  of 
muskets  charred  with  fire  in  heaps,  where  they  had  been 
heaped  and  burned.  *  * 

"  All  along  the  road  were  the  bodies  of  Mexican  lan 
cers  and  their  horses,  cut  down  by  Colonel  Harney's 
dragoons,  when  these  fire-eaters  chased  Santa  Anna  and 
his  retreating  troops  into  and  beyond  Jalapa.  Almost 
every  man's  skull  was  literally  split  open  with  the  sabres 
of  our  horsemen,  and  they  lay  stretched  upon  the  ground 
in  ghastly  groups." 

From  this  sad  scenery  of  war,  as  exhibited  in  the  relics 
of  a  battle-field,  we  must  hasten  on  with  the  gallant  gen 
eral,  who  renewed  with  yet  deeper  verdure  the  laurels  of 
Niagara  on  the  summits  of  Cerro  Gordo.  Scott  was  no 
distant  spectator  of  the  combat.  He  had  called  others  to 
the  field,  and  he  shared  its  dangers  himself.  Having  pre 
pared  all  things  for  the  storm  of  the  tower,  (called  by  the 
Mexicans  the  Telegraph,)  he  took  post  at  the  point  Col. 
Harney  charged,  and  under  the  heavy  fire  of  the  enemy's 
artillery.  There  he  witnessed  the  gallant  charge,  and 
there  he  encouraged  the  troops.  It  was  then  that  he  thus 
addressed  Colonel  Harney,  (between  whom  and  himself 
there  had  been  some  coolness  :)  "  Colonel  Harney,  I  can 
not  now  adequately  express  my  admiration  of  your  gallant 
achievement,  but  at  the  proper  time  I  shall  take  great 
pleasure,  in  thanking  you  in  proper  terms."  Harney,  with 
the  modesty  of  true  valor,  claimed  the  praise  as  due  to  his 
officers  and  men. 

At  this  time  Captain  Patten,  an  excellent  officer  of  the 


REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  BATTLE.          195 

3d  infantry,  was  wounded,  losing  a  part  of  his  left  hand. 
It  was  in  the  midst  of  the  thunder-crash  of  battle,  when 
the  dying  fell  thickest,  and  when  the  crisis  was  at  hand. 
It  was  a  plunging  fire  ;  and  after  thus  wounding  Captain 
Patten,  the  ball  struck  a  rock  which  it  broke  into  frag 
ments,  one  of  which  cut  down  and  wounded  the  second 
sergeant  of  Captain  Patten's  company. 

While  Captain  Patten  was  yet  in  the  field,  holding  with 
his  right  hand  the  arm  of  the  shattered  left,  General  Scott 
rode  slowly  by,  "  under  a  canopy,"  to  use  Captain  Patten's 
expression,  "  of  cannon-balls."  Seeing  a  wounded  man, 
and  supposing  him  to  be  a  soldier,  he  exclaimed,  slacking 
his  pace,  "  There  is  a  brave  soldier  badly  wounded,  I 
fear ;"  and  then,  being  told  by  an  officer  that  it  was  Cap 
tain  Patten,  the  general  halted,  and  called  to  Captain  Pat 
ten  to  inquire  the  nature  of  the  wound  ;  but  in  the  roar  of 
battle  he  was  not  heard. 

Captain  Patten  spoke  with  enthusiasm  as  well  of  the 
calm  and  soldierly  bearing  of  his  gallant  commander,  amid 
the  thickest  and  hottest  of  this  murderous  cannonade,  as 
of  his  ready  sympathy  with,  and  attention  to  the  wounded 
men  and  officers. 

When  the  battle  was  closed,  the  hoped-for  victory  had 
become  reality,  and  the  future  no  longer  absorbed  all  the 
mind,  Scott  hastened  to  the  side  of  the  wounded.     It  was 
from  a  hospital  of  wounded  and  sick,  that  his  first  official 
report,  dated  April  19th,  was  despatched.    An  officer  who  > 
was  present  in  these  scenes,  relates  that  General  Scott    ' 
visited  in  person  the  wounded,  and  saw,  himself,  that  they 
were  attended  in  the  best  manner.     His  men  were  in  all 
cases,  when  the  events  of  the  campaign  allowed  him  any 
time  for  thought  on   other  subjects,  his  first  care.     He 


106  GEN.  SCOTT'S  OFFICIAL  DESPATCHES. 

was  ever  as  humane  as  heroic.  "He  attended  the  bedside 
of  the  sick  with  cholera  in  the  Northwest,  and  he  now  vis 
ited  and  aided,  in  the  hospitals  of  the  wounded  of  Cerro 
Gordo.  Soon  after  this  event,  and  on  the  occupation  of 
Jalapa,  he  caused  the  removal  of  the  wounded  and  sick 
to  the  more  comfortable  and  healthier  quarters  in  that 
town.  Among  these  was  the  brave  Shields,  in  whose 
dangerous  condition  he  deeply  sympathized. 

It  will  be  recollected  that  Santa  Anna's  carriage,  with  a 
large  amount  of  specie,  was  captured,  just  after  the  Mexi 
can  army  fled  from  the  field.  Whatever  of  this  property 
belonged  personally  to  Santa  Anna,  Scott  was  most  care 
ful  to  return  to  his  agent  and  man  of  business.  It  was  a 
principle  with  General  Scott,  which  he  has  most  carefully 
carried  out,  that  war  was  not  a  scheme  for  robbery,  but 
the  honorable  contest  of  nations  for  national  rights,  lie 
suffers  no  plunder  of  private  property,  no  aggression  on 
the  rights  of  citizens,  and  he  is  most  anxious  to  vindicate 
the  American  soldier  and  the  American  name  from  that 
barbarism  which  would  convert  war  into  the  pillage  of 
plunderers,  and  the  glory  of  victory  into  the  grossness  of 
brutality.  The  following  is  the  official  despatch  of  the 
commander-m-chief : — 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,  i 

PLAN  DEL  Rio,  50  miles  from  Vera  Cruz,  > 

April  19,  1847.      ) 

SIR:  The  plan  of  attack,  sketched  in  General  Orders,  No. 
Ill,  forwarded  herewith,  was  finely  executed  by  this  gallant 
army,  before  two  o'clock  p.  M.  yesterday.  We  are  quite  em 
barrassed  with  the  results  of  victory — prisoners  of  war,  heavy 
ordnance,  field  batteries,  small-arms,  and  accoutrements. 

About  3,000  men   laid  down  their  arms,  with  the  usual 


GEN.  SCOTT  S  DESPATCHES.  197 

proportion  of  field  and  company  officers,  besides  five  generals, 
several  of  them  of  great  distinction — Pinson,  Jarrero,  La 
Vega,  Noriega,  and  Obando.  A  sixth  general,  Vasquez, 
was  killed  in  defending  the  battery  (tower)  in  the  rear  of  the 
whole  Mexican  army,  the  capture  of  which  gave  us  those 
glorious  results. 

Our  loss,  though  comparatively  small  in  numbers,  has 
been  serious.  Brigadier-general  Shields,  a  commander  of 
activity,  zeal,  and  talent,  is,  I  fear,  if  not  dead,  mortally 
wounded.  He  is  some  five  miles  from  me  at  the  moment. 
The  field  of  operations  covered  many  miles,  broken  by 
mountains  and  deep  chasms,  and  I  have  not  a  report,  as  yet, 
from  any  division  or  brigade. 

Twiggs'  division,  followed  by  Shields'  (now  Col.  Baker's) 
brigade,  are  now  at  or  near  Xalapa,  and  Worth's  division  is 
in  route  thither,  all  pursuing,  with  good  results,  as  I  learn, 
that  part  of  the  Mexican  army — perhaps  six  or  seven  thou 
sand  men — who  had  fled  before  our  right  had  carried  the 
tower,  arid  gained  the  Xalapa  road. 

Pillow's  brigade  alone,  is  near  me  at  this  depot  of  wounded, 
sick,  and  prisoners  ;  and  I  have  time  only  to  give  from  him 
the  names  of  1st  Lieut.  F.  B.  Nelson,  and  2d  C.  G.  Hill,  both 
of  the  2d  Tennessee  foot,  (Haskell's  regiment,)  among  the 
killed,  and  in  the  brigade  106,  of  all  ranks,  killed  or  wounded. 

Among  the  latter,  the  gallant  Brigadier-general  himself 
has  a  smart  wound  in  the  arm,  but  not  disabled ;  and  Major 
R.  Farqueson,  2d  Tennessee,  Captain  H.  F.  Murray,  2d 
Lieut.  G.  T.  Sutherland,  1st  Lieut.  W.  P.  Hale,  Adjutant, 
all  of  the  same  regiment,  severely,  and  1st  Lieut.  W.  Year- 
wood,  mortally  wounded.  And  I  know,  from  personal  obser 
vation  on  the  ground,  that  1st  Lieut.  Ewell,  of  the  rifles,  if 
not  now  dead,  was  mortally  wounded  in  entering,  sword  in 
hand,  the  intrenchments  around  the  captured  tower. 

2d  Lieut.  Derby,  topographical  engineers,  I  also  saw,  at 
R2 


198  GEN.  SCOTT'S  DESPATCHES. 

the  same  place,  severely  wounded,  and  Captain  Patten,  2d 
United  States  Infantry,  lost  his  right  hand.  Major  Sumner, 
2d  United  States  dragoons,  was  slightly  wounded  the  day  be 
fore,  and  Capt.  Johnston,  topographical  engineers,  (now  Lieut. - 
colonel  of  infantry,)  was  very  severely  wounded  some  days 
earlier  while  reconnoitring.  1  must  not  omit  to  add  that 
Capt.  Mason,  and  2d  Lieut.  Davis,  both  of  the  rifles,  were 
among  the  very  severely  wounded  in  storming  the  same 
tower. 

I  estimate  our  total  loss,  in  killed  and  wounded,  may  be 
about  250,  and  that  of  the  enemy  at  350.  In  the  pur- 
suit  towards  Xalapa  (25  miles  hence)  I  learn  we  have  added 
much  to  the  enemy's  loss  in  prisoners,  killed,  and  wounded. 
In  fact,  I  suppose  his  retreating  army  to  be  nearly  dis 
organized,  and  hence  my  haste  to  follow,  in  an  hour  or  two,  to 
profit  by  events. 

In  this  hurried  and  imperfect  report  I  must  not  omit  to  say 
that  Brigadier-general  Twiggs,  in  passing  the  mountain- 
range  beyona  Cerro  Gordo,  crowned  with  the  tower,  detached 
from  his  division,  as  I  suggested  the  day  before,  a  strong 
force  to  carry  that  height,  which  commanded  the  Xalapa 
road  at  the  foot,  and  could  not  fail,  if  carried,  to  cut  off  the 
whole,  or  any  part  of  the  enemy's  forces,  from  a  retreat  in 
any  direction. 

A  portion  of  the  1st  artillery,  under  the  often-distinguish 
ed  Brevet  Colonel  Childs,  the  3d  infantry,  under  Captain 
Alexander,  the  7th  infantry,  under  Lieut. -colonel  Plymton, 
and  the  rifles,  under  Major  Loring,  all  under  the  temporary 
command  of  Colonel  Harney,  2d  dragoons,  during  the  con 
finement  to  his  bed  of  Brevet  Brig. -general  P.  F.  Smith, 
composed  that  detachment.  The  style  of  execution,  which 
I  had  the  pleasure  to  witness,  was  most  brilliant  and  decisive. 

The  brigade  ascended  the  long  and  difficult  slope  of  Cerro 
Gordo,  without  shelter,  and  under  the  tremendous  fire  of 


GEN.   SCOTT  S  DESPATCHES.  19f> 

artillery  and  musketry  with  the  utmost  steadiness,  reached 
the  breastworks,  drove  the  enemy  from  them,  planted  the 
colors  of  the  1st  artillery,  3d  and  7th  infantry — the  enemy's 
flag  still  flying — and,  after  some  minutes'  sharp  firing,  finish- 
ed  the  conquest  with  the  bayonet. 

It  is  a  most  pleasing  duty  to  say  that  the  highest  praise  is 
due  to  Harney,  Childs,  Plymton,  Loring,  Alexander,  their 
gallant  officers  and  men,  for  this  brilliant  service,  independent 
of  the  great  results  which  soon  followed. 

Worth's  division  of  regulars  coming  up  at  this  time,  he 
detached  Brevet  Lieutenant-colonel  C.  F.  Smith,  with  his 
light  battalion,  to  support  the  assault,  but  not  in  time.  The 
general,  reaching  the  tower  a  few  minutes  before  me,  and 
observing  a  white  flag  displayed  from  the  nearest  portion  of 
the  enemy  towards  the  batteries  below,  sent  out  Colonels 
Harney  and  Childs  to  hold  a  parley.  The  surrender  follow 
ed  in  an  hour  or  two. 

Major-general  Patterson  left  a  sick-bed  to  share  in  the 
dangers  and  fatigues  of  the  day  ;  and  after  the  surrender  went 
forward  to  command  the  advanced  forces  towards  Xalapa. 

Brig. -general  Pillow  and  his  brigade  twice  assaulted  with 
great  daring  the  enemy's  line  of  batteries  on  our  left  ;  and 
though  without  success,  they  contributed  much  to  distract 
and  dismay  their  immediate  opponents.  , 

President  Santa  Anna,  with  Generals  Canalizo    and  ^JM 
monte,  and  some  six  or  eight  thousand  men,  escaped  to^rds 
Xalapa  just   before   Cerro   Gordo   was   carried,   and    before 
Twiggs'  division  reached  the  National  road  above. 

I  have  determined  to  parole  the  prisoners — officers  and 
men — as  I  have  not  the  means  of  feeding  them  here,  beyond 
to-day,  and  cannot  afford  to  detach  a  heavy  body  of  horse  and 
foot,  with  wagons,  to  accompany  them  to  Vera  Cruz.  Our 
baggage  train,  though  increasing,  is  not  half  large  enough^to 
give  an  assurpd  progress  to  this  army. 


*200  ADVANCE  FROM  CERRO  GORDO. 

Besides,  a  greater  number  of  prisoners  would,  probably, 
escape  from  the  escort  in  the  long  and  deep  sandy  road, 
without  subsistence — ten  to  one — than  we  shall  find  again, 
out  of  the  same  body  of  men,  in  the  ranks  opposed  to  us. 
Not  one  of  the  Vera  Cruz  prisoners  is  believed  to  have  been 
in  the  lines  of  Cerro  Gordo.  Some  six  of  the  officers,  highest 
in  rank,  refuse  to  give -their  paroles,  except  to  go  to  Vera 
Cruz,  and  thence,  perhaps,  to  the  United  States. 

The  small-arms  and  accoutrements,  being  of  no  value  to 
our  army  here  or  at  home,  I  have  ordered  them  to  be  destroy 
ed  ;  for  we  have  not  the  means  of  transporting  them.  I  am, 

also,  somewhat  embarrassed  with  the pieces  of  artillery, 

all  bronze,  which  we  have  captured.  It  would  take  a 
brigade,  and  half  the  mules  of  our  army,  to  transport  them 
fifty  miles.  , 

A  field  battery  I  shall  take  for  service  with  the  arrny  ;  but 
the  heavy  metal  must  be  collected,  and  left  here  for  the 
present.  We  have  our  own  siege-train  and  the  proper 
carriages  with  us. 

Being  much  occupied  with  the  prisoners,  and  all  the  details 
of  a  forward  movement,  besides  looking  to  the  supplies  which 
are  to  follow  from  Vera  Cruz,  I  have  time  to  add  no  more — 
intending  to  be  at  Xalapa  early  to-morrow.  We  shall  not, 
probably,  again  meet  with  serious  opposition  this  side  of 
Perote — certainly  not,  unless  delayed  by  the  want  of  the 
means  of  transportation. 

I  have  the  honor  to  remain,  sir,  with  high  respect,  your 
most  obedient  servant, 

WINFIELD  SCOTT. 
Hon.  WM.  L.  MARCY,  Secretary  of  War. 

From  the  field  of  Cerro  Gordo  the  rout  of  the  Mexi 
can  army  was  complete.  JALAPA  was  entered  on  the  19th. 
The  strong  position  of  LA  HOYA  was  abandoned,  with  its 


PUEBLA  ENTERED.  201 

artillery  and  works  ;  and  on  the  22d  of  April,  Worth  and 
his  division  occupied  the  strong  castle  and  town  of  PEROTE  ! 
Here  fifty-four  pieces  of  cannon,  and  mortars,  (both  bronze 
and  iron,)  eleven  thousand  cannon-balls,  fourteen  thou 
sand  bombs,  and  five  hundred  muskets,  swelled  the  vast 
amount  of  the  munitions  of  war  captured  from  the  army  of 
Mexico  ! 

On  the  15th  of  May,  General  Worth,  after  encountering 
but  little  resistance,  entered  the  ancient  city  of  Puebla. 
Thus,  in  a  campaign  which  extended  only  from  the  12th 
of  March  to  the  15th  of  May,  the  city  of  Vera  Cruz 
had  been  besieged  and  taken,  the  famed  castle  of  San 
Tuan  d'Ulloa  had  fallen,  the  battle  of  Cerro  Gordo  was 
fought  and  won,  the  city  of  Jalapa  taken,  the  castle  and 
town  of  Perote  captured,  and  the  fine  city  of  Puebla  occu 
pied  !  Ten  thousand  men  made  prisoners  of  war,  seven 
hundred  splendid  cannon,  ten  thousand  stand  of  arms, 
thirty  thousand  shells  and  shot,  were  the  spoils  of  the  tri 
umphant  victories  which  had  attended  the  American  army, 
in  a  campaign  of  only  two  months  !  History  has  few 
parallels  for  such  rapid  and  such  brilliant  achievements  ! 
Bat  a  few  months  before,  an  unguarded  expression  had 
made  WINFIELD  SCOTT  the  mark  of  a  ribald  ridicule  ! 
Now,  the  government  journal  pronounces  his  campaign 
the  rival  of  European  splendor  in  war,  eloquence  is  fervid 
in  its  declamatory  praises,  and  the  more  just  and  grateful 
sentiment  of  the  people  renders  back  to  the  commander 
at  Cerro  Gordo,  the  admiration  so  gloriously  won  on  the 
memorable  plains  of  Niagara  ! 


CHAPTER  X. 

Entrance  of  the  American  Army  into  Puebla. — Mexican  Account.— 
American  Officers.— Conduct  of  the  Army.— Situation  of  Puebla.— 
Character  of  the  Country. — The  ancient  Cholula. — Strength  of  the 
Army.— Scott's  Proclamation. — Humanity  of  the  Army.— Mission  of 
Trist.— Reasons  for  remaining  in  Puebla. — Drilling  of  the  Army.— 
Raising  new  Regiments.— New  Volunteers. — Attack  on  the  Train  of 
M'Intosh. — Advance  of  Pierce. — Concentration  of  the  Army. 

IN  a  morning  of  the  beautiful  month  of  May,  and  with 
in  the  tropical  zone,  the  American  army  of  the  north 
entered  the  "  City  of  the  Angels  ;"  in  the  Spanish  tongue, 
Puebla  de  los  Angelas.  They  came  with  the  renown, 
sounding  far  in  advance,  of  San  Juan  de  Ulloa  captured, 
and  the  heights  of  Cerro  Gordo  victoriously  stormed. 
They  had  landed  on  the  shores  of  the  Mexican  Gulf, 
intrenched  themselves  in  the  wind-driven  sands,  battered 
the  defences  of  Vera  Cruz,  received  the  surrender  of  the 
castle,  arid  marched  two  hundred  miles  into  the  land  of 
the  Spanish-Aztec  Americans.  The  National  Bridge  had 
been  passed,  Jalapa  had  surrendered,  Perote  made  no 
resistance,  and  now  the  bold  invaders  of  Mexico  ap 
proached  a  city  surrounded  by  the  monuments  of  ancient 
civilization,  and  deemed  fit,  in  the  warm  imagination  of 
southern  climes,  for  celestial  residents.  It  was  natural 
that  such  an  army,  the  heralds  too  of  a  new  and  ex 
traordinary  republic,  should  be  received  by  the  inhabitants 
with  mingled  feelings  of  fear,  surprise,  and  curiosity. 


ARMY    ENTERS    PUEBLA.  203 

Accordingly,  the  citizens  of  Puebla  crowded  the  street 
and  filled  the  balconies  on  the  line  with  spectators. 
Near  noon  the  division  of  Worth  entered  the  city,  the 
artillery  and  infantry  forming  in  the  square,  and  the  train 
of  wagons  extending  from  the  street  of  Mercadores  to  the 
bridge  of  Nocte  Buena.1  The  troops  were  fatigued  with 
their  march,  and  needed  both  rest  and  refreshment.  This 
weary  aspect,  the  fact  that  many  of  them  had  been  ill,  the 
common  gray  undress  uniform,  and  the  plain  truth  that 
they  were  neither  giants  nor  centaurs,  disappointed  the 
vivid  imaginations  of  the  Mexicans  of  Puebla,  who  had 
supposed  that  the  conquerors  of  Cerro  Gordo  were  some 
thing  marvellous  in  appearance  or  superhuman  in  power. 
The  spectators  turned  from  the  scene  with  surprise,  and 
asked  themselves,  How  have  these  men  become  the  con 
querors  of  Mexico  ? 

One  of  the  most  intelligent  of  the  Mexican  citizens, 
writing  from  Puebla  two  days  after  the  entrance  of  the 
American  army,  thus  expresses  his  disappointment  at  the 
appearance  of  that  army,  and  endeavors  to  solve  the  prob 
lem  proposed  by  its  achievements  :  — 

"  Nor  does  their  armament  seem  to  me  any  thing  ex 
traordinary.  In  a  word,  except  the  draught-horses,  which 
are  very  good,  I  assure  you,  without  exaggeration,  that 
these  men  bring  nothing  that  we  have  not  seen  a  thou 
sand  times.  Even  the  immense  number  of  their  wagons 
is  not  a  proof  of  large  stores.  The  wagons  are  all  empty, 
and  I  understood  their  principal  use  to  be  for  the  trans 
port  of  troops.  How,  then,  have  they  done  what  they 


1  Letter  from  a  native  of  Puebla,  dated  May  16th,  aud  published   in 
the  London  Times. 


204  SURPRISE    OF    THE    MEXICANS. 

have  ?  How  have  they  continually  beaten  our  army, 
which  not  only  surpasses  them  in  appearance — for  that  is 
unquestionable — but  in  my  opinion  has  real  and  positive 
advantages  over  them  ?  Every  one  asks  this  question,  to 
which  there  is  but  one  reply.  Their  leaders,  and  par 
ticularly  the  colonels  of  regiments,  are  old  gray-haired 
men.  Their  gray  hairs  explain  the  phenomenon.  This 
makes  me  still  rely  on  our  soldiers,  and  gives  me  for  the 
future  some  hopes,  which  we  require  more  than  ever."1 

This  solution  of  the  problem  was  at  least  partially  cor 
rect.  The  officers  of  the  American  army  have  expe 
rience,  skill,  and  science.  Many  of  them  served  in  the 
campaigns  of  1813,  1«14,  and  1815,  against  the  veteran 
soldiers  of  Great  Britain  ;  many  of  them  were  bred  at  the 
military  school  at  West  Point — the  equal,  and  in  some 
things  the  superior,  of  any  school  of  military  instruction 
in  the  world.  All  of  them  have  been  accustomed  to  the 
discipline  of  their  profession,  and  are  perfectly  acquainted 
with  the  superior  energies  which  the  republican  habits 
and  intellectual  vivacity  of  their  countrymen  have  devel 
oped  in  war.  The  army  of  the  United  States  is  not  in 
trusted  to  weak  or  ill-instructed  hands  ;  but  to  officers 
skilled  in  the  science  and  experience  of  the  duties  of  the 
military  art — a  fact  as  honorable  to  the  legislative  sagacity 
of  the  republic,  as  its  achievements  in  arms  have  proved 
illustrious  in  history. 

The  soldiers  piled  their  arms  in  the  public  square, 
and  although  surrounded  by  thousands  of  a  hostile  popu 
lation,  lay  down  to  sleep,  in  perfect  confidence  that  the 
enemy  could  not  and  dare  not  disturb  them.  No  higher 


1  Letter  of  the  native  of  Puebla. 


DESCRIPTION    OF    PUEBLA.  205 

evidence  could  be  given  of  that  sense  of  absolute  superi 
ority  and  of  resistless  energy,  which  is  uniformly  felt  by 
American  troops — the  sense  that  they  are  predestined  to 
victory,  no  matter  by  whom,  in  what  numbers,  or  in  what 
manner  opposed.  On  the  following  day  they  took  pos 
session  of  the  hills  of  Loreto  and  Guadaloupe,  and  artil 
lery  was  sent  to  the  hill  of  San  Juan.  General  WorJ;h 
paid  the  compliment  of  a  visit  to  the  Bishop  of  Puebla. 
and  the  bishop,  in  returning  it,  was  received  at  the  quarters 
of  Worth  with  the  honors  paid  to  a  general.  Affably  and 
respectfully  did  the  American  officers  mingle  with  the 
people  ;  and  for  a  time  the  stern  countenance  of  war 
seemed  to  be  lighted  up  with  the  smiles  of  beneficence, 
and  its  fearful  strifes  deferred  to  a  peaceful  harmony. 

The  city  of  PUEBLA  is  situated  on  that  vast  plain  which, 
in  its  height  above  the  sea  and  the  character  of  its  pro 
ductions,  is  the  most  singular  portion  of  the  earth. 

This  plain  is  seven  thousand  feet  high,  and  although 
wholly  within  the  torrid  zone,  is  called  the  tierras  frias, 
or  the  cold  grounds.  The  climate  of  a  country  depends 
as  much  upon  altitude  as  latitude,  and  hence  these  lofty 
plains  are  called  cold,  and  really  produce  the  grains  and 
fruits  of  the  most  temperate  climes.1  Wheat  of  the  finest 
quality,  our  Indian  corn,  barley,  and  fruits  peculiar  to  this 
region,  constitute  the  staple  productions  and  elementary 
food  of  the  inhabitants.  Within  this  tropical  but  really 
temperate  zone  of  lofty  plains,  and  encircled  by  the  sub 
lime  range  of  the  Cordilleras,  lies  the  province  of  Puebla. 
Its  soil  is  scattered  over  with  and  partly  composed  of 


Humboldt's  Travels  in  New  Spain. 


206  FACE    OF    THE    COUNTRY. 

the  volcanic  remains  of  ancient  convulsions.1     The  lava  is 
•strewed  over  the  ground   in  different  varieties,  bearing  a 
resemblance  to  the  cinders  of  an  iron-furnace.     On  the 
tops  of  the  highest  and  most  magnificent  mountains  may 
be  found  the  craters  whence  in  ages  past  have  streamed 
out   these   rich   but   dangerous    ingredients    of   the    soil. 
Yet,  with  all  this,  the  earth  is  there  garnished  with  but 
little  of  that  beauty  of  foliage  and  that  abundance  of  vege 
table  production  which  so  distinguishes  the  great  alluvia's 
of  the  United   States  of  the  north.     The  cactus,  that  dis 
criminating  inhabitant  of  barren  lands,  is   still   frequent, 
and,  except  within  a  few  miles  of  Puebla,  the  whole  road 
from  Vera  Cruz  to  that  city  presents  but  a  few  scrubby 
bushes,  some  palms,  and  this  unproductive  cactus,  called 
in  this  country  the  prickly-pear.2     In  the  neighborhood 
of  Puebla,  cultivated  fields   and   waving   grain    indicate 
that,  husbandry  has  resumed  its  occupation,  and  that  man, 
a  resident  of  cities,  has  higher  demands  for  food  and  lux 
ury  than  the  natural  fruits  or  natural  grasses  can  supply. 
He  is  still,  however,  the  man  of  two  thousand  years  ago. 
Time,  which  has  revolutionized  empires  and  established 
the    supremacy  of   science  in  other    lands,  has  lett  the 
Spanish   Aztec,  the   unchanged  image  of  his  ancient  fa 
thers,  in  the  indolence  of  his  life  and  the  fixedness  of  his 
habits.     In  vain  has  invention   created   arts,  and   genius 
startled   a  world  with  its  wonderful   achievements.     He 
uses  the  plough  of  two  thousand   years   since,  employs 
oxen  instead  of  horses,  folds   his  arms  in  contemptuous 
pride,  and   sees  the  world,  and  its  exhibitions  of  power 


1  Waddy  Thompson's  Recollections  of  Mexico,  page  17. 
8  Ibid. 


ANCIENT   CHOLULA.  207 

and  wonder  in  science,  pass  by  him,  with  the  frigidity  of 
indolence  and  the  indifference  of  contempt !  In  this  state 
was  once  one  of  the  most  numerous  populations  of  the 
ancient  Mexicans,  yet  it  now  scarcely  contains  fifty  to  a 
square  mile — a  number  large  compared  with  most  of  the 
provinces  of  Mexico,  yet  small  compared  with  the  popu 
lous  nations  which  inhabited  here  in  the  time  of  Cortez.1 
It  was  then  the  seat  of  the  Tlascalans  and  Cholulans — 
people  who  had  advanced  far  in  the  arts,  and  whose 
monuments  were  among  the  greatest  of  the  earth.  Six 
miles  from  the  present  city  of  Puebla  was  the  great  city 
of  Cholula,  which  once  contained  two  hundred  thousand 
inhabitants,  and  where  Cortez  beheld  the  towers  of  four 
hundred  idol  temples  !  Of  this  great  city  not  a  vestige 
remains  !  Not  a  brick  nor  a  stone  stands  upon  another  ! 
One  monument  stands  in  gloomy  and  solitary  grandeur 
amidst  the  vast  plain  which  surrounded  it.2  This  is  the 
great  pyramid,  truncated  at  top,  and  supposed  to  have 
been  dedicated  to  the  worship  of  the  gods  of  the  Aztecs. 
This  pyramid  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable  among  the 
ruins  of  ancient  nations.  It  is  1440  feet  on  the  side,  at 
the  base,  177  feet  in  height,  and  45,210  square  feet  on 
the  summit.3 

In  the  midst  of  these  ruins  of  ancient  empires,  sur 
rounded  by  these  mountains,  upon  this  high  plain,  looking 
out  upon  these  lava-covered  fields,  and  through  the  clear, 
vivid,  brilliant  atmosphere  of  tropical  highlands,  is  the 
city  of  Puebla.  It  now  contains  about  eighty  thousand 


1  Cortez  and  Denial  Diaz. 

3  Waddy  Thompson's  Recollections  of  Mexico. 

3  Description  of  Huinboldt. 


208  SCOTT'S  ARMY   REACHES  PUEBLA. 

inhabitants.  It  is  a  beautiful  city,  well  built,  with  lofty 
houses,  broad  streets,  and  fine  public  buildings.1  Here, 
a:  two  hundred  miles  from  the  city  of  Vera  Cruz  on  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  ninety  from  Mexico,  the  heart  of  the 
Aztec  empire,  the  small  but  brave  and  glorious  army  of 
Scott  arrived  on  the  loth  of  May,  1847.  With  com 
plexions  sallowed,  and  disabled  by  the  unwholesome 
climate  of  Vera  Cruz — in  the  gray  undress  uniform  of  the 
United  States,  and  weaned  with  many  miles  of  tedious 
march,  the  army  entered  this  Mexican  city,  to  surprise  its 
inhabitants  as  much  by  the  inferiority  of  its  appearance 
as  it  had  done  by  the  greatness  of  its  deeds.  Were  these 
indeed  to  be  the  conquerors  of  Mexico  ?  Where  were  the 
far-famed  heroes  of  Cerro  Gordo  ?  Time,  however,  was 
to  convince  the  Pueblans,  in  a  yet  more  startling  manner, 
that  the  energy  of  the  American  soldier  could  be  revived 
to  greater  actions,  and  the  glory  of  former  battles  be  ob 
scured  by  the  brightness  of  those  to  come. 

The  army,  as  it  entered  Puebla,  was  stated  by  a  Mexi 
can  eye-witness  to  have  numbered  four  thousand  two 
hundred  and  ninety  effective  men,  with  thirteen  pieces 
of  artillery.2  This  was  the  marching  force  at  that 
point.  On  that  day  and  at  that  place  the  number  given 
was  very  nearly  correct.  Scott's  force  at  that  time  capa 
ble  of  marching  on  Mexico  did  not  exceed  four  thousand 
Jive  hundred  men.  A  slight  review  of  the  preceding 
events  and  circumstances  will  explain  this  fact,  and  show 
that  such  was  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  measures 
taken  by  the  government,  and  the  losses  necessarily  sus- 


1  Letter  from  a  native  of  Puebla. 
3  Ibid 


>  of 


/>  C- 

DIFFICULTIES    TO    BE    MET.  209 

lained  in  a  distant  campaign  in  a  foreign  land.  In  May, 
1846,  Congress  had  authorized  the  President  to  call  out 
fifty  thousand  volunteers.  Twenty-three  regiments  had 
been  called  out  in  May  and  June.  The  time  for  which 
they  were  called  out  was  but  twelve  months,  and  expired 
in  May,  1847.  Several  of  these  regiments  were  in  the 
army  of  Scott,  and  had  been  discharged  on  the  way  to 
Puebla.  Sickness  also  had  been  rife  among  the  troops. 
The  camp  dysentery,  so  common  and  so  fatal  among 
armies,  had  disabled  many  and  destroyed  others.  At 
Vera  Cruz,  at  Cerro  Gordo,  and  in  other  engagements 
and  skirmishes,  not  a  few  of  the  brave  men  who  landed 
in  Mexico  had  fallen  a  sacrifice  to  the  bloody  rites  of  war. 
The  army,  when  concentrated  at  the  Island  of  Lobos, 
had  numbered  fourteen  thousand  men;  but  thus  re 
duced  by  sickness,  by  discharges,  and  by  death,  in  ad 
dition  to  the  garrisons  required,  not  more  than  five  thou 
sand  (exclusive  of  the  garrison  of  Jalapa)  capable  of 
moving  in  arms  could  be  assembled  to  march  against  the 
capital  of  Mexico.  What  were  they  to  do  ?  Were  the 
laurels  of  many  battles  and  the  glory  of  victorious  cam 
paigns  to  be  risked,  in  the  heart  of  a  hostile  nation,  with 
so  small  a  band  ?  Already  had  complaints  of  delay  been 
made  and  repeated  by  the  unthinking  friends  of  the  ad 
ministration.  They  seemed  tc  imagine  that  armies  had 
nothing  to  do  but  march  and  fight,  and  that  these  should 
be  done,  by  Americans,  with  a  speed  which  surpassed  all 
human  experience  ;  that  they  neither  required  sleep  nor 
bread,  baggage  nor  transportation  ;  but  that,  heedless  of 
supplies  and  regardless  of  opposition,  they  should  hurry 
on  to  the  end,  rivalling  the  winds  and  trusting  in  a  pre 
destined  victory  !  Such  a  compliment  was  not  untie- 
s2  14 


210  DECISION    OF    THE     CABINET. 

served  by  the  skilful  commander  and  heroic  soldiers  of 
the  army  of  Mexico ;  but  even  they  ought  not  to  have 
been  expected  to  perform  such  unprecedented  achieve 
ments.  With  this  small  array,  however,  impelled  by  the 
natural  ardor  of  a  successful  general,  and  in  reliance  upon 
the  invincible  energies  of  the  American  soldier,  would 
Scott  have  proceeded  at  once  to  the  city  of  Mexico,  but 
for  other  and  unexpected  interferences. 

The  cabinet  at  Washington  had  from  the  commence 
ment  of  the  war  professed  an  anxious  desire  to  terminate 
the  controversy  with  Mexico,  in  any  way  honorable  to  the 
United  States.  General  Scott,  animated  by  the  same 
desire,  and  conscious  that  no  useful  end  was  to  be  gained 
by  carrying  the  terrors  of  martial  law  among  the  people  of 
Mexico,  beyond  that  of  securing  a  permanent  peace,  had 
already  addressed  from  Jalapa,  a  humane  and  reasoning 
proclamation  to  the  Mexican  people,  stating  to  them  the 
plain  facts  in  their  own  condition,  the  events  of  the  war, 
the  unskilfulness  of  their  leaders,  the  burdens  imposed 
upon  them,  and  the  already  foreshadowed  results  of  this 
drama  of  conquest.  This  document1  is  one  of  the  finest 
specimens  of  military  literature,  both  for  the  matter  it 
contains  and  the  manner  of  its  composition.  Having  re 
cited  the  civil  and  military  events  which  preceded  the 
battle  of  Cerro  Gordo,  the  commander  of  the  army  pro 
ceeds  to  say — 

Finally,  the  bloody  event  of  Cerro  Gordo  has  shown  the 
Mexican  nation  what  it  may  reasonably  expect  if  it  longer 
continues  blind  to  the  true  situation  in  which  it  has  been 

1  Scott's  Proclamation,  dated  Jalapa,  May  11,  1847 


SCOTT  S    PROCLAMATION.  21  1 

placed  by  some  generals,  whom  it  has  most  distinguished 
and  in  whom  it  has  most  confided. 

The  hardest  heart  would  be  moved  to  grief  in  contem 
plating  the  battle-fields  of  Mexico  a  moment  after  the  last 
struggle.  Those  generals  whom  the  nation  has.  without 
service  rendered,  paid  for  so  many  years,  with  some  honor- 
able  exceptions,  have  in  the  day  of  need  betrayed  it  by  their 
example  or  unskilfulness.  On  that  field,  among  the  dead 
and  dying,  are  seen  no  proofs  of  military  honor,  for  they  are 
reduced  to  the  sad  fate  of  the  soldier — the  same  on  every 
occasion,  from  Palo  Alto  to  Cerro  Gordo — the  dead  to  remain 
unburied,  and  the  wounded  abandoned  to  the  charity  ana 
clemency  of  the  conqueror.  Soldiers  who  go  to  fight  ex 
pecting  such  a  recompense,  deserve  to  be  classed  among  the 
best  in  the  world,  since  they  are  stimulated  by  no  hope  of 
ephemeral  glory,  of  regret,  of  remembrance,  or  even  of  a 
grave. 

Again,  Mexicans  of  honorable  pride — contemplate  the  lot 
of  peaceful  and  laborious  citizens  in  all  classes  of  your  so 
ciety.  The  possessions  of  the  Church  menaced  and  held  out 
as  an  incitement  to  revolution  and  anarchy ;  the  fortune  of 
the  rich  proprietors  pointed  out  for  plunder  to  the  ill-disposed; 
the  merchant  and  the  artisan,  the  laborer  and  the  manufac 
turer,  burdened  with  contributions,  excises,  monopolies,  taxes 
upon  consumption,  surrounded  with  restrictions  and  charged 
with  odious  internal  customs ;  the  man  of  letters  and  the 
statesman,  the  man  of  liberal  knowledge  who  dares  to  speak, 
persecuted  without  ,trial  by  some  factions  or  by  the  rulers 
who  abuse  their  power ;  criminals  unpunished  and  set  at 
liberty,  as  were  those  of  Perote — is  this,  then,  Mexicans,  the 
liberty  which  you  enjoy  1 

\  will  not  believe  that  the  Mexicans  of  the  present  day  are 
wanting  in  courage  to  confess  errors  which  do  not  dishonor 


212  SCOTT'S  PROCLAMATION. 

them,  and  to  adopt  a  system  of  true  liberty,  of  peace,  and 
union  with  their  brethren  and  neighbors  of  the  north  ;  neither 
will  I  believe  that  they  are  ignorant  of  the  falsity  of  the 
calumnies  of  the  press,  intended  to  excite  hostility.  No ! 
public  sentiment  is  not  to  be  created  or  animated  by  false 
hood.  We  have  not  profaned  your  temples,  nor  abused  your 
women,  nor  seized  your  property,  as  they  would  have  you 
believe. 

We  say  this  with  pride,  and  we  confirm  it  by  your  own 
bishops,  and  by  the  clergy  of  Tampico,  Tuspan,  Matamoras, 
Monterey,  Vera  Cruz,  and  Jalapa,  and  by  all  the  authorities 
civil  and  religious,  and  the  inhabitants  of  every  town  we 
have  occupied.  We  adore  the  same  God,  and  a  large  por 
tion  of  our  army,  as  well  as  of  the  population  of  the  United 
States,  are  Catholics,  like  yourselves.  We  punish  crime 
wherever  we  find  it,  and  reward  merit  and  virtue. 

The  army  of  the  United  States  respects,  and  will  always 
respect,  private  property  of  every  description,  and  the  prop 
erty  of  the  Mexican  church. 

Mexicans !  the  past  cannot  be  remedied,  but  the  future 
may  be  provided  for.  Repeatedly  have  I  shown  you  that 
the  government  and  people  of  the  United  States  desire  peace, 
desire  your  sincere  friendship. 

Abandon,  then,  rancorous  prejudices,  cease  to  be  the  sport 
of  individual  ambition,  and  conduct  yourselves  like  a  great 
American  nation ;  leave  off  at  once  colonial  habits,  and 
learn  to  be  truly  free,  truly  republican,  and  you  will  become 
prosperous  and  happy,  for  you  possess  all  the  elements  to  be 
so.  Remember  that  you  are  Americans,  and  that  your  hap 
piness  is  not  to  come  from  Europe. 

I  desire,  in  conclusion,  to  declare,  and  with  equal  frank 
ness,  that,  if  necessary,  an  army  of  one  hundred  thousand 
could  promptly  be  brought,  and  that  the  United  States  would 


SCOTT  S    PROCLAMATION.  213 

not  terminate  their  differences  with  Mexico  (if  compelled  to 
do  so  by  force  of  arms)  in  any  manner  uncertain,  precari 
ous,  or  dishonoring  to  yourselves.  I  should  insult  the  intelli 
gent  of  this  country  if  I  had  any  doubt  of  their  acquaintance 
with  this  truth. 

The  order  to  form  guerilla  parties  to  attack  us,  I  assure 
you  can  procure  nothing  but  evil  to  your  country,  and  no 
evil  to  our  army,  which  will  know  how  to  proceed  against 
them  ;  and  if,  so  far  from  conciliating,  you  succeed  in  irri 
tating,  you  will  impose  upon  us  the  hard  necessity  of  retalia 
tion,  and  then  you  cannot  blame  us  for  the  consequences 
which  will  fall  upon  yourselves. 

I  am  marching  with  my  army  upon  Puebla  and  Mexico — 
I  do  not  conceal  it ;  from  those  capitals  I  shall  again  address 
you.  I  desire  peace,  friendship,  and  union — it  is  for  you  to 
select  whether  you  prefer  war ;  under  any  circumstances,  be 
assured  I  shall  not  fail  my  word. 

WINFIELD  SCOTT. 

This  proclamation  contains  one  of  the  best  and  most 
correct  pictures  of  the  conduct  of  the  Mexican  army,  and 
the  real  operations  of  its  government,  anywhere  to  be 
found.  It  is  true  that  it  was  (with  a  few  honorable  ex 
ceptions)  the  Mexican  officers  and  not  the  soldiers  who 
had  been  wanting  in  skill,  energy,  or  courage.  The 
battle-fields,  as  here  depicted,  were  strewed  with  the 
dead  soldiers  of  the  Mexican  army;  but  in  some  instances 
the  officers  had  retreated  in  haste,  in  some  they  were 
unwilling  to  fight,  and  in  all  they  had  shown  a  deficiency 
in  military  education,  utterly  incompetent  to  meet  in  suc 
cessful  contest  the  superior  skill  and  the  wonderfully 
developed  power  of  modern  military  science.  It  was 
true,  also,  that  the  government  of  Mexico  was  one  of  une- 


214  COMMISSIONER    TRIST    ARRIVES. 

qtial  burdens  and  of  unstable  power.  It  depended  rather 
upon  the  will  of  military  chiefs  than  the  affections  of  the 
people.  It  imposed  burdens  by  caprice  rather  than  prin 
ciple.  It  fettered  trade  by  restrictions  alike  unjust  and 
unnecessary.  It  was  true,  and  as  honorable  as  true,  that 
the  army  of  Scott  had  signalized  the  humanity  of  modern 
warfare  by  a  forbearance  of  all  the  barbarities  of  con 
quest.  It  had  seized  no  individual  property,  destroyed 
no  church  structures,  violated  no  private  rights,  and  im 
posed  no  contributions  upon  a  prostrate  population.  The 
armies  of  Mexico  were  indeed  swept  from  its  paths  with 
the  fearful  might  of  destruction,  but  they  were  swept 
away  only  in  pursuance  of  the  acknowledged  rights  of 
war,  and  left  behind  no  mournful  evidences  of  a  vindic 
tive  malice.  It  was  war  and  not  barbarism  which  bore 
over  the  fields  of  Mexico  the  unfolded  banner  of  the 
North  American  republic. 

Such  was  the  professed  disposition  of  the  United  States 
government  towards  Mexico,  such  the  address  of  General 
Scott,  and  such  the  humane  manner  in  which  the  war 
had  been  carried  on,  when  an  agent  of  the  cabinet  in 
Washington  arrived  in  Mexico  to  negotiate  peace.  This 
person  was  Mr.  Nicholas  P.  Trist,  chief  clerk  in  the  de 
partment  of  state.  From  the  hostile  attitude  of  the  two 
governments  towards  each  other,  he  could  not  come  in  the 
character  of  a  regularly  appointed  envoy — a  character  only 
consistent  with  a  state  of  peace.  He  did  come,  however, 
with  certain  letters  from  the  cabinet  at  Washington  to 
persons  in  Mexico,  and  with  powers,  on  certain  terms,  as 
a  commissioner  to  conclude  a  treaty  of  peace.1  Mr. 


Mr.  Folk's  official  commission  to  Trist. 


REASONS  FOR  REMAINING  AT  PUEBLA.      215 

Trist  arrived  at  Jalapa  just  before  Scott's  departure  for 
Puebla,  and  immediately  intimated  a  desire  to  transmit  cer 
tain  papers  to  the  Mexican  government.  If  the  proposi 
tions  they  contained  were  acceptable  to  the  authorities  in 
Mexico,  they  necessarily  implied  a  cessation  of  hostilities 
while  the  negotiations  proceeded.  Such  was  the  condi 
tion  of  affairs  at  Puebla  in  the  beginning  of  June.  With 
the  government  commissioner  anxious  for  peace,  and  actu 
ally  seeking  opportunities  of  negotiation,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  with  an  army  diminished  (including  all  its  disposable 
force)  in  effective  men  to  less  than  five  thousand,  Scott, 
anxious  to  go  forward,  and  looking  with  hope  to  the  con 
summation  of  the  campaign  in  the  city  of  Mexico,  was 
yet  compelled,  by  considerations  both  civil  and  military, 
to  remain  in  Puebla. 

The  military  reasons  why  the  army  should  remain  at 
Puebla  till  reinforced,  were  of  the  strongest  kind,  and 
demanded  the  serious  attention  of  the  boldest  commander, 
even  if  convinced  of  the  entire  infallibility  of  his  troops. 
The  event  proved  their  force  and  the  superior  sagacity  of 
the  general,  who,  hopeful  of  the  highest  glory,  and  antici 
pating  only  victory,  sacrificed  this  ardor  of  action  to  high 
prudential  considerations.  These  reasons  were  :  1st.  If 
the  entire  five  thousand  men  then  at  Puebla  could  be 
placed  at  once  in  the  city  of  Mexico,  they  were  barely 
sufficient  to  constitute  a  common  garrison,  impotent  to 
move  in  any  direction,  or  to  overawe  the  Mexican  govern 
ment  by  any  demonstrative  movement.  2d.  In  this  de 
fensive,  shut-up  position,  they  must  remain  for  months, 
before  reinforcements  could  arrive1  sufficiently  strong  to 


1  The  brigade  of  Pierce  did  not  arrive  at  Puebla  till  the  5th  of  August. 
—See  Scott's  official  despatch,  (No.  34,)  dated  September  18th. 


216  NECESSITY    FOR    DELAY. 

authorize  any  offensive  movement.  3d.  The  main  body 
of  the  army  of  Santa  Anna  was  yet  unbroken,  and  at  this 
period  it  would  have  been  his  policy  to  leave  the  Ameri 
can  army  to  shut  itself  up  in  Mexico,  while  he  fell,  in 
succession,  on  the  advancing  bodies  of  new  troops  march 
ing  to  reinforce  Scott.  In  this,  he  would  either  have 
defeated  them  or  have  prevented  their  junction.  4th.  Al 
varez,  with  a  division  of  four  thousand  men,  was  within 
striking  distance  of  Puebla,1  and  on  the  advance  of  Scott 
to  Mexico  would  have  taken  possession  of  the  post  he 
left,  arid  cut  off  all  communication  with  his  rear.2  In  fine, 
it  is  only  remarkable  that  the  commander  or  his  officers 
should  have  at  all  entertained  the  idea  of  advancing  with 
so  small  a  force.  That  persons  in  the  United  States 
should  have  thought  their  delay  singular,  only  proved  that 
they  were  very  little  acquainted  with  military  affairs,  and 
that  they  believed,  that  by  some  extraordinary  decree  of 
Heaven  the  army  was  rendered  invulnerable  to  misfor 
tune,  and  predestined  to  inevitable  victory.  It  has,  in 
deed,  realized  such  a  destiny  ;  but  only  by  science  the 
most  accomplished,  by  sagacity  the  most  penetrating,  and 
by  valor  the  most  indomitable.  The  children  of  destiny 
are  first  made  such  by  the  energy  of  their  own  character, 
and  the  superiority  of  their  own  minds. 

Such  was  the  necessity,  both  civil  and  military,  which 
constrained  General  Scott  to  restrain  his  desire  to  ad 
vance,  and  maintain  the  army  at  Puebla.  Nor  was  it 


1  Mr.  Kendall's  letter,  dated  October  15th,  1847. 

2  Let  the  reader  recollect,  that  notwithstanding  all  the  reinforcements 
which  arrived  between  May  and  September,  General  Scott's  communica 
tions  with  Vera  Cruz  were  cut  off  during  the  whole  period  for  want  of 
troops  to  keep  them  open  ! 


SCOTT    KEINFORCED.  217 

unemployed  or  useless  delay.  Whatever  gives  an  army 
discipline  gives  it  strength.  More  than  thirty  years  pre 
vious,  Scott  had,  in  the  camp  at  Buffalo,  availed  himself  of 
such  an  opportunity  to  drill  and  discipline  the  men  whose 
valor  and  firmness  had  withstood  the  veteran  troops  of 
Great  Britain  on  the  fields  of  Chippevva  and  Niagara. 
Such  experience  was  not  lost.  The  divisions  of  Worth, 
Twiggs,  and  <4uitman,  were  drawn  out  -and  constantly 
drilled  on  the  plains  bordering  Puebla,  till  their  discipline 
was  complete.1  Thus  was  perfected  the  only  remaining 
element  which  was  necessary  to  give  an  unexampled  suc 
cess  to  the  arms  of  the  United  States  in  the  republic  of 
Mexico. 

In  the  mean  while,  the  cabinet  at  Washington  had  be 
come  awakened  to  the  necessity  of  reinforcing  the  army 
of  Scott,  left  alone  in  the  midst  of  hostile  millions.  Con 
gress  had  authorized  the  enlistment  of  fen  new  regiments, 
and  the  business  of  recruiting  was  rapidly  carried  on. 
Recruiting-stations  were  established  in  the  principal  inte 
rior  towns  of  the  United  States,  and  the  spirit  of  adven 
ture,  the  high  pay,  and  the  bounty  lands  so  liberally 
olFered  by  the  government,  were  rapidly  filling  the  ex 
hausted  ranks  of  the  army.  New  volunteer  regiments 
were  called  out ;  but  this  resource  was  not  taken  till  too 
late  to  supply  the  places  of  the  levy  of  1846,  whose  time 
expired  in  May.  General  Scott  had  been  obliged  to  dis 
charge  the  portion  of  these  connected  with  his  army,  at 
Jalapa.  The  want  of  foresight  in  not  preparing  for  this 
event  was  the  real  reason  why  the  array  of  Scott  was, 


1  Kendall's  letter,  of  October  15th,  1847. 
T 


218  M'iNTOSH    ADVANCES. 

numerically,  too  small  to  advance,  without  hazard,  at  once 
from  Puebla. 

Soon  after  Scott  arrived  at  that  place  the  garrison  of 
Jalapa  was  broken  up,  the  army  not  being  strong  enough 
lo  spare  such  a  detachment.  Perote  was  made  a  depot, 
;md  the  line  of  communication  was  left  without  defence 
— one  of  the  few  examples  of  a  general  trusting  to  the 
innate  energies  of  his  army,  leaving  it  alone  in  an  enemy's 
country,  without  any  provision  for  retreat.  This  measure 
was,  however,  one  of  necessity  ;  for,  taking  the  received 
maxims  of  war  as  the  rule,  the  garrisons  alone  necessary 
to  keep  open  the  line,  would  have  consumed  the  entire 
army  ! 

On  the  5th  of  May  a  large  train,  under  the  command 
of  Colonel  M'Intosh,  left  Vera  Cruz  for  the  army.  It 
consisted  of  one  hundred  and  thirty-two  wagons,  six  hun 
dred  pack-mules,  and  about  eight  hundred  men.  This 
corps  was  attacked  by  a  strong  body  of  guerillas  at  Passo 
de  Ovejas.  The  guerillas  were  partially  successful, 
although  the  detachment  made  good  its  defence.  The 
Americans  lost  thirty  men,  killed  and  wounded,  thirty-five 
wagons,  and  two  hundred  mules.  This  was  a  serious 
check ;  but  was  soon  remedied  by  new  reinforcements. 
On  the  10th  of  May  General  Cadwallader  marched  to  the 
aid  of  M'Intosh  with  six  hundred  men,  from  Vera  Cruz, 
composed  chiefly  of  the  new  regiment  of  voltigeurs,  ac 
companied  with  six  howitzers.  A  junction  was  made, 
and  the  detachment,  now  fourteen  hundred  strong,  with 
its  train,  moved  on,  to  join  as  soon  as  possible  the  main 
army. 

On  the  17th  of  May  General  Pillow  left  Vera  Cruz 
with  another  detachment  of  about  one  thousand  men. 


PIERCE  JOINS  THE  ARMY.  219 

At  a  subsequent  period  General  Pierce  was  also  sent  for 
ward,  with  about  two  thousand  five  hundred.  Thus,  by 
successive  additions  of  new  recruits,  the  government  was 
able,  after  two  months'  delay,  to  increase  the  army  of 
General  Scott  to  a  number  short  of  eleven  thousand  avail 
able  men.  With  this  number,  in  the  early  part  of  August, 
the  army  moved  to  the  conquest  of  Mexico — the  capital  of 
the  Spanish  Aztec  nation  !  Its  progress,  its  victories,  its 
heroic  conduct,  and  its  wonderful  achievements,  we  must 
now  pursue,  record,  and,  as  far  as  possible,  spread  out, 
for  the  admiration  of  all  true  lovers  of  the  great  and 
heroic  in  martial  achievement. 


aroTin  d 
MEXICO 

Taken  "by-permission  from 
Hiimboldt'.-,  Valley  of  Mexico 


CHAPTER  XI. 

Strength  of  the  Army. — Reinforcements. — Divisions  of  the  Army. — 
March  from  Puebla. — Hospitals  of  Puebla. — Volcano  of  Popocatapetl. — 
Pass  of  Rio  Frio. — View  of  Mexico. — Valley  of  Mexico. — Lakes. — 
Inundations. — Topography  of  the  Valley. — Position  of  the  Army  on 
the  13th  of  August. — Reconnaissance  of  the  Rifles. — El  Penon. — 
Mexicalcingo. — Turning  of  Lake  Chalco. — March  to  San  Augustine. — 
Skirmish  at  Buena  Vista. — Concentration. — Position  of  the  Army  on 
the  18th. 

WE  have  already  said  that  Scott's  army  in  Puebla,  on 
the  1st  day  of  June,  1847,  did  not  exceed  five  thousand 
effectives, — that  is,  capable  of  marching  and  fighting. 
From  Vera  Cruz  to  Puebla,  the  road  had  been  strewed 
with  the  sick,  or  languishing — the  convalescent  invalids, 
or  the  wounded, — who  had  been  left  in  depots  or  were  in 
the  moveable  hospitals  of  the  army.  Here  we  should 
recollect,  and  consider  carefully,  the  wide  and  important 
difference  which  exists  between  a  mere  detachment  of  an 
army,  or  light  division  moving  rapidly  through  a  country 
for  temporary  purposes,  and  a  regularly  organized  army, 
equipped  to  remain  in  the  midst  of  a  hostile  nation,  and, 
therefore,  obliged  to  supply  all  its  own  wants.  The 
former  being  small,  and  moving  rapidly  for  a  short  time, 
either  has  no  sick  and  wounded,  or  depends  upon  trans 
porting  them  in  wagons  or  leaving  them  to  the  private 
kindness  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  country.  On  the 
other  hand,  a  regularly  organized  army,  subsisting  in  the 
heart  of  an  enemy's  country,  must  provide  itself  with 

T2 


222  CONDITION    OF    THE    ARMY. 

hospitals  and  depots,  either  moveable  or  stationary ;  and 
must  there  leave  all  the  provisions,  guards,  men,  and 
equipments,  which  are  necessary  to  maintain  these  depots, 
and  secure  their  safety  and  comfort.  If  these  are 
stationary  in  towns,  (as  they  should  be,)  then  garrisons 
must  be  left  with  them.  If  moveable,  from  camp  to 
camp,  they  require  a  large  number  of  wagons,  a  nu 
merous  body  of  teamsters,  and  a  yet  more  numerous 
body  of  attendants.  In  either  case,  it  is  not  too  high 
an  estimate  to  say,  that  an  invading  army,  advanced 
within  the  territory  of  a  hostile  country,  requires  at 
least  one-fourth  of  its  original  number  to  be  enrolled  as 
non-combatants.  A  part  of  these  will  be  sick,  a  part 
wounded,  and  a  large  part  engaged  as  attendants,  con 
voys,  or  garrisons.  If  Scott  had  left  Jalapa,  then,  with 
eight  thousand  effective  men,  he  could  not  have  had  more 
than  six  thousand  with  which  to  leave  Puebla.  But 
far  worse  than  this  was  the  actual  fact.  The  inhospita 
ble  climate  of  Mexico  did  not  cease  its  ravages  with  the 
lowlands  of  the  coast.  The  record  of  disease  in  the 
army  has  never  been  fully  unfolded.  In  the  more  un 
healthy  positions  on  the  Rio  Grande,  at  Vera  Cruz, 
Tampico,  Perote,1  and  many  other  places — even  at 
Puebla — disease  pursued  the  troops,  and  in  the  space  of 
one  year  hurried  thousands  to  the  grave.  Hundreds  and 
thousands  of  the  volunteer  regiments  also  disappeared 
from  the  army,  from  the  effects  of  disease,  which  caused 
their  discharge,  from  voluntary  absences,  and  from  being 
cut  off  in  small  parties.  Nor  was  this  all.  Desertions 


1  The   names  were  recently  published  of  no   less  than  seven   hundred 
men,  who  died  in  a  few  mouths  at  Perote. 


STRENGTH    OF    THE    ARMY.  223 

from  the  regular  army  were  frequent.  No  less  than 
seventeen  hundred  were  reported  in  a  little  more  than  a 
year.1 

Such  were  the  causes  which  rapidly  diminished  the 
number  of  effective  troops  in  the  field ;  but  which 
could  not  be  properly  estimated  by  those  who  looked 
only  to  the  muster-rolls  at  Washington. 

Three  different  bodies  of  reinforcements  had  left 
Vera  Cruz  for  Puebla,  and  reached  there  in  time  for  the 
march  on  Mexico.  With  these,  and  the  garrison  of 
Jalapa,  the  army  of  Scott,  in  the  beginning  of  August, 
may  be  thus  enumerated  : 

ARMY  ON  THE  GTH  DAY  OF  AUGUST,  1847. 
Scott's  forces  at  Puebla,  (including  all,)       .     7,000 
Cadwallader's  Brigade,       ....     1,400 
Pillow's  "  ....     1,800 

Pierce's  Corps       "  ....     2,409 

Garrison  of  Puebla,  under  Colonel  Childs     .     1,400 

Total  arrived  at  Puebla, 
Deduct  from  this,  Garrison  of  Puebla,  ) 
with  the  sick  in  hospitals,  ) 


Total  marched  from  Puebla,        .         .         .  10,738 

Nor  was  the  want  of  men  the  only  difficulty  with  the 
troops,  in  preparing  for  its  march.  Although  the  gov 
ernment  (Congress)  had,  in  the  aggregate,  provided 
amply  for  the  troops ;  yet  the  difficulty  of  transmitting 
funds  to  distant  posts,  in  a  foreign  country,  without  the 

1  Their  names  were  recorded  in  the  Police  Gazette. 


224  WANT    OF    FUNDS. 

aid  of  mercantile  arrangements,  was  so  great,  that  the 
officers  of  the  different  departments,  and  of  the  line, 
were  frequently  much  embarrassed  for  funds.  The 
merchants  of  Puebla,  and  of  Mexico  generally,  deal 
almost  altogether  with  England  and  France.  They 
were  willing  to  buy  drafts  on  those  countries,  but  not  on 
our  own.  The  consequence  was,  that  the  officers  oi 
the  quartermaster's  and  commissary's  departments,  had 
often  to  get  money  discounted  at  a  heavy  rate,  for  the 
purchase  of  such  supplies,  in  the  country,  as  were 
needed  at  the  moment. 

The  following  paragraph  is  from  a  letter  written  on  the 
6th  of  August,  at  Puebla  : 

"  General  Pierce  came  up  to-day  with  his  command, 
bringing  eighty-five  thousand  dollars  in  drafts,  but  rot 
one  cent  in  money.  The  disappointment  and  vexation, 
both  of  the  general-in-chief,  and  the  quartermaster's  and 
commissary's  departrnents,  is  great  in  the  extreme,  and 
how  they  are  to  get  along,  is  with  them  an  unsolved 
problem.  The  paymaster's  department  is  no  better  off; 
and  the  only  way  officers  can  get  along  to  provide  them 
selves  with  the  necessaries  of  life,  is  to  first  procure  a 
draft  on  one  of  the  cities  of  our  Union  from  the  pay 
master,  and  then  have  it  shaved  at  the  rate  of  twenty- 
five  or  thirty  per  cent,  from  its  face.  This  is  but  a  faint 
and  imperfect  sketch  of  the  financial  operations  of  our 
army."1 

This  was  a  consequence  of  one  of  the  errors  of  the 
campaign, — not  on  the  part  of  the  army,  or  its  com 
mander,  but  in  the  War  Department.  This  error  was, 


Letter  to  the  St.  Louis  Republican. 


COUNCIL    OF    WAR.  225 

in  leaving  the  army  too  weak  to  maintain  its  co?n?nunica- 
tions.  It  is  a  rule  of  common  sense,  not  less  than  of 
the  military  art,  that  at  every  step  made  by  the  army, 
it  should  leave  such  defences  and  depots  in  its  rear,  that 
there  may  always  be  a  direct  communication  with  its 
source  of  supply  at  home.  When  the  army  of  Scott 
had  arrived  at  Jalapa,  the  volunteer  corps  enrolled  in 
May  and  June,  1846,  began  to  disappear.  Their  places 
were  not  supplied  till  months  afterwards.  Thus  the 
army  moved  on  towards  Mexico,  without  being  able  to 
keep  open  its  communications.  In  fact,  many  places, 
such  as  the  National  Bridge,  which  it  was  important  to 
defend,  were  abandoned.  The  army  was  too  weak  to 
move  forward  and  leave  garrisons  behind.  The  conse 
quence  of  this  condition  of  things  was  an  inconvenient 
derangement  in  the  transmission  of  funds.  Specie  could 
only  be  carried  safely  with  the  large  trains ;  while  drafts 
on  the  government  treasuries  in  the  towns  of  the  United 
States  were  at  a  discount  in  Mexico.  Such  was  the  state 
of  the  military  chest,  when  it  was  determined  to  march 
from  Puebla  to  Mexico. 

On  the  5th  of  August  a  council  of  war  was  held,  at 
which  the  heads  of  the  different  divisions  and  brigades 
were  present ;  among  whom  were  Major-Generals  Worth, 
Quitman,  and  Pillow,  with  Brigadiers  Twiggs,  Shields, 
and  Cadwallader.  General  Pierce  did  not  arrive  till  next 
day.  The  general-in-chief  (Scott)  then  laid  down  dis 
tinctly  the  plan  of  operations,  the  routes,  and  the  mode, 
by  which  he  proposed  to  reach,  attack,  and  capture 
the  city  of  Mexico  and  its  defences.  Subsequent  events 
proved  how  ably  and  clearly  these  dispositions  were 
made. 


226 


COUNCIL    OF    WAR. 


We  have  s&id  that  Scott  left  Puebla  with  10,738  men,1 
and  that  3,261  were  left  in  garrison  and  in  hospitals.  Of 
the  last,  the  largest  part  were  in  the  hospital,  where  were 
at  one  time  no  less  than  nineteen  hundred  sick  !  Of  these, 
seven  hundred  found  their  graves  at  Puebla.  Leaving 
this  large  body  of  sick  with  a  very  moderate  garrison, 
under  Col.  Childs,  the  army  commenced  its  march  for  the 
valley  of  Mexico  on  the  7th  of  August. 

The  army,  under  the  directions  of  the  general-in-chief, 
was  arranged  in  four  divisions,  with  a  cavalry  brigade. 
The  divisions  comprehended  a  large  number  of  regiments, 
but  their  numbers  were  reduced  one-half.  Some  of  them 
were  the  mere  skeletons  of  what  they  should  be,  under 
the  regular  organization. 

The  divisions  were  very  nearly  as  follows  : 


Cavah 
Col.  Harney. 


1st  Division, 
Gen.  Worth. 


1st  Dragoons,  Capt.  Kearney, 
2d  do.  Major  Sumner, 
3d  do.  Capt.  McReynolds, 


Parts. 


1st  Brigade, 
Col.  Garland. 


Col.  Clarke. 


f"2d  Regiment  Artillery. 
j  3d        do.  do. 

j  4th       do.         Infantry. 
[_ Duncan's  Field  Battery. 

55th  Infantry. 
6th       do. 
8th       do. 


2d  Division,        , 
Gen.  Twiggs. 

1st  Brigade, 
Gen.  Smith. 

2(1  Brigade, 
Col.  Riley. 

f  Rifle  Regiment. 
I  1st  Artillery. 
]  3d  Infantry. 
[_  Taylor's  Battery 
i  4th  Artillery. 
<  1st  Infantry. 
(  7th       do. 

Scott's  Official  Report,  No.  34. 


DIVISIONS    FOR    THE    MARCH  227 


Jlst  Brigade, 
Gen.  Cadwallader.  (  uth       do> 

Wu.*««w.  2dBrio-ade,        5    9th  Infantry. 

Gen.  Pierce.          I?1!1       ^a 


f       1st  Brigade,  (  S.  Carolina  Volunteers. 

4th  Division,        I       G«:-n.  Shields.  >  N.  York  Volunteers. 

Gen.  Quitman.      \         0  i  TJ  •      i  >  2d  Perm,        do. 

2d  Brigade.  Dotachmont  of  y.  S>  Mar 


This  organization  apparently  gives  twenty  regiments, 
and  parts  of  five  others.  Had  these  regiments  been  full, 
up  to  their  legal  number,  they  would  have  contained 
twenty  thousand  men,  a  regiment,  when  completely  or 
ganized,  having  a  thousand.  The  whole  army,  however, 
contained  but  little  more  than  half  that  number.  The 
regiments,  therefore,  averaged  but  five  hundred,  and,  in 
fact,  some  of  them  had  but  three  hundred. 

In  order  that  the  different  corps  should  not  be  thrown 
together,  and  that  the  troops  might  move  easily,  the  divis 
ions  took  up  their  line  of  march  on  different  days,  but  in 
such  a  manner  that  they  might  reinforce  each  other  at 
four  hours'  notice.  As  it  was  known  that  there  was  no 
large  Mexican  army  immediately  in  front,  no  evil  could 
arise  from  this  mode  of  march. 

Accordingly  on  the  7th  the  second  division,  under  Gen 
eral  Twiggs,  commenced  its  march,  preceded  by  the 
brigade  of  cavalry  under  Harney.  On  the  8th,  Quitman's 
division  of  volunteers  moved  ;  on  the  9th  the  first  division, 
under  Worth  ;  on  the  10th  the  third  division,  under  Pil 
low.1  General  Scott,  the  commander,  joined  and  contin 
ued  with  the  leading  division. 


'Scott's  Official  Report,  No.  31,  August  19th,  1847. 


22S  ROUTE    OF    THE    TROOPS. 

The  army  was  now  under  full  way,  marching  on  to 
that  singular  capital  of  that  singular  nation,  whose  ancient 
and  whose  modern  civilization  has  made  a  phenomenon  in 
the  history  of  society.  The  fragments  of  mutation  and 
revolution  lay  scattered  in  its  path — all  was  new  and 
strange  ;  yet,  unmoved  by  these  associations,  and  undi 
verted  by  these  novelties,  it  marched  steadily  on  to  fulfil 
what  was  apparently  the  decree  of  destiny. 

The  road  on  which  the  troops  marched  was  the  great 
stage-travelled  route  from  Vera  Cruz  to  Mexico,  through 
Puebla.  The  route  travelled  by  Cortez,  in  his  conquest, 
after  diverging  to  the  right  a  little  south  of  Perote,  here 
crossed  the  modern  road  and  passed  to  the  left  through 
Cholula,  and  round  the  base  of  Popocatapetl,  gnd  finally 
rejoined  the  present  road,  near  Lake  Chalco.  Cortez,  no 
doubt,  pursued  the  common  way  at  that  time,  especially 
as  Cholula  was  then  a  magnificent  city.  The  modern 
road  has  been  made  to  suit  the  modern  relations  of  society 
and  the  new  growth  of  towns.  Nearly  at  right  angles  to 
the  road  from  Vera  Cruz,  and  west  of  the  range  of  the 
Cordilleras,  lies  the  road  from  Mexico  to  Acapulco  on  the 
Pacific.  Near  the  city  of  Mexico,  are  the  lakes  of  Chalco 
and  Xachimilco.  On  this  road  to  Acapulco  is  the  village 
of  San  Augustine,  at  which  the  American  army  ultimately 
arrived,  previous  to  the  battles  of  Mexico. 

On  the  morning  of  the  7th,  Twiggs'  division  passed 
out  of  Puebla,  and  took  its  way  through  a  beautiful, 
rolling  country,  where  gardens  supplied  the  city  with 
fruits  and  vegetables.  The  road  was  ascending,  and 
crossed,  before  it  entered  the  city  of  Mexico,  the  Anahuac 
range  of  the  Cordilleras,  the  most  magnificent  portion  of 
that  chain  of  mountains  which  extends  from  Cape  Horn 


NATURAL    SCENERY.  229 

to  the  Arties — and  from  whose  sky-crested  summits  the 
eye  of  fancy  might  extend  its  uninterrupted  vision  from 
the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific,  and  call  up,  in  bright  and 
long  array,  the  nations,  the  arts,  and  the  triumphs  of 
victorious  science,  to  be  spread  over  all  this  continent,  in 
the  ages  of  the  deep  and  distant  future  !  Many  miles  to 
the  left  arose  the  snow-topped  Popocatapetl,  whose  ven 
erable  summit  was  eighteen  thousand  feet  in  the  air  ; 
three  thousand  feet  above  the  point  where  ice  and  snow 
dwell  in  perpetual  congelation  !  A  little  further,  arose 
the  twin  summit  of  Iztac-cithuatl,  whose  icy  top  looks 
over  the  earth  in  the  same  cold  and  isolated  glory. 
Thirty  miles  from  the  road,  as  these  were,  yet  in  the 
clear  atmosphere  of  this  elevated  plain  they  seemed 
near  by,  and  their  snows  chilled  the  air.  Thus  amidst 
the  ruins  of  Cholula  and  Tlascala,  on  either  side,  and  in 
full  view  of  these  volcanic  monuments  to  the  grandeur 
of  nature,  the  army  marched  on.  The  road  gradually 
ascended  through  mountain  scenery,  which  seemed  to 
befit  rather  the  north  of  New  England  then  the  region 
of  the  tropics.  Thick  woods  would  now  and  then  cover 
the  hills,  while  here  and  there  little  lakes  were  inter 
spersed  in  deep  valleys.  The  thirst  of  the  soldier  was 
relieved  by  the  coldness  of  their  waters,  and  his  weari 
ness  was  almost  forgotten  in  the  beauty  and  sublimity  of 
surrounding  nature.  At  length,  on  the  third  day,  they 
reached  the  pass  of  Rio  Frio.  They  left  Puebla,  seven 
thousand  two  hundred  feet  above  the  ocean,  and  were 
now  ten  thousand  one  hundred  and  twenty ;  having 
gradually  ascended  three  thousand  feet  in  forty-eight 
miles,  and  arrived  in  the  midst  of  the  Anahuac  range  of 
the  Cordilleras,  at  a  point  forty-five  miles  distant  from 
u 


230  ARMY    REACHES    RIO    FRIO. 

the  city  of  Mexico.1  Rio  Frio,  says  an  officer,  is  "  a 
little  stream  pouring  down  from  the  Snow  mountains,  of 
icy  coldness  and  crystal  purity."2  The  mountains  from 
which  it  runs  are  composed  of  porphyritic  rocks,  and 
their  highest  summits,  like  that  of  Popocatapetl,  are 
ancient  volcanoes. 

At  this  point  the  army  had  anticipated  resistance,  and 
the  position  was  favorable  to  defence.  Being  in  the 
midst  of  the  mountains,  they  here  closed  down  on  both 
sides  of  the  road,  so  as  completely  to  overhang  and  en 
filade  it.  Signs  of  preparation  were,  indeed,  found  in 
temporary  parapets,  and  timber  felled.  The  intention, 
however,  of  defending  this  point  had  been  abandoned. 
It  was  supposed  that  General  Valencia,  who  commanded 
the  division  of  the  north,  was  stationed  here.  If  so,  he 
had  retreated  towards  the  capital. 

A  march  of  a  few  miles  further,  and  the  army  passed 
over  the  highest  crest  of  the  mountains  ;  and  one  of  the 
most  splendid  scenes  of  the  world  opened  upon  the  eyes 
of  the  weary  soldiers. 

It  is  thus  described  by  an  officer  of  the  Rifles.3 

"  When  all  were  pretty  nearly  worn  out,  a  sudden 
turn  in  the  road  brought  to  our  view  a  sight  which  none 
can  ever  forget.  The  whole  vast  plain  of  Mexico  was 
before  us.  The  coldness  of  the  air,  which  was  most 
sensibly  felt  at  this  great  height — our  fatigue  and  danger, 
were  forgotten,  and  our  eyes  were  the  only  sense  that 
thought  of  enjoyment.  Mexico,  with  its  lofty  steeples 


1  Stealey's  Map  of  the  Roads  from  Vera  Cruz  to  Mexico. 

2  Letter  to  the  New  York  Courier,  dated  August  31st- 
8  Letter  to  the  New  York  Courier 


VIEW    OF    MEXICO.  231 

and  its  checkered  domes — its  bright  reality,  and  its  former 
fame — its  modern  splendor,  and  its  ancient  magnificence, 
was  before  us  ;  while  around  on  every  side  its  thousand 
lakes  seemed  like  silver  stars  on  a  velvet  mantle." 

With  this  description  we  may  compare  another  by  an 
English  officer,  who  seems  to  have  been  equally  en 
raptured  with  the  same  view.  "  From  an  eminence, 
(says  Captain  Lyon,)  we  came  suddenly  in  sight  of  the 
great  valley  of  Mexico,  with  its  beautiful  city  appearing 
in  the  centre,  surrounded  by  diverging  shady  pa'seos, 
bright  fields,  and  picturesque  haciendas.  The  great 
lake  Tezcuco  lay  immediately  beyond  it,  shaded  by  a 
low  floating  cloud  of  exhalations  from  its  surface,  which 
hid  from  our  view  the  bases  of  the  volcanoes  of  Popoca- 
tapetl  and  Iztac-cithuatl — while  their  snowy  summits, 
brightly  glowing  beneath  the  direct  rays  of  the  sun, 
which  but  partially  illumined  the  plains,  gave  a  delight 
fully  novel  appearance  to  the  whole  scene  before  me. 
I  was,  however,  at  this  distance,  disappointed  as  to  the 
size  of  Mexico ;  but  its  lively  whiteness  and  freedom 
from  smoke — the  magnitude  of  the  churches,  and  the 
extreme  regularity  of  its  structure,  gave  it  an  ap 
pearance  which  can  never  be  seen  in  a  European  city, 
and  declare  it  unique — perhaps  unequalled  in  its  kind."1 

Thus  suddenly  did  the  army  burst  upon  this  extra 
ordinary  view — a  view  as  remarkable  for  its  historical 
associations,  as  for  the  grandeur  of  its  natural  elements, — 
a  scene  too,  which  must  forever  connect  this  army  with 


1  Captain  Lyon's  Journal  of  a  Residence  and  Tour  in  the  Republic  of 
M-.xu-o 


232          DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  VALLEY. 

the   memory  of  the  past,  and   the   developments   of  the 
future. 

There  must  have  been  some,  also,  in  that  martial  array, 
who  turned  their  thoughts  from  the  scenes  of  war,  to 
contemplate  here  some  of  the  most  singular  features  of 
the  natural  world.  The  valley  of  Mexico  is  one  of  the 
most  extraordinary  regions  of  the  earth.  It  is  a  basin 
enclosed  by  a  wall  of  porphyritic  mountains.  Its  length, 
north  and  south,  is  about  sixty  miles,  and  its  breadth 
(east  and  west)  about  forty  miles.1  It  is  really  formed 
by  a  separation  (south  of  the  city  of  Mexico)  of  the 
great  chain  of  the  Cordilleras  into  two  chains — one 
bending  east  and  the  other  west,  which  again  unite 
north  of  the  city.  The  result  of  this  conformation  is  to 
leave  a  basin,  surrounded  by  the  walls  of  the  mountain. 
In  this  basin,  "  all  the  water  furnished  by  the  sur 
rounding  Cordilleras  is  collected.  No  stream  issues 
from  it  excepting  the  brook  of  Tequisquiac,  which  joins 
the  Rio  de  Tula.  The  lakes  rise  by  stages,  in  pro 
portion  to  their  distance  from  its  centre,  or  in  other 
words,  from  the  site  of  the  capital.  Next  to  the  lake  of 
Tezcuco,  Mexico  is  the  least  elevated  point  of  the  val 
ley  ;  the  Plaza  Mayor,  or  Great  Square,  being  only  one 
foot  and  one  inch  higher  than  the  mean  level  of  this 
lake,  which  is  eleven  and  three-fourths  feet  lower  than 
that  of  San  Christobal.  Zumpongo,  which  is  the  most 
northern,  is  29TVoV  inches  higher  than  the  surface  of 
Tezcuco  ;  while  that  of  Chalco,  at  the  southern  ex 
tremity,  is  only  3TV/o  feet  more  elevated  then  the  Great 
Square  of  Mexico."2 

1  See  Stealey's  Maps  of  the  Roads  from  Vera  ,Cruz  to  Mexico. 

2  Humboldt's  New  Spain. 


SITUATION    OF    THE    CITY.  233 

In  consequence  of  this  peculiarity,  the  city  has,  for  a 
long  series  of  ages,  been  exposed  to  inundations.  Five 
immense  floods  have  occurred  since  the  Spanish  inva 
sion.  Immense  works  have  been  constructed  at  dif 
ferent  times  to  avoid  this  danger.  One  of  these  is  the 
great  cut,  planned  by  Enrico  Martinez,  which  connects 
the  Rio  de  Suautitlon  with  the  Rio  Tula,  and  thus 
carries  off  the  lake  of  Zumpongo.1  Around  the  same 
lake  are  stone  dikes.  In  the  south,  dikes  and  sluices 
have  been  formed  round  Lakes  Chalco  and  Xochimilco, 
by  which  they  are  prevented  from  overflowing.  By 
means  like  these,  the  city  of  Mexico  is  prevented  from 
inundation,  and  is  no  longer,  as  it  seems  to  have  been 
in  the  time  of  Cortez,  an  island  in  a  lake.  The  charac 
ter  of  the  country  remains  unchanged — and  it  is  yet  a 
marshy  valley,  in  a  basin  of  the  Cordilleras,  spotted  with 
lakes  and  filled  with  volcanic  remains.  On  some  of 
the  causeways,  there  is  still  a  continuous  body  of  water 
for  miles  from  the  city — while  on  others,  the  ground  is 
marshy,  but  sometimes  cultivated. 

On  the  10th,  the  division  of  Twiggs  encamped  at  the 
base  of  the  mountain,2  and  at  this,  the  enemy's  scouts 
began  to  be  seen  on  all  sides.  On  the  llth,  this  di 
vision  reached  Ayotla,  only  fifteen  miles  by  the  National 
Road  from  Mexico,  and  waited  for  the  other  divisions  to 
come  up. 

At  this  point,  a  survey  of  the  valley  of  Mexico  showed 


1  This  was  thought,  by  Humboldt,  to  be  one  of  the  most  gigantic 
hydraulic  operations  executed  by  man.  Its  length  is  67,537  feet,  the 
greatest  depth  197,  and  its  greatest  breadth  361. 

3  Letter  to  the  New  York  Courier. 

u2 


I 

234  VIEW    OF    THE    COUNTRY. 

the  lake  of  Tezcuco  directly  in  front  of  the  road  ;  and 
at  the  lower  end,  and  about  half  way  to  Mexico,  (seven 
miles,)  on  the  left  of  the  road,  is  El  Penon,  a  fortified 
mountain.  Directly  west  of  that,  at  the  upper  end  oi 
Lake  Xochimilco,  and  about  five  miles  south  of  Mexico, 
is  Mexicalcingo,  another  fortified  point.  Directly  south 
and  west  of  Ayotla,  lies  the  lake  of  Chalco,  and  the  lake 
of  Xochimilco.  Entirely  west  of  these  again,  and  run 
ning  from  the  city  of  Mexico,  nearly  at  right  angles  with 
the  National  Road,  lies  the  road  toAcapulco,  leading  west 
from  Mexico  to  the  Pacific.  On  this  last  road  lies  San 
Augustine,  the  general  depot  of  the  army  in  its  sub 
sequent  operations.  Between  San  Augustine  and  the 
city  of  Mexico,  and  on  or  near  the  Acapulco  road,  lie  in 
succession,  San  Antonia,  Contreras,  and  Churubusco, 
points  where  successive  engagements  took  place.  CON 
TRERAS  is  about  four  miles  nearly  northwest  of  San  Au 
gustine,  on  a  road  leading  through  San  Angel  to  the 
Tacubaya  causeway.  CHURUBUSCO  is  on  the  Aca 
pulco  road,  near  a  canal,  at  the  crossing  of  which  was 
a  tete  du  pont,  (bridge-head.) 

A  rapid  coup  d'ceil  (birds-eye  view)  of  the  topography 
of  the  valley,  and  the  position  of  the  army  on  the  13th  of 
August,  will  show  Twiggs's  division  at  Ayotla,  east  of 
Lake  Chalco ;  Worth's  division  near  the  village  of 
Chalco,  at  the  south  end  of  the  lake,  and  the  divisions 
of  Pillow  and  Quitman  intermediate.  In  front,  the  great 
lake  of  Tezcuco,  and  on  the  left,  Lake  Chalco.  The 
city  of  Mexico  lay  on  the  side  of  Lake  Tezcuco,  and 
fifteen  miles,  by  the  road  from  Ayotla,  approached 
through  the  lakes  and  marshes  by  great  causeways. 

An  attentive  examination  shows,  that  on  the  south  and 


THE    COUNTRY    EXAMINED.  235 

west,  there  are  three  great  roads  which  respectively  enter 
Mexico  by  causeways.  The  first,  is  the  Vera  Cruz  or 
National  Road,  on  which  the  army  now  was,  and  which 
passed  by  El  Penon,  immediately  in  front,  and  for  miles 
on  a  narrow  causeway,  built  on  the  shoals  of  the  lake. 
The  second  was  the  Acapulco  road,  which  lay  directly 
across  Lake  Chalco,  from  where  the  army  now  was,  and 
proceeded  through  San  Augustine  and  San  Antonia,  by  a 
causeway  to  the  city.  The  third  was  the  Toluca  road, 
passing  into  Mexico  by  the  Tacubaya  causeway,  still 
further  to  the  west. 

The  problem  now  presented  to  the  commander-in- 
chief  was,  by  which  of  these  roads  shall  the  army  at 
tempt  its  passage  into  the  city  ?  The  solution  of  this 
question  required  a  close  reconnaissance  >  and  an  accurate 
survey,  if  possible,  of  the  position  and  defences  of  the 
enemy. 

On  the  12th  of  August,  the  Rifle  regiment,  with  three 
companies  of  cavalry,  were  pushed  forward  to  recon 
noitre  El  Penon.1  This  work  was  successfully  per 
formed,  and  the  work  pronounced  impracticable,  without 
immense  loss,  which  the  commander  of  the  army  thought 
unnecessary  to  the  object.  The  reconnoitring  party 
(rifles  and  dragoons)  continued  their  search  to  the  left,  in 
order  to  find  a  way  of  easier  approach  to  the  city.  At 
about  five  miles  from  Mexico,  they  were  arrested  by 
coming  suddenly  upon  five  strong  batteries  commanding 
the  road.  This  was  the  post  of  Mexicalcingo,  before 
described,  at  the  head  of  Lake  Xochimilco.  The  party 
(composed  of  about  four  hundred  men)  soon  counter- 

1  Letter  of  an  officer  to  the  New  York  Courier. 


236  EL    PENON    EXAMINED. 

marched,  and  found  El  Penon,  with  its  bristling  batteries, 
immediately  between  them  and  the  camp  of  General 
Twiggs.  For  some  unknown  reason,  they  were  not  at 
tacked  ;  and  after  a  rapid  march,  arrived  in  camp  about 
midnight.  General  Scott  pronounced  this  "  the  boldest 
reconnaissance  of  the  war." 

El  Penon,  which  had  been  thus  reconnoitred,  is  a 
rocky  hill,  which  "  completely  enfilades  and  commands 
the  National  Road,  and  had  been  fortified  and  repaired 
with  the  greatest  care  by  Santa  Anna.  One  side  was 
inaccessible  by  nature,  the  rest  had  been  made  so  by 
art.  Batteries,  in  all  mounting  fifty-one  guns  of  dif 
ferent  calibres,  had  been  placed  on  its  sides,  and  a  deep 
ditch,  twenty-four  feet  wide  and  ten  feet  deep,  had 
been  cut,  connecting  the  parts  already  surrounded  by 
marshes."1  From  the  Penon  to  the  city,  was  a  cause 
way,  surrounded  by  water.  This  position  could  not 
be  turned,  and  therefore  must  be  carried  by  assault. 
Against  this,  General  Scott  decided  on  grounds  of  hu 
manity. 

In  his  report  of  the  19th  of  August,  1847,  he  thus 
writes : 

"  This  mound,  close  to  the  National  Road,  commands 
the  principal  approach  to  the  city  from  the  east.  No 
doubt  it  might  have  been  carried,  but  at  a  great  and  dis 
proportionate  loss,  and  I  was  anxious  to  spare  the  lives  of 
this  gallant  army  for  a  general  battle,  which  I  knew  we 
had  to  win  before  capturing  the  city,  or  obtaining  the 
great  object  of  the  campaign — a  just  and  honorable 
peace." 

1  Letter  to  the  New  York  Courier. 


ARMY  TURNS  THE  PENON.  237 

Of  the  pass,  by  Mexicalcingo,  the  general  writes,  and 
thus  discloses  the  plan  which  was  ultimately  adopted. 

"  It  might  have  been  easy  (masking  the  Penon)  to 
force  the  passage  ;  but  on  the  other  side  of  the  bridge 
we  should  have  found  ourselves,  four  miles  from  this 
road,  on  a  narrow  causeway,  flanked  to  the  right  and  left 
by  water,  or  boggy  grounds.  These  difficulties  closely 
viewed,  threw  me  back  upon  the  project  long  entertained, 
of  turning  the  strong  eastern  defences  of  the  city,  by 
passing  around  south  of  Lakes  Chalco  and  Xochimilco,  at 
the  foot  of  the  hills  and  mountains,  so  as  to  reach  San 
Augustine,  and  hence  to  manoeuvre  on  hard,  though  much 
broken  ground,  to  the  south  and  southwest  of  the  capital, 
which  had  been  more  or  less  under  our  view  since  the 
10th  inst."1 

El  Penon,  being  on  the  common  and  only  good  road 
from  Puebla  to  Mexico,  and  being  likewise  an  almost 
impregnable  position,  General  Santa  Anna  had  judged 
correctly  and  wisely  in  placing  there  his  principal  fortifi 
cation.  The  fortress  of  Mexicalcingo,  being  likewise  a 
strong  one,  and,  if  taken,  leaving  the  American  army  on 
a  narrow  causeway,  easily  defensible,  the  Mexican  gen 
eral  had  apparently  provided  for  every  possible  passage 
between  the  Lake  Chalco  and  the  Lake  Tezcuco.  This 
was  the  only  way  in  which  there  was  a  regular  and  toler 
able  road  from  Puebla  to  Mexico.  On  this  the  American 
army  had  advanced,  and  the  vanguard  had  actually 
reached  Ayotla,  several  miles  in  front  of  the  south  end 
of  Chalco.  The  measures  of  the  Mexican  general  were, 


Genera!  Scott's  Official  Report,  No.  31,  dated  August  19th. 


238  GOES    ROUND    CHALCO. 

therefore,  judiciously  taken,  and  at  this  time  promised,  if 
any  defence  could  avail,  to  be  successful. 

The  real  question  in  military  science  at  this  time  was, 
could  the  Lake  Chalco  be  turned  ?  If  it  could,  did  the 
new  route  present  a  better  or  safer  way  ?  The  reconnais 
sances  made,  and  the  information  of  scouts,  determined 
the  fact  that  a  passage  existed  round  the  south  end  of 
Lake  Chalco  which  might  be  made  practicable,  and  by 
which  the  army  would  be  brought  on  to  the  Acapulco 
road,  and  advance  to  the  city  on  a  route  less  defended, 
and  affording  greater  advantages  in  fighting.  This  route, 
if  practicable,  Scott  had  contemplated  taking,  and  now  at 
once  put  the  army  in  motion  for  that  purpose. 

The  order  of  march  was  reversed,  and  Worth's  di 
vision,  which  was  in  the  rear  at  Chalco,  was  now  in 
advance,  marching  round  the  south  end  of  Lake  Chalco, 
and  cutting  their  way  to  San  Augustine.  On  the  15th 
the  several  divisions  took  up  their  line  of  march,  and 
Worth's  corps  proceeded  steadily  on  to  the  fortified  posi 
tion  of  San  Antonia.  "  The  road  lay  along  the  base  of  a 
high  range  of  mountains,  at  times  crossing  rocky  spurs  of 
the  mountains,  or  along  the  margin  of  the  lake,  on  very 
narrow  causeways  very  much  cut  up.  The  hills  on  the 
left  were  often  precipitous,  and  a  few  sharp-shooters  might 
have  annoyed  us  exceedingly  by  their  fire,  and  a  few  en 
terprising  men  might  have  blocked  up  the  road  completely 
by  rolling  down  rocks,  and  yet  they  attempted  it  but  once ; 
a  few  shot  soon  dislodged  them,  and  two  or  three  hours' 
work  cleared  the  road."1 

On  the   17th   the    head  of  General  Worth's    division 


Letter  from  an  officer,  published  hi  the  Washington  Uuiun. 


WORTH    REACHES    SAN    AUGUSTINE.  239 

reached  San  Augustine,  and  in  a  few  hours  after  the  other 
divisions  were  within  striking  distance.  The  march 
round  the  lake  to  San  Augustine  was  twenty-seven  miles, 
by  a  route  deemed  by  the  Mexicans  impracticable  ;  and 
on  the  18th  all  the  several  corps  were  in  position  in  the 
neighborhood  of  that  post.1 

Twiggs's  division  left  Ayotla  on  the  16th  with  the  train, 
the  brigade  of  General  Smith  forming  the  rearguard.  As 
the  train  was  passing  the  little  village  of  Buena  Vista  a 
Mexican  division  appeared  in  sight,  attempting  to  cross 
the  road  and  cut  the  train  off.  Here  a  skirmish  ensued, 
which  is  thus  described  by  an  officer : 

"  On  our  left  were  large  fields  of  half-grown  barley, 
through  which  was  seen  advancing,  in  splendid  order,  the 
enemy's  column.  It  was  the  most  splendid  sight  I  had 
ever  seen.  The  yellow  cloaks,  red  caps  and  jackets  of 
the  lancers,  and  the  bright  blue  and  white  uniforms  of  the 
infantry,  were  most  beautifully  contrasted  with  the  green 
of  the  barley-field.  Our  line  of  battle  was  soon  formed, 
and  we  deployed  through  the  grain  to  turn  their  left  and 
cut  them  off  from  the  mountains.  A  few  shots,  however, 
from  the  battery,  soon  showed  them  that  they  were  ob 
served,  and  countermarching  in  haste,  they  left  their  dead 
on  the  field.  Thus  ended  our  fight  at  Buena  Vista.  That 
night  we  stayed  at  Chalco."8 

The  train  continued  to  move  on,  by  roads  over  which 
it  was  almost  impossible  to  drag  the  wagons.  On  the 
18th  it  arrived  in  sight  of  the  main  army,  which  had  now 
taken  possession  of  San  Augustine. 

1  Scott's  Official  Report,  dated  the  19th. 

9  Letter  from  an  officer,  in  the  New  York  Courier. 


240  ARMY    IN    POSITION. 

The  army  was  now  concentrated,  the  different  divisions 
in  sight  of  one  another,  and  the  arrangements  made  for 
final  operations.  On  the  13th  it  was  on  the  Puebla  road 
on  the  east  side  of  Lake  Chalco,  advancing  on  El  Penon. 
On  the  18th  it  was  on  the  Acapulco  road,  near  San  Au 
gustine,  nine  miles  from  the  city  of  Mexico.  The  change 
was  made  in  good  order,  and  the  ground  to  operate  on 
was  far  better,  and  the  defences  in  front  less.  The  city 
of  the  Spanish-Aztecs  was  now  within  the  grasp  of  the 
arms  of  the  United  States,  predestined,  in  the  convictions 
of  the  people,  to  be  invincible  wherever  they  should  be 
carried.  A  conviction  like  this,  existing  in  ages  past, 
alike  in  the  minds  of  Roman,  Mohammedan,  and  Puritan, 
often  makes  the  destiny  which  it  affirms  and  courts. 
Asserted  in  the  cause  of  liberty  and  justice,  it  would 
subdu$  a  world  to  the  civilization  of  Christianity.  In 
any  other  cause,  its  predestined  glory  may  fade  before  a 
darker  fate. 


LINES    OF    DEFENCE.          #>  ?         ^        241 

JO  -'*  <• 


CHAPTER  XII. 

Mexican  Line  of  Defence. — Position  of  the  American  and  Mexican  Ar 
mies. — Action  of  the  19th. — Position  in  the  Hamlet  of  Contreras. — Po 
sition  of  General  Scott. — Arrangements  for  the  Battle. — Distribution  of 
the  American  and  Mexican  Forces. — Battle  of  Contreras. — Rout  of  the 
Mexicans. — Surrender  of  Mexican  Generals. — Recapture  of  the  Buena 
Vista  Guns. — Scott's  Arrangements. — Evacuation  of  San  Antonia. — 
Storm  of  the  Tete  du  Pont. — Battle  of  Churubusco. — Defeat  of  the 
Mexicans. — Loss. — Truce. 

THE  Mexican  plan  of  defence  for  the  city  of  Mexico 
seems  to  have  contemplated  two  lines  of  defence— an  ex 
terior  and  interior  one.  The  exterior  was  composed  of  a 
line  of  forts  and  fortified  eminences.  The  strongest  was 
EL  PENON,  on  the  National  Road,  completely  command 
ing  it,  near  the  edge  of  Lake  Tezcuco.  This  fortress,  as 
we  have  already  stated,  was  pronounced  impracticable 
without  immense  loss.  It  contained  fifty-one  guns,  dis 
posed  in  several  different  batteries,  with  infantry  breast 
works,  and  the  whole  surrounded  by  a  deep  ditch  con 
necting  the  marshes  and  waters  about  it.  The  next  fort 
of  this  class  was  at  MEXICALCINGO,  at  the  upper  end  of 
Lake  Xochimilco,  and  commanding  a  narrow  causeway  to 
the  city.  This,  also,  was  defended  with  batteries  and 
infantry  breastworks.  The  next  position  was  the  BRIDGE 
OF  CHURUBUSCO,  a  tete  du  pant  at  the  crossing  of  a  canal, 
armed  also  With  cannon,  on  the  Acapulco  road.  The 
next,  but  to  the  west,  and  front  of  this,  was  the  HILL  OF 
CONTRERAS,  thoroughly  armed  with  batteries  and  breast- 
v  16 


BATTL8GBIMIMB8 


around 
BX  I  < 

Taken  bypermiss 

Humboldt's  Valle 


DESCRIPTION    OF    THE    DEFENCES.  243 

works.  In  the  route,  and  still  nearer  to  the  city,  was  the 
HILL  OF  CHAPULTEPEC,  on  which  was  the  Military  Col 
lege.  This  was  at  the  point  where  the  mountains  ap 
proached  the  city.  It  was  a  strong  position  and  well 
armed.1  It  is  plain,  from  an  examination  of  the  map,  that 
these  positions  really  commanded  all  the  practicable  passes 
to  the  city  on  the  whole  semicircle,  extending  round  from 
Lake  Tezcuco  in  the  east  to  where  the  mountains  come 
near  the  city  on  the  west.  These  fortifications  were  armed 
with  near  one  hundred  pieces  of  cannon,  while  the  ground 
between  them  was  either  marshy,  or  covered  with  volcanic 
remains,  sharp  and  abrupt,  rendering  it  almost  impassable 
even  for  footmen.  Behind  this  line  of  exterior  defences 
General  Valencia,  with  6,000  of  the  best  troops  of  the 
Mexican  army,  was  to  manoeuvre,  and  reinforce  any  point 
which  might  be  exposed  to  attack. 

The  interior  line  seems  to  have  been  only  the  forts, 
and  canals  or  ditches  of  the  city  itself.  These,  however, 
were  by  no  means  weak.  The  city  was  approached  only 
by  causeways.  Canals  and  ditches  surrounded  it  in  va 
rious  directions,  and  at  the  gateways  were  garitas,  or 
small  forts,  constructed  at  the  angles  of  the  streets  or  en 
trances  of  the  causeways,  eight  in  number.2  These  de 
fences  of  the  city  were  also  mounted  with  a  large  number 
of  cannon.  This  interior  line,  however,  was  evidently 
weaker  than  the  exterior  one.  These  various  defences 
were  well  calculated  to  protect  the  city  against  any  thing 
less  than  a  large  army  and  protracted  siege,  had  the  energy 


1  This  statement  corresponds  in  substance  with  one  made  by  Captam 
Lee  of  the  engineers. 
8  See  Scott's  Official  Report. 


244  POSITION    OF    THE    ARMY. 

of  the  men,  or  the  ability  of  their  officers,  corresponded 
with  the  natural  strength  of  the  positions.  This,  however, 
was  not  the  case.  Whether  it  be  a  superior  strength,  in 
nate  in  the  natural  constitutions  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
northern  temperate  zone,  or  whether  it  be  what  is  more 
than  equivalent  to  strength,  a  higher  and  better  education, 
it  is  certain  that  the  arms  of  England  and  the  United 
States  have  exhibited  a  great  superiority  over  those  of 
more  southern  nations — a  superiority,  whose  final  result 
on  the  dominion  and  civilization  of  the  world  is  yet  to  be 
made  knuwn  by  the  events  of  futurity. 

On  the  18th  of  August,  the  position  of  the  armies,  at 
night,  was  in  the  order  following,  viz. :  Worth's  division 
had,  during  the  day,  advanced  from  San  Augustine  in  the 
direction  of  San  Antonia,  whose  batteries  were  brought 
to  bear  on  his  troops,  and  the  first  shot  killed  Captain 
Thornton,  a  brave  but  unfortunate  officer  of  the  2d  dra 
goons.1  The  cavalry  had  been  thrown  in  front  to  recon 
noitre.  The  village  proved  to  be  strongly  fortified,  and 
a  bold  reconnaissance  made  by  Captain  Mason  of  the  en 
gineers,  accompanied  by  Lieutenants  Stevens  and  Tower, 
determined  that  this  point  could  only  be  approached  by 
the  front,  over  a  narrow  causeway  of  great  length,  flanked 
with  wet  ditches  of  great  depth.2  Worth  was  ordered  not 
to  attack,  but  to  threaten  and  mask  the  place.  On  the 
left  of  the  road  here,  extending  west,  was  an  immense 
field  of  volcanic  rocks  and  lava,  called  pedregal,  and  on 
the  east  it  was  wet  and  boggy.3  This  pedregal  was 


1  Scott's  Official  Report. 

8  Official  Report. 

3  Letter  of  an  officer  iu  the  Washington  Union. 


FACE    OF    THE    COUNTRY.  245 

thrown  up  in  sharp  rocks  and  broken  pieces,  in  such  a 
manner,  that  the  Mexican  officers  supposed  it  to  be  im 
passable.  It  extended  to  the  mountains,  five  miles  to  the 
left.  That  night  Worth  made  the  headquarters  of  his 
division  at  a  hacienda  on  the  road,  near  Antonia,  and 
within  reach  of  the  enemy's  guns. 

On  the  same  night  the  division  of  Twiggs  slept  in  a 
little  village,  in  sight  of  Worth's  corps.1  The  divisions 
of  Pillow  and  Quitman  were  near. 

On  the  same  evening  (the  18th)  General  Valencia, 
whose  division  had  previously  been  held  liable  to  march 
to  any  point,  and  whose  troops  were  called  "  the  flower" 
of  the  Mexican  army,  occupied  the  fortified  intrenchments 
at  the  heights  of  Contreras,  about  five  miles  to  the  north 
west  of  San  Augustine.2  At  the  same  time  (evening  of 
the  18th)  General  Rincon  took  command  at  Clmrubusco, 
whose  fortifications  were  not  then  completed,  but  to  finish 
which  he  immediately  addressed  himself.3  The  garrison 
of  that  post  appears  to  have  been  composed,  according  to 
the  official  report,  of  the  battalions  of  national  guards, 
called  Independencia  and  Bravo,  which  were  subsequent 
ly  reinforced  (19th  and  20th)  by  different  batteries  of  ar 
tillery. 

At  San  Antonia  was  posted  another  Mexican  division, 
reinforced  on  the  morning  of  the  19th,  by  the  battalions 
of  Hidalgo  and  Victoria.  In  the  neighborhood  of  Con 
treras  and  San  Angel  were  other  divisions  of  the  enemy 
under  Santa  Anna. 


1  Letter  in  the  New  York  Courier  and  Enquirer. 
3  Official  Report  of  General  Salas. 
3  Official  Report  of  General  Rincou. 
v2 


246  SCOTT'S  PLAN  OF  BATTLE. 

This,  then,  was  the  situation  of  the  two  armies  on  the 
night  of  the  18th  August.  General  Scott's  headquarters 
were  at  San  Augustine.  The  pass  of  San  Antonia,  in 
front,  being  strong  and  on  a  narrow  causeway,  the  plan  of 
attack  adopted  seems  to  have  been  this — to  turn  Antonia 
by  taking  the  fort  at  Contreras,  and  thus  be  able  to  march 
round  San  Antonia ;  or  rather,  to  gain  Coyhoacan  on  the 
San  Angel,  in  the  rear  of  San  Antonia,  and  which  was 
also  but  one  mile  from  Churubusco.  To  do  this,  how 
ever,  required  that  a  new  road  should  be  cut  for  artillery 
from  San  Augustine  to  Contreras,  and  that,  when  there, 
that  position,  strongly  defended  by  artillery,  should  be 
stormed  and  taken.  This  was  the  plan  now  devised  by 
the  American  general,  and  to  be  immediately  executed  by 
the  arrny. 

On  the  morning  of  the  19th,  all  was  animation  in  both 
armies.  General  Valencia  was  strongly  posted  at  Con 
treras  ;  Rincon  was  busy  increasing  the  fortifications  of 
Churubusco  ;  Santa  Anna  was  reinforcing  both  Antonia 
and  Contreras,  with  bodies  of  troops  drawn  from  the  city  ; 
and  General  Scott,  having  made  a  new  reconnaissance  to 
the  left  by  Captain  Lee,  with  Lieutenants  Beauregard 
and  Tower,1  now  detached  Pillow's  division  on  the  con 
templated  route  to  make  a  practicable  road  for  heavy  ar 
tillery.2 

Captain  Lee  of  the  engineers,  having  discovered  a 
corps  of  observation  in  the  direction  taken  by  Pillow's 
division,  Twiggs  was  advanced  in  front  to  cover  the  party 
cutting  the  road.3  This  last  division  had  now  arrived  at 


1  Scott's  Official  Report,  (No.  31,)  19th  August,  1847. 
3  Official  Report.  8  Idem. 


POSITION    OF    CONTRERAS.  247 

the  village  of  San  Juan,  and  were  prepared  for  the  severe 
labor  of  the  next  two  days.  The  men  were  ordered  to 
put  their  blankets  on  their  shoulders,  their  knapsacks  in 
their  wagons,  and  two  days'  bread  and  beef  in  their  haver 
sacks.  At  one  p.  M.,  they  left  San  Juan,  and  proceeded 
forward,  dragging  with  them  Magruder's  battery  and  the 
mountain  howitzers.1  At  two  p.  M.,  General  Smith's 
brigade  had  arrived  at  the  crest  of  a  hill,  from  which  Va 
lencia,  in  his  intrenchments,  was  plainly  visible,  and  in 
the  distance  reinforcements  marching  to  his  assistance. 
These  intrenchments  of  Valencia,  at  the  hill  of  Contre- 
ras,  had  twenty-Two  pieces  of  artillery  (mostly  heavy) 
mounted  in  a  battery  commanding  the  difficult,  broken, 
rocky  ground,  on  which  the  American  troops  had  to  man 
oeuvre.  With  this  position  the  city  of  Mexico  was  con 
nected,  by  an  excellent  road  beyond  the  volcanic  field,  and 
by  which  it  received,  from  time  to  time,  great  bodies  of 
cavalry.2 

At  four  P.  M.,  General  Scott  took  position  on  one  of  the 
eminences  in  front  of  Contreras,  and  found  the  brigades 
of  P.  F.  Smith  and  Riley,  (Twiggs'  division,)  supported 
by  those  of  Pierce  and  Cadwallader,  (Pillow's  division,) 
picking  their  way  over  the  broken  ground  in  the  enemy's 
front,  and  extending  themselves  towards  the  road  which 
leads  to  the  city.  With  great  difficulty  Captain  Magru 
der's  battery  of  twelve  and  six  pounders,  and  Lieut.  Callen- 
der's  battery  of  mountain  howitzers  and  rockets,  had  been 
advanced  to  within  range  of  the  intrenchments.3  "  The 


1  Letter  of  an  officer  in  the  New  York  Courier 
f  Scott's  Oflicial  Report. 
8  Official  Report 


248  MANCEUVRING    OF   THE    ARMIES. 

ground,"  says  an  officer,  "  was  the  worst  possible  for  ar 
tillery  ;  covered  with  rocks,  large  and  small,  prickly-pear 
and  cactus  ;  intersected  by  ditches  filled  with  water,  and 
lined  with  maguey  plant,  itself  imperviable  to  cavalry  ; 
and  with  patches  of  corn,  which  concealed  the  enemy's 
skirmishers  while  it  impeded  our  passage.  The  artil 
lery  advanced  but  slowly,  under  a  most  murderous 
fire  of  grape,  canister,  and  round  shot,  until  it  got  into 
position."1 

Our  artillerymen  could  get  but  three  pieces  in  battery, 
while  the  enemy  had  twenty-two,  which,  being  mostly 
heavy,  rendered  our  fire  nugatory.  "  For  two  hours," 
says  the  same  officer,  "  our  troops  stood  the  storm  of  iron 
and  lead  which  hailed  upon  them,  unmoved.  At  every 
discharge  they  laid  flat  down  to  avoid  the  storm,  and  then 
sprung  up  to  serve  the  guns.  At  the  end  of  that  time, 
two  of  the  guns  were  dismounted,  and  we  (the  rifles) 
badly  hurt ;  thirteen  of  the  horses  were  killed  and  dis 
abled,  and  fifteen  of  the  cannoniers  killed  and  wounded. 
The  troops  were  then  recalled." 

In  the  mean  time  the  Mexican  lancers  had  been  repeat 
edly  repulsed.  In  another  part  of  the  field  Riley's  brigade 
sustained  the  enemy's  fire,  and  were  engaged  in  skirmish 
ing.  This  action  lasted  for  about  three  hours,  during 
which  time  our  troops  maintained  themselves  under  a 
heavy  and  severe  fire,  and  successfully  resisted  the 
charges  of  large  columns  of  cavalry. 

The  day  of  the  19th,  however,  closed  without  any  de 
cisive  results.  The  infantry,  unsustained  by  either  cav- 


1  Letter  of  an  officer  in  the  New  York  Courier 


CONTRERAS    OCCUPIED.  249 

airy  or  artillery,  could  not  charge  in  column  without  being 
mowed  down  by  the  Mexican  batteries,  nor  in  line,  with 
out  being  successfully  assailed  by  the  Mexican  cavalry.1 
To  cut  off  the  junction  of  further  reinforcements  from  the 
capital  (which  till  now  arrived  at  will)  the  general-in- 
chief  determined  to  occupy  the  hamlet  and  church  of 
Contreras,  on  the  road  leading  from  the  capital  to  Va 
lencia's  camp.  Cadwallader's  brigade,  already  advanced 
in  that  direction,  had  taken  position,  and  needed  assist 
ance.  The  14th  regiment  of  infantry,  Colonel  Morgan, 
was  then  ordered  by  Scott  to  occupy  the  hamlet,  and  a 
few  minutes  later  they  were  followed  by  the  New  York 
and  South  Carolina  volunteers,  composing  the  brigade  of 
General  Shields.  These  troops  made  their  way  through 
a  dense  forest  to  the  left  of  the  road  at  Contreras,  (east 
side,)  and  in  the  night  took  post  in  the  hamlet  on  the  road. 
In  the  mean  time  the  brigades  of  Smith  and  Riley  had 
advanced  still  further,  and  taken  post  in  rear  and  flank  of 
the  enemy's  post  at  Contreras. 

It  was  determined  by  Scott  to  make  a  diversion  in  the 
morning,  or  earlier,  if  practicable,  in  front  of  Fort  Con 
treras,  while  the  brigades  of  Smith  and  Riley  should  at 
tack,  and  Shields  should  cut  off  the  advance  of  reinforce 
ments,  or  the  retreat  of  the  defeated  through  the  hamlet 
on  the  road.  This  purpose  was  carried  out. 

General  Persifer  F.  Smith  of  Twiggs'  division  was  first 
on  the  ground,  and  had  the  merit  of  making  the  imme 
diate  dispositions  for  the  battle  of  the  following  morning. 
They  were  made  with  skill  and  judgment,  drawing  from 


Scott's  Official  Report. 


250  POSITION    OF    CONTRERAS. 

the  commander-in-chief  the  warmest  praise,  and  from  the 
army  universal  admiration.  The  close  of  the  19th  was, 
to  the  troops  immediately  engaged,  neither  pleasant  nor 
inspiring.  They  closed  a  severe  action  without  decisive 
results.  The  rifle  regiment,  with  the  1st  artillery  and  3d 
infantry,  (engaged  in  front  with  the  enemy,)  marched  to 
their  new  positions  through  chapporal  and  cactus,  tired, 
hungry,  and  sorrowful.1  In  the  evening  they  marched 
into  the  little  hamlet,  and  there  spent  the  night,  with  the 
brigade  of  Riley  in  the  same  road.  Shields'  brigade  was 
in  an  orchard  near  by,  and  Cadwallader  nearer  the  enemy. 
The  night  was  cold,  wet,  and  dreary.  An  officer  of  the 
rifles  thus  describes  it  .2 

"  As  we  were  within  reach  of  their  batteries,  which 
could  enfilade  the  road  in  which  we  lay,  we  built  a  stone 
breastwork  at  either  end  to  conceal  ourselves  from  their 
view  and  grape.  There  we  were,  completely  surrounded 
by  the  enemy,  cut  off  from  our  communications,  ignorant 
of  the  ground,  without  artillery,  weary,  dispirited,  and  de 
jected — we  were  a  disheartened  set.  With  Santa  Anna 
and  Salas'  promise  of  '  no  quarter,'  a  force  of  four  to  one 
against  us,  and  one  half  defeated  already,  no  succor  from 
Puebla  and  no  news  from  Scott,3  all  seemed  dark.  Sud 
denly  the  words  came  whispered  along,  '  We  storm  at 
midnight  /'  Now  we  were  ourselves  again. 

"  But  what  a  horrible  night !  There  we  lay — too  tired 
to  eat,  too  wet  to  sleep — in  the  middle  of  that  muddy 


1  Letter  from  an  officer  in  the  New  York  Courier. 
8  From  the  same. 

*  Scott  was,  till  after  dark,  in  a  position  opposite  the  enemy's  centre. 
He  then  retired  to  San  Augustine  and  wrote  the  despatch  of  the  day. 


POSITION    OF    CONTRERAS.  251 

road,  officers  and  men  side  by  side,  with  a  heavy  rain 
pouring  down  upon  us — the  officers  without  blankets  or 
overcoats,  (they  had  lost  them  in  coming  across,)  and  the 
men  worn  out  with  fatigue.  About  midnight,  the  rain 
was  so  heavy  that  the  streams  in  the  road  flooded  us  ; 
and  there  we  stood,  crowded  together,  drenched  and  be 
numbed,  waiting  till  daylight." 

The  darkness  and  heavy  rain  impeded  the  troops,  and 
rendered  the  transmission  of  orders1  so  difficult,  that  the 
attack  on  the  enemy  which  had  been  planned  for  the  dawn 
of  day  did  not  commence  till  a  later  hour.  About  four 
o'clock  the  troops  of  Riley  and  Smith,  which  had  occu 
pied  the  hamlet  and  road  during  the  night,  defiled  into 
their  position  in  rear  of  the  enemy,  by  a  ravine  covered 
by  orchards  and  corn-fields.  The  nature  of  the  ground 
facilitated  this  operation.  The  batteries  and  intrenched 
camp  of  Valencia  were  on  the  side  of  a  hill,  towards  the 
east  or  southeast,  so  as  to  command  the  road,  it  being  the 
great  object  to  defend  the  roads  which  led  to  the  city. 
The  volcanic  and  rocky  formation  here  made  several  little 
eminences,  with  ravines  between.  In  this  instance  there 
were  other  eminences  in  the  rear  still  higher.  The  brigade 
of  Riley  passed  through  an  orchard  into  the  ravine  behind 
Valencia,  so  as  to  be  out  of  sight  of  Valencia's  corps,  and 
yet  occupy  a  position  near  to  him,  in  his  rear.  The  bri 
gade  of  Smith  followed.  That  of  Cadwallader  had  already 
taken  position  in  rear  of  these,  as  a  support,  while  Shields' 
was  held  in  reserve — taking  the  place  of  Smith's  men,  in 


1  Scott  had  sent  seven  officers  out  for  information  that  evening,  of  which 
not  one  got  through.  Captain  Lee,  alone,  with  a  message  from  Shields, 
was  able  to  get  through. 


252  POSITION    OF    CONTRERAS. 

the  village  of  Contreras,  and  undertaking  to  hold  that 
against  the  approach  of  the  Mexican  main  army  from  the 
city,1  or,  in  case  Valencia  was  defeated,  to  cut  off  his  re 
treat  to  the  city.  He  was  accompanied  also  by  the  13th 
regiment  under  Colonel  Morgan.  In  the  mean  time,  a 
diversion  (at  General  Smith's  request)  had  been  intended, 
by  the  advance  in  front  of  one  of  Worth's  brigades  and 
one  of  Quitman's,  leaving  San  Augustine  (the  general 
depot)  to  be  garrisoned  by  Harney's  dragoons.  This 
movement,  however,  occurred  too  late  to  affect  the  en 
gagement.2 

These  movements  were  made,  and  the  action  ready  to 
begin,  at  about  six  A.  M.  It  appears  that  the  march  of 
the  American  troops  in  the  night,  and  preparatory  to  the 
engagement,  was  altogether  unknown  to  the  Mexicans, 
whose  attention  was  chiefly  directed  to  an  attack  in  front. 
The  action  of  the  afternoon  of  the  19th,  in  which  the 
Americans  had  made  no  impression,  inspired  them  with 
an  idea  that  they  might  be  victorious ;  and  as  the  evening 
had  come  on  leaving  the  Americans  in  front,  they  had  the 
belief  that  the  attack  would  be  in  front  or  along  the  line 
of  the  road.  Here  we  may  remark,  that  the  idea  of  rapid 
night  movements,  with  a  view  to  turn  positions  or  make 
surprises  by  skill  and  energy,  seems  not  to  be  at  all  fa 
miliar  to  the  Mexican  generals.  Had  it  been,  why  did 
they  not  discover,  and  endeavor  to  prevent  the  execution 
and  use  of  the  new  road  made  round  the  heights  of  Cerro 
Gordo  ?  Why  did  they  not  throw  their  troops  into,  and 
defend  the  narrow  pass,  between  mountain  and  water, 


1  See  Official  Report.  8  See  Scott's  Official  Report 


POSITION    OF    THE    ARMIES.  253 

round  the  south  end  of  Lake  Chalco?  And  why,  now, 
with  twenty  thousand  men  in  sight,  did  they  not  watch 
and  defend  the  space  between  Valencia's  batteries,  and 
the  road  and  hamlet  occupied  on  the  night  of  the  19th  by 
the  brigades  of  Riley  and  Smith  ?  They  did  not,  and 
lost  the  battle  (stratagetically  considered)  on  that  account. 
Let  us  now  review  the  exact  position  of  the  two  armies 
on  the  morning  of  the  20th — and  which,  all  other  things 
being  equal,  decided  their  fate — as  to  the  position  of  Con- 
treras.  First,  we  observe,  that  the  road  leading  by  the 
heights  of  Contreras,  goes  to  Mexico  through  San  Angel. 
At  the  last  place  a  road  branches  off,  rather  southeast,  by 
Coyhoacan,  to  the  San  Antonia  road  at  Churubusco.  Al 
the  last  place,  and  very  near  the  junction  of  the  roads,  the 
San  Antonia  road  crosses  a  little  stream,  or  canal,  called 
Churubusco  River.  At  this  point,  covering  the  crossing, 
is  a  regular  fortification,  called  Tete  du  Pont,  or  Bridge 
head.  This  is  connected  with  a  church  or  convent,  in 
the  hamlet  of  Churubusco,  by  defences.  Churubusco  is 
approached,  then,  on  the  south  and  west,  by  two  roads 
only ;  one  from  San  Angel,  through  Coyhoacan ;  the 
other  from  San  Antonia.  Now  the  reader  will  mark  that 
the  Mexican  positions  were  these  :  1st.  Valencia,  with  the 
division  of  the  north,  composed  of  about  six  thousand 
men,  occupied  the  batteries  and  hill-side  on  the  height  of 
Contreras.  This  was  a  battery  mounted  with  heavy 
pieces.  The  object  of  this  defence  was  to  command  the 
road,  which  was  a  good  one,  from  here  to  Mexico.  2d. 
At  about  two  miles  from  this  work,  and  parallel  with  the 
same  road,  lay  the  main  body  of  the  Mexican  army,  un 
der  Santa  Anna,  supposed  to-be  about  twelve  thousand 
men.  A  reference  to  the  map  of  the  ground  will  show> 
w 


254  POSITION    OF    THE    ARMIES 

that  this  was  a  position  well  adapted  to  reinforce  either 
Contreras  upon  one  road,  or  Churubusco  on  the  other. 
3d.  General  Rincon,  with  the  regiments  of  Bravo  and 
Independencia,  occupied  the  church  and  tete  du  pont, 
at  Churubusco.1  4th.  San  Antonia,  which  had  first  ar 
rested  the  march  of  Worth's  division  in  this  direction,  was 
likewise  garrisoned  and  fortified.  In  all  these  positions, 
taken  in  the  aggregate,  the  Mexican  forces  amounted  to 
about  twenty-five  thousand  men.  All  of  them  were 
strong  positions  when  skilfully  and  energetically  defended. 
It  is  very  evident,  however,  that  if  Contreras  were  taken, 
San  Antonia  would  be  turned  and  rendered  useless. 
Churubusco  then  might  be  attacked  without  touching 
Antonia.  The  enemy  must  then  concentrate  his  defence 
at  the  tete  du  pont  of  Churubusco.  This  actually  took 
place. 

The  American  positions  we  have  already  detailed. 
The  object  of  Scott  was  first  to  force  the  fortifications  of 
Contreras,  and  thus  command  the  read  through  San  An 
gel,  and  then  to  carry  Churubusco,  when  the  main  road 
would  be  open  to  the  city  of  Mexico.  For  this  purpose, 
the  brigades  under  the  command  of  General  P.  F.  Smith 
were  detached  to  surround,  if  possible,  the  height  of  Con 
treras  ;  Shields  to  support  and  hold  the  road  ;  Worth  to 
check  Antonia  and  divert  in  front ;  while  Quitman  gar 
risoned  the  depot  of  San  Augustine.  The  immediate  ar 
rangements  and  command  at  Contreras  devolved  upon 
General  Smith,  who  most  ably  carried  out  the  views  of 
the  commander-in-chief.  The  nature  of  the  ground  and 


1  General  Riucon's  Official  Report. 


STORMING  OF  CONTRERAS.  255 

the  negligence  of  the  Mexicans  favored  our  troops  in  ta 
king  their  respective  places.  We  have  seen  that  the 
brigades  of  Riley,  Cadwallader,  and  Smith,  each  took 
their  position  in  rear  of  the  enemy,  with  only  the  crest  of 
a  hill  between.  Shields'  position  in  the  hamlet  was  such, 
that  he  was  able  on  one  hand  to  cut  off  or  check  rein 
forcements,  and  on  the  other  to  intercept  the  retreat  of 
Valencia.  In  fact,  the  Americans  had  cut  the  line  of  the 
Mexican  defence,  and  were  thus  able  to  attack  their  posts 
and  divisions  in  detail.  This  was  done. 

At  six  A.  M.  the  arrangements  for  battle  were  all  made. 
The  place  and  course  of  Riley's  brigade  was  given  by 
Lieutenant  Tower,  of  the  engineers.  In  the  same  man 
ner,  that  of  Cadwallader  was  pointed  out  by  Lieutenants 
Beauregard  and  Brooks  ;  while  Captain  Lee  directed  the 
course  of  the  column  under  Colonel  Ransom.1  All  these 
officers  had  reconnoitred  the  enemy's  camp  and  forces. 

When  the  word  was  given,  our  men  sprung  up  in  rear 
and  on  both  flanks  of  the  astonished  Mexicans,  rushed 
over  the  crest  of  the  hill,  and  dashed  pell-mell  into  the 
intrenchrnents  !  Nothing  could  resist  them  :  the  batteries 
were  taken ;  the  army  of  Valencia  driven  out  in  utter 
rout ;  and  its  flying  remnants  pursued  on  the  road  to  Mex 
ico  !  So  admirable  were  the  dispositions,  and  so  impul 
sively  energetic,  that  the  battle  was  ended  almost  as  soon 
as  begun.  The  actual  conflict  lasted  but  seventeen  min 
utes  !  The  pursuit  was  for  hours.  The  results  were 
gigantic. 

Of  the  scene  during  the  battle,  and  the  fierce  ardor 


Scott's  Official  Report,  (No.  32.) 


256  STORMING    OF    CONTKERAS. 

which  impelled  the  American1  troops,  we  take  a  descrip 
tion  from  the  same  graphic  writer  whom  we  have  before 
quoted.  "  At  last,  just  at  daylight,  General  SMITH  slowly 
walking  up,  asked  if  all  was  ready.  A  look  answered 
him.  '  Men,  forward  /'  and  we  did  '  forward.'  Spring- 
nig  up  at  once,  Riley's  brigade  opened,  when  the  crack  of 
a  hundred  rifles  started  the  Mexicans  from  their  astonish 
ment,  and  they  opened  their  fire.  Useless  fire — for  we 
were  so  close  that  they  overshot  us,  and  before  they  could 
turn  their  pieces  on  us  we  were  on  them.  Then  such 
cheers  arose  as  you  never  heard.  The  men  rushed 
forward  like  demons,  yelling  and  firing  the  while.  The 
carnage  was  frightful,  and  though  they  fired  sharply,  it  was 
of  no  use.  The  earthen  parapet  was  cleared  in  an  in 
stant,  and  the  blows  of  the  stocks  could  be  plainly  heard, 
mingled  with  the  yells  and  groans  around.  Just  before 
the  charge  was  made,  a  large  body  of  lancers  came  wind 
ing  up  the  road,  looking  most  splendidly  in  their  brilliant 
uniforms.  They  never  got  to  the  work,  but  turned  and 
lied.2  In  an  instant  all  was  one  mass  of  confusion,  each 


1  The  Mexicans  uniformly,  in  their  reports  and  letters,  speak  of  the  peo 
ple  of  the  United  States  of  the  north,  as  "  Americans,"  although  they  are 
themselves  just  as  much  "  Americans."  This  settles  the  question,  whether 
the  people  of  the  United  States  have  a  name. 

8  This  dastardly  conduct  of  the  Mexican  cavalry  is  thus  spoken  of  in 
the  Official  Report  of  General  Salas,  which  corresponds  hi  this  respect 
with  the  above  account : 

"  As  soon  as  I  observed  the  dispersion  of  our  forces,  I  endeavored  to 
check  it.  Crying  '  Victory  to  Mexico !'  and  sounding  the  signal  of  attack, 
I  succeeded  in  rallying  our  troops,  and  ordered  General  Anastasia  Torre- 
jon  to  make  a  charge  with  his  cavalry  ;  but  this  chief,  far  from  obeying 
my  orders,  rled  like  a  coward,  and  the  cavalry  following  his  example, 


STORMING    OF    CONTRERAS.  257 

trying  to  be  foremost  in  the  flight.  The  road  was  literally 
blocked  up,  and  while  many  perished  by  their  own  guns, 
it  was  almost  impossible  to  fire  on  the  mass  from  the  dan 
ger  of  killing  our  own  men.  Some  fled  up  the  ravine  on 
the  left,  or  on  the  right,  and  many  of  these  were  slain  by 
turning  their  own  guns  on  them.  Towards  the  city,  the 
rifles  and  2d  infantry  led  off  the  pursuit.  Seeing  that  a 
large  crowd  of  fugitives  were  jammed  up  in  a  pass  in  the 
road,  some  of  the  men  ran  through  the  corn-field,  and  by 
thus  heading  them  off  and  firing  down  upon  them,  about 
thirty  men  took  over  five  hundred  prisoners,  nearly  a  hun 
dred  of  them  officers."1 

In  the  mean  time,  the  enemy  (who  previous  to  the  as 
sault  were  ignorant  of  the  American  forces  in  the  ravine) 
had  commenced  a  heavy  fire  on  Shields'  brigade  in  the 
hamlet.  This,  however,  ceased  when  the  charge  was 
made  by  Riley.  Shields  then  ordered  his  brigade,  com 
posed  of  the  New  York  and  South  Carolina  regiments, 
into  the  road,  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  such  of  Valencia's 
corps  as  passed  that  way.  In  this  they  succeeded.  Large 
parties  of  the  enemy  were  met  by  the  fire  of  these  regi 
ments,  and  either  scattered  through  the  fields  or  made 
prisoners.  At  this  point  on  the  road  three  hundred  and 
sixty-five  were  taken,  of  whom  twenty-five  were  officers, 
and  among  the  latter  was  General  Nicholas  Mendoza.2 

The  victory  of  CONTRERASS  was  brilliant  and  decisive. 


trampled  down  the  infantry  in  tljeir  flight,  and  completed  our  defeat."— 
S ALAS'  Official  Report,  August  28th,  1847. 

1  Letter  of  an  officer  in  the  New  York  Courier. 

2  Official  Report  of  General  Shields. 

3  Official  Report  of  General  Scott. 

w2  17 


258  RESULTS    OF    THE    VICTORY. 

The  aggregate  loss  of  the  enemy  was  seven  hundred 
killed,  about  one  thousand  wounded,  eight  hundred  and 
thirteen  prisoners,  of  whom  eighty-eight  were  officers, 
(including  four  generals,)  twenty-two  pieces  of  brass  can 
non,  seven  hundred  pack-mules,  and  an  immense  number 
of  small-arms,  shot,  shells,  and  ammunition.  But  the 
most  important  loss,  to  an  experienced  military  eye,  was 
that  of  one  of  the  strong  positions  by  which  the  roads  to 
Mexico  were  commanded,  and  in  consequence  of  which 
San  Antonia  was  turned,  and  Churubusco  attacked  in 
flank.  It  was  only  two  miles  from  the  point  where 
Shields  captured  Mendoza  to  San  Angel,  and  but  three 
miles  (by  good  roads)  from  the  last  point  (by  Coyhoacan) 
to  Churubusco.  On  these  roads  the  American  troops 
rushed  in  pursuit  of  the  flying  enemy,  till  they  united 
with  Worth's  corps  in  the  storm  of  the  church  and  tete 
du  pont  at  the  last  place. 

Among  the  generals  taken,  were  SALAS,  MENDOZA, 
GARCIA,  and  GUADALUPE.  The  two  former  appear  to 
have  been  men  of  talent,  while  of  General  Valencia,  their 
commander,  nothing  was  then  heard  ;  and  he  seems  to 
have  been  either  wanting  in  skill  and  courage,  or  to  have 
been  so  overwhelmed  with  his  misfortune,  as  to  be  un 
willing  to  make  his  appearance.1  By  a  private  corre 
spondence2  between  him  and  Santa  Anna,  it  seems  that 
the  latter  had  directed  him,  on  the  17th  or  18th,  (previous 
to  the  arrival  of  the  army  in  front  of  the  fortifications,)  to 
abandon  his  post  at  San  Angel,  (probably  the  fortification,) 


1  Official  Report  of  General  Salas. 

*  Private  intercepted  correspondence  between  Valencia  and  Santa  Anna, 
dated  the  18th  and  19th  of  August.  * 


PLEASING    INCIDENT.  259 

which  Valencia,  on  the  1 8th,  gave  reasons  why  he  should 
not  obey  ;  and  on  the  19th  Santa  Anna  yields,  but  doubts 
the  propriety  of  Valencia  maintaining  his  post.  Both  ap 
pear  to  have  been  wrong  in  a  military  point  of  view.  The 
heights  of  Contreras  were  a  proper  point  to  defend,  but 
batteries  should  have  been  placed  on  two  or  three  ether 
eminences  ;  and,  above  all,  the  commander  should  never 
have  allowed  a  storming  party  to  get  into  a  ravine,  within 
gunshot,  without  being  known.  Such  a  fact  argues  gross 
negligence. 

One  of  the  striking  events  of  the  day,  was  the  recap 
ture  of  the  identical  pieces  of  artillery  taken  at  Buena 
Vista  by  the  Mexicans.  This  circumstance  is  thus  related 
by  the  commander-in-chief  i1 

"  One  of  the  most  pleasing  incidents  of  the  victory  is 
the  recapture,  in  the  works,  by  Captain  Drum,  4th  artil 
lery,  under  Major  Gardner,  of  the  two  brass  six-pounders, 
taken  from  another  company  of  the  same  regiment,  though 
without  the  loss  of  honor,  at  the  glorious  battle  of  Buena 
Vista,  about  which  guns  the  whole  regiment  had  mourned 
for  so  many  months.  Coming  up,  a  little  later,  I  had  the 
happiness  to  join  in  the  protracted  cheers  of  the  gallant 
4th,  on  the  joyous  event ;  and,  indeed,  the  whole  army 
sympathizes  in  its  just  pride  and  exultation."2 


1  General  Scott's  Official  Report. 

8  In  connection  with  this  circumstance,  it  is  proper  to  say  that  Captain 
O'Brien,  who  commanded  the  battery  to  which  these  guns  were  attached 
at  Buena  Vista,  requested  a  court  of  inquiry,  which  was  held  in  March, 
1847.  The  court  found  the  fact,  that  he  was  the  last  man  who  left  the 
pieces,  the  others  having  been  all  killed  and  wounded.  Their  opinion  was 
thus  given : 


260  STRENGTH    OF    THE    ARMIES. 

The  strength  of  the  two  armies  in  this  engagement, 
may  be  thus  stated.  Including  the  brigade  of  Shields, 
placed  in  the  hamlet,  and  which  we  have  shown  to  have 
done  most  effective  service,  the  American  troops  amounted 
to  about  four  thousand  five  hundred ;  while  the  corps  of 
Valencia  and  Mendoza  were  seven  thousand,  and  at  least 
twelve  thousand  were  on  the  same  road.  If  we  deduct 
Shields'  brigade,  as  keeping  in  check  the  main  body  of 
Mexicans,  it  is  probable  the  actual  battle  was  fought  by 
three  thousand  five  hundred  on  our  side,  against  seven 
thousand  Mexicans  in  fortified  intrenchments.  The  dis 
crepancy  in  numbers  was  not  so  great  as  in  some  other 
actians  ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  military  dispositions 
were  admirable,  and  the  battle  was  won  before  it  was 
fought. 

We  must  now  follow  the  army  in  its  bloody  march 
through  and  over  the  intrenchments  of  Churubusco.  At 
8  A.  M.,  or  two  hours  from  its  commencement,  the  fight 
of  Contreras  may  be  said  to  have  been  completed  ;  the 


OPINION. 

"  The  court  is  unanimously  of  the  opinion  that  the  conduct  of  Captain 
O'Brien,  during  the  whole  time,  was  bold  and  intrepid,  and  deserving  of 
the  highest  commendation.  The  firm  stand  made  by  him  in  the  after 
noon,  by  which  he  sacrificed  his  whole  section,  contributed  largely  to  the 
success  of  the  day,  if  it  did  not  save  us  from  disaster." 

II.  The  proceedings  of  the  court,  in  the  above  case,  having  been  sub 
mitted  to  and  examined  by  the  commanding  general,  are  by  him  fully  ap 
proved. 

III.  The  court  of  inquiry,  of  which  Brevet  Colonel  W.  G.  Belknap,  8th 
infantry,  is  president,  is  hereby  dissolved. 

By  order  of  Maj.  Gen.  Taylor. 
(Signed)  W.  VV.  S.  BLISS,  Asst.  Adjt  Gen 


POSITION    OF    CHURUBUSCO.  261 

greater  part  of  the  time  being  occupied  in  pursuit  of  the 
broken  and  scattered  remnants  of  Valencia's  division — 
Valencia  himself  having  disappeared. 

Churubusco  is  really  about  four  miles  from  the  heights 
of  Contreras,  in  a  direct  line  east ;  but  the  road  goes 
northeast  to  San  Angel,  and  then  forks  southeast,  so 
that  the  distance  by  the  road  is  about  six  miles.  This 
point  was  defended  by  General  Rincon,  (as  we  have 
before  said,)  with  the  regiments  of  Independencia  and 
Bravo — reinforced  largely  on  the  morning  of  the  20th.1 
The  retreating  bodies  of  men,  who  had  occupied  An- 
tonia,  and  the  fragments  left  from  Contreras,  were  con 
centrated  in  and  about  Churubusco,  where  they  ar 
rived  but  little  before  the  advancing  and  attacking  regi 
ments  of  Scott.  That  morning,  the  commander  of 
artillery,  Don  Martin  Correra,  arrived,  bringing  six 
pieces  of  cannon,  which  were  placed  in  battery  on  the 
road  to  Coyhoacan,  and  in  the  centre  of  a  field-work, 
erected  around  the  hacienda,  which  was  at  the  com 
mencement  of  the  causeway  leading  to  the  western  gate 
of  the  city,  and  had  to  be  passed  before  getting  on  the 
road.  This  hacienda  consisted  of  an  enclosure  of  stone 
walls — inside  of  which,  was  a  stone  building  higher  than 
these  walls  ;  and  above  all,  a  stone  church,  higher  than 
the  rest.  The  outside  walls  were  pierced  with  two 
ranges  of  embrasures,  and  high  enough  to  command  the 
surrounding  country,  and  fire  plungingly  upon  those  ap 
proaching  to  the  assault.2  The  church  and  the  hacienda 
were  surrounded  by  this  outside  field-work.  About 


1  General  Rincon's  Official  Despatch,  dated  August  26th. 
9  Letter  of  an  officer,  in  the  New  York  Courier. 


262  DESCRIPTION    OF    CHURUBUSCO. 

three  hundred  yards  in  the  rear,  and  a  little  to  the  east, 
was  the  tete  du  pont,  at  the  intersection  of  the  cause 
way,  or  principal  road  with  a  canal  or  river.  By  passing 
along  the  causeway,  the  church  and  field-work  would 
be  left  a  little  on  the  west  side,  and  the  troops  would  be 
first  arrested  by  the  tete  du  pont.  This  was  the  case 
with  Worth's  division. 

On  the  morning  of  the  20th,  about  8  A.  M.,  when  it  was 
fully  ascertained  that  the  enemy  (now  defeated  at  Con 
treras)  was  in  full  retreat  towards  the  great  causeway 
road  from  San  Antonia  to  Mexico,  the  two  brigades  (one 
of  Worth's  and  one  of  Quitman's)  which  had  been  or 
dered  to  make  a  diversion  in  front  of  Contreras,  were  or 
dered  back  to  their  respective  divisions.  Quitman  was 
directed  with  his  remaining  brigade  (Shields'  being  now 
under  the  direction  of  General  Twiggs,  on  the  road  from 
San  Angel)  to  garrison  San  Augustine,  the  general  depot 
of  the  army,  and  the  loss  of  which  could  not  be  risked.1 
The  division  of  Worth  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  the 
attack  of  San  Antonia,  and  when  that  was  carried,  to 
march  on  and  rejoin  the  other  divisions  in  the  attack  of 
the  defences  of  Churubusco.  Accordingly,  the  brigades 
of  Clarke  and  Garland  (Worth's)  proceeded  to  the  at 
tack  of  Antonia.  This  post,  left  unsupported  by  the  line 
of  troops,  now  driven  from  Contreras,  and  with  com 
paratively  open  ground  about  it,  could  be  turned.  Ac 
cordingly,  Colonel  Clarke's  brigade,  conducted  by  Cap 
tain  Mason  of  the  engineers,  and  Lieutenant  Hardcastle 
of  the  topographical  corps,  turned  the  enemy's  right, 
by  a  sweep  to  the  left,  and  came  out  on  the  high  road 

1  Scott's  Official  Report,  No.  32,  August  28th. 


X 

ATTACK    ON    CHURUBUSCO.  263 

to  Mexico.  In  the  mean  time,  the  garrison  had  retreated, 
and  were  now  cut  in  the  centre  by  the  advancing  column 
of  Clarke.  One-half  were  driven  off  towards  the  east, 
and  the  other  part  on  the  causeway  towards  Churubusco. 
The  brigade  of  Garland  advancing  in  front,  now  oc 
cupied  the  evacuated  hamlet — capturing  the  artillery  in 
its  batteries.  These  brigades  were  soon  united,  and 
rushed  on  in  hot  pursuit.1 

The  grand  movement  of  the  day  now  commenced — 
the  march  of  the  united  army  (Quitman's  2d  brigade  ex- 
cepted)  on  the  fortified  post  of  Churubusco.  This  was 
made  in  two  columns — the  division  of  Worth  from  San 
Antonia  in  front,  and  the  divisions  of  Twiggs  and  Pillow, 
with  the  brigade  of  Shields  from  Coyhoacan ;  to  which 
point  they  had  pursued  the  remains  of  the  Mexican 
army, — routed  at  Contreras,  and  followed  through  San 
Angel.  This  naturally  resolved  the  battle  into  two  dis 
tinct  actions  on  the  same  field,  and  so  clearly  connected, 
as  to  be  within  half  cannon-shot  at  the  centres  of  contest. 
These  were  respectively,  the  tete  du  pont,  attacked  by 
the  first  column  under  Worth,  and  the  fortified  church 
and  hacienda,  attacked  by  the  column  of  Twiggs  and 
Pillow.  Let  us  first  follow  Worth's  attack. 

It  had  got  to  be  about  1  P.  M.,  when  the  different  di 
visions  from  the  south  and  west  were  united,  not  in  line, 
(nor  together,)  but  within  the  same  circuit  of  attack.2 
At  the  same  time,  the  garrisons  of  Churubusco,  (strongly 
reinforced,)  the  brigade  of  Perez,  at  Portalis,  the  broken 
corps  from  San  Angel,  and  the  principal  divisions  of 


1  Scott's  Official  Report. 

8  Letter  in  the  New  York  Courier 


264  BATTLE    OF    CHURUBUSCO. 

Santa  Anna's  army  were  all  prepared  for  battle,  having 
concentrated  in  and  about  Churubusco.  The  division 
of  Twiggs  had  commenced  the  attack  on  the  fortified 
church  about  an  hour,  amidst  an  incessant  roll  of  fire, 
when  Worth,  with  Cadwallader's  brigade,  (Pillow's  di 
vision,)  commenced  manoeuvring  on  the  tete  du  pont. 
The  other  fortification  attacked  by  Twiggs,  was  just  half- 
gunshot  to  the  left,  and  but  for  the  attack  on  it,  would 
have  poured  a  destructive  fire  on  Worth.  Both  were 
attacked  simultaneously — and  thus  the  fire  of  Pablo  de 
Churubusco  was  in  a  measure  diverted.  The  brigade 
of  Colonel  Garland,  with  Smith's  light  battalion,  moved 
along  a  little  to  the  right  of  the  road,  directly  up  to  the 
tete  du  pont.  They  advanced  under  the  fire  of  a  long 
line  of  infantry.  Clarke's  brigade  marched  at  the  same 
time,  directly  on  the  road;  and  this  again  was  supported 
by  the  llth  and  14th  regiments,  (Cadwallader's,)  and  the 
whole  moved  steadily  up  under  a  tremendous  discharge 
of  both  small-arms  and  cannon.  Most  of  these  corps, 
advancing  perpendicularly,  suffered  greatly  from  the  fire 
of  batteries  at  the  bridge-head.1  At  length,  the  line  in 
front  of  Garland's  column  gave  way,  and  made  a  rapid 
retreat  to  Mexico.  The  tete  du  pont  was  reached  by 
Clarke's — its  deep  ditch  was  crossed  by  the  5th  and  8th 
infantry — tlie  parapets  stormed — and  one  of  the  most 
formidable  defences  of  Mexico  crowned  by  its  capture, 
the  third  action  of  the  memorable  20th  of  August. 

In  the  meanwhile,  a  yet  more  active,  bloody,  and 
eventful  action  took  place  to  the  left  of  Worth's  line,  in 
the  attack  on  what  may  be  called  the  Citadel  of  Churu- 

1  Scott's  Official  Report. 


BATTLE    OF    CHURUBUSCO.  265 

busco,  the  fortification  at  the  hacienda,  before  described. 
Scott,  who  on  the  19th  had  been  posted  on  an  eminence 
in  front  of  Contreras,  and  on  that  night  gave  directions 
for  the  early  storm  of  Contreras — had  this  morning  given 
(amidst  the  trophies  of  the  field)  his  orders  for  the 
forward  movement  of  Worth,  and  now  (in  the  forenoon) 
joined  General  Pillow's  division  in  its  march  to  Coy- 
hoacan.  Here,  just  one  mile  west  of  Churubusco,  at  a 
point  made  convenient  by  several  cross-roads,  he  made 
the  arrangements  for  the  day.  Cadwallader's  brigade 
was  detached  (as  we  have  seen)  to  reinforce  Worth  at 
Antonia.  Twiggs's  division  was  ordered  (except  the 
rifles)  to  attack  the  citadel,  San  Pablo,  in  front.  Pierce's 
brigade  first,  and  soon  after  Shields',  were  directed  to 
take  a  road  which  led  to  the  rear  of  Churubusco,  to 
divert  the  troops  under  Santa  Anna,  and  threaten  his 
right  and  rear ;  with  a  view  also,  should  the  attack  in 
front  succeed,  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  Mexican  forces 
to  the  city.  General  Shields  commanded  this  corps, 
which  was  directed  in  its  course  by  Captain  Lee,  of  the 
engineers.1  These  dispositions  were  rapidly  made,  and 
as  quickly  executed.  The  troops  moved  regularly  and 
gallantly  into  their  places,  and  the  battle  of  Churubusco 
was  commenced,  which,  for  three  hours  was  vigorously 
maintained  amidst  the  raging  of  all  the  elements,  which 
mingle  their  terrible  voices  and  their  crimson  banners  on 
the  battle-field.  The  veteran  regiments  of  Smith  and 
Riley  quailed  not  amidst  the  whirlwind  of  fire,  and  the 
storm  of  balls  which  rolled  from  the  well-directed  guns 
of  San  Pablo  in  front ;  while  far  to  the  left,  the  gallant 

1  Scott's  Official  Report 


266  BATTLE    OF    CHURUBUSCO. 

volunteers  of  Carolina  and  New  York,  were  rapidly 
filling  their  untimely,  though  glorious  graves  !  Here, 
the  Mexican  general,  Rincon,  ably  defended  his  post. 
There,  the  masses  of  Santa  Anna  poured  themselves  on 
the  division  of  Shields  !  A  lurid  canopy  of  sulphurous 
smoke  rose  over  the  heads  of  the  combatants,  and,  far 
over  the  ancient  plains  of  Mexico,  rolled  the  roar  of 
cannon  and  the  crash  of  arms — that  awful  music,  which 
makes  the  song  of  battle,  the  prelude  of  death,  and  the 
voice  of  angry  nations.  One  might  imagine  the  fierce 
spirit  of  Guatimozin  hovering  exultant  over  the  plain, 
where  the  Celt  and  the  Saxon,  the  enemies  of  his  race, 
poured  out  in  mortal  conflict,  (as  if  in  just  retribution,) 
their  blood  and  their  lives,  over  the  graves  of  his  fathers. 
In  the  centre  of  the  batteries  of  San  Pablo  was  placed 
the  company  of  St.  Patrick's,  formed  out  of  deserters  from 
the  American  army.1  These  men  fought  desperately  and 
skilfully,  causing  the  deaths  of  many  of  the  assailants,  and 
delaying  the  capture  of  the  post.  An  officer  of  the  rifles 
thus  describes  the  scene  :2  "  The  firing  was  most  tremen 
dous  ;  in  fact,  one  continued  roll  while  the  combat  lasted. 
The  enemy,  from  their  elevated  position,  could  readily  see 
our  men,  who  were  unable  to  get  a  clear  view  from  their 
position.  Three  of  the  pieces  were  manned  by  the  '  de- 
serters]  a  body  of  about  one  hundred  who  had  deserted 
from  the  ranks  of  our  army  during  the  war.  They  were 
enrolled  in  two  companies,  commanded  by  a  deserter,3 


1  Report  of  General  Rincon,  who  says  that  the  battalion  of  Bravo  and 
the  companies  of  St.  Patrick  were  stationed  in  the  front  batteries. 
8  Letter  in  the  New  York  Courier. 
*  This  man's  name  is  Thomas  Riley,  a  deserter  from  the  3d  infantry. 


BATTLE    OF    CHURUBUSCO.  .267 

and  were  better  uniformed  and  disciplined  than  the  rest 
of  the  army.  These  men  fought  most  desperately  ;  and 
are  said  not  only  to  have  shot  down  several  of  our  officers 
whom  they  knew,  but  to  have  pulled  down  the  white  flag 
of  surrender  no  less  than  three  times." 

It  was  now  two  hours  and  a  half  from  the  commence 
ment  of  the  battle  by  the  division  of  Twiggs,  when  the 
tete  du  pont  gave  way  before  the  storming  parties  of 
Worth.  The  enemy  were  driven  out  at  the  point  of  the 
bayonet,  and  the  larger  part  of  Worth's  and  Pillow's  divis 
ions  crossed  the  bridge  and  followed  in  vigorous  pursuit. 
Captain  Larkin  Smith  and  Lieutenant  Snelling  of  the  8th 
infantry,  however,  seized  upon  a  field-piece  and  fired 
upon  the  church,  or  citadel.  The  furious  battle  at  that 
point  still  continued  ;  but  in  half  an  hour  more — just 
three  hours  from  the  commencement — the  citadel  (San 
Pablo)  was  entered,  sword  in  hand,  by  two  companies 
of  the  3d  infantry  under  Captains  Alexander  and  J.  M. 
Smith,  with  Lieutenant  Shepler.  At  the  same  moment 
the  while  flag  had  been  exhibited,  and  Captain  Alexander 
received  the  surrender,  and  hoisted  on  the  balcony  the 
flags  of  the  gallant  3d  infantry.  A  fourth  time,  in  one 
day,  had  the  eagle  of  victory  perched  upon  her  favorite 
standard.  The  bold  bird  of  war  seemed  to  rejoice  with 
exultant  flight  in  the  career  of  the  conquering  Saxon  ! 

But  the  dead  and  the  dying  were  not  yet  to  be  left  to 
the  stillness  of  advancing  night.  Far  to  the  left  the  tide 
of  war  still  rolled  its  angry  waves.  The  brigades  of 
Pierce  and  Shields,  supported  by  the  rifles,  had  encoun 
tered,  to  the  rear  of  the  works  of  Churubusco,  four 
thousand  Mexican  infantry  supported  by  three  thousand 
cavalry.  Hotly  and  furiously  did  the  battle  rage  in  this 


268  RESULTS  OF  THE  BATTLE. 

quarter.  Regiment  after  regiment,  the  9th,  12th,  15th 
infantry,  with  Ransom,  Wood,  and  Morgan,  carne  up  to  the 
charge.  Here  were  covered  with  glory  and  with  blood 
the  chivalry  of  Carolina,  the  bold  soldiers  of  New  York  ! 
Here  Pierce,  fainting  with  pain,  was  taken  from  the  field ; 
here  the  brave  Butler  fell  ;  and  here,  a  fifth  time  on  the 
same  extraordinary  day,  the  banner  of  the  Anglo-American 
waved  over  troops  triumphantly  victorious  !  The  Span 
ish-Aztecs  retreated  from  the  bloody  scene  of  their  defeat, 
leaving  hundreds  of  their  bravest  prisoners,  and  hundreds 
more  to  mingle  their  dust  with  the  undistinguished  dead, 
to  be  remembered  no  more.  Over  the  dead  and  over  the 
long  causeway  the  fugitives  are  pursued  by  the  gallant 
dragoons,  and  it  was  not  till  at  the  very  gates  of  Mexico 
that  the  impulsive  Captain  Kearney  reined  in  his  horse.1 

In  the  citadel  (church)  of  Churubusco  the  brave  Gen 
erals  Rincon  and  Anaya,2  (provisional  president,)  with 
hundreds  of  others,  were  taken  prisoners.  Thus  had  the 
army  of  Scott  at  Contreras,  Antonia,  the  Tete  du  Pont, 
Churubusco,  and  in  the  field,  five  times  in  one  glorious 
day,  defeated  the  enemy  in  sight  of  the  capital  of 
Mexico,  in  that  wonderful  valley  where,  three  hundred 
years  before,  Cortez  had  overwhelmed  the  Aztecs  with 
the  invincibles  of  Spain.  History,  the  Kaleidescope  of 
humanity,  is  again  exhibiting  strange  and  various  and 
mysterious  events.  The  northman  had  come  from  the 
dark  forests  of  the  Danube  and  the  Elbe  to  overwhelm 


1  Orders  had  been  dispatched  to  recall  the  dragoons,  but  they  did  not 
receive  them  ;  and  Kearney  lost  his  arm,  and  stopped  only  at  the  gates 
of  Mexico. 

9  General  Anaya  has  since  been  elected  president 


REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  BATTLE.  269 

the  Roman  in  the  English  isles ;  again  he  embarks  on  the 
waters  of  the  Atlantic  and  penetrates  the  woods  of  the 
western  continent,  builds  republics,  renews  the  glory  of 
civilization,  and  now  sends  the  chariots  of  war  to  over 
whelm  in  conquest  the  descendants  of  those  very  invinci- 
bles  whom  Cortez  had  victoriously  led  from  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  to  the  palace  of  the  Montezumas.  Is  there  no 
ministry  of  retribution  in  this — no  angel  of  fate  unfolding 
the  cycles  of  providence  ? 

Scott,  now  at  Churubusco,  turns  with  a  glad  spirit  and 
grateful  heart  to  the  troops,  and  rejoices  with  them  in  the 
martial  glory  of  their  country.  The  old  soldiers  seize  his 
hand  ;  there  is  silence,  and  the  old  commander  pours 
forth  "  in  eloquent  and  patriotic  words  the  commendation 
of  their  gallant  conduct."1 

An  officer,  who  was  present,  says  :  "  During  this 
thrilling  scene,  I  looked  up  to  a  balcony  of  the  church 
that  had  been  so  bravely  defended.  It  was  filled  by 
Mexican  prisoners.  Among  them  General  Rincon,  a 
venerable  old  soldier,  was  leaning  forward,  his  counte 
nance  glowing  and  his  eyes  sparkling  with  every  mani 
festation  of  delight.  I  verily  believe  that  the  old  veteran, 
with  the  spirit  of  a  true  soldier,  upon  beholding  a  victo 
rious  general  so  greeted  by  the  brave  men  he  had  just 
led  to  victory,  forgot  for  a  moment  his  own  position,  that 
he  was  defeated  and  a  prisoner ;  and  saw  and  thought 
only  of  the  enthusiasm  by  which  he  was  surrounded."2 

First.  Let  us  now  examine  the  results  of  this  great 
day  in  American  military  annals.  Let  us  review  in  brief 


1  Letter  in  the  Journal  of  Commerce. 
5  Letter  in  the  Journal  of  Commerce. 
x  2 


270  RESULTS  OF  THE  BATTLE. 

the  actions  of  the  day  and  the  defences  overcome.  1st. 
There  were,  as  we  have  said,  five  distinct  actions,  al 
though  the  last  three  were  fought  as  parts  of  one  great 
battle.  There  were,  1,  The  storm  of  Contreras  ;  2,  The 
capture  of  Antonia ;  3,  The  storm  of  the  tete  du  pont ; 
4,  The  battle  and  assault  of  the  church  and  outworks  of 
Churubusco ;  5,  The  action  in  the  rear  of  Churubusco 
with  the  right  wing  of  Santa  Anna's  corps.  These  last 
three  were  parts  of  one  drama,  but  distinct  in  the  skill, 
the  action,  and  the  relative  effects.  The  tete  du  pont 
was  about  four  hundred  yards  from  the  fortified  church 
of  Churubusco  ;  and  the  field  in  which  Pierce  and  Shields 
were  engaged,  nearly  a  mile  in  rear  of  both.  There  is  no 
doubt  the  fierce  attack  on  the  church  (citadel)  aided  the 
divisions  of  Worth  in  their  assault  on  the  tete  du  pont ; 
and  there  is  no  doubt,  either,  that  the  fall  of  the  latter 
determined,  in  a  great  measure,  the  fall  of  the  former. 

2d.  The  next  point  of  interest  is  the  relative  proportions 
of  either  army  in  numbers  and  position.  It  must  be  re 
membered  here,  that  the  American  army  were  in  the  heart 
of  an  enemy's  country,  and  were  assailing  fortified  posi 
tions.  These  facts  may  be  fairly  said  to  have  doubled 
the  real  strength  of  the  Mexican  army.  At  Contreras  the 
relative  numbers,  actually  in  fight,  were — Americans,  three 
thousand  five  hundred — Mexicans,  seven  thousand  :  in 
field,  supporting,  all  counted,  four  thousand  five  hundred 
Americans — nineteen  thousand  Mexicans  :  at  Churubusco, 
in  all  parts  of  the  field,  nine  thousand  Americans — thirty 
thousand  Mexicans.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  actual 
garrison  of  the  fortified  church,  under  General  Rincon, 
was  comparatively  small,  and  that  those  who  defended 
the  mere  batteries  of  the  tete  du  pont  were  not  very 


STRENGTH    OF    THE    MEXICANS.  271 

numerous ;  but  behind  these,  and  especially  behind  the 
tete  du  pont,  were  long  lines  of  infantry  and  cavalry, 
amounting,  taken  in  all,  to  nearly  thirty  thousand. 

3d.  The  third  point  is  the  strength  of  the  batteries  and 
defences.     The  following  is  a  statement  of  these  :l 


INFANTRY 
BATTERIES.          GUNS.    BREASTWORKS. 


Contreras 1  22  0 

San  Antonia 7  24  2 

Churubusco 2  15  0 

Total „..  10  61  2 


At  the  tete  du  pont  of  Churubusco,  a  canal,  or  river, 
passed  behind,  over  which  was  a  bridge.  This  was  the 
field-defence  of  Santa  Anna's  army,  which  lay  behind ; 
and  certainly  any  one  who  will  examine  the  positions  and 
defences  of  the  Mexicans  at  Churubusco  must  pronounce 
them  very  strong,  well  chosen,  and  well  defended,  in 
regard  to  the  fortified  points. 

Second.  What  were  the  results  in  respect  to  the 
enemy?  These  positions,  which  commanded  the  main 
roads  to  Mexico  in  that  direction,  were  all  taken ;  the 
causeways  were  laid  open  to  the  very  gates  of  the  city  ; 
and  the  vasl  materiel  arrayed  for  its  defence  destroyed 
or  captured. 

At  the  end  of  this  great  day  in  war,  Scott,  while  the 
troops  were  yet  pursuing,  proceeded  on  to  Tacubaya;  but 
on  the  way  was  met  with  propositions  for  peace.  After 

1  Taken  from  a  statement  made  by  Captain  Lee. 


272  THE    ARMISTICE. 

making  his  reply,  he  proceeded  to  Tacubaya,  near  the 
strong  castle  of  Chapultepec.  The  guns  from  the  castle 
were  silent,  and  the  headquarters  of  the  American  army 
were  soon  safely  established  in  the  palace  of  the  arch 
bishop,  a  huge  pile  of  buildings,  surrounded  with  beautiful 
gardens.  Before  him,  in  full  view,  rose  the  domes  and 
spires  of  the  famed  city,  environed  by  beautiful  lakes,  and 
the  richest  natural  scenery.  He  was  at  the  gates  of  the 
"  Halls  of  the  Montezumas,"  with  an  army  flushed  with 
victory,  and  impatient  to  be  led  to  the  assault.  But  nei 
ther  the  glory  of  military  renown,  nor  the  rich  treasures 
which  have  been  dug  from  the  mines  of  Mexico,  could 
dazzle  the  eye  of  the  patriot  soldier,  or  swerve  him  from 
the  obligations  to  humanity. 

Before  the  carnage  of  another  battle,  he  must  make  one 
final  effort  to  stay  the  iron  arm  of  destruction,  and  reclaim 
warring  nations  to  the  paths  of  peace.  Hence  his  beau 
tiful  letter,  expressing  the  Christian  sentiment,  "  Enough 
blood  has  been  shed  in  this  unnatural  war."  When  the 
echoes  of  the  cannon  shall  have  died  away,  and  the  clangor 
of  arms  shall  have  ceased — when  the  steeled  warrior  shall 
have  gone  to  his  rest,  and  the  conqueror  and  the  van 
quished  shall  lie  down  together — Christianity  will  weave 
her  unfading  chaplet  for  the  soldier  who  has  ever  been 
true  to  her  highest  obligations  and  benign  requirements.1 


1  The  following  are  the  results  of  the  battles  of  the  20th  :— 

American  loss — killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  1,053. 

Mexican  loss — 3,500  prisoners  ;  1,500  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  ; 
37  pieces  artillery  captured  ;  small-arms,  ammunition,  and  equipments 
for  an  army. 


THE    ARMISTICE.  273 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

Peace  Negotiations. — President  Polk's  Commission. — Mexican  Conditions. 
— American  Ultimatum. — Failure  of  Negotiations. — Scott's  Notice  to 
Santa  Anna. — Trial  and  Execution  of  the  Deserters. — Description  of 
Chapultepec. — Of  Molino  del  Rey. — Mexican  Defences. — March  of 
Worth. — Strength  of  his  Corps. — Battle  of  Molino  del  Rey. — Mexican 
Loss. — Evacuation  of  Molino  del  Rey. — Preparations  for  the  Attack  of 
Chapultepec. — Erection  of  Batteries. — Storm  of  Chapultepec. — Ac 
tion  of  the  13th. — Capture  of  Mexico.— Entrance  into  the  City. — Scott's 
Address  to  the  Soldiers. — Insurrection  of  the  Leperos. — Appearance  of 
the  City. 

IN  the  last  chapter  we  recorded  the  memorable  events 
of  the  20th  of  August,  1847,  in  the  valley  of  Mexico,— 
events  unequalled  in  their  extraordinary  character  and 
their  dramatic  interest  by  any  preceding  part  of  the  mili 
tary  history  of  America.  Kearney  had  hardly  been  re 
called  from  his  adventurous  charge  to  the  gates  of  Mexico, 
when  the  shades  of  evening  gathered  round  the  bloody 
field  of  Churubusco.  The  battle  had  passed,  and  the  vale 
lay  as  silent  as  the  lonely  bodies  of  the  slain.  Passed 
away  are  all  the  rolling  thunders  of  the  red  artillery,  and 
quenched  their  fires  as  the  silent  and  quenched  volcanoes 
of  the  snow-crowned  Popocatapetl,  rearing  its  cold  head 
upon  the  distant  horizon.  Nature  sleeps,  and  the  dead 
sleep,  and  the  weary  soldier  sleeps,  while  the  sentry  and 
the  stars  keep  watch  together.  But  though  the  fires  of 
volcanoes  may  sleep,  and  the  artillery  may  cease  to  flash, 
the  events  of  time  and  providence  will  never  sleep. 

18 


274  THE    ARMISTICE. 

HISTORY  MOVES  ON.  Its  recording  pen  never  ceases  to 
write  while  roan  is  an  actor  in  the  drama  of  providence, 
and  humanity  continues  to  develop  its  mighty  and  myste 
rious  powers. 

On  the  morning  of  the  21st,  Scott,  en  route  to  Coyhoa- 
can,  was  met  by  commissioners  from  Santa  Anna,  pro 
posing  an  armistice.  The  time  was  not  then  agreed  to, 
but  Scott  told  them  he  should  sleep  that  night  at  Tacu- 
baya.  The  commissioners  then  told  him  that  if  he  would 
delay  his  march  a  few  hours,  they  would  send  an  order  to 
the  fortress  of  Chapultepec  not  to  fire  on  him  !  The 
general,  however,  did  not  delay  his  march,  but  entered 
Tacubaya  early  in  the  afternoon,  attended  by  the  dragoons 
alone  ;  Worth's  division  did  not  arrive  till  late  in  the  eve 
ning.1  That  night  Scott  occupied  the  Archiepiscopal 
Palace  of  Mexico.  At  this  time  it  is  unquestionably  true 
that  the  American  general  might  have  entered  the  plaza 
of  Mexico,  or  have  demolished  its  splendid  edifices  by  the 
fire  of  his  bombs.  He  did  not ;  but,  in  conformity  with 
the  dictates  of  humanity,  on  the  following  morning  re 
ceived  the  propositions  of  the  Mexican  commissioners  for 
a  truce.  This  he  arranged  on  his  own  terms,  when  the 
negotiations  commenced. 

To  understand  this  negotiation,  we  must  recur  to  the 
events  in  the  order  of  time.  In  the  first  place,  we  must 
note  the  commission  of  President  Polk  to  Mr.  N.  P.  Trist. 
It  seems  that  on  the  15th  day  of  April,  1847,  the  Presi 
dent  gave  a  formal  commission  to  Mr.  Trist,  in  which  he 
states  that  he  has  "  invested  him,  in  the  fullest  and  most 
complete  manner,  with  ample  power  and  authority,  in  the 

1  Letter  in  the  Jourual  of  Commerce. 
1 


MR.  TRIST'S  MISSION.  275 

name  of  the  United  States,  to  meet  and  confer  with  any 
person  or  persons,  who  shall  have  similar  authority  from 
the  republic  of  Mexico,  and  between  them  to  negotiate 
and  conclude  an  arrangement  of  the  differences  which 
exist  between  the  two  countries — a  treaty  of  peace,  ami 
ty,  and  lasting  boundaries."1  The  President  had  no  power 
by  the  Constitution,  to  constitute  a  mission  to  a  foreign 
country,  nor  would  he  have  power  to  make  a  treaty  with 
out  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate.  Mr.  Trist, 
then,  notwithstanding  his  commission,  was  in  fact  the 
mere  agent  of  the  President,  and  no  more.  Accordingly, 
he  carried  out  with  him  from  the  department  of  state  a 
"  project  of  a  treaty"  to  be  presented  to  the  Mexican  gov 
ernment.2  The  inference  from  this  transaction  is,  that 
the  cabinet  at  Washington  supposed  that  the  Mexican 
people  were  anxious  for  peace,  and  there  was  nothing  for 
the  President  of  the  United  States  to  do  but  to  say  on 
what  terms  peace  should  be  made.  The  opposite  of  this 
idea  appears  to  have  been  the  state  of  the  Mexican  mind, 
for  they  met  the  American  agent  with  instructions  to  their 
commissioners  that  the  treaty  should  be  made  on  the  basis 
that  they  had  triumphed,  and  as  if  the  war  could  be  pros 
ecuted  by  them  with  advantage.3  In  this  spirit  met  the 
commissioners.  Mr.  Trist,  the  agent  of  President  Polk, 
at  two  thousand  miles  from  his  principal,  tied  down  to 
the  letter  and  detail  of  a  treaty  drawn  up  by  the  Secretary 
of  State,  without  the  power  to  change  it ;  and  the  Mexican 


1  See  copy  of  Mr.  Trist's  commission. 

2  See  official  copy  of  the  "  Project  of  a  Treaty. 

3  See  conditions  for  the  Mexican  commissioners  drawn  up  by  Santa 
Anna,  Pacheco,  &.C.,  £,c. 


276  COMMISSIONERS    APPOINTED. 

commissioners  meeting  him,  as  if  their  country  was  in 
tact,  and  their  arms  invulnerable  to  conquest. 

On  the  25th  of  August,  Mr.  Trist  addressed  a  note  to 
the  Mexican  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations,  informing  him 
that  he  is  ready  to  treat  with  commissioners  on  the  part 
of  Mexico.  On  the  26th,  Mr.  Pacheco  replies,  that  he  is 
engaged  in  appointing  commissioners  for  that  purpose, 
who  would  assemble  the  following  evening  at  the  village 
of  Atzcopozalco,  an  intermediate  point  between  the  two 
armies. 

The  invitation  and  appointment  Mr.  Trist  accepted  in 
a  note  of  the  same  date. 

Among  the  commissioners  appointed  by  the  Mexican 
secretary  was  General  Herrera,  formerly  president,  of  the 
republic.  This  distinguished  man  promptly  declined  the 
appointment.  The  grounds  on  which  he  declined  are 
worthy  of  note.  He  was  president  in  1845,  when  the 
mission  of  Slidell  occurred.  He  was  willing  to  hear  Sli- 
dell  state  his  terms  ;  but  that  person,  as  we  have  already 
stated,  had  neither  the  patience  nor  temper  to  wait  and 
watch  events,  but  impetuously  demanded  that  he  should 
be  immediately  received.  The  downfall  of  Herrera  im 
mediately  took  place  ;  and  Herrera  now  says  :  "  For  the 
single  act  of  being  willing  to  listen  to  his  propositions, 
my  administration  was  calumniated  in  the  most  atrocious 
manner,  this  act  alone  causing  the  revolution  which  de 
prived  me  of  the  command  ;  and  to  take  part  in  the  same 
question,  at  this  day,  would  cause  a  renewal  of  the  cal 
umnies  which  then  assailed  me."  Mr.  Pacheco,  however, 
insisted  upon  his  acceptance,  and  he  finally  acted  on  the 
commission.  The  Mexican  commission  was  composed 
of  the  following  persons  :  ' 


COMMISSIONERS    MEET.  277 

Don  Jose  Joaquin  de  Herrera,  general  of  division. 

Don  Bernardo  Conto,  general  of  brigade. 

Don  Ignacio  Mora  y  Villamil,  general. 

Don  Miguel  Atristairi, 

Don  Jose  Miguel  Arroyo,  Secretary.  * 

The  great  points  of  negotiation  were  the  boundaries  to 
be  drawn  between  Mexico  and  the  United  States,  one 
party  insisting  upon  territory  to  be  taken  from  the  other. 
The  boundaries  in  the  "  project"  of  Mr.  Trist  were  chief 
ly  these  : 

Article  4th  of  the  "  project"  requires  that  the  boundary 
line  should  commence  in  front  of  the  mouth  of  the  Rio 
Grande,  and  should  follow  the  middle  of  that  river  to  the 
southern  boundary  of  New  Mexico  ;  thence  west  with  the 
southern  line  of  New  Mexico  to  the  western  boundary  ; 
thence  north  with  the  river  Gila  till  it  empties  into  the 
Rio  Colorado  ;  thence  down  the  Colorado  and  the  gulf 
of  Mexico  to  the  Pacific. 

Article  8th  required  the  free  right  of  way  forever  over 
the  isthmus  of  Tehuantepec. 

An  examination  of  the  map  will  show  that  our  govern 
ment  demanded,  1st,  The  cession  of  the  disputed  terri 
tory  between  the  Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande ;  2d,  Of 
New  Mexico ;  3d,  Of  both  Upper  and  Lower  California. 

The  Mexican  commissioners  presented  a  counter- 
project,  which  contained  the  following  definition  of  boun 
dary  : 

1st,  The  dividing  line  between  the  two  republics  shall 
commence  in  the  bay  of  Corpus  Christi ;  thence  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Nueces  ;  thence  with  the  middle  of  said 
stream  to  its  source  ;  thence  west  to  the  eastern  boundary 

Y 


278  TERMS    DEMANDED. 

of  New  Mexico  ;  thence  north  with  that  boundary  to  the 
37th  degree  of  latitude  ;  thence  west  with  that  parallel  tc 
the  Pacific.  2d,  That  the  government  of  Mexico  would 
found  no  settlement  or  colony  between  the  Nueces  and 
the  Rio  Grande,  leaving  that  country  as  an  uninhabited 
frontier. 

The  map  shows  that  this  proposition  grants  to  the  Uni 
ted  States  the  best  part  of  California,  while  it  proposes  to 
leave  the  territory  in  dispute  an  uninhabited  region.  Bar 
ren  by  nature,  it  is  not  likely  to  invite  inhabitants  till  the 
better  parts  of  the  continent  are  settled.  In  a  subsequent 
oral  discussion  between  Mr.  Trist  and  the  Mexican  com 
missioners,  it  appears  that  the  former  was  willing  to 
abandon  the  claim  to  Lower  California,  and  to  refer  the 
decision  on  the  Nueces  territory  to  the  cabinet  at  Wash 
ington.1  As  between  Mr.  Trist  and  the  Mexican  com 
missioners,  the  failure  of  the  negotiation  turned  wholly 
on  the  claim  of  the  south  part  of  New  Mexico ;  for, 
above  the  37th  degree  Mexico  had  conceded  every  thing, 
and  Mr.  Trist,  in  the  name  of  the  United  States,  was 
willing  to  concede  Lower  California.  New  Mexico  had 
never  been  claimed  by  the  United  States  at  all,  previous 
to  this  negotiation,  nor  had  we  any  plausible  claim  to  it 
except  that  which  President  Polk  had  formally  disclaimed, 
— that  of  conquest.2 

The  formal  report  made  by  the  Mexican  commissioners 
to  the  secretary  for  foreign  relations,  the  7th  of  Septem 
ber,  1847,  announced  that  the  discussions  had  closed  and 


1  The  Mexican   commissioners'  statement  to  the  secretary  of  foreign 
affairs,  dated  Sept.  7th,  1847. 

8  President  Polk  disclaimed  conquest  in  his  messages. 


NEGOTIATIONS    CLOSED.  279 

the  negotiations  failed.  In  the  mean  time,  various  docu 
ments  had  been  issued  by  the  Mexican  authorities,  which 
disclosed  the  fact  that  Mexico  was  not  ready  for  peace. 
One  was  a  protest  of  the  representatives  of  the  states  of 
Mexico,  Jalisco,  and  Zacatecas,  signed  by  Valentin  Go 
mez  Farias  and  his  colleague  deputies,  declaring  that,  un 
der  existing  circumstances,  "  the  city  of  Mexico  would  not 
allow  the  necessary  freedom  in  its  discussions  and  delib 
erations,  if  Congress  should  assemble  in  that  city,  and  that 
it  would  not  comport  with  the  dignity  of  the  republic  that 
its  representatives  should  deliberate  there  on  this  matter." 
They  also  declared  that  any  arrangement  in  regard  to  ex 
ternal  relations,  "  without  the  ratification  of  Congress," 
would  be  null  and  unconstitutional.  They  further  affirm, 
that  this  step  is  taken  with  the  express  view  to  save  the 
republic  "  from  the  ignominy  which  would  inevitably  at 
tach  to  a  treaty  concluded  and  ratified  under  the  guns  of 
the  enemy,  and  on  the  day  succeeding  unlooked-for  re 
verses."1  At  the  same  time,  the  secretary  of  state  issued 
a  circular  to  the  states  of  Puebla  and  Mexico,  calling  for  a 
levy  en  masse,  "  in  order  that  they  may  attack  and  harass 
the  enemy  with  whatever  weapons  each  may  conveniently 
procure,  whether  good  or  bad,  by  fire  and  sword,  and  by 
every  practicable  means  which  it  is  possible  to  employ  in 
the  annihilating  of  an  invading  army."  These  and  other 
declarations  and  documents,  prove  conclusively  that,  how 
ever  fairly  and  sincerely  General  Herrera  and  his  col 
leagues  may  have  conducted  the  negotiations,  yet,  in  fact, 
the  Mexican  population  were  indisposed  to  peace. 

1  There  is  no  evidence  that  any  considerable  number  of  Mexicans  have 
ever  been  for  peace. 


280  ARMISTICE    TERMINATED. 

On  the  6th  of  September,  Scott  had  given  General 
Santa  Anna  notice  of  certain  breaches  of  the  armistice. 
To  this  the  Mexican  chief  replied  with  similar  complaints. 
On  the  7th,  the  failure  of  the  negotiations  became  known, 
and  General  Scott  took  his  measures  for  the  recommence 
ment  of  hostilities. 

Before  we  proceed,  however,  to  narrate  events  of  new 
and  extraordinary  interest  in  the  valley  of  Mexico,  we 
must  turn  aside  to  witness  another  and  a  sadder  tragedy 
— one  in  which  no  rays  of  glory  light  up  the  darkness 
of  death,  but  the  gloomy  curtains  of  despair  and  shame 
are  drawn  round  the  unpitied  and  unhonored  CRIM 
INAL.  Desertion  in  the  face  of  an  enemy,  and  during 
the  existence  of  actual  war,  has  been,  among  all  nations 
and  in  all  time,  punished  with  death.  It  is  treason — dis 
loyalty — in  its  worst,  least  excusable,  and  most  dangerous 
form.  Of  this  crime,  were  "  the  companies  of  St.  Pat 
rick"1  palpably  and  undeniably  guilty.  They  had  fought  in 
the  ranks  of  the  Mexican  army,  at  the  batteries  of  Churu- 
busco  ;  they  had  fought  longest  and  hardest  against  those 
very  colors  which  they  had  sworn  to  defend ;  they  were 
deserters,  and  many  of  them  were  taken  prisoners.  Soon 
after  the  battles  of  the  20th,  and  while  the  negotiations 
were  pending,  twenty-nine  of  these  men  were  tried  by  a 
general  court-martial,  of  which  Colonel  Riley  of  the  2d 
infantry  was  president.  The  court  found  these  men 
guilty,  (two-thirds  of  the  whole  court  concurring  in  each 
several  case,)  and  sentenced  each  one  of  them  to  hang 
by  the  neck  till  dead.  In  a  general  order,  dated  the  8th 
of  September,  General  Scott  approved  the  sentence,  with 


1  See  the  Report  of  General  Rincou. 


EXECUTION  OF  THE  DESERTERS.         281 

the  exception  of  three,  who  had  deserted  previous  to  the 
commencement  of  the  war,  and  two  others,  who  were  rec 
ommended  to  favor  by  the  court ;  and  four,  in  whose  pallia 
tion  there  appeared  some  mitigating  circumstances.  The 
remainder  were  executed  according  to  the  sentence.  Six 
teen  were  executed  at  San  Angel,  on  the  10th  of  Septem 
ber.  Six  of  the  whole  number  tried  were  deserters  from 
the  3d  infantry,  three  from  the  5th  infantry,  four  from  the 
7th  infantry,  two  from  the  2d  infantry,  Jive  from  the  3d  ar 
tillery,  six  from  the  4th  artillery,  one  from  the  1  st  artillery, 
and  two  from  the  2d  dragoons.  General  Scott,  in  examin 
ing  the  proceedings  of  the  court,  appears  to  have  released 
every  man  from  the  penalty  of  death,  in  whose  favor  any 
reason  or  mitigation  could  be  pleaded.  Among  the  three 
whom  he  found  were  not  legally  subject  to  the  penalty  of 
death,  because  they  had  deserted  previous  to  the  commence 
ment  of  the  war,  was  the  notorious  Riley,  the  commander 
of  the  deserters'  company.  His  sentence  was  commuted, 
so  that  he  was  lashed  and  branded.  The  lesson  given  by 
this  terrible  execution  was  undoubtedly  a  severe  one,  but 
one  which  war  necessarily  carries  with  it.  and  without 
which  the  discipline  of  the  army  could  not  be  maintained. 
On  the  7th  September,  Scott,  having  determined  to 
carry  the  city  of  Mexico  by  assault,  accompanied  by  Gen 
eral  Worth,  made  a  reconnaissance  of  the  formidable  de 
fences  of  the  enemy  immediately  in  front  of  Tacubaya, 
and  commanding  the  principal  causeway  and  the  aqueduct 
supplying  the  city  with  water.  This  observation  deter 
mined  the  general-in-chief  to  attack  what  may  be  called 
the  defences  of  Chapultepec.  These  were  several,  col 
laterally  supporting  one  another,  and  constituting  on  the 
whole  a  very  strong  point  d'appui  and  support  for  the 
y  2 


282  DESCRIPTION    OF    CHAPULTEPEC. 

Mexican  army ;  the  larger  part  (if  not  the  whole)  was 
now  assembled  at  this  point.  We  must  now  take  a  view 
of  these  defences  to  understand  the  actions  which  ensued. 
Early  on  the  same  morning,  Captain  Mason  of  the  engi 
neers  made  a  close  and  daring  reconnaissance  of  the  ene 
my's  line,  round  and  on  Chapultepec.  The  results  of 
this  investigation  may  be  thus  stated  : 

The  little  village  of  Tacubaya,  at  which  General 
Scott's  headquarters  had  been  now  established  nearly 
three  weeks,  is  about  two  miles  and  a  half  from  the  city 
of  Mexico.  About  twelve  hundred  yards  north  of  it, 
just  point-blank  range  for  twelve-pounders,  is  the  hill 
and  fortified  buildings  of  Chapultepec.  At  this  point, 
the  causeway  branches  off  to  the  east,  being  about  two 
miles  in  length  to  the  city.  The  Tacubaya  road  passed 
on  till,  in  two  miles  more,  it  entered  the  San  Cosme 
causeway.  These  causeways  are  the  avenues  to  the 
city ;  and  bombs  and  cannon  of  heavy  calibre,  placed  on 
the  hill  of  Chapultepec,  could  command  them,  and  the 
city  itself.  The  knowledge  of  this  fact  informs  us,  at 
once,  why  General  Scott  deemed  it  necessary  to  possess 
this  castle,  in  order  to  take  the  city.  Once  possessed. 
the  city  must  fall  of  course.  Without  it,  the  avenues 
to  the  city,  and  the  city  itself,  would  be  exposed  to  the 
bombardment  of  the  enemy's  batteries. 

Let  us  now  examine  in  detail,  the  particular  points  of 
the  defence. 

CHAPULTEPEC  is  a  porphyritic  rock,  called  in  the  Aztec 
language,  "Grasshopper's  Hill."  It  rose  from  the  former 
margin  of  the  lake — was  the  resort  of  the  Aztec  princes, 
and  is  the  real  site  of  the  much-sought  Halls  of  the 
Montezumas.  Here  are  the  remains  of  gardens,  groves, 


DESCRIPTION    OF    CHAPULTEPEC.  283 

and  grottoes — the  lingering  remnants  of  that  magnificence 
which  adorned  the  ancient  city  of  Mexico.  Here  also, 
the  Spanish  viceroys  selected  their  residence,  as  the 
most  beautiful  spot  in  the  valley  of  Mexico.  And  here 
was  now  placed  the  Military  college.  The  cadets  of  the 
institution  were  now  among  its  defenders.  The  build 
ings  on  the  top  were  well  fortified,  and  the  base  of  the 
hill  was  nearly  surrounded  by  a  thick  stone-wall.  On 
the  north,  east,  and  south,  this  hill  was  abrupt  and 
stony.  On  the  west  only  (from  the  city)  it  seemed  to 
permit  any  approach.  On  this  side,  down  the  slope,  was 
a  heavy  forest.  On  this  side,  the  American  commander 
determined  to  assault  it ;  but  here  also,  were  formidable 
defences. 

EL  MOLINO  DEL  REY  is  just  at  the  foot  of  this  hill- 
slope — adjoins  the  grove  of  trees,  and  is  a  stone  building 
of  thick  and  high  walls,  with  towers  at  the  end.  This 
was  strongly  garrisoned,  and  made  a  sort  of  depot,  and 
was  supposed  to  have  been  used  as  a  foundry  recently, 
though  really  built  for  mills,  and  called,  "the  King's  Mill." 

CASA  DE  MATA  is  another  massive,  thick-walled  stone 
building,  standing  about  four  hundred  yards  to  the  west 
of  Molino  del  Rey,  and  in  a  straight  line  with  that 
and  the  castle  of  Chapultepec.  It  is  also  at  the  foot 
of  a  gentle  declivity  or  ridge,  descending  from  the  village 
of  Tacubaya. 

It  follows  then,  from  this  topographical  survey,  that 
Chapultepec  is  a  position  commanding  all  the  roads 
around,  and  that  this  position  can  be  approached  only  on 
one  side,  on  which  is  a  grove  of  trees  ;  and  that  at  the 
foot  of  this  slope,  lie  Molino  del  Rey  and  Casa  de  Mata, 
well  defended,  so  that  the  first  attack  must  necessarily 


284  DESCRIPTION    OF    CHAPULTEPEC. 

be  made  on  Molirio  del  Rey,  or  Chapultepec  could  not 
be  taken  ;  and  if  not  taken,  there  was  no  safe  passage 
to  the  city.  The  first  thing  to  be  done  then,  was  the 
storming  of  Molino  del  Rey. 

Accordingly,  after  the  reconnaissance  of  the  7th,  Gen 
eral  Scott  ordered  General  Worth  with  the  1st  division, 
reinforced  by  Cadwallader's  brigade,  and  a  detachment 
of  dragoons  and  artillery,  to  attack  and  carry  the  lines 
and  defences  of  the  enemy  at  the  foot  of  the  hill  ; 
capture  Molino  del  Rey  ;  destroy  the  supposed  materiel 
there  ;  and  then  withdraw  again  to  the  village  of  Ta- 
cubaya.1 

The  position  of  the  enemy  was  well  selected  to  de 
fend  the  naturally  strong  grounds  they  had  assumed.  His 
left  rested  upon  and  occupied  the  stone  building,  Molino 
del  Rey  ;  his  right,  in  the  same  manner,  rested  upon  the 
stone  building  called  Casa  de  Mata.  Midway  between 
these  was  his  field-battery,  and  on  each  side  of  it  was  his 
lines  of  infantry.2  The  Mexican  account  of  the  position 
of  their  army  does  not  differ  essentially  from  that  given 
by  our  officers.  It  states,  that  the  left  wing  of  their  army 
rested  on  Molino  del  Rey,  close  to  the  forest  of  Chapul 
tepec  ;  that  this  point  was  commanded  by  General  Leon, 
who  had  the  battalion  of  Mina,  and  the  battalions  of 
Union  and  La  Patria  of  Oaxaca,  the  companies  of  Puebla, 
and  a  body  from  Queretaro,  all  composed  of  National 
Guards.  The  right  wing  rested  on  the  Casa  de  Mata,  and 
was  composed  of  the  brigade  of  General  Perez,  fifteen 


J  Official  Despatch  of  General  Worth,  dated  Sept.  10th,  1847. 
*  General  Worth's  Report. 


ATTACK    ON    MOLING    DEL    KEY.  285 

hundred  of  the  regular  army.1  Independent  of  these 
strongly-garrisoned  fortresses,  the  Mexican  army,  to  the 
number  of  at  least  ten  thousand  men,  under  the  command 
of  Santa  Anna,  were  posted  as  above  described,  in  a  line 
with  a  field-battery  between  posts.  The  corps  ordered 
by  General  Scott  to  the  attack  of  this  line  was  composed 
as  follows  : 

1st  division,  (General  Worth,)  .  .  about  2,000 
Cad wallader's brigade, (llth,  14th,  and  Voltigeurs)  784 
Three  squadrons  of  dragoons  and  company  of 

mounted  riflemen,  under  Major  Sumner,   .         .  270 
Drum's  battery,  (three  field-pieces,)    i 
Huger's  battery,  (two  24-pounders,)    \ 

\ 
Total  corps  of  General  Worth,2     .     men  3,154 

It  must  be  recollected,  however,  that  when  this  arrange 
ment  was  made,  no  one  in  the  American  army  knew  the 
real  strength  of  the  fortified  posts  occupied  by  the  Mexi 
can  army.  Worth  made  the  most  judicious  arrangements 
for  the  attack.  The  object  in  view  wras  to  break  up,  1  st, 
the  enemy's  lines  of  intrenchments,  and,  2dly,  to  destroy 
the  munitions  in  Molino  del  Rey,  after  which  the  troops 
were  to  retire.  Those  defences  being  completely  under 
the  guns  of  the  castle  of  Chapultepec,  it  may  be  assumed 
that  the  commanding-general  deemed  it  unnecessary  to 
retain  the  troops  in  that  exposed  situation,  when  the  ob- 


1  Extract  from  the  Boletin,  Mexican  newspaper. 
8  General  Worth's  Report 


rt. 


286  ATTACK    ON    MOLING    DEL    KEY. 

ject   for  which  they  had  gone   there   had   been   accom 
plished. 

Worth  divided  his  corps  into  three  columns,  with  a 
reserve,  to  act  respectively  against  the  wings  and  centre 
of  the  enemy.  1st.  The  right  column  (opposite  the  en 
emy's  left,  Molino  del  Rey)  was  composed  of  Garland's 
brigade,  to  look  at  and  in  time  attack  El  Molino.  This 
column  was  accompanied  by  Captain  Drum,  and  two 
pieces  of  artillery.  To  attack  with  this  column,  and  thus 
keep  in  check  Chapultepec  and  its  defences,  Captain 
Huger's  battery  of  24-pounders  was  placed  on  the  ridge 
descending  from  Tacubaya,  and  at  about  six  hundred 
yards  from  El  Molino.  2d.  A  storming  party  of  five 
hundred  picked  men  was  placed  to  the  left  of  this  bat 
tery,  under  the  command  of  Major  Wright  of  the  8th 
infantry,  to  assail  the  enemy's  centre,  and  capture  his 
field-battery.  3d.  The  second  brigade  (now  under  the 
command  of  Colonel  M'Intosh)  was  placed  higher  up  the 
ridge,  accompanied  by  Duncan's  battery,  to  watch  the 
enemy's  left,  support  Major  Wright,  or  assail,  as  circum 
stances  might  require.  Cadwallader's  brigade  was  held 
in  reserve,  in  a  position  between  the  last  column  (M'ln 
tosh's)  and  the  battering  guns,  that  they  might  support 
either  column,  as  they  might  need.  Surnner's  dragoons 
were  on  the  extreme  left,  guarding  that  flank.  Such 
were  the  dispositions  made  by  Worth1  on  the  night  of  the 
7th  of  September.  At  3  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the 
8th,  the  columns  were  put  in  motion,  and  at  daylight  they 
were  all  in  their  respective  positions.  At  half-past  4 
A.  M.,  when  things  could  be  distinctly  seen,  the  battle 

1  Sue  Worth's  Official  Report. 


ATTACK    ON    MOLING    DEL    KEY.  287 

began  by  the  firing  of  Huger's  battery  (24-pounders)  on 
Molino  del  Rey,  which  continued  till  that  strong  point 
was  sensibly  shaken.1  At  this  time,  the  storming  party 
under  Major  Wright  rushed  forward,  under  the  guidance 
of  Captain  Mason  of  the  engineers,  and  Lieut.  Foster. 
They  were  received  unexpectedly  with  a  tremendous 
fire  of  artillery.  They  still  dashed  on,  drove  the  artillery 
men  from  their  pieces,  and  had  actually  taken  the  bat 
tery,  when  the  enemy,  perceiving  how  small  was  the  body 
of  men  by  whom  he  was  dispossessed,  re-rallied,  and  the 
infantry  of  their  whole  line  poured  in  a  destructive  fire. 
Here  no  less  than  eleven  out  of  only  fourteen  officers  were 
either  killed  or  wounded  !  The  column  was  driven  back 
for  a  moment,  and  the  Mexican  troops  regained  possession 
of  the  disputed  point.  They  are  said  to  have  killed 
nearly  all  the  wounded  left  on  the  field.2  The  light  bat 
talion  left  to  cover  Huger's  battery,  and  the  right  wing 
of  Cadwallader's  brigade,  under  Captain  Kirby  Smith, 
were  now  ordered  forward.  They  came  gallantly  into  ac 
tion.  The  enemy's  line  was  defeated.  The  contested 
point  was  carried,  and  the  two  wings  of  the  enemy,  Mo- 
lino  del  Rey  and  Casa  de  Mata,  were  left  isolated. 

On  our  right  the  battle  raged  with  equal  fury  and  with 
equal  success.  Garland's  brigade,  sustained  by  Drum's 
artillery,  assaulted  the  left  of  the  enemy  at  Molino  del 
Rey,  and  after  a  hot  conflict  drove  him  from  that  appa 
rently  impregnable  position  under  the  guns  of  Chapulte- 
pec.  On  the  left  of  our  army,  at  Casa  de  Mata,  another 
fearful  and  bloody  action  was  maintained.  The  brigade 


1  General  Worth's  Official  Report. 

9  Letter  from  an  officer  in  the  New  York  Courier  and  Enquirer 


288  ATTACK    ON    MOLING    DEL    KEY. 

of  Colonel  M'Intosh  moved  on,  till  by  coming  in  front  of 
Duncan's  battery,  that  was  for  a  time  silent,  and  the  ad 
vancing  column  assaulted  Casa  de  Mata.  Again  the  en 
emy's  defences  proved  stronger  than  had  been  anticipated. 
Instead  of  field  intrenchments,  or  an  old  house,  it  was  a 
strong  stone  citadel,  with  bastions  and  ditches.  Within 
musket  range,  a  deadly  fire  of  musketry  was  opened  upon 
the  advancing  column.  Still  the  column  rushed  on  till  it 
reached  the  very  verge  of  the  parapet!  Again  did  the 
heroes  of  Mexico  fall  within  sight  of  victory.  M'Intosh, 
Scott,  Waite,  had  now  fallen,  and  the  column  fell  back  to 
the  left  of  Duncan's  battery,  again  to  rally,  and  again  to 
charge.  Just  as  this  attack  was  made,  a  heavy  column 
of  cavalry  and  infantry  was  seen  defiling  round  the  ene 
my's  right  upon  our  extreme  left.  Thousands  of  the 
Mexican  lancers  in  bright  uniform  now  came  to  crush 
apparently  the  small  band  who  were  storming  Casa  de 
Mata.  Then  it  was  that  Duncan's  battery,  silent  by  the 
interposition  of  our  storming  column,  moved  rapidly  to 
the  extreme  left,  supported  by  the  Voltigeurs,  under  Col 
onel  Andrews.  As  the  Mexican  column  came  within  range 
of  canister-shot,  the  battery  opened  an  effective  fire, 
which  soon  scattered  its  columns.  At  the  same  moment, 
Major  Sumner's  cavalry,  formed  on  the  left,  charged  and 
completed  the  rout.  The  retreat  of  our  assaulting  in 
fantry  had  again  opened  Casa  de  Mata  to  the  fire  of  our 
artillery.  It  was  opened  upon  it.  The  Mexican  infantry 
was  already  defeated.  Their  cavalry  was  already  in 
flight.  A  few  shots  more  from  our  artillery,  and  Casa  de 
Mata  was  abandoned.  All  was  now  done  that  was  at 
tempted.  Molino  del  Rey  was  taken.  Casa  de  Mata 
was  taken.  Fourteen  thousand  of  the  Mexican  army, 


CASA    DE    MATA    DESTROYED.  289 

thus  strongly  posted,  had  been  defeated  by  one-fourth 
their  numbers.  Fifty-two  commissioned  officers  and  eight 
hundred  prisoners  were  captured.  Great  quantities  of 
arms  and  ammunition  were  also  taken. 

Casa  de  Mata  was  blown  up,  and  the  ammunition  and 
other  materiel  of  war  found  in  Molino  del  Rey  destroyed. 
When  this  was  accomplished,  these  places  were  evacu 
ated  by  the  orders  of  the  commander-in-chief.  It  is  evi 
dent  to  all  intelligent  minds  that  they  could  not  be  held 
unless  Chapultepec  had  also  been  carried ;  for  that,  the 
corps  under  Worth  were  inadequate,  and  were  not  de 
tached  for  that  purpose.  The  testimony  of  General 
Worth,  furnished  in  his  official  report,  proves  that  after 
the  most  accurate  and  daring  reconnaissance  on  the  part 
of  the  engineers,  and  also  by  general  officers,  the  impres 
sion  was  left  on  the  minds  of  all  those  officers,  that  the 
defences  of  Molino  del  Rey,  and  especially  of  Casa  de 
Mata,  were  less  strong  than  they  really  proved  to  be. 
They  were  thought  likewise  to  be  more  important  and 
valuable  to  the  Mexican  army  than  they  really  were,  as 
depositories  of  munitions.  General  Scott,  therefore,  had 
detached  an  ample  force  to  carry  outposts  of  such  a  kind 
as  were  anticipated,  but  insufficient  to  carry,  without  too 
-much  loss,  the  castle  of  Chapultepec.  The  movement 
was  necessary,  however,  for  another  and  a  different  reason 
from  those  which  have  been  given.  Chapultepec  must 
be  carried.  To  do  this,  the  destruction  of  the  defences 
at  the  foot  of  the  hill,  and  covering  the  Mexican  army, 
was  essential  to  success.  The  strength  of  those  defences, 
unknown  and  impossible  to  know,  was  the  only  cause  of 
the  extraordinary  loss,  which  rendered  this  proportionably 
the  bloodiest  battle  of  the  war.  One-fourth  of  Worth's 


290  REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  BATTLE. 

entire  force  were  either  killed  or  wounded  !  Nor  were 
the  Mexicans  less  sorely  injured.  Desperately  did  they 
fight.  Leon,  their  bravest,  general ;  Balderez,  the  gal 
lant  colonel  of  the  battalion  of  Mina  ;  Huerta,  Moteos, 
and  other  distinguished  officers,  were  lost  on  that  fatal 
field. 

Such  was  the  battle  of  MOLINO  DEL  REY  ;  long  to  be 
remembered  as  the  scene  of  extraordinary  actions,  and 
long  grieved,  as  that  which  made  the  graves  of  brave  and 
noble  men. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  8th,  the  corps  of  Worth,  hav 
ing  accomplished  the  purpose  of  the  battle,  retired  to 
Tacubaya,  and  the  commander-in-chief  directed  his  in 
quiries  to  the  defences  of  Mexico  and  the  modes  of  over 
coming  them.  On  the  9th  and  10th,  reconnaissances 
were  made  in  every  practicable  direction,  especially  by 
the  engineers  Lee,  Beauregard,  Stevens,  and  Tower,  and 
also  by  the  commander-in-chief.  These  reconnaissances 
were  especially  directed  to  the  south  and  west.  The  San 
Antonia  road  (on  which  lay  Antonia  and  Churubusco) 
came  in  on  the  south.  This  is  the  road,  the  reader  will 
recollect,  by  which  the  army  had  advanced  till  after  the 
battle  of  Churubusco.  Then  it  diverged  to  the  north 
west,  through  Coyhoacan,  Sari  Angel,  and  Tacubaya. 
This  road  was,  in  fact,  the  great  Acapulco  road,  passing 
southwest  from  the  city  of  Mexico  to  the  Pacific  ocean, 
and  which  the  army  had  reached  by  its  bold  and  success 
ful  march  round  the  Lake  Chalco.  The  general-in-chief 
and  engineer  now  sought,  whether  by  this  or  any  other 
route,  they  could  most  successfully  approach  and  enter 
the  city.  The  observations  disclosed  these  facts,  that 
there  were  1st,  Five  great  roads  leading  to  the  city  of 


DESCRIPTION  OF  MEXICO  AND  ITS  DEFENCES.         291 

Mexico,  viz.  i1  the  road  to  Vera  Cruz,  which  the  army 
had  followed  to  Ayotla  ;  the  road  to  Acapulco,  by  which 
it  advanced  to  Antonia  and  Churubusco ;  the  road  to  To- 
luca,  on  which  it  now  was,  at  Tacubaya ;  the  road  to 
Guadalupe,  by  which  Santa  Anna  finally  retreated  ;  and 
the  road  to  Tampico,  which  went  northeast  round  Lake 
Tezcuco.  2d,  These  roads  terminated  in  eight  gates. 
Three  of  these  gates  were  approached  by  causeways  from 
the  Acapulco  road,  viz.  :  the  San  Antonia,  Perdido,  and 
Piedad  ;  two  by  the  Toluca  road,  by  Tacubaya,  viz. : 
Chapultepec  and  San  Cosme.  Each  of  the  other  three 
roads  had  a  gate  also.  These  gateways  were  small  forts 
mounting  cannon,  which,  in  time  of  peace,  were  used  as 
a  sort  of  custom-houses,  the  city  being  unapproachable 
from  any  other  quarter  than  these  causeways.  They  were 
now  converted  into  a  sort  of  bastions  for  the  city,  or  en 
filading  forts.  Around  the  greater  part  of  the  city,  es 
pecially  where  these  great  roads  approached,  there  was  a 
great  ditch,  or  canal,  which  it  was  almost  impossible  to 
bridge  in  face  of  the  enemy's  cannon  and  small-arms. 

Let  the  reader  now  conceive  the  city  and  defences  of 
Mexico,  as  we  have  described  their  features.  A  large, 
regular,  solid-built  city,  at  the  very  bottom  of  a  large,  ob 
long  valley,  surrounded  by  a  lofty  range  of  mountains. 
These  mountains  turn  the  water  into  the  valley  below, 
forming  great  lakes,  occupying  no  small  part  of  the 
entire  surface  of  the  valley.  The  city  is  partially 
drained  from  these  inundating  waters ;  but  only  par 
tially  so.  Much  the  greatest  part  of  the  land  between 
these  lakes  is,  in  the  rainy  season,  a  marsh,  too  wet  and 

1  Slealey's  map  of  the  environs  of  Mexico. 


292  DESCRIPTION    OF  THE  COUNTRY. 

boggy  for  wagons,  or  horses,  or  an  army  to  pass.  Over 
these  bogs  and  wet  grounds  the  great  causeways  are  cut, 
and  over  them  only  can  the  city  be  approached.  The 
entrances  of  these  causeways  are  defended  by  the  bas- 
tioned  gateways  :  and  finally,  around  the  city  is  a  canal, 
or  ditch.  It  was  now  the  wet  season,  and  the  ground 
was  marshy  and  the  lakes  high.  Such  was  the  series  of 
obstacles,  natural  and  artificial,  which,  on  the  9th  of  Sep 
tember,  presented  themselves  to  the  experienced  eye  of 
General  Scott.  He  saw  himself  with  a  small  army,  re 
duced  by  bloody  battles  and  severe  sickness,  in  the  heart 
of  the  valley  of  Mexico.  In  front,  a  city  of  two  hundred 
thousand  inhabitants,  an  army  of  twenty-five  thousand 
men,  and  defences,  which  in  other  hands  would  seem  im 
pregnable  ;  and  finally,  with  the  line  of  his  communica 
tion,  connecting  the  army  with  the  base  of  its  supply,  cut 
off !  This  position  was  one,  which  can  only  be  equalled 
in  military  history  by  the  conquest  of  Egypt  by  Bonaparte, 
when  his  retreat  was  cut  off  by  the  English  victory  of 
Aboukir  Bay.  The  difference  is,  that  Napoleon  was 
foiled,  but  the  American  general  was  not.  Mexico  had  no 
St.  Jean  d'Acre  for  the  general  who  had  conquered  at 
Niagara,  at  San  d'Ulloa,  at  Cerro  Gordo,  and  Churu- 
busco !  He  marched  on,  and  marched  victoriously 
through  all  the  obstacles  of  nature  and  of  art ! 

On  the  llth  of  September,  Scott  had  completed  all  his 
reconnaissances,  made  his  arrangements,  and  now  had 
determined  on  the  final  assault.  The  general  determined 
to  attack  the  western,  or  southwestern  gates,  by  the  Cha- 
pultepec  causeway  :  but,  to  deceive  the  enemy,  and  econo 
mize  our  own  soldiers,  he  arranged  a  masked  movement 
against  the  southern  gates,  while  the  real  one  was  on  the 


ATTACK    ON    THE    CITY.  293 

other  side.  The  point  of  attack  was  Chapultepec.  The 
mask  movement  was  made  by  the  divisions  of  Quitman 
and  Pillow,  in  daylight,  on  the  llth,  marching  from  Coy- 
hoacan  to  manoeuvre  and  make  false  attacks  on  the  San 
Antonia  road,  before  the  gates  of  the  south  side.  In  the 
same  manner  Twiggs,  with  Riley's  brigade,  and  Taylor's 
and  Steptoe's  batteries,  was  left  in  front  of  the  same  gates 
to  threaten  and  act  according  to  circumstances.  The  for 
mer  divisions  (Pillow's  and  Quitman's)  were  to  return  by 
night  to  Tacubaya,  while  Twiggs  still  remained  on  the 
southern  front ;  Smith's  brigade  was  posted  at  San  Angel ; 
Worth's  division  remained  with  the  general-in-chief,  at 
Tacubaya.  This  was  the  position  of  the  several  corps 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  llth.1  That  night,  the  divisions 
of  Pillow  and  Quitman  moved  up  to  Tacubaya,  according 
to  the  orders  of  the  general-in-chief,  previously  given ; 
Twiggs,  with  his  brigade  and  batteries  alone  remaining, 
to  keep  up  the  appearance  of  attack  on  the  south  side. 

All  things  were  now  ready  for  the  full  development  of 
the  assault.  The  point  d'appui  for  the  enemy  was  the 
Castle  of  Chapultepec,  and  constituted  the  point  of  attack 
for  the  American  army — commanding  with  its  cannon, 
the  Chapultepec  and  San  Cosmo  causeways.  We  have 
already  described  the  hill  of  Chapultepec,  a  steep,  bluff, 
rocky  height,  rising  one  hundred  and  fifty  feet  above  the 
surrounding  grounds,  and  defended  by  a  strong  castle  of 
thick  stone  walls.  The  whole  fortress  or  work  of  defence, 
is  about  nine  hundred  feet  in  length  ;  and  the  terre-plein 
and  main  buildings,  about  six  hundred  feet. 

The  following  account  is  given  by  an  officer  of  the  army 

1  Scott's  Official  Report,  dated  Sept.  18th,  1847,  No.  34. 


294  DESCRIPTION    OF    CHAPULTEPEC. 

"The  Castle  is  about  ten  feet  high,  and  the  whole 
structure,  including  the  wings,  bastions,  parapets,  re 
doubts,  and  batteries,  is  very  strongly  built,  and  of  the 
most  splendid  architecture.  A  splendid  dome  decorates 
the  top,  rising  in  great  majesty  about  twenty  feet  above 
the  whole  truly  grand  and  magnificent  pile,  and  near 
which  is  the  front  centre,  supported  by  a  stone  arch, 
upon  which  is  painted  the  coat-of-arms  of  the  republic, 
where  once  floated  the  tri-colored  banner,  but  is  now 
decorated  by  the  glorious  stars  and  stripes  of  our  own 
happy  land.  Two  very  strongly-built  stone  walls  sur 
round  the  whole  ;  and  at  the  west  end,  where  we  storm 
ed  the  works,  the  outer  walls  are  some  ten  feet  apart, 
and  twelve  or  fifteen  feet  high,  over  which  we  charged 
by  the  help  of  fascines.  It  was  defended  by  heavy  ar 
tillery,  manned  by  the  most  learned  and  skilful  gunners 
of  their  army,  including  some  French  artillerists  of  dis 
tinction.  The  infantry  force  consisted  of  the  officers 
and  students  of  the  institution,  and  the  national  guards, 
and  chosen  men  of  war  of  the  republic — the  whole  under 
the  command  of  General  Bravo,  whom  we  made  prisoner. 
The  whole  hill  is  spotted  with  forts  and  outposts,  and 
stone  and  mud  walls,  which  were  filled  with  their  picket 
or  castle  guard.  A  huge  high  stone-wall  extends  around 
the  whole  frowning  craggy  mount,  and  another  along  the 
southeast  base,  midway  from  the  former  and  the  castle. 
A  well-paved  road  leads  up  in  a  triangular  form  to  the 
main  gate,  entering  the  south  terre-plein ;  and  the  whole 
works  are  ingeniously  and  beautifully  ornamented  with 
Spanish  fastidiousness  and  skill."1 

1  Letter  of  Lieut.  Sutten,  of  the  1 5th  Infantry,  in  the  Union. 


ATTACK    ON    CHAPULTEPEC.  295 

This  was  now  to  be  assaulted — and  the  next  step  was, 
on  the  night  of  the  llth,  the  erection  of  batteries  which 
•  would  command  the  fortress.  The  ground  for  these 
was  traced  out  by  Captains  Huger  and  Lee,  and  they 
were  thus  placed  : 

Battery  No.  1,  mounted  two  eighteen-pounders,  and 
one  eight-inch  mortar,  and  was  commanded  by  Captain 
Drum.  This  battery  was  about  six  hundred  yards  from 
the  castle,  just  to  the  left  of  the  Tacubaya  road. 

Battery  No.  2,  mounted  one  twenty-four  pounder,  and 
one  eight-inch  mortar,  and  was  commanded  by  Captain 
Hagner,  of  the  Ordnance.  This  battery  was  placed  to 
the  front  and  to  the  left  of  Tacubaya,  a  little  further  from 
the  castle. 

Battery  No.  3,  mounted  one  eighteen-pounder,  and  one 
eight-inch  mortar.  This  was  placed  half  way  between 
Tacubaya  and  Molino  del  Rey,  and  was  commanded  by 
Captain  Brooks  and  Lieutenant  Anderson,  of  the  2d  ar 
tillery,  alternately. 

Battery  No.  4,  was  placed  near  Molino  del  Rey — was 
commanded  by  Lieutenant  Stone,  of  the  Ordnance,  and 
mounted  one  large  rnortar. 

The  object  of  these  batteries  was  to  cripple  the  de 
fences  of  the  castle,  preparatory  to  an  assault.  Ac 
cordingly,  the  next  morning,  (the  12th,)  these  batteries 
being  in  position,  commenced  firing  at  daylight.  The 
air  was  filled  with  blazing  fuzes  and  whirling  balls. 
Every  ball  went  through  the  building,  and  every  shell 
tore  up  the  ramparts — while  from  the  bastions  and  bat 
teries  of  Chapultepec,  the  enemy  rained  down  an  in 
cessant  fire  upon  the  assailants  below.  Such  was  the 
work  of  the  12lh — closed  only  when  daylight  disap- 


296  STORMING    OF    THE    CASTLE. 

peared,  and  left  the  troops  to  darkness  and  to  a  short 
repose. 

The  divisions  of  Pillow  and  Quitman  were  in  posi 
tion  on  the  night  of  the  llth,  waiting  for  orders.  Twiggs 
was  still  firing  away  at  the  southern  gates,  to  divert  and 
deceive  the  enemy.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  12th, 
Smith's  brigade  (stationed  at  San  Angel)  was  moved  up 
to  Piedad,  a  small  village  two  miles  from  Chapultepec. 
General  Scott  had  appointed  the  momentary  cessation  of 
fire  from  our  batteries,  as  a  signal  of  assault.  This  was 
to  lake  place  in  two  columns,  commanded  respectively 
by  Generals  Quitman  and  Pillow,  each  preceded  by  a 
storming  party  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  select  men  ;  and 
the  whole  supported  by  Worth's  division  in  reserve. 
The  storming  party  for  Pillow,  was  furnished  from  Worth's 
division,  and  commanded  by  Captain  McKenzie,  of  the 
2d  artillery.  The  storming  party  of  Quitman's  column 
was  furnished  by  Twiggs'  division,  and  commanded  by 
Captain  Casey,  of  the  2d  infantry. 

At  8  A.  M.,  on  the  morning  of  the  13th,  the  general-in- 
chief  sent  word,  by  his  aids,  to  Pillow  and  Quitman,  that 
the  concerted  signal  was  about  to  be  given.1  The  bri 
gade  of  General  Smith  had  left  Piedad,  at  6  A.  M.,  and 
was  now  arrived  on  the  ground.  It  was  to  act  with  the 
column  of  Quitman.  The  column  of  Pillow  was  to  ad 
vance  on  the  west  side,  that  of  Quitman  on  the  southeast. 
The  reserve  under  Worth  was  to  turn  the  castle,  and 
come  into  the  road  on  the  north,  there  either  to  assist  in 
the  assault  or  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  enemy. 

This  entire  plan  was  successfully  carried  out.     Both 

1  General  Scott's  Official  Report 


STORMING    OF    THE    CASTLE.  297 

columns  charged  with  alacrity  at  9  A.  M.  of  the  13th 
Pillow  advanced  through  an  open  grove  on  the  west,  filled 
with  sharpshooters.  These  were  speedily  dislodged,  and 
the  column  emerged  into  an  opening  at  the  foot  of  the  rocky 
acclivity.  Here  General  Pillow  was  wounded,  and  the 
command  devolved  on  General  Cadwallader.1  The  bro 
ken  acclivity  was  still  to  be  ascended,  and  a  redoubt  half 
way  up  to  be  carried.  Bravely  led  by  gallant  officers, 
bravely  did  the  men  advance.  Slowly,  but  surely 
did  they  advance  ;  step  by  step  the  ground  is  gained. 
Now  the  first  battery  is  taken  !  Now  the  soldiers  march 
over  mines  !2  Now  the  match  is  lighted  to  fire  them  ' 
The  man  is  shot  down,  and  the  assailants  are  safe,  from 
all  but  this  terrible  shower  of  balls  !  Now  they  reach 
the  ditch,  and  the  stone  wall  is  beyond.  The  fas 
cines3  are  applied — the  ditch  is  bridged.  The  scaling 
ladders  are  applied  to  that  massive  wall,  and  they  mount ! 
they  mount !  The  castle  is  carried,  and  now  the  flags  of 
these  brave  regiments  fly  on  its  ramparts  !  The  loud 
hurrah  resounds  through  the  ranks  ! 

But  what  is  doing  by  the  column  of  the  brave  Quit- 
man  ?  Have  they  no  part  ?  As  bravely,  and  as  actively, 
and  successfully  did  they  storm  the  rock-built  castle  of 
Chapultepec. 


1  Official  Report 

a  General  Scott,  in  his  Official  Report,  says  that  men  in  attempting  to 
fire  the  mines  were  shot  down.  General  'Bravo,  who  commanded,  says 
that  the  engineer  who  had  charge  of  them  disappeared,  and  they  could 
not  be  fired.  Both  statements  are  no  doubt  true. 

*  Fascines  are  bundles  of  withes,  or  sticks,  tied  round  and  filled  up  with 
earth,  to  fill  up  ditches. 


298  STORMING  OF  THE  CASTLE. 

Moving  over  a  causeway  from  Tacubaya,  flanked  on 
either  side  by  deep  ditches,  and  cut  in  several  places, 
Quitman  had  little  room  to  manoeuvre,  while  in  front  was 
a  strong  body  of  the  enemy,  and  two  or  three  small  pieces. 
All  these  obstacles  were  overcome,  the  enemy  routed,  and 
the  volunteers  of  Quitman,  of  New  York,  of  Pennsylva 
nia,  and  of  South  Carolina,  arrived  in  time  to  join  the 
storming  parties,  as  they  scaled  the  walls  of  Chapultepec. 
Here,  too,  the  "  Rifles,"  so  often  distinguished,  joined  the 
assault,  and  shared  in  the  bloodiest  adventures  of  the 
day.  An  officer  of  that  gallant  corps  thus  describes  the 
scene  : 

"  After  about  an  hour's  hard  firing,  the  enemy's  fire  be 
gan  to  slacken,  and  the  word  was  given  to  charge.  We 
rushed  forward,  and  in  three  minutes  we  carried  the 
first  battery.  The  rifles  entered  the  battery  with  the 
storming  party,  which  was  commanded  by  one  of  its  cap 
tains.  We  followed  the  fugitives  close  up  to  the  aque 
duct,  and,  turning  to  the  left,  clambered  up  the  steep  path 
to  the  castle.  The  enemy  were  running  down  in  crowds, 
and  the  slaughter  was  tremendous  in  the  road  and  orchard. 
Our  men  were  infuriated  by  the  conduct  of  the  Mexicans 
at  Molino  del  Rey,  and  took  but  few  prisoners.  The 
castle  was  completely  torn  to  pieces ;  nearly  every  part 
was  riddled  by  our  shot,  while  the  pavements  and  fortifi 
cations  were  completely  torn  up  by  the  shells.  In  it 
were  crowds  of  prisoners  of  every  rank  and  color  ;  among 
whom  were  fifty  general  officers,  and  about  a  hundred 
cadets  of  the  Mexican  military  academy.  The  latter 
wTere  pretty  little  fellows,  from  ten  to  sixteen  years 
of  age.  Several  of  them  were  killed  fighting  like  de 
mons,  and  indeed  they  showed  an  example  of  cour- 


CHAPULTEPEC  TAKEN.  299 

age  worthy  of  imitation  by  some  of  their  superiors  in 
rank."1 

Thus  was  Chapultepec  taken.  Its  rocky  heights — its 
strong  batteries — its  military  college — its  mines — its  suc 
coring  army — were  all  in  vain.  The  heroes  who  had 
stormed  the  hill  of  Contreras,  the  intrenchments  of  Chu- 
rubusco,  and  the  King's  Mill,  failed  not  here.  Chapul 
tepec  is  taken,  and  the  great  causeways  to  Mexico  are  no 
longer  defended  by  fortresses.  The  gates  alone  remain. 

Just  at  this  time  the  general-in-chief  arrived  at  the 
castle,  and  took  a  coup  d'ceil  view  of  the  whole  field,  as  it 
lay  around  the  city  of  Mexico.  His  determination  was 
instantly  taken.  On  the  right,  the  road  passed  on  to  the 
Belen  gate  ;  on  the  left,  it  passed  to  the  San  Cosmo 
causeway  and  gate.  Worth  had  turned  the  castle  during 
the  conflict,  passed  round  to  the  north  centre  of  Chapul 
tepec,  and  there  attacked  the  right  wing  of  the  Mexican 
army  on  the  road.  Now  he  had  already  pursued  the  ene 
my,  and  was  inarching  on  the  San  Cosmo  road.  Quitman 
on  the  other  hand  was  pursuing  the  enemy  by  the  cause 
way  to  the  Belen  gate.  Scott  knew  that  the  San  Cosmo 
gate  was  easier  taken  than  the  Belen,  and  therefore  or 
dered  Cadwallader's  brigade  arid  other  forces  up  to  Worth, 
intending  his  to  be  the  main  attack.  He  garrisoned  Cha 
pultepec  with  the  15th  regiment  of  infantry,  and  after 
sending  guns  and  ammunition  to  both  Worth  and  Quit 
man,  and  taking  care  of  the  ordnance  and  prisoners,  he  fol 
lowed  Worth's  division  on  the  San  Cosmo  road.  This 
corps  soon  come  to  a  suburb,  just  in  front  of  the  gate  of 
San  Cosmo,  and  there  found  the  enemy  again  prepared 

1  Letter  in  the  New  York  Courier  and  Enquirer. 


300  ATTACK    ON    THE    CITY. 

for  battle,  behind  ditches,  and  on  the  flat  roofs  of  houses, 
making  the  village  a  fortification,  and  defending  it  inch  by 
inch.  The  pioneers,  with  picks  and  crowbars,  soon  made 
their  way  through  windows  and  houses,  burrowing  their 
way.  The  mountain  howitzers  began  to  play,  and  by  8  p.  M. 
the  positions  were  carried,  and  Worth  quietly  rested  his 
troops  in  the  suburbs  of  Mexico.  A  single  gate,  unable 
to  make  successful  resistance  now,  alone  raised  its  feeble 
barrier  between  the  northrnan  and  the  now  humbled  con 
querors  of  the  Aztecs. 

On  the  other  causeway  the  scene  was  yet  more  remark 
able.  Quitman,  reinforced  with  Smith's  brigade,  in  the 
ardor  of  pursuit  had  carried  an  intermediate  battery,  and 
actually  entered  the  Belen  gate,  after  a  hard  battle.  The 
capture  of  the  Belen  gate  is  thus  described  by  an  officer 
of  the  "  Rifles." 

"  Again  we  commenced  our  slow  and  deadly  march,  as 
we  gradually  approached  the  garita,  or  gate  of  the  city, 
the  enemy  retreating  slowly  before  us.  As  soon  as  they 
crossed  the  gate  a  tremendous  fire  of  artillery  opened 
upon  us  on  both  sides  of  the  aqueduct  as  well  as  from 
two  flanking  batteries  on  both  sides  the  road.  Here  our 
loss  was  very  great.  Slowly  creeping  from  arch  to  arch, 
we  lost  many  men  by  the  batteries  in  front,  while  the  fire 
from  flanking  batteries  coming  through  the  arches  killed 
many  who  were  safe  from  that  in  front.  About  noon  we 
got  close  up  to  the  garita,  and  the  enemy's  fire  being 
partly  silenced  by  our  artillery  in  the  road,  and  thus  being 
driven  out  of  the  cross-battery  on  the  left,  we  once  more 
gave  the  rifle  yell,  and  charged  the  garita.  Again  we 
were  first,  and  at  twenty  minutes  past  one,  of  the  13th  of 
September,  the  regiment  entered  the  city  of  Mexico. 


CITY    ENTERED.  301 

But  our  work  was  not  yet  ended.  Directly  in  front  was 
still  another  battery,  with  flanking  batteries  as  before. 
Our  regiment  again  went  forward,  and  assisted  by  some 
others  we  occupied  a  house  and  some  of  the  arches,  and 
not  only  kept  them  ofT,  but  repelled  four  attempts  at 
charges  which  they  made.  Meanwhile  we  had  construct 
or!  a  battery  of  sand-bags  at:  the  garita,  and  kept  up  a 
sharp  fire  in  front.  Towards  dark  those  in  front  were 
recalled,  and  all  retired  behind  the  batteries.  That  night 
the  battery  was  completed,  and  the  men  slept  on  their 
arms  in  the  arches  of  the  aqueduct."1 

Thus  closed  the  13th  of  September  in  the  valley  of 
Mexico.  The  morning  had  found  the  armies  of  the  North 
and  the  South  in  a  yet  undecided  position.  It  is  true  that 
victory  had  constantly  granted  her  favors  to  the  army  of 
Scott ;  but  that  army  was  small,  and  the  columns  of  the 
enemy  were  numerous,  and  his  defences  strong.  Cha- 
pultepec  looked  down  from  almost  impregnable  heights. 
The  rays  of  the  risen  sun  glanced  from  the  plumes  and 
swords  and  guns  of  twenty  thousand  men.  Mexico  poured 
out  her  throng  to  defend  her  gates  and  walls,  and  ditches 
and  causeways  raised  their  obstacles  and  embarrassments 
in  the  way  of  the  American  general.  Night  had  now 
come,  and  all  these  arms,  and  fortresses,  and  soldiers,  and 
obstacles  had  disappeared,  as  if  charmed  away  by  the 
magician's  wand,  before  the  triumphant  energy  of  the 
northern  soldier.  The  flag  of  the  republic  of  the  North 
waved  in  the  evening  breeze  from  the  rock-built  castle  .of 
Chapultepec,  and  now  as  the  clouds  of  night  gather  in 
darkness  round  its  summit,  some  famished  dog  may  find 

1  Letter  in  the  New  York  Courier  and  Enquirer. 
AA 


302  CITY  ASKS  FOR  TERMS. 

his  meal  on  the  cold  flesh  of  its  brave  but  unfortunate 
defenders.  The  clouds  will  break  away,  and  the  stars 
beam  out  upon  that  lonely  hill ;  but  from  those  cold 
bodies  no  cloud  will  break,  no  stars  beam  out  on  earth 
for  the  loved  hearts  who  wait  and  watch  for  them.1  The 
victor  rushes  on  !  Batteries  are  taken,  causeways  passed, 
and  his  cannon  thunder  and  batter  at  the  gates  of  Mexico. 
Night  has  found  him  too,  and  the  sentinel  alone  keeps 
watch  round  the  wearied  soldier  of  America,  who  sinks 
to  rest  with  his  garments  yet  rolled  in  blood.  Neither 
the  glorious  drama  of  such  a  day,  the  grandeur  of  such  a 
scene,  nor  the  strange  novelty  of  such  events,  can  repel 
the  weariness  of  fatigue,  or  prevent  the  necessity  of  re 
pose.  He  sinks  to  rest  as  softly  and  calmly  as  the  inno 
cent  child,  and  welcomes  to  his  aching  limbs  and  drowsy 
eyes, 

"  Tired  Nature's  sweet  restorer,  balmy  sleep." 

Daylight  of  the  14th  of  September  had  scarcely  arrived, 
when  the  Ayuntamiento  (city  council)  of  Mexico  waited 
upon  General  Scott,  informed  him  that  both  the  Mexican 
government  and  army  had  marched  out  of  the  city  some 
hours  before,  and  demanded  terms  of  capitulation.2  The 
general  replied  that  the  city  was  virtually  in  his  power 
the  night  previous,  and  that  the  American  army  would 
come  under  no  terms  not  self-imposed.  About  daylight 
he  gave  his  orders  to  Worth  and  Quitman  to  advance  and 
occupy  the  city.  The  corps  of  Quitman  rushed  forward, 


1  Intercepted  Mexican  letters  show  that  many  of  the  Mexican  officers 
were  anxiously  awaited  by  sisters,  wives,  and  mothers. 
8  Scott's  Official  Despatch. 


GEN.   SCOTT  ENTERS  THE  GRAND  PLAZA.  303 

and  soon  the  colors  of  its  regiments  were  planted  on  the 
far-famed  palace  of  Mexico.  Worth's  division  had  been 
delayed  at  the  Alameda  ;  that  the  men  who  had  entered 
the  Belen  gate  the  night  before,  might  be  first  in  the 
grand  plaza.  At  7  A.  M.,  on  the  14th  of  September, 
1847,  the  flag  of  the  American  Union  was  hoisted  on  the 
walls  of  the  national  palace  in  the  city  of  Mexico.  Soon 
after  this  event,  at  9  A.  M.,  a  "  tremendous  hurrah  broke 
from  the  corner  of  the  plaza,  and  in  a  few  minutes  were 
seen  the  towering  plumes  and  commanding  form  of  our 
gallant  old  hero,  GENERAL  SCOTT,  escorted  by  the  2d 
dragoons.  The  heartfelt  welcome  that  came  from  our 
little  band  was  such  as  Montezumas'  Halls  had  never 
heard,  and  must  have  deeply  affected  the  general."1 

Soon  after  this  a  firing  was  Jieard,  and  it  appeared  that 
the  Leperos,  or  mob  of  the  city,  with  some  liberated  con 
victs,  had  made  an  insurrection.  A  fire  was  opened  on 
our  men  from  the  flat  roofs  of  houses,  from  windows  and 
corners  of  streets,  by  the  vagabonds  of  the  city,  liberated 
convicts,  and  disbanded  soldiers.  This  was  not  put  down 
till  twenty-four  hours  had  passed,  and  till  many  were 
killed  and  wounded.  The  object  was  as  much  plunder, 
as  hatred.2 

We  insert  here  the  official  report  of  the  Commander- 
in-chief,  General  Scott. 


1  Letter  of  an  officer  of  the  Rifles. 
*  Scott's  Official  Report. 


304  OFFICIAL    DESPATCH    OF    GEN.    SCOTT. 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,  i 
National  Palace  of  Mexico,  Sept.  18,  1847.  J 

SIR  : — At  the  end  of  another  series  of  arduous  and  brilliant 
operations  of  more  than  forty-eight  hours'  continuance,  this 
glorious  army  hoisted,  on  the  morning  of  the  14th,  the  colors 
of  the  United  States  on  the  walls  of  this  palace. 

The  victory  of  the  8th,  at  the  Molino  del  Rey,  was  fol 
lowed  by  daring  reconnoissunces  on  the  part  of  our  distin 
guished  engineers — Capt.  Lee,  Lieuts.  Beauregard,  Stevens, 
and  Tower, — Major  Smith,  senior,  being  sick,  and  Capt. 
Mason,  third  in  rank,  wounded.  Their  operations  were  di 
rected  principally  to  the  south — towards  the  gates  of  the 
Piedad,  San  Angel,  (Nino  Perdido,)  San  Antonio,  and  the 
Paseo  de  la  Viga. 

This  city  stands  on  a  slight  swell  of  ground,  near  the 
centre  of  an  irregular  basin,  and  is  girdled  with  a  ditch  in  its 
greater  extent — a  navigable  canal  of  great  breadth  and  depth 
— very  difficult  to  bridge  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy,  and 
serving  at  once  for  drainage,  custom-house  purposes,  and  mili 
tary  defence  ;  leaving  eight  entrances  or  gates,  over  arches — 
each  of  which  we  found  defended  by  a  system  of  strong 
works,  that  seemed  to  require  nothing  but  some  men  and  guns 
to  be  impregnable. 

Outside  and  within  the  cross-fires  of  those  gates,  we  found 
to  the  south  other  obstacles  but  little  less  formidable.  All  the 
approaches  near  the  city  are  over  elevated  causeways,  cut  in 
many  places  (to  oppose  us),  and  flanked  o'n  both  sides  by 
ditches,  also  of  unusual  dimensions.  The  numerous  cross 
roads  are  flanked  in  like  manner,  having  bridges  at  the  inter 
sections,  recently  broken.  The  meadows  thus  checkered,  are, 
moreover,  in  many  spots,  under  water  or  marshy  ;  for,  it  will 
be  remembered,  we  were  in  the  midst  of  the  wet  season, 
though  with  less  rain  than  usual,  and  we  could  not  wait  for 


OFFICIAL  DESPATCH  OF  GEN.  SCOTT.       305 

the  fall  of  the  neighboring  lakes  and  the  consequent  drainage 
of  the  wet  grounds  at  the  edge  of  the  city — the  lowest  in  the 
whole  basin. 

After  a  close  personal  survey  of  the  southern  gates,  covered 
by  Pillow's  division  and  Riley's  brigade  of  Twiggs' — with  four 
times  our  numbers  concentrated  in  our  immediate  front — I  de 
termined  on  the  llth  to  avoid  that  net- work  of  obstacles,  and 
to  seek,  by  a  sudden  diversion,  to  the  southwest  and  west,  less 
unfavorable  approaches. 

To  economize  the  lives  of  our  gallant  officers  and  men,  as 
well  as  to  ensure  success,  it  became  indispensable  that  this  res 
olution  should  be  long  masked  from  the  enemy  ;  and  again, 
that  the  new  movement,  when  discovered,  should  be  mistaken 
for  a  feint,  and  the  old  as  indicating  our  true  and  ultimate  point 
of  attack. 

Accordingly,  on  the  spot,  the  llth,  I  ordered  Quitman's 
division  from  Coyoacan,  to  join  Pillow,  by  daylight,  before  the 
southern  gates,  and  then  that  the  two  major-generals,  with 
their  divisions,  should,  by  night,  proceed  (two  miles)  to  join 
me  at  Tacubaya,  where  I  was  quartered  with  Worth's  di 
vision.  Twiggs,  with  Riley's  brigade  and  Captains  Taylor's 
and  Steptoe's  field  batteries — the  latter  of  12-pounders — was 
left  in  front  of  those  gates,  to  manoeuvre,  to  threaten,  or  to 
make  false  attacks,  in  order  to  occupy  and  deceive  the  enemy. 
Twiggs'  other  brigade  (Smith's)  was  left  at  supporting  dis 
tance,  in  the  rear,  at  San  Angel,  till  the  morning  of  the  13th, 
and  also  to  support  our  general  depot  at  Miscoac.  The  strata 
gem  against  the  south  was  admirably  executed  throughout 
the  12th  and  down  to  the  afternoon  of  the  13th,  when  it  was 
too  late  for  the  enemy  to  recover  from  the  effects  of  his 
delusion. 

The  first  step  in  the  new  movement  was  to  carry  Chapultepec, 
a  natural  and  isolated  mound,  of  great  elevation,  strongly  for- 
AA2  20 


306  OFFICIAL    DESPATCH    OF    GEN.    SCOTT. 

tified  at  its  base,  on  its  acclivities,  and  heights.  Besides  a 
numerous  garrison,  here  was  the  military  college  of  the  re 
public,  with  a  large  number  of  sub -lieutenants  and  other  stu 
dents.  Those  works  were  within  direct  gun-shot  of  the  village 
of  Tacubaya,  and,  until  carried,  we  could  not  approach  the, 
city  on  the  west,  without  making  a  circuit  too  wide  and  too 
hazardous. 

In  the  course  of  the  same  night  (that  of  the  llth)  heavy 
batteries,  within  easy  ranges,  were  established.  No.  1,  on  our 
right,  under  the  command  of  Capt.  Drum,  4th  artillery,  (re 
lieved  late  next  day,  for  some  hours,  by  Lieut.  Andrews  of  the 
3d,)  and  No.  2,  commanded  by  Lieut.  Hagner,  ordnance — 
both  supported  by  Quitman's  division.  Nos.  3  and  4  on  the 
opposite  side,  supported  by  Pillow's  division,  were  commanded, 
the  former  by  Capt.  Brooks  and  Lieut.  S.  S.  Anderson,  2d 
artillery,  alternately,  and  the  latter  by  Lieut.  Stone,  ordnance. 
The  batteries  were  traced  by  Capt.  Huger  and  Capt.  Lee, 
engineer,  and  constructed  by  them  with  the  able  assistance  of 
the  young  officers  of  those  corps  and  the  artillery. 

To  prepare  for  an  assault,  it  was  foreseen  that  the  play  of 
the  batteries  might  run  into  the  second  day  ;  but  recent  cap 
tures  had  not  only  trebled  our  siege  pieces,  but  also  our 
ammunition ;  and  we  knew  that  we  should  greatly  augment 
both  by  carrying  the  place.  I  was,  therefore,  in  no  haste  in 
ordering  an  assault  before  the  works  were  well  crippled  by 
our  missiles. 

The  bombardment  and  cannonade,  under  the  direction  of 
Capt.  Huger,  were  commenced  early  in  the  morning  of  the  12th. 
Before  nightfall,  which  necessarily  stopped  our  batteries,  we 
had  perceived  that  a  good  impression  had  been  made  on  the 
castle  and  its  outworks,  and  that  a  large  body- of  the  enemy 
had  remained  outside,  towards  the  city,  from  an  early  hour  to 
avoid  our  fire,  and  to  be  at  hand  on  its  cessation,  in  order  to 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCH 'OF    GEN.    SCOTT.  307 

reinforce  the  garrison  against  an  assault.  The  same  outside 
force  was  discovered  the  next  morning,  after  our  batteries  had 
reopened  upon  the  castle,  by  which  we  again  reduced  its  gar 
rison  to  the  minimum  needed  for  the  guns. 

Pillow  and  Quitman  had  been  in  position  since  early  in  the 
night  of  the  llth.  Major-general  Worth  was  now  ordered  to 
hold  his  division  in  reserve,  near  the  foundry,  to  support 
Pillow ;  and  Brigadier-general  Smith,  of  Twiggs'  division,  had 
just  arrived  with  his  brigade  from  Piedad,  (2  miles,)  to  sup 
port  Quitman.  Twiggs'  guns,  before  the  southern  gates,  again 
reminded  us,  as  the  day  before,  that  he,  with  Riley's  brigade 
and  Taylor's  and  Steptoe's  batteries,  was  in  activity,  threaten 
ing  the  southern  gates,  and  there  holding  a  great  part  of  the 
Mexican  army  on  the  defensive. 

Worth's  division  furnished  Pillow's  attack  with  an  assaulting 
party  of  some  250  volunteer  officers  and  men,  under  Capt. 
McKenzie,  of  the  2d  artillery ;  and  Twiggs'  division  supplied 
a  similar  one,  commanded  by  Capt.  Casey,  2d  infantry,  to 
Quitman.  Each  of  those  little  columns  was  furnished  with 
scaling  ladders. 

The  signal  I  had  appointed  for  the  attack  was  the  momen 
tary  cessation  of  fire  on  the  part  of  our  heavy  batteries. 
About  8  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  13th,  judging  that  the 
time  had  arrived  by  the  effect  of  the  missiles  we  had  thrown, 
I  sent  an  aid-de-camp  to  Pillow,  and  another  to  Quitman,  with 
notice  that  the  concerted  signal  was  about  to  be  given.  Both 
columns  now  advanced  with  an  alacrity  that  gave  assurance  of 
prompt  success.  The  batteries,  seizing  opportunities,  threw 
shots  and  shells  upon  the  enemy  over  the  heads  of  our  men, 
with  good  effect,  particularly  at  every  attempt  to  reinforce  the 
works  from  without  to  meet  our  assault. 

Major-general  Pillow's  approach,  on  the  west  side,  lay 
through  an  open  grove,  filled  with  sharp-shooters,  who  were 


308       OFFICIAL  DESPATCH  OF  GEN.  SCOTT. 

speedily  dislodged ;  when  being  up  with  the  front  of  the  at 
tack,  and  emerging  into  open  space,  at  the  foot  of  a  rocky  ac 
clivity,  that  gallant  leader  was  struck  down  by  an  agonizing 
wound.  The  immediate  command  devolved  on  Brigadier- 
general  Cadwallader,  in  the  absence  of  the  senior  brigadier 
(Pierce)  of  the  same  division — an  invalid  since  the  events  of 
August  19.  On  a  previous  call  of  Pillow,  Worth  had  just 
sent  him  a  reinforcement — Colonel  Clarke's  brigade. 

The  fjroken  acclivity  was  still  to  be  ascended,  and  a  strong 
redoubt,  midway,  to  be  carried,  before  reaching  the  castle  on 
the  heights.  The  advance  of  our  brave  men,  led  by  brave 
officers,  though  necessarily  slow,  was  unwavering,  over  rocks, 
* '.basins,  and  mines,  and  under  the  hottest  fire  of  cannon  and 
musketry.  The  redoubt  now  yielded  to  resistless  valor,  and 
the  shouts  that  followed  announced  to  the  castle  the  fate  that 
impended.  The  enemy  were  steadily  driven  from  shelter  to 
shelter.  The  retreat  allowed  not  time  to  fire  a  single  mine, 
without  the  certainty  of  blowing  up  friend  and  foe.  Those 
who  at  a  distance  attempted  to  apply  matches  to  the  long 
trains,  were  shot  down  by  our  men.  There  was  death  below, 
as  well  as  above  ground.  At  length  the  ditch  and  wall  of 
the  main  work  were  reached ;  the  scaling  ladders  were 
brought  up  and  planted  by  the  storming  parties ;  some  of 
the  daring  spirits  first  in  the  assault  were  cast  down — killed 
or  wounded  ;  but  a  lodgment  was  soon  made ;  streams  of 
heroes  followed  ;  all  opposition  was  overcome,  and  several  of 
our  regimental  colors  flung  out  from  the  upper  walls,  amidst 
long-continued  shouts  and  cheers,  which  sent  dismay  into 
the  capital.  No  scene  could  have  been  more  animating  or 
glorious. 

Major-general  Quitman,  nobly  supported  by  Brigadier- 
generals  Shields  and  Smith,  (P.  F.,)  his  other  officers  and 
men,  was  up  with  the  part  assigned  him.  Simultaneously  with 


OFFICIAL  DESPATCH  OF  GEN.  SCOTT.       309 

the  movement  on  the  west,  he  had  gallantly  approached  the 
southeast  of  the  same  works,  over  a  causeway  with  cuts  and 
batteries,  and  defended  by  an  army  strongly  posted  outside, 
to  the  east  of  the  works.  Those  formidable  obstacles  Quit- 
man  had  to  face,  with  but  little  shelter  for  his  troops  or 
space  for  manoeuvring.  Deep  ditches  flanking  the  causeway, 
made  it  difficult  to  cross  on  either  side  into  the  adjoining 
meadows,  and  these  again  were  intersected  by  other  ditches. 
Smith  and  his  brigade  had  been  early  thrown  out  to  make 
a  sweep  to  the  right,  in  order  to  present  a  front  against  the 
enemy's  line,  (outside,)  and  to  turn  two  intervening  batteries 
near  the  foot  of  Chapultepec.  This  movement  was  also  in 
tended  to  support  Quitman's  storming  parties,  both  on  the 
causeway.  The  first  of  these,  furnished  by  Twiggs'  division, 
was  commanded  in  succession  by  Captain  Casey,  2d  infantry, 
and  Captain  Paul,  7th  infantry,  after  Casey  had  been  severely 
wounded  ;  and  the  second,  originally  under  the  gallant  Major 
Twiggs,  marine  corps,  killed,  and  then  Captain  Miller,  2d 
Pennsylvania  volunteers.  The  storming  party,  now  com 
manded  by  Captain  Paul  seconded  by  Captain  Roberts,  of 
the  rifles,  Lieutenant  Stewart,  and  others  of  the  same  regi 
ment,  Smith's  brigade,  carried  the  two  batteries  hi  the  road, 
took  some  guns,  with  many  prisoners,  and  drove  the  enemy 
posted  behind  in  support.  The  New  York  and  South  Caro 
lina  volunteers  (Shields'  brigade)  and  the  2d  Pennsylvania 
volunteers,  all  on  the  left  of  Quitman's  line,  together  with 
portions  of  his  storming  parties,  crossed  the  meadows  in  front, 
under  a  heavy  fire,  and  entered  the  outer  enclosure  of  Chapul 
tepec  just  in  time  to  join  in  the  final  assault  from  the  west. 

Besides  Major-generals  Pillow  and  Quitman,  Brigadier- 
generals  Shields,  Smith,  and  Cadwallader,  the  following  are 
the  officers  and  corps  most  distinguished  in  those  brilliant 
operations :  The  voltigeur  regiment  in  two  detachments,  com- 


310       OFFICIAL  DESPATCH  OF  GEN.  SCOTT. 

manded  respectively  by  Colonel  Andrews  and  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Johnstone — the  latter  mostly  in  the  lead,  accompanied 
by  Major  Caldwell ;  Captains  Barnard  and  Biddle,  of  the 
same  regiment — the  former  the  first  to  plant  a  regimental 
color,  and  the  latter  among  the  first  in  the  assault;  the 
storming  party  of  Worth's  division,  under  Captain  McKenzie, 
2d  artillery,  with  Lieutenant  Seldon,  8th  infantry,  early  on 
the  ladder  and  badly  wounded ;  Lieutenant  Armistead,  6th 
infantry,  the  first  to  leap  into  the  ditch  to  plant  a  ladder ; 
Lieutenants  Rodgers  of  the  4th,  and  J.  P.  Smith  of  the  5th 
infantry — both  mortally  wounded ;  the  9th  infantry,  under 
Colonel  Ransom,  who  was  killed  while  gallantly  leading  that 
gallant  regiment ;  the  loth  infantry,  under  Lieutenant-colonel 
Howard  and  Major  Woods,  with  Captain  Chase,  whose  com 
pany  gallantly  carried  the  redoubt,  midway  up  the  acclivity ; 
Colonel  Clarke's  brigade  (Worth's  division)  consisting  of  the 
5th,  8th,  and  part  of  the  6th  regiments  of  infantry,  com 
manded  respectively  by  Captain  Chapman,  Major  Mont 
gomery,  and  Lieutenant  Edward  Johnson — the  latter  specially 
noticed,  with  Lieutenants  Longstreet,  (badly  wounded,  ad 
vancing,  colors  in  hand,)  Pickett,  and  Merchant,  the  last  three 
of  the  8th  infantry ;  portions  of  the  United  States  marines, 
New  York,  South  Carolina,  and  2d  Pennsylvania  volunteers, 
which,  delayed  with  their  division  (Quitman's)  by  the  hot  en 
gagement  below,  arrived  just  in  time  to  participate  in  the 
assault  of  the  heights — particularly  a  detachment  under  Lieu 
tenant  Reid,  New  York  volunteers,  consisting  of  a  company 
of  the  same,  with  one  of  marines  ;  and  another  detachment, 
a  portion  of  the  storming  party,  (Twiggs'  division,  serving 
with  Quitman,)  under  Lieutenant  Steele,  2d  infantry,  after 
the  fall  of  Lieutenant  Gantt,  7th  infantry. 

In  this  connection,  it  is  but  just  to  recall  the  decisive  effect 
of  the  heavy  batteries,  Nos.  1,  2,   3,  and  4,  commanded  by 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCH    OF    GEN.    SCOTT.  311 

those  excellent  officers,  Captain  Drum,  4th  artillery,  assisted 
by  Lieutenants  Benjamin  and  Porter  of  his  own  company ; 
Captain  Brooks  and  Lieutenant  Anderson,  2d  artillery,  as 
sisted  by  Lieutenant  Russell,  4th  infantry,  a  volunteer ;  Lieu 
tenants  Hagner  and  Stone  of  the  ordnance,  and  Lieutenant 
Andrews,  3d  artillery  ;  the  whole  superintended  by  Captain 
Huger,  chief  of  ordnance  with  this  army — an  officer  dis 
tinguished  by  every  kind  of  merit.  The  mountain  howitzer 
battery,  under  Lieutenant  Reno,  of  the  ordnance,  deserves, 
also,  to  be  particularly  mentioned.  Attached  to  the  volti- 
geurs,  it  followed  the  movements  of  that  regiment,  and  again 
won  applause. 

In  adding  to  the  list  of  individuals  of  conspicuous  merit,  I 
must  limit  myself  to  a  few  of  the  many  names  which  might 
be  enumerated  :  Captain  Hooker,  assistant  adjutant-general, 
who  won  special  applause,  successively,  in  the  staff  of  Pillow 
and  Cadwallader;  Lieutenant  Lovell,  4th  artillery,  (wounded,) 
chief  of  Quitman's  staff;  Captain  Page,  assistant  adjutant- 
general,  (wounded,)  and  Lieutenant  Hammond,  3d  artillery, 
both  of  Shields'  staff,  and  Lieutenant  Van  Dorn,  (7th  in 
fantry,)  aid-de-camp  to  Brigadier-general  Smith. 

Those  operations  all  occurred  on  the  west,  southeast,  and 
heights  of  Chapultepec.  To  the  north  and  at  the  base  of  the 
mound,  inaccessible  on  that  side,  the  llth  infantry,  under 
Lieut.  Col.  Hebert,  the  14th,  under  Col.  Trousdale,  and  Capt. 
Magruder's  field  battery,  1st  artillery — one  section  advanced 
under  Lieut.  Jackson — all  of  Pillow's  division — had,  at  the 
same  time,  some  spirited  affairs  against  superior  numbers, 
driving  the  enemy  from  a  battery  in  the  road,  and  capturing  a 
gun.  In  these,  the  officers  and  corps  named  gained  merited 
praise.  Colonel  Trousdale,  the  commander,  though  twice 
wounded,  continued  on  duty  until  the  heights  were  carried. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  13th,  I  repeated  the  orders  of 


312        OFFICIAL  DESPATCH  OF  GEN.  SCOTT. 

the  night  before  to  Major-general  Worth,  to  be,  with  his 
division  at  hand,  to  support  the  movement  of  Major-general 
Pillow  from  our  left.  The  latter  seems  soon  to  have  called 
for  that  entire  division,  standing  momentarily  in  reserve,  and 
Worth  sent,  him  Col.  Clarke's  brigade.  The  call,  if  not  un 
necessary,  was  at  least,  from  the  circumstances,  unknown  to  me 
at  the  time  ;  for,  soon  observing  that  the  very  large  body  of 
the  enemy,  in  the  road  in  front  of  Major-general  Quitman's 
right,  was  receiving  reinforcements  from  the  city — less  than  a 
mile  and  a  half  to  the  east — I  sent  instructions  to  Worth,  on 
our  opposite  flank,  to  turn  Chapul tepee  with  his  division,  and 
to  proceed,  cautiously,  by  the  road  at  its  northern  base,  in 
order,  if  not  met  by  very  superior  numbers,  to  threaten  or  to 
attack,  in  rear,  that  body  of  the  enemy.  The  movement,  it 
was  also  believed,  could  not  fail  to  distract  and  to  intimidate 
the  enemy  generally. 

Worth  promptly  advanced  with  his  remaining  brigade — 
Colonel  Garland's — Lieut.  Col.  C.  F.  Smith's  light  battalion, 
Lieut.  Col.  Duncan's  field  battery — all  of  his  division — and 
three  squadrons  of  dragoons,  under  Major  Sumner,  which  I 
had  just  ordered  up  to  join  in  the  movement. 

Having  turned  the  forest  on  the  west,  and  arriving  opposite 
to  the  north  centre  of  Chapultepec,  Worth  came  up  with  the 
troops  in  the  road,  under  Col.  Trousdale,  and  aided,  by  a  flank 
movement  of  a  part  of  Garland's  brigade,  in  taking  the  one 
<run  breastwork,  then  under  the  fire  of  Lieut.  Jackson's  section 
of  Capt.  Magruder's  field  battery.  Continuing  to  advance, 
this  division  passed  Chapultepec,  attacking  the  right  of  the 
enemy's  line,  resting  on  that  road,  about  the  moment  of  the 
o-eneral  retreat  consequent  upon  the  capture  of  the  formidable 
castle  and  its  outworks. 

Arriving  some  minutes  later,  and  mounting  to  the  top  of  the 
castle,  the  whole  field,  to  the  east,  lay  plainly  under  my  view. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCH    OF    GEN.    SCOTT.  313 

There  are  two  routes  from  Chapultepec  to  the  capital — the 
one  on  the  right  entering  the  same  gate,  Belen,  with  the  road 
from  the  south,  via  Piedad  ;  and  the  other  obliquing  to  the 
left,  to  intersect  the  great  western,  or  San  Cosmo  road,  in  a 
suburb  outside  of  the  gate  of  San  Cosmo. 

Each  of  these  routes  (an  elevated  causeway)  presents  a 
double  roadway  on  the  sides  of  an  aqueduct  of  strong  mason 
ry  and  great  height,  resting  on  open  arches  and  massive 
pillars,  which  together  afford  fine  points  both  for  attack  and 
defence.  The  sideways  of  both  aqueducts  are,  moreover, 
defended  by  many  strong  breastworks  at  the  gates,  and  before 
reaching  them.  As  we  had  expected,  we  found  the  four 
tracks  unusually  dry  and  solid  for  the  season. 

Worth  and  Quitman  were  prompt  in  pursuing  the  retreating 
enemy — the  former  by  the  San  Cosmo  aqueduct,  and  the 
latter  along  that  of  Belen.  Each  had  now  advanced  some 
hundred  yards. 

Deeming  it  all-important  to  profit  by  our  successes,  and  the 
consequent  dismay  of  the  enemy,  which  could  not  be  otherwise 
than  general,  I  hastened  to  despatch  from  Chapultepec — first 
Clark's  brigade,  and  then  Cadwallader's,  to  the  support  of 
Worth,  and  gave  orders  that  the  necessary  heavy  guns  should 
follow.  Pierce's  brigade  was,  at  the  same  time,  sent  to  Quit 
man,  and,  in  the  course  of  the  afternoon,  I  caused  some 
additional  siege  pieces  to  be  added  to  his  train.  Then,  after 
designating  the  15th  infantry,  under  Lieut.  Col.  Howard- 
Morgan,  the  colonel,  had  been  disabled  by  a  wound  at  Churu- 
busco — as  the  garrison  of  Chapultepec,  and  giving  directions 
fv>r  the  care  of  the  prisoners  of  war,  the  captured  ordnance 
and  ordnance  stores,  I  proceeded  to  join  the  advance  of 
Worth,  within  the  suburb,  and  beyond  the  turn  at  the  junction 
of  the  aqueduct  with  the  great  highway  from  the  west  to  the 
gate  of  San  Cosmo. 

BB 


314  OFFICIAL    DESPATCH    OF    GEN.    SCOTT. 

At  this  junction  of  roads,  we  first  passed  one  of  those 
formidable  systems  of  city  defences,  spoken  of  above,  and  it 
had  not  a  gun ! — a  strong  proof,  1.  That  the  enemy  had 
expected  us  to  fail  in  the  attack  upon  Chapultepec,  even  if  we 
meant  any  thing  more  than  a  feint ;  2.  That,  in  either  case, 
we  designed,  in  his  belief,  to  return  and  double  our  forces 
against  the  southern  gates — a  delusion  kept  up  by  the  active 
demonstrations  of  Twiggs  and  the  forces  posted  on  that  side ; 
and,  3.  That  advancing  rapidly  from  the  reduction  of  Chapul 
tepec,  the  enemy  had  not  time  to  shift  guns — our  previous 
captures  had  left  him,  comparatively,  but  few — from  the 
southern  gates. 

Within  those  disgarnished  works,  I  found  our  troops  engaged 
in  a  street  fight  against  the  enemy  posted  in  gardens,  at  win 
dows,  and  on  house-tops — all  flat,  with  parapets.  Worth 
ordered  forward  the  mountain  howitzers  of  Cadwallader's 
brigade,  preceded  by  skirmishers  and  pioneers,  with  pickaxes 
and  crowbars,  to  force  windows  and  doors,  or  to  burrow 
through  walls.  The  assailants  were  soon  in  an  equality  of 
position  fatal  to  the  enemy.  By  eight  o'clock  in  the  evening, 
Worth  had  carried  two  batteries  in  this  suburb.  According 
to  my  instructions,  he  here  posted  guards  and  sentinels,  and 
placed  his  troops  under  shelter  for  the  night.  There  was  but 
one  more  obstacle — the  San  Cosmo  gate,  (custom-house,)  be 
tween  him  and  the  great  square  in  front  of  the  cathedral  and 
palace,  the  heart  of  the  city  ;  and  that  barrier  it  was  known 
could  not,  by  daylight,  resist  our  siege  guns  thirty  minutes. 

I  had  gone  back  to  the  foot  of  Chapultepec,  the  point  from 
which  the  two  aqueducts  begin  to  diverge,  some  hours  earlier, 
in  order  to  be  near  that  new  depot,  and  in  easy  communication 
with  Quitman  and  Twiggs,  as  well  as  with  Worth. 

From  this  point  I  ordered  all  detachments  and  stragglers 
to  their  respective  corps,  then  in  advance ;  sent  to  Quitman  ad- 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCH    OF    GEN.    SCOTT.  315 

ditional  siege  guns,  ammunition,  intrenching  tools  ;  directed 
Twiggs'  remaining  brigade  (liiley's)  from  Piedad,  to  support 
Worth,  and  Captain  Steptoe's  field-battery,  also  at  Piedad,  to 
rejoin  Quitman's  division. 

I  had  been,  from  the  first,  well  aware  that  the  western  or 
San  Cosmo,  was  the  less  difficult  route  to  the  centre,  and  con 
quest  of  the  capital,  and  therefore  intended  that  Quitman 
should  only  manceuvre  and  threaten  the  Belen  or  southwest 
ern  gate,  in  order  to  favor  the  main  attack  by  Worth,  knowing 
that  the  strong  defences  at  the  Belen  were  directly  under  the 
guns  of  the  much  stronger  fortress,  called  the  Citadel,  just 
within.  Both  of  these  defences  of  the  enemy  were  also  with 
in  easy  supporting  distance  from  the  San  Angel  (or  Nino  Per- 
dido)  and  San  Antonio  gates.  Hence  the  greater  support,  in 
numbers,  given  to  Worth's  movement  as  the  main  attack. 

These  views  I  repeatedly,  in  the  course  of  the  day,  commu 
nicated  to  Major-general  Quitman ;  but  being  in  hot  pursuit — 
gallant  himself,  arid  ably  supported  by  Brigadier-generals 
Shields  and  Smith,  Shields  badly  wounded  before  Chapulte- 
pec,  and  refusing  to  retire,  as  well  as  by  all  the  officers  and 
men  of  the  column — Quitman  continued  to  press  forward, 
under  flank  and  direct  fires,  carried  an  intermediate  battery  of 
two  guns,  and  then  the  gate,  before  two  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon,  but  not  without  proportionate  loss,  increased  by  his 
steady  maintenance  of  that  position. 

Here,  of  the  heavy  battery,  (4th  artillery,)  Captain  Drum 
and  Lieutenant  Benjamin  were  mortally  wounded,  and  Lieu 
tenant  Porter,  its  third  in  rank,  slightly.  The  loss  of  those 
two  most  distinguished  officers  the  army  will  long  mourn. 
Lieutenants  J.  B.  Morange  and  William  Canty,  of  the  South 
Carolina  volunteers,  also  of  high  merit,  fell  on  the  same  occa 
sion,  besides  many  of  our  bravest  non-commissioned  officers 
and  men,  particularly  in  Captain  Drum's  veteran  company.  1 


316  OFFICIAL   DESPATCH    OF    GEN.    SCOTT. 

cannot,  in  this  place,  give  names  or  numbers ;  but  full  returns 
of  the  killed  and  wounded,  of  all  corps,  in  their  recent  opera 
tions,  will  accompany  this  report. 

Quitman  within  the  city — adding  several  new  defences  to 
the  position  he  had  won,  and  sheltering  his  corps  as  well  as 
practicable — now  awaited  the  return  of  daylight  under  the 
guns  of  the  formidable  citadel,  yet  to  be  subdued. 

About  4  o'clock  next  morning,  (Sept.  14,)  a  deputation  of 
the  ayuntamiento  (city  council)  waited  upon  me  to  report  that 
the  federal  government  and  the  army  of  Mexico  had  fled  from 
the  capital  some  three  hours  before  ;  and  to  demand  terms  of 
capitulation  hi  favor  of  the  church,  the  citizens,  and  the  mu 
nicipal  authorities.  I  promptly  replied,  that  I  would  sign  no 
capitulation;  that  the  city  had  been  virtually  in  our  possession 
from  the  time  of  the  lodgments  effected  by  Worth  and  Quit- 
man  the  day  before  ;  that  I  regretted  the  silent  escape  of  the 
Mexican  army ;  that  I  should  levy  upon  the  city  a  moderate 
contribution,  for  special  purposes  ;  and  that  the  American 
army  should  come  under  no  terms  not  self-imposed  :  such 
only  as  its  own  honor,  the  dignity  of  the  United  States,  and 
the  spirit  of  the  age,  should,  in  my  opinion,  imperiously  de 
mand  and  impose. 

For  the  terms,  so  imposed,  I  refer  the  department  to  subse 
quent  General  Orders,  Nos.  287  and  289,  (paragraphs  7,  8, 
and  9  of  the  latter,)  copies  of  which  are  herewith  enclosed. 

At  the  termination  of  the  interview  with  the  city  deputation, 
I  communicated,  about  daylight,  orders  to  Worth  and  Quit 
man  to  advance  slowly  and  cautiously  (to  guard  against  treach 
ery)  towards  the  heart  of  the  city,  and  to  occupy  its  stronger 
and  more  commanding  points.  Quitman  proceeded  to  the 
great  plaza  or  square,  planted  guards,  and  hoisted  the  colors 
of  the  United  States  on  the  national  palace,  containing  the 
halls  of  Congress  and  executive  departments  of  federal  Mexico. 


OFFICIAL    DESPATCH    OF    GEN.    SCOTT.  317 

In  this  grateful  service,  Quitman  might  have  been  anticipated 
by  Worth,  but  for  my  express  orders,  halting  the  latter  at  the 
head  of  the  Alameda,  (a  green  park,)  within  three  squares  of 
that  goal  of  general  ambition.  The  capital,  however,  was  not 
taken  by  any  one  or  two  corps,  but  by  the  talent,  the  science, 
the  gallantry,  the  prowess  of  this  entire  army.  In  the  glori- 
rious  conquest,  all  had  contributed,  early  and  powerfully,  the 
killed,  the  wounded,  and  the  fit  for  duty,  at  Vera  Cruz,  Cerro 
Gordo,  Contreras,  San  Antonia,  Churubusco,  (three  battles,) 
the  Molino  del  Rey,  and  Chapultepec,  as  much  as  those  who 
fought  at  the  gates  of  Belen  and  San  Cosmo. 

Soon  after  we  had  entered,  and  were  in  the  act  of  occupy 
ing  the  city,  a  fire  was  opened  upon  us  from  the  flat  roofs  of 
the  houses,  from  windows  and  corners  of  streets,  by  some  two 
thousand  convicts,  liberated  the  night  before  by  the  flying 
government,  joined  by,  perhaps,  as  many  Mexican  soldiers, 
who  had  disbanded  themselves,  and  thrown  off  their  uniforms. 
This  unlawful  war  lasted  more  than  twenty-four  hours,  in 
spite  of  the  exertions  of  the  municipal  authorities,  and  was  not 
put  down  till  we  had  lost  many  men,  including  several  officers, 
killed  or  wounded,  and  had  punished  the  miscreants.  Their 
objects  were  to  gratify  national  hatred,  and  in  the  general 
alarm  and  confusion,  to  plunder  the  wealthy  inhabitants,  par 
ticularly  the  deserted  houses.  But  families  are  now  generally 
returning ;  business  of  every  kind  has  been  resumed,  and  the 
city  is  already  tranquil  and  cheerful,  under  the  admirable 
conduct  (with  exceptions  very  few  and  trifling)  of  our  gallant 
troops. 

This  army  has  been  more  disgusted  than  surprised,  that  by 
some  sinister  process  on  the  part  of  certain  individuals  at 
home,  its  numbers  have  been,  generally,  almost  trebled  in  our 
public  papers,  beginning  at  Washington. 

Leaving,   as   we   all  feared,   inadequate  garrisons  at   Vera 

BB2 


318        OFFICIAL  DESPATCH  OF  GEN  SCOTT. 

Criiz,  Perote,  and  Puebla,  with  much  larger  hospitals ;  and 
being  obliged,  most  reluctantly,  from  the  same  cause  (general 
paucity  of  numbers)  to  abandon  Jalapa,  we  marched  (August 
7-10)  from  Puebla  with  only  10,738  rank  and  file.  This  num 
ber  includes  the  garrison  of  Jalapa,  and  the  2,429  men  brought 
up  by  Brigadier-general  Pierce,  August  6. 

At  Contreras,  Churubusco,  &c.,  [August  20,]  we  had  but 
8,497  men  engaged — after  deducting  the  garrison  of  San 
Augustin,  (our  general  depot,)  the  intermediate  sick  and  the 
dead ;  at  the  Molino  del  Rey,  (September  8,)  but  three 
brigades,  with  some  cavalry  and  artillery — making  in  all  3,251 
men — were  in  the  battle  ;  in  the  two  days — September  1 2th 
and  13th — our  whole  operating  force,  after  deducting,  again, 
the  recent  killed,  wounded,  and  sick,  together  with  the  garri 
son  of  Miscoac  (the  then  general  depot)  and  that  of  Tacubaya, 
was  but  7,180  ;  and,  finally,  after  deducting  the  new  garrison 
of  Chapultepec,  with  the  killed  and  wounded  of  the  two  days, 
we  took  possession,  (September  14th,)  of  this  great  capital 
with  less  than  6,000  men.  And  I  reassert,  upon  accumu 
lated  and  unquestionable  evidence,  that,  in  not  one  of  those 
conflicts  was  this  army  opposed  by  fewer  than  three-and-a-half 
times  its  numbers — in  several  of  them,  by  a  yet  greater  excess. 

I  recapitulate  our  losses  since  we  arrived  in  the  basin  of 
Mexico. 

AUGUST  19,  20.— Killed,  137,  including  14  officers.— 
Wounded,  877,  including  62  officers.  Massing,  (probably 
killed,)  38  rank  and  file.  Total,  1,052. 

SEPTEMBER  8. — Killed,  116,  including  9  officers. — Wounded, 
665,  including  49  officers.  Missing,  18  rank  and  file.  Total,  789. 

SEPTEMBER  12,  13,  14. — Killed,  130,  including  10  officers. 
Wounded,  703,  including  68  officers.  Missing,  29  rank  and 
file.  Total,  862. 

Grand  total  of  losses,  2,703,  including  383  officers. 


OFFICIAL  DESPATCH  OF  GEN.  SCOTT.       319 

On  the  other  hand,  this  small  force  has  beaten  on  the  same 
occasions  in  view  of  their  capital,  the  whole  Mexican  army,  of 
(at  the  beginning)  thirty-odd  thousand  men — posted,  always, 
in  chosen  positions,  behind  intrenchments,  or  more  formidable 
defences  of  nature  and  art  ;  killed  or  wounded,  of  that  num 
ber,  more  than  7,000  officers  and  men  ;  taken  3,730  prisoners, 
one-seventh  officers,  including  13  generals,  of  whom  3  had 
been  presidents  of  this  republic ;  captured  more  than  20 
colors  and  standards,  75  pieces  of  ordnance,  besides  57  wall 
pieces,  20,000  small-arms,  an  immense  quantity  of  shots,  shells, 
powder,  &c.,  &c: 

Of  that  enemy,  once  so  formidable  in  numbers,  appoint 
ments,  artillery,  &c.,  twenty-odd  thousand  have  disbanded 
themselves  in  despair,  leaving,  as  is  known,  not  more  than 
three  fragments — the  largest  about  2,500 — now  wandering  in 
different  directions,  without  magazines  or  a  military  chest,  and 
living  at  free  quarters  upon  their  own  people. 

General  Santa  Anna,  himself  a  fugitive,  is  believed  to  be 
on  the  point  of  resigning  the  chief- magistracy,  and  escaping  to 
neutral  Guatemala.  A  new  President,  no  doubt,  will  soon  be 
declared,  and  the  federal  Congress  is  expected  to  reassemble 
at  Queretaro,  125  miles  north  of  this,  on  the  Zacatecas  road, 
some  time  in  October.  I  have  seen  and  given  safeconduct 
through  this  city  to  several  of  its  members.  The  govern 
ment  will  find  itself  without  resources  ;  no  army,  no  arsenals, 
no  magazines,  and  but  little  revenue,  internal  or  external. 
Still,  such  is  the  obstinacy,  or  rather  infatuation,  of  this 
people,  that  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  the  new  authorities 
will  dare  to  sue  for  peace  on  the  terms  which  in  the  recent 
negotiations,  were  made  known  by  our  minister. 

***  *  *#** 

In  conclusion,  I  beg  to  enumerate,  once  more,  with  due 
commendation  and  thanks,  the  distinguished  statf  officers, 


320  OFFICIAL    DESPATCH    OF    GEN.    SCOTT. 

general  and  personal,  who,  in  our  last  operations  in  front  of 
the  enemy,  accompanied  me,  and  communicated  orders  to 
every  point  and  through  every  danger.  Lieutenant- colonel 
Hitchcock,  acting  inspector-general ;  Major  Turnbull  and 
Lieutenant  Hardcastle,  topographical  engineers ;  Major  Kirby, 
chief  paymaster  ;  Captain  Irwin,  chief  quartermaster  ;  Captain 
Grayson,  chief  commissary ;  Captain  H.  L.  Scott,  chief  in  the 
adjutant-general's  department ;  Lieutenant  Williams,  aid-de 
camp  ;  Lieutenant  Lay,  military  secretary  ;  and  Major  J.  P. 
Gaines,  Kentucky  cavalry,  volunteer  aid-de-camp ;  Captain 
Lee,  engineer,  so  constantly  distinguished,  also  bore  important 
orders  from  me,  (September  13,)  until  he  fainted  from  a  wound 
and  the  loss  of  two  nights'  sleep  at  the  batteries.  Lieutenants 
Beauregard,  Stevens,  and  Tower,  all  wounded,  were  employed 
with  the  divisions,  and  Lieutenants  G.  W.  Smith  and  G.  B. 
McClellan,  with  the  company  of  sappers  and  miners.  Those 
five  lieutenants  of  engineers,  like  their  captain,  won  the  admi 
ration  of  all  about  them.  The  ordnance  officers,  Captain 
Huger,  Lieutenants  Hagner,  Stone,  and  Reno,  were  highly 
effective,  and  distinguished  at  the  several  batteries  ;  and  I  must 
add  that  Captain  McKinstry,  assistant  quartermaster,  at  the 
close  of  the  operations,  executed  several  important  commis 
sions  for  me  as  a  special  volunteer. 

Surgeon-general  Lawson,  and  the  medical  staff  generally, 
were  skilful  and  untiring,  in  and  out  of  fire,  in  ministering  to 
the  numerous  wounded. 

To  illustrate  the  operations  in  this  basin,  I  enclose  two 
beautiful  drawings,  prepared  under  the  directions  of  Major 
Turnbull,  mostly  from  actual  survey. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir,  with  high  respect,  your  most 
obedient  servant, 

WINFIELD  SCOTT. 

The  Hon.  WM.  L.  MARCY,  Secretary  of  War. 


REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  EVENT.          321 

On  the  morning  of  the  18th  of  September  all  was 
quiet.  MEXICO,  the  capital  of  the  ancient  Aztecs — 
the  seat  of  the  Spanish-American  empire  in  America — 
had  passed  from  Aztec  and  from  Spaniard,  to  the  Anglo- 
American — the  Northman  of  the  Goths,  the  Saxon  of  Ger 
many,  the  Englishman  of  America — the  same  bold,  hardy, 
energetic,  ingenious,  invincible,  ambitious,  and  adventu 
rous  being,  whose  genius  the  forms  of  civilization  cannot 
confine,  and  to  whose  dominion  continents  are  inadequate  ! 
In  what  hour  of  time,  or  limit  of  space,  shall  this  man  of 
the  moderns — this  conqueror  over  land  and  seas,  nations 
and  governments — find  rest,  in  the  completion  of  his 
mighty  progress  ?  Commencing  his  march  in  the  cold 
regions  of  Scandinavia,  no  ice  chilled  his  blood — no  wil 
derness  delayed  his  steps — no  labor  wearied  his  industry — 
no  arms  arrested  his  march — no  empire  subdued  his  pow 
er.  Over  armies  and  over  empires — over  lands  and  over 
seas — in  heat  and  cold,  and  wilderness  and  flood — amidst 
the  desolations  of  death  and  the  decays  of  disease — this 
Northman  has  moved  on  in  might  and  majesty,  steady  as 
the  footsteps  of  Time,  and  fixed  as  the  decrees  of  Fate  ! 

How  singular — how  romantically  strange  is  this — his 
wild  adventure  arid  marvellous  conquest  in  the  valley  of 
valleys  !  How  came  the  Northman  and  the  Moorish  Celt 
here  to  meet,  and  here  to  battle,  in  this  North-American 
valley  ?  Look  at  it !  Inquire  !  Ask  yourself  how  they 
came  here  ?  Are  they  the  citizens,  by  nature,  of  this  con 
tinent  ?  Are  they  the  aborigines  of  these  wild  and  won 
derful  forests  ?  Never  !  How  came  they  then  to  be  con 
tending  for  the  lands  and  groves  of  those  whose  children 
they  are  not  ? 

In  the  beginning  of  the  16th  century,  Hernando  Cortez 
21 


322          REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  EVENT. 

landed  on  the  coast  of  Mexico,  and,  at  the  head  of  Span 
ish  troops,  marched  on  to  the  conquest  of  Mexico,  over 
whose  effeminate  inhabitants  the  Spaniard  has,  for  three 
hundred  years,  held  undivided  dominion.  Not  many 
years  after,  the  Anglo-Saxon  landed  on  the  coasts  of  the 
northern  Atlantic.  He,  too,  marched  on  to  conquest. 
The  native  citizens  of  the  forest  disappeared  before  him. 
Forests,  mountains,  and  Indians,  were  ineffectual  to  op 
pose  him.  From  the  banks  of  the  St.  Lawrence  to  the 
Sabine  of  Texas,  he  is  a  conqueror  over  nature.  In  the 
soulfi,  the  natives  die,  or  become  slaves  to  the  Spaniard. 
In  the  north,  they  fade  and  perish  before  the  Anglo- 
American.  The  one  spreads  his  empire  from  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico  to  the  far  shores  of  California ;  .the  other,  from 
the  hills  of  St.  Francis  to  the  mountains  of  Oregon.  Both 
extend  over  breadths  of  land,  and  power  of  resources, 
unknown  to  the  widest  empire  of  antiquity.  Egypt,  and 
her  millions,  with  the  famed  valley  of  the  Nile,  fade  be 
fore  the  broad  magnificence,  the  mighty  growth,  of  these 
American  empires  !  Even  the  terrible  and  far-seeing 
eagles  of  Rome  grow  dizzy  and  dim  in  their  sight,  as 
they  look  down  from  the  summits  of  history  upon  these 
continental  nations — these  colossal  giants  of  the  modern 
world  !  And  now,  this  Spaniard  and  this  Northman  meet, 
in  battle-panoply,  in  this  valley  of  volcanoes,  by  the  an 
cient  graves  of  unknown  nations,  on  the  lava-covered  soil 
where  nature  once  poured  forth  her  awe-inspiring  flames, 
and  the  brave  Tlascalan  once  sung  of  glory  and  of  great 
ness  !  Three  centuries  since,  these  warrior  nations  had 
left  their  homes  beyond  the  wide  Atlantic.  Two  thousand 
miles  from  each  other,  they  had  planted  the  seats  of  their 
empire  ;  and  now,  as  if  time  in  the  moral  world  had  com- 


REFLECTIONS    ON    THE    EVENT.  32*J 

pleted  another  of  its  grand  revolutions,  they  have  met  in 
mortal  conflict.  Like  the  EAGLE  and  the  VULTURE,  who 
had  long  pursued  different  circles  in  the  heavens,  and 
long  made  prey  of  the  weak  tenants  of  the  air,  their  cir 
cles  have  been  enlarged  till  they  cross  each  other.  They 
shriek !  They  fight !  The  victorious  eagle  bears  the 
vulture  to  the  earth,  and  screams  forth  through  the  clouds 
his  triumphant  song !  Has  the  bold  bird  received  no 
wound  ?  Has  no  blood  tinged  the  feathers  of  his  wing? 
Is  there  no  secret  flow  of  life  from  the  portals  of  his 
heart  ?  Will  he  continue  to  look,  with  unblenched  eye, 
on  the  blazing  glories  of  the  sun?  Hid  in  the  eternal 
decrees  of  God,  is  the  life  of  nations  ;  and  not  till  He  has 
drawn  away  the  curtains  of  time,  wTill  mortals  know  the 
secrets  of  His  will  in  the  government  of  nations. 


v 


324  SIEGE    OF    PUEBLA. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

Siege  of  Puebla. — March  of  Santa  Anna. — Desertion  of  his  troops. — March 
of  Rea. — Battle  of  Huaraantla. — Santa  Anna's  resignation. — Pena  y 
Pen  a  President. — Negotiations  for  peace. — Treaty  signed. — Ratifications. 
— The  Treaty. — Territory  acquired. — Losses  of  the  army. — Names  of 
officers  killed. — Conclusion. 

THE  military  events  which  closed  on  the  18th  of  Sep 
tember,  with  the  capture  of  the  city  of  Mexico,  closed 
also,  with  the  exception  of  some  incidental  arid  minor  en 
gagements,  the  war  with  Mexico.  To  all  practical  in 
tents,  Mexico  was  conquered.  From  Santa  Fe  in  the 
north  to  Tampico  in  the  south, — from  the  Rio  Grande  to 
the  shores  of  the  Pacific, — from  the  heights  of  the  Sierra 
Madre  to  those  of  the  Sierra  Nevada, — the  troops  and 
navy  of  the  United  States  held  every  position  which,  either 
in  a  military  or  commercial  view,  was  valuable  or  accessi 
ble  to  the  channels  of  business  and  population.  Hence 
forward,  the  chief  movement  of  our  troops  was  the  advance 
of  reinforcements,  which,  had  they  been  earlier,  had  been 
useful,  but  were  now  too  late  to  aid  the  victorious  army, 
or  share  in  the  glory  of  its  achievements.  Collateral 
movements  were  made,  and  two  or  three  small  skirmishes 
took  place  which  were  honorable  to  our  arms.  But  the 
burden  and  battle  of  the  war  was  past.  The  victory  was 
won,  and  the  question  of  the  day  was,  "  When  and  how 
shall  peace  be  made  ?" 

Santa  Anna,  who  had  been  driven  out  of  Mexico  by 


MOVEMENTS    OF    SANTA    ANNA.  325 

the  American  troops,  escaped  with  a  body  of  two  or  three 
thousand  men,  and  for  some  days  was  unheard  of.  On 
the  25th  of  September,  however,  he  appeared  in  the  city 
of  Puebla,  the  surrounding  heights  of  which  were  garri 
soned  and  defended  by  Col.  Childs.  The  American  gar 
rison  was  weak,  and  had  under  its  care  the  hospitals, 
which  contained  many  sick.  The  object  of  the  Mexican 
commander  was  the  surprise  and  capture  of  this  post, 
which  had  been  left  isolated  by  the  advance  of  the  Amer 
ican  army  on  Mexico,  and  was  now  besieged  by  Rea. 
The  movement  was  a  good  one,  had  the  Mexican  strength 
been  sufficient  for  the  purpose.  On  his  appearance  Santa 
Anna  immediately  summoned  the  American  commander 
to  surrender,  to  which  Col.  Childs  returned  a  prompt,  re 
fusal,  couched  in  firm  and  dignified  terms.1  On  the  28th, 
the  positions  around  Puebla  were  occupied  by  Santa 
Anna  with  batteries,  and  a  bombardment  commenced  on 
the  American  intrenchments.  In  return,  the  batteries  of 
Col.  Childs  bombarded  the  city.  On  the  29th,  the  troops 
of  Santa  Anna  occupied  the  convent  of  Santa  Theresa, 
and  began  to  cover  themselves  with  cotton-bales.  On 
the  30th,  General  Rea,  who  was  joined  by  Santa  Anna, 
commenced  erecting  batteries,  and  cannonading  the  Amer 
icans. 

In  the  mean  time,  however,  the  Mexican  troops  were 
almost  wholly  destitute  of  provisions,  and  in  a  most  suffer 
ing  condition.  Having  heard  of  the  advance  of  an  Amer 
ican  convoy  on  the  National  Road,  Santa  Anna,  on  the  1st 
of  October,  sallied  out  of  Puebla  with  the  view  to  inter 
cept  it.  Before  his  arrival  at  the  point  of  destination,  he 

1  Correspondence  in  the  Washington  Union, 


326  GENERAL    REA    RAISES    THE    SIEGE. 

was  deserted  by  all  his  troops,  except  about  130  hussars. 
They  alleged  that  he  was  incapable  of  accomplishing  any 
further  service,  and  that  certain  destruction  awaited  them 
should  they  any  longer  follow  a  leader  whose  fortunes 
were  so  desperate.  Thus  after  many  bold  enterprises, 
signal  defeats,  and  sanguinary  adventures,  this  celebrated 
Mexican  chief  found  himself  again  a  wanderer,  alike  de 
serted  by  fortune  and  by  friends.  He  was  soon  after 
denounced  by  the  new  Mexican  government,  and  became 
an  exile  from  the  shores  of  that  country,  where,  for  thirty 
years,  he  had  been  the  star  of  its  destiny,  alternately  rising 
and  setting  on  its  political  horizon,  attended  by  all  the 
hues  of  a  checkered  fate,  and  by  all  the  incidents  of  a 
various  romance.  Like  other  unfortunate  warriors,  he 

" leaves  his  broken  bands, 

And  shows  his  miseries  in  distant  lauds." 

In  the  mean  time,  General  Lane  had  left  Vera  Cruz 
about  the  1st  of  October,  with  a  corps  of  3000  men,  ar 
rived  at  Perote  on  the  4th,  and  on  the  8th  nearly  surprised 
Santa  Anna,  who  barely  escaped  the  village  of  Huamantla. 
On  the  12th  of  October,  General  Rea  raised  the  siege  of 
Puebla,  and  marched,  as  it  was  supposed,  to  surprise 
General  Lane  and  his  convoy  at  Tinal.  This  was,  how 
ever,  not  done,  and  Lane,  hearing  that  he  was  at  Hua 
mantla,  forthwith  marched  to  attack  him.  A  brilliant  ac 
tion  took  place,  in  which  the  usual  success  attended  the 
American  arms,  and  the  Mexicans  were  driven  out  with  con 
siderable  loss.  In  this  action,  Captain  Walker,  one  of  the 
most  distinguished  of  the  noted  Texan  Rangers,  was  killed. 
He  was  more  distinguished  for  a  barbarous  desperation  of 
adventure,  than  for  true  chivalry  or  magnanimous  war 


RESIGNATION    OF    SANTA    ANNA.          %  327 

On  the  19th  of  October,  the  Americans  entered  Atlisco 
with  1,500  men;  and  soon  after,  they  captured  Orizaba, 
with  several  other  considerable  places.  The  young  offi 
cers  of  the  army,  searching  with  keen  ambition  for  the 
novelties  of  romantic  enterprise,  planted  the  American 
flag  in  succession  on  the  loftiest  peaks  of  the  Cordilleras, 
— on  summits  which  looked  down  on  the  region  of  clouds, 
and  are  clothed  with  eternal  ice.  There,  on  rocks  visited 
only  in  the  waste  of  ages  by  the  lone  eagle  in  his  sun 
ward  flight,  the  flag  of  the  conqueror  waves  in  the  wind 
which  bathes  the  silent  volcanoes  of  Orizaba  and  Popo 
catepetl  ! 

But  the  word  which  is  now  on  the  lips  of  conquered 
and  conqueror  is — PEACE.  The  United  States  desired 
not  to  govern  the  mixed  races  of  Mexico,  and  Mexico  felt 
that  she  had  no  longer  opposition  to  offer.  A  new  gov 
ernment  and  a  new  destiny  was  about  to  arise  for  Mexico. 

On  the  18th  of  October,  Santa  Anna  resigned  the  su 
preme  power  into  the  hands  of  Peiia  y  Pefia,  President 
of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Justice.  On  the  22d,  he  issued 
his  proclamation  to  the  Mexican  people,  vindicating  his 
conduct  throughout  the  turbulent  scenes  and  unfortunate 
events  of  the  war,  and  from  that  time  he  has  disappeared 
from  the  stage  of  Mexican  affairs. 

Previous  to  this  resignation  of  Santa  Anna,  however, 
Pefia  y  Pefia  had  assumed  the  reins  of  government. 
The  executive  chair  was  declared  vacant,  and  on  the  27th 
of  September,  Pena  took  the  vacant  place,  by  virtue  of 
being  President  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Justice.  He 
immediately  addressed  circulars  to  the  States,  calling  up 
on  them  to  send  deputies  to  Queretaro,  to  pay  their  ex 
penses,  and  provide  funds  for  their  support.  The  Presi- 


328  NEGOTIATIONS    FOR    PEACE. 

dent,  in  urging  attention  to  this  important  business,  says, 
"  This  is  probably  the  last  experiment  of  government 
which  will  be  made  in  our  unfortunate  country." 

Under  these  urgent  solicitations,  the  Congress  assem 
bled  at  Queretaro  in  November,  and  on  the  llth  General 
Anaya  was  elected  President.  Pena  y  Pena  was  elected 
Secretary  of  State.  One  of  the  first  acts  of  the  new  gov 
ernment  was  to  appoint  a  commission  to  proceed  to  Mex 
ico,  and  negotiate  with  Mr.  Trist  the  terms  of  peace,  on 
the  basis  of  his  former  scheme.  This  commission  con 
sisted  of  Messrs.  Couto,  Atristain,  Cuevas,  and  Rincon, 
who  immediately  proceeded  to  execute  the  duties  of  their 
office. 

On  the  1st  of  January  the  old  Congress  was  dissolved, 
but  a  new  one  had  in  the  mean  time  been  elected ;  and 
on  the  8th  of  January,  the  new  administration  was  organ 
ized  by  the  meeting  of  Congress  at  Queretaro,  and  the 
return  of  Pena  y  Pena  to  the  executive  chair.  The  pe 
riod  for  which  Anaya  was  elected  President  expired  with 
the  old  Congress,  and  Pena  returned  to  power  in  virtue  of 
being  President  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Justice. 

On  the  2d  of  February  the  Treaty  of  Peace  was  signed 
at  Guadaloupe  by  Nicholas  P.  Trist,  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States,  and  Messrs.  Couto,  Atristain,  and  Cuevas, 
commissioners,  on  the  part  of  Mexico.  The  powers  of 
Mr.  Trist,  as  commissioner,  had  been  withdrawn  by  the 
American  executive  ;  but  he  assumed  to  continue  his  au 
thority  on  the  very  natural  ground,  it  may  be  supposed, 
that  the  necessities  for  peace  were  so  great,  and  felt  so 
strongly  by  the  government  of  the  United  States,  that  any 
treaty,  not  degrading  to  our  government  in  its  terms,  would 
be  ratified,  without  a  very  serious  and  special  inquiry  into 


TREATY    SIGNED. 

the  authority  by  which  it  was  made.     In  this  judgment 
he  was  justified  by  the  event. 

On  the  6th  of  February,  the  Treaty  was  officially  an 
nounced  to  the  Mexican  States  by  a  circular  from  Secre 
tary  Rosas.  Dispatches  were  immediately  forwarded  to 
Secretary  Buchanan  at  Washington  ;  and  the  sole  inquiry 
now  before  the  public  mind  was,  whether  the  Treaty  would 
be  ratified  by  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  on  one 
hand,  or  the  Congress  of  Mexico  on  the  other, — in  whom 
was  vested  by  the  constitutions  of  the  respective  coun 
tries,  the  power  of  ratification.  By  some  means  the  con 
tents  of  the  Treaty  became  known  to  the  public,  and  it 
was  perceived  that  the  United  States  had  agreed  to  pay 
a  larger  sum  of  money  than  was  originally  contemplated, 
while  the  land  received  in  exchange  was  substantially  no 
more  valuable.  This  fact,  taken  in  connection  with  an 
other — that  the  Treaty  was  negotiated  without  authority 
— made  it  doubtful  whether  it  would  be  ratified  by  the 
constitutional  majority. 

On  the  22d  of  February,  only  twenty  days  after  it  was 
signed  at  Guadaloupe,  President  Polk  formally  submitted 
it  to  the  Senate.  On  the  28th  he  transmitted  another 
message,  recommending  its  ratification. 

The  HON.  DANIEL  WEBSTER  proposed  in  a  resolution, 
that  a  new  commission  should  be  appointed  to  negotiate 
a  new  treaty.  This  proposition  was  laid  on  the  table.1 
The  Senate  then  proceeded  to  consider  the  treaty  in  de 
tail. 

March  2d.— Part  of  the  10th  Article,  confirming  former 
contracts  for  lands,  was  unanimously  struck  out. 


Journals  of  the  Senate. 


330  AMENDMENT    IN    THE    U.    S.    SENATE. 

March  3d. — The  secret  article,  extending  the  time  for 
ratification  to  eight  months,  was  stricken  out,  by  48  to  2. 

March  7th. — The  HON.  J.  J.  CRITTENDEN  introduced 
a  resolution,  that  we  should  be  confined  in  the  Treaty  to 
a  "  satisfactory  settlement  of  the  boundary  of  Texas,  and 
the  acquisition  of  the  Bay  of  San  Francisco."  This  reso 
lution  was  rejected  by  the  following  vote,1  viz. : 

Yeas. — Badger,  Baldwin,  Bell,  Berrien,  Clarke,  Clay 
ton,  Corwm,  Crittenden,  Davis  of  Mass.,  Dayton,  Greene, 
Hale,  Johnson  of  Md.,  Miller,  Spruance,  Underwood, 
Upham. 

Nays. — Allen,  Ashley,  Alchison,  Atherton,  Bradbury, 
Breese,  Bright,  Butler,  Calhoun,  Cameron,  Cass,  Dix, 
Dickinson,  Davis  of  Miss.,  Douglas,  Downs,  Felch, 
Foote,  Hannegan,  Houston,  Johnson  of  La.,  Johnson  of 
Ga.,  Lewis,  Mason,  Moore,  Niles,  Rusk,  Sevier,  Stur- 
geon^  Turney,  Yulee. — 17  yeas  to  31  nays. 

March  8th. — MR.  BALDWIN  moved  to  insert  at  the  end 
of  the  5th  Article — "  Provided,  that  there  shall  be  neither 
slavery  nor  involuntary  servitude  in  the  territories  hereby 
ceded,  otherwise  than  in  the  punishment  of  crimes,  where 
of  the  party  shall  have  been  duly  convicted."  This  also 
was  negatived  by  the  following  vote  : 

Yeas. — Atherton,  Baldwin,  Clarke,  Clayton,  Corwin, 
Davis  of  Mass.,  Dayton,  Dix,  Greene,  Hale,  Miller,  Niles, 
Phelps,  Spruance,  Upham. — 15. 

Nays. — Allen,  Ashley,  Atchison,  Badger,  Bagby,  Bell, 
Benton,  Berrien,  Bradbury,  Breese,  Bright,  Butler,  Cal 
houn,  Cameron,  Cass,  Crittenden,  Davis  of  Miss.,  Dickin 
son,  Douglas,  Downs,  Felch,  Foote,  Hannegan,  Hunter, 

1  Journals  of  the  Senate. 


TREATY    RATIFIED.  331 

Johnson  of  La.,  Johnson  of  Md.,  Johnson  of  Ga.,  Lewis, 
Mangum,  Mason,  Moore,  Pearce,  Rusk,  Sevier,  Sturgeon, 
Turney,  Underwood,  Yulee. — 38. 

March  10th. — After  several  important  amendments  to 
the  original  form  of  the  Treaty,  that  instrument  was  final 
ly  ratified,  by  two-thirds  of  the  Senate  advising  and  con 
senting  thereto,  by  the  following  vote  : 

Yeas. — Ashley,  Atherton,  Bagby,  Bell,  Bradbury, 
Bright,  Butler,  Calhoun,  Cameron,  Cass,  Clarke,  Critten- 
den,  Davis,  Dayton,  Dickinson,  Dix,  Felch,  Foote,  Greene, 
Hale,  Hannegan,  Hunter,  Johnson  of  Md.,  Johnson  of 
La.,  Johnson  of  Ga.,  Mangum,  Mason,  Miller,  Moore, 
Niles,  Rusk,  Sevier,  Sturgeon,  Turney,  Downs,  Clayton, 
Yulee,  Underwood.— 38. 

Nays. — Allen,  Atchison,  Badger,  Baldwin,  Benton, 
Berrien,  Breese,  Corwin,  Douglas,  Lewis,  Spruance,  Up- 
ham,  Webster,  Westcott. — 14. 

The  Senate  having  thus  ratified  the  Treaty,  with  sev 
eral  important  amendments,  it  became  necessary  that  the 
Treaty  should  be  also  ratified  by  the  Mexican  Congress. 
The  President  accordingly  appointed  NATHAN  CLIFFORD, 
Attorney-general,  and  AMBROSE  SEVIER,  Chairman  of  the 
Committee  of  Foreign  Relations  in  the  Senate,  as  Com 
missioners  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  to  lay  the 
Treaty,  thus  modified,  before  the  Mexican  Congress. 
These  gentlemen  hastened  to  Mexico,  but  some  weeks 
elapsed  before  a  quorum  of  the  Mexican  Congress  could 
be  assembled  at  Queretaro.  At  length  the  Congress  met, 
and  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty  was  urged  upon  the 
Congress  ably  and  eloquently  by  President  Pena.  He 
succeeded.  The  Treaty  was  ratified  by  a  large  majority 
in  the  Congress,  and  by  33  to  5  in  the  Senate. 


332  PEACE    PROCLAIMED. 

The  American  Commissioners  officially  notified  the 
Secretary  of  State  that  the  Treaty  was  complete,  and  on 
the  19th  of  June,  1848, — being  two  years  and  two  months 
from  the  commencement  of  the  war, — the  people  of  the 
United  States  were  formally  notified,  that  there  was 
PEACE  BETWEEN  MEXICO  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  ! 

By  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America. 

A  PROCLAMATION. 

Whereas  a  treaty  of  peace,  friendship,  limits,  and  settle 
ment  between  the  United  States  of  America  and  the  Mexican 
republic,  was  concluded  and  signed  at  the  city  of  Guadaloupe 
Hidalgo,  on  the  second  day  of  February,  one  thouland  eight 
hundred  and  forty-eight,  which  treaty,  as  amended  by  the 
Senate  of  the  United  States,  and  being  in  the  English  and 
Spanish  languages,  is  word  for  word  as  follows : 

In  the  name  of  Almighty  God  : 

The  United  States  of  America  and  the  United  Mexican  States,  anima 
ted  by  a  sincere  desire  to  put  an  end  to  the  calamities  of  the  war  which 
unhappily  exists  between  the  two  republics,  and  to  establish  upon  a  solid 
basis  relations  of  peace  and  friendship,  which  shall  confer  reciprocal  bene 
fits  upon  the  citizens  of  both,  and  assure  the  concord,  harmony,  and  mu 
tual  confidence  wherein  the  two  people  should  live,  as  good  neighbors, 
have  for  that  purpose  appointed  their  respective  plenipotentiaries — that  is 
to  say,  the  President  of  the  United  States  has  appointed  Nicholas  P. 
Trist,  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  the  President  of  the  Mexican 
republic  has  appointed  Don  Luis  Gonzaga  Cuevas,  Don  Bernardo  Couto, 
and  Don  Miguel  Atristain,  citizens  of  the  said  republic,  who,  after  a  re 
ciprocal  communication  of  their  respective  full  powers,  have,  under  the 
protection  of  Almighty  God,  the  author  of  peace,  arranged,  agreed  upon, 
and  signed  the  following 

Treaty  of  peace,  friendship,  limits,  and  settlement,  between  the  United 
States  of  America  and  the  Mexican  republic. 

ARTICLE  I. 

There  shall  be  firm  and  universal  peace  between  the  United  States 
of  America  and  the  Mexican  republic,  and  between  their  respective  coun 
tries,  territories,  cities,  towns,  and  people,  without  exception  of  places  or 
persons. 


TREATY    OF    PEACE.  333 

ARTICLE  II. 

Immediately  upon  the  signature  of  this  treaty,  a  convention  shall  be 
entered  into  between  a  commissioner  or  commissioners  appointed  by  the 
General-in-chief  of  the  forces  of  the  United  States,  and  such  as  may  be 
appointed  by  the  Mexican  government,  to  the  end  that  a  provisional  sus 
pension  of  hostilities  shall  take  place,  and  that,  in  the  places  occupied  by 
the  said  forces,  constitutional  order  may  be  re-established,  as  regards  the 
political,  administrative,  and  judicial  branches,  so  far  as  this  shall  be  per 
mitted  by  the  circumstances  of  military  occupation. 

ARTICLE  III. 

Immediately  upon  the  ratification  of  the  present  treaty  by  the  govern 
ment  of  the  United  States,  orders  shall  be  transmitted  to  the  commanders 
of  their  land  and  naval  forces,  requiring  the  latter  (provided  this  treaty 
shall  then  have  been  ratified  by  the  government  of  the  Mexican  republic, 
and  the  ratifications  exchanged)  immediately  to  desist  from  blockading 
any  Mexican  ports  ;  and  requiring  the  former  (under  the  same  condition) 
to  commence,  at  the  earliest  moment  practicable,  withdrawing  all  troops 
of  the  United  States  then  in  the  interior  of  the  Mexican  republic,  to  points 
that  shall  be  selected  by  common  agreement,  at  a  distance  from  the  sea 
ports  not  exceeding  thirty  leagues  ;  and  such  evacuation  of  the  interior  of 
the  republic  shall  be  completed  with  the  least  possible  delay  ;  the  Mexi 
can  government  hereby  binding  itself  to  afford  every  facility  in  its  power 
for  rendering  the  same  convenient  to  the  troops  on  their  march  and  in 
their  new  positions,  and  for  promoting  a  good  understanding  between 
them  and  the  inhabitants.  In  like  manner,  orders  shall  be  dispatched  to 
the  persons  in  charge  of  the  custom-houses  at  all  ports  occupied  by  the 
forces  of  the  United  States,  requiring  them  (under  the  same  conditions) 
immediately  to  deliver  possession  of  the  same  to  the  persons  authorized 
by  the  Mexican  government  to  receive  it,  together  with  all  bonds  and 
evidences  of  debt  for  duties  on  importations  and  on  exportations  not  yet 
fallen  due.  Moreover,  a  faithful  and  exact  account  shall  be  made  out, 
showing  the  entire  amount  of  all  duties  on  imports  and  on  exports  collected 
at  such  custom-houses  or  elsewhere  in  Mexico  by  authority  of  the  United 
States,  from  and  after  the  day  of  ratification  of  this  treaty  by  the  govern 
ment  of  the  Mexican  republic  ;  and  also  an  account  of  the  cost  of  collec 
tion  ;  and  such  entire  amount,  deducting  only  the  cost  of  collection,  shall 
be  delivered  to  the  Mexican  government,  at  the  city  of  Mexico,  within 
three  months  after  the  exchange  of  ratifications. 

The  evacuation  of  the  capital  of  the  Mexican  republic  by  the  troops 
of  the  United  States,  in  virtue  of  the  above  stipulation,  shall  be  completed 
in  one  month  after  the  orders  there  stipulated  for  shall  have  been  received 
by  the  commander  of  said  troops,  or  sooner  if  possible. 


334  TREATY    OF    PEACE. 


ARTICLE  IV. 

Immediately  after  the  exchange  of  ratifications  of  the  present  treaty,  aH 
castles,  forts,  territories,  places,  and  possessions,  which  have  been  taken  or 
occupied  by  the  forces  of  the  United  States  during  the  present  war,  with 
in  the  limits  of  the  Mexican  republic,  as  about  to  be  established  by  the  fol 
lowing  article,  shall  be  definitively  restored  to  the  said  republic,  together 
with  all  the  artillery,  arms,  apparatus  of  war,  munitions,  and  other  public 
property,  which  were  in  the  said  castles  and  forts  when  captured,  and 
which  shall  remain  there  at  the  time  when  this  treaty  shall  be  duly  ratified 
by  the  government  of  the  Mexican  republic.  To  this  end,  immediately 
upon  the  signature  of  this  treaty,  orders  shall  be  dispatched  to  the  Ameri 
can  officers  commanding  such  castles  and  forts,  securing  against  the  re 
moval  or  destruction  of  any  such  artillery,  arms,  apparatus  of  war,  muni 
tions,  or  other  public  property.  The  city  of  Mexico,  within  the  inner  line 
of  intrenchments  surrounding  the  said  city,  is  comprehended  in  the  above 
stipulations,  as  regards  the  restoration  of  artillery,  apparatus  of  war,  &c. 

The  final  evacuation  of  the  territory  of  the  Mexican  republic,  by  the 
forces  of  the  United  States,  shall  be  completed  in  three  months  from  the 
said  exchange  of  ratifications,  or  sooner  if  possible  ;  the  Mexican  govern 
ment  hereby  engaging,  as  in  the  foregoing  article,  to  use  all  means  in  its 
power  for  facilitating  such  evacuation,  and  rendering  it  convenient  to  the 
troops,  and  for  promoting  a  good  understanding  between  them  and  the  in 
habitants. 

If,  however,  the  ratification  of  this  treaty  by  both  parties  should  not 
take  place  in  time  to  allow  the  embarkation  of  the  troops  of  the  United 
States  to  be  completed  before  the  commencement  of  the  sickly  season  at 
the  Mexican  ports  on  the  gulf  of  Mexico,  in  such  case  a  friendly  arrange 
ment  shall  be  entered  into  between  the  general-in-chief  of  the  said  troops 
and  the  Mexican  government,  whereby  healthy  and  otherwise  suitable 
places  at  a  distance  from  the  ports  not  exceeding  thirty  leagues  shall  be 
designated  for  the  residence  of  such  troops  as  may  not  yet  have  embarked, 
until  the  return  of  the  healthy  season.  And  the  space  of  time  here  re 
ferred  to  as  comprehending  the  sickly  season  shall  be  understood  to  ex 
tend  from  the  first  day  of  May  to  the  first  day  of  November. 

All  prisoners  of  war  taken  on  either  side,  on  laud  or  on  sea,  shall  be  re 
stored  as  soon  as  practicable  after  the  exchange  of  ratifications  of  this 
treaty.  It  is  also  agreed  that  if  any  Mexicans  should  now  be  held  as 
captives  by  any  savage  tribe  within  the  limits  of  the  United  States,  as 
about  to  be  established  by  the  following  article,  the  government  of  the  said 
United  States  will  exact  the  release  of  such  captives,  and  cause  them  to 
be  restored  to  their  country. 


TREATY    OF    PEACE.  335 


ARTICLE  V. 

The  boundary  line  between  the  two  republics  shall  commence  in  the 
gulf  of  Mexico,  three  leagues  from  land,  opposite  the  mouth  of  the  Rio 
Grande,  otherwise  called  Rio  Bravo  del  Norte,  or  opposite  the  mouth  of  its 
deepest  branch,  if  it  should  have  more  than  one  branch  emptying  directly 
into  the  sea  ;  from  theuce  up  the  middle  of  that  river,  following  the 
deepest  channel,  where  it  has  more  than  one,  to  the  point  where  it  strikes 
the  southern  boundary  of  New  Mexico  ;  thence,  westwardly,  along  the 
whole  southern  boundary  of  New  Mexico  (which  runs  north  of  the  town 
called  Paso}  to  its  western  termination  ;  thence,  northward,  along  the 
western  line  of  New  Mexico,  until  it  intersects  the  first  branch  of  the 
river  Gila  ;  (or  if  it  should  not  intersect  any  branch  of  that  river,  then  to 
the  point  on  the  said  line  nearest  to  such  branch,  and  thence  in  a  direct 
line  to  the  same  ;)  thence  down  the  middle  of  the  said  branch  and  of  the 
said  river,  until  it  empties  into  the  Rio  Colorado  ;  thence  across  the  Rio 
Colorado,  following  the  division  line  between  Upper  and  Lower  California, 
to  the  Pacific  ocean. 

The  southern  and  western  limits  of  New  Mexico,  mentioned  in  this 
article,  are  those  laid  down  in  the  map  entitled  "  Map  of  the  United 
Mexican  States,  as  organized  and  defined  by  various  acts  of  the  Con 
gress  of  said  republic,  and  constructed  according  to  the  best  authorities. 
Revised  edition.  Published  at  New  York  in  1847,  by  J.  Disturnell." 
Of  which  map  a  copy  is  added  to  this  treaty,  bearing  the,  signatures  and 
seals  of  the  undersigned  plenipotentiaries.  And,  in  order  to  preclude  all 
difficulty  in  tracing  upon  the  ground  the  limit  separating  Upper  from 
Lower  California,  it  is  agreed  that  the  said  limit  shall  consist  of  a  straight 
line  drawn  from  the  middle  of  the  Rio  Gila,  where  it  unites  with  the 
Colorado,  to  a  point  on  the  coast  of  the  Pacific  ocean  distant  one  marine 
league  due  south  of  the  southernmost  point  of  the  port  of  San  Diego,  ac 
cording  to  the  plan  of  said  port  made  in  the  year  1782  by  Don  Juan  Pan- 
toja,  second  sailing-master  of  the  Spanish  fleet,  and  published  at  Madrid 
in  the  year  1802,  in  the  Atlas  to  the  voyage  of  the  schooners  Sutil  and 
Mexicana,  of  which  plan  a  copy  is  hereunto  added,  signed  and  sealed  by 
the  respective  plenipotentiaries. 

In  order  to  designate  the  boundary  line  with  due  precision,  upon  au 
thoritative  maps,  and  to  establish  upon  the  ground  landmarks  which  shall 
show  the  limits  of  both  republics,  as  described  in  the  present  article,  the 
two  governments  shall  each  appoint  a  commissioner  and  a  surveyor,  who, 
before  the  expiration  of  one  year  from  the  date  of  the  exchange  of  ratifica 
tions  of  this  treaty,  shall  meet  at  the  port  of  San  Diego,  and  proceed  to 
run  and  mark  the  said  boundary  in  its  whole  course  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Rio  Bravo  del  Norte.  They  shall  keep  journals  and  mark  out  plans  of 


336  TREATY    OF    PEACE 

their  operations :  and  the  result  agreed  upon  by  them  shall  be  deemed  a 
part  of  this  treaty,  and  shall  have  the  same  force  as  if  it  were  inserted 
therein.  The  two  governments  will  amicably  agree  regarding  what  may 
be  necessary  to  these  persons,  and  also  as  to  their  respective  escorts, 
should  such  be  necessary. 

The  boundary  line  established  by  this  article  shall  be  religiously  respect 
ed  by  each  of  the  two  republics,  and  no  change  shall  ever  be  made 
therein,  except  by  the  express  and  free  consent  of  both  nations,  lawfully 
given  by  the  general  government  of  each,  in  conformity  with  its  own 
constitution. 

ARTICLE  VI. 

The  vessels  and  citizens  of  the  United  States  shall,  in  all  time,  have  a 
free  and  uninterrupted  passage  by  the  gulf  of  California,  and  by  the  river 
Colorado  below  its  confluence  with  the  Gila,  to  and  from  their  possessions 
situated  north  of  the  boundary  line  defined  in  the  preceding  article  ;  it 
being  understood  that  this  passage  is  to  be  by  navigating  the  gulf  of  Cali 
fornia  and  the  river  Colorado,  and  not  by  land,  without  the  express  con 
sent  of  the  Mexican  government. 

If,  by  the  examinations  which  may  be  made,  it  should  be  ascertained 
to  be  practicable  and  advantageous  to  construct  a  road,  canal,  or  railway, 
which  should  in  whole  or  in  part  run  upon  the  river  Gila,  or  upon  its 
right  or  its  left  bank,  within  the  space  of  one  marine  league  from  either 
margin  of  the  river,  the  governments  of  both  republics  will  form  an 
agreement  regarding  its  construction,  in  order  that  it  may  serve  equally 
for  the  use  and  advantage  of  both  countries. 

ARTICLE  VII. 

The  river  Gila,  and  the  part  of  the  Rio  Bravo  del  Norte  lying  below  the 
southern  boundary  of  New  Mexico,  being,  agreeably  to  the  fifth  article, 
divided  in  the  middle,  between  the  two  republics,  the  navigation  of  the 
Gila  and  of  the  Bravo  below  said  boundary  shall  be  free  and  common  to 
the  vessels  and  citizens  of  both  countries  ;  and  neither  shall,  without  the 
consent  of  the  other,  construct  any  work  that  may  impede  or  interrupt, 
in  whole  or  in  part,  the  exercise  of  this  right ;  not  even  for  the  purpose 
of  favoring  new  methods  of  navigation.  Nor  shall  any  tax  or  contribu 
tion,  under  any  denomination  or  title,  be  levied  upon  vessels  or  persons 
navigating  the  same,  or  upon  merchandise  or  effects  transported  thereon, 
except  in  the  case  of  landing  upon  one  of  their  shores.  If,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  making  the  said  rivers  navigable,  or  for  maintaining  them  in  such 
state,  it  should  be  necessary  or  advantageous  to  establish  any  tax  or  con 
tribution,  this  shall  not  be  done  without  the  consent  of  both  governments. 


TREATY    OF    PEACE.  337 

The  stipulations  contained  in  the  present  article  shall  not  impair  the 
territorial  rights  of  either  republic  within  its  established  limits. 

ARTICLE  VIII. 

Mexicans  now  established  in  territories  previously  belonging  to  Mexico, 
and  which  remain  for  the  future  within  the  limits  of  the  United  States,  as 
defined  by  the  present  treaty,  shall  be  free  to  continue  where  they  now 
reside,  or  to  remove  at  any  time  to  the  Mexican  republic,  retaining  the 
property  which  they  possess  in  the  said  territories,  or  disposing  thereof, 
and  removing  the  proceeds  wherever  they  please,  without  their  being 
subjected,  on  this  account,  to  any  contribution,  tax,  or  charge  whatever. 

Those  who  shall  prefer  to  remain  in  the  said  territories,  may  either  re 
tain  the  title  and  rights  of  Mexican  citizens,  or  acquire  those  of  citizens 
of  the  United  States.  But  they  shall  be  under  the  obligation  to  make 
their  election  within  one  year  from  the  date  of  the  exchange  of  ratifica 
tions  of  this  treaty  ;  and  those  who  shall  remain  in  the  said  territories 
after  the  expiration  of  that  year,  without  having  declared  their  intention 
to  retain  the  character  of  Mexicans,  shall  be  considered  to  have  elected  to 
become  citizens  of  the  United  States. 

In  the  said  territories,  property  of  every  kind,  now  belonging  to  Mexi 
cans  not  established  there,  shall  be  inviolably  respected.  The  present 
owners,  the  heirs  of  these,  and  all  Mexicans  who  may  hereafter  acquire 
said  property  by  contract,  shall  enjoy  with  respect  to  it  guarantees  equally 
ample,  as  if  the  same  belonged  to  citizens  of  the  United  States. 

ARTICLE  IX. 

Mexicans  who,  in  the  territories  aforesaid,  shall  not  preserve  the  char 
acter  of  citizens  of  the  Mexican  republic,  conformably  with  what  is  stip 
ulated  in  the  preceding  article,  shall  be  incorporated  into  the  union  of  the 
United  States,  and  be  admitted  at  the  proper  time  (to  be  judged  of  by  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States)  to  the  enjoyment  of  all  the  rights  of  citi 
zens  of  the  United  States,  according  to  the  principles  of  the  constitution  ; 
and  in  the  mean  time  shall  be  maintained  and  protected  in  the  enjoyment 
of  their  liberty  and  property,  and  secured  in  the  free  exercise  of  their  re 
ligion  without  restriction. 

ARTICLE  X. 
[Stricken  out.] 

ARTICLE  XI. 

Considering  that  a  great  part  of  the  territories  which,  by  the  present 
treaty,  are  to  be  comprehended  for  the  future  within  the  limits  of  the  Uni 
ted  States,  is  now  occupied  by  savage  tribes,  who  will  hereafter  be  under 

22 


333  TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

the  exclusive  control  of  the  government  of  the  United  States,  and  whose 
incursions  within  the  -territory  of  Mexico  would  be  prejudicial  in  the  ex 
treme,  it  is  solemnly  agreed  that  all  such  incursions  shall  be  forcibly  re 
strained  by  the  government  of  the  United  States  whensoever  this  may  be 
necessary  ;  and  that  when  they  cannot  be  prevented,  they  shall  be  punish 
ed  by  the  said  government,  and  satisfaction  for  the  same  shall  be  exacted 
— all  in  the  same  way.  and  with  equal  diligence  and  energy,  as  if  the 
same  incursions  were  meditated  or  committed  within  its  own  territory, 
against  its  own  citizens. 

It  shall  not  be  lawful,  under  any  pretext  whatever,  for  any  inhabitant 
of  the  United  States  to  purchase  or  acquire  any  Mexican,  or  any  foreigner 
residing  in  Mexico,  who  may  have  been  captured  by  Indians  inhabiting 
the  territory  of  either  of  Jhe  two  republics,  nor  to  purchase  or  acquire 
horses,  mules,  cattle,  or  property  of  any  kind,  stolen  within  Mexican  ter 
ritory  by  such  Indians. 

And  in  the  event  of  any  person  or  persons,  captured  within  Mexican 
territory  by  Indians,  being  carried  into  the  territory  of  the  United  States, 
the  government  of  the  latter  engages  and  binds  itself,  in  the  most  solemn 
manner,  so  soon  as  it  shall  know  of  such  captives  being  within  its  terri 
tory,  and  shall  be  able  so  to  do,  through  the  faithful  exercise  of  its  influ 
ence  and  power,  to  rescue  them  and  return  them  to  their  country,  or 
deliver  them  to  the  agent  or  representative  of  the  Mexican  government. 
The  Mexican  authorities  will,  as  far  as  practicable,  give  to  the  government 
of  the  United  States  notice  of  such  captures;  and  its  agent  shall  pay  the 
expenses  incurred  in  the  maintenance  and  transmission  of  the  rescued 
captives ;  who,  in  the  mean  time,  shall  be  treated  with  the  utmost  hospi 
tality  by  the  American  authorities  at  the  place  where  they  may  be.  But 
if  the  government  of  the  United  States,  before  receiving  such  notice  from 
Mfcxico,  should  obtain  intelligence,  through  any  other  channel,  of  the  ex 
istence  of  Mexican  captives  within  its  territory,  it  will  proceed  forthwith  to 
effect  their  release  and  delivery  to  the  Mexican  agent  as  above  stipulated. 

For  the  purpose  of  giving  to  these  stipulations  the  fullest  possible  effica 
cy,  thereby  affording  the  security  and  redress  demanded  by  their  true 
spirit  and  intent,  the  government  of  the  United  States  will  now  and  here 
after  pass,  without  unnecessary  delay,  and  always  vigilantly  enforce,  such 
laws  as  the  nature  of  the  subject  may  require.  And  finally,  the  sacred- 
ness  of  this  obligation  shall  never  be  lost  sight  of  by  the  said  government 
when  providing  for  the  removal  of  the  Indians  from  any  portion  of  the  said 
territories,  or  for  *ts  being  settled  by  citizens  of  the  United  States  ;  but,  on 
the  contrary,  special  care  shall  then  be  taken  not  to  place  its  Indian  occu 
pants  under  the  necessity  of  seeking  new  homes,  by  committing  those 
invasions  which  the  United  States  have  solemnly  obliged  themselves  to 
restrain. 


TREATY    OF    PEACE.  339 

ARTICLE  XII. 

In  consideration  of  the  extension  acquired  by  the  boundaries  of  the 
United  States,  as  defined  in  the  fifth  article  of  the  present  treaty,  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  United  States  engages  to  pay.  to  that  of  the  Mexican  re 
public  the  sum  of  fifteen  millions  of  dollars. 

Immediately  after  this  treaty  shall  have  been  duly  ratified  by  the 
government  of  the  Mexican  republic,  the  sum  of  three  millions  of  dollars 
shall  be  paid  to  the  said  government  by  that  of  the  United  States,  at  the 
city  of  Mexico,  in  the  gold  or  silver  coin  of  Mexico.  The  remaining 
twelve  millions  of  dollars  shall  be  paid  at  the  same  place,  and  in  the  same 
coin,  in  annual  instalments  of  three  millions  of  dollars  each,  together  with 
interest  on  the  same  at  the  rate  of  six  per  centum  per  annum.  This  in 
terest  shall  begin  to  run  upon  the  whole  sum  of  twelve  millions  from  the 
day  of  the  ratification  of  the  present  treaty  by  the  Mexican  government, 
and  the  first  of  the  instalments  shall  be  paid  at  the  expiration  of  one  year 
from  the  same  day.  Together  with  each  annual  instalment,  as  it  falls 
due,  the  whole  interest  accruing  on  such  instalment  from  the  beginning 
shall  also  be  paid. 

ARTICLE  XIII. 

The  United  States  engage,  moreover,  to  assume  and  pay  to  the  claim 
ants  all  the  amounts  now  due  them,  and  those  hereafter  to  become  due, 
by  reason  of  the  claims  already  liquidated  and  decided  against  the  Mexi 
can  republic,  under  the  conventions  between  the  two  republics  severally 
concluded  on  the  eleventh  day  of  April,  eighteen  hundred  and  thirty-nine, 
and  on  the  thirtieth  day  of  January,  eighteen  hundred  and  forty-three :  so 
that  the  Mexican  republic  shall  be  absolutely  exempt,  for  the  future, 
from  all  expense  whatever  on  account  of  the  said  claims. 

ARTICLE  XIV. 

The  United  States  do  furthermore  discharge  the  Mexican  republic  from 
all  claims  of  citizens  of  the  United  States  not  heretofore  decided  against 
the  Mexican  government,  which  may  have  arisen  previously  to  the  date 
of  the  signature  of  this  treaty  ;  which  discharge  shall  be  final  and  perpet 
ual,  whether  the  said  claims  be  rejected  or  be  allowed  by  the  board  of 
commissioners  provided  for  in  the  following  article,  and  whatever  shall  be 
the  total  amount  of  those  allowed. 

ARTICLE  XV. 

The  United  States,  exonerating  Mexico  from  all  demands  on  account 
of  the  claims  of  their  citizens  mentioned  in  the  preceding  article,  and  con 
sidering  them  entirely  and  forever  cancelled,  whatever  their  amount  may 


340  TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

be,  undertake  to  make  satisfaction  for  the  same,  to  an  amount  not  ex 
ceeding  three  and  one  quarter  millions  of  dollars.  To  ascertain  the  validity 
and  amount  of  those  claims,  a  board  of  commissioners  shall  be  established 
by  the  government  of  the  United  States,  whose  awards  shall  be  final  and 
conclusive  ;  provided,  that  in  deciding  upon  the  validity  of  each  claim, 
the  board  shall  be  guided  and  governed  by  the  principles  and  rules  of 
decision  prescribed  by  the  first  and  fifth  articles  of  the  unratified  conven 
tion,  concluded  at  the  city  of  Mexico  on  the  twentieth  day  of  November, 
one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  forty-three  ;  and  in  no  case  shall  an 
award  be  made  in  favor  of  any  claim  not  embraced  by  these  principles 
and  rules. 

If,  in  the  opinion  of  the  said  board  of  commissioners,  or  of  the  claimants, 
any  books,  records,  or  documents  in  the  possession  or  power  of  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  Mexican  republic,  shall  be  deemed  necessary  to  the  just 
decision  of  any  claim,  the  commissioners,  or  the  claimants  through  them, 
shall,  within  such  period  as  Congress  may  designate,  make  an  application 
in  writing  for  the  same,  addressed  to  the  Mexican  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  to  be  transmitted  by  the  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States  ; 
and  the  Mexican  government  engages,  at  the  earliest  possible  moment 
after  the  receipt  of  such  demand,  to  cause  any  of  the  books,  records,  or 
documents,  so  specified,  which  shall  be  in  their  possession  or  power,  (or 
authenticated  copies  or  extracts  of  the  same,)  to  be  transmitted  to  the 
said  Secretary  of  State,  who  shall  immediately  deliver  them  over  to  the 
said  board  of  commissioners:  Provided,  That  no  such  application  shall 
be  made  by,  or  at  the  instance  of,  any  claimant,  until  the  facts  which  it 
is  expected  to  prove  by  such  books,  records,  or  documents,  shall  have 
been  stated  under  oath  or  affirmation. 

ARTICLE  XVI. 

Each  of  the  contracting  parties  reserves  to  itself  the  entire  right  to  for 
tify  whatever  point  within  its  territory  it  may  judge  proper  BO  to  fortify 
for  its  security. 

ARTICLE  XVII. 

The  treaty  of  amity,  commerce,  and  navigation,  concluded  at  the  city 
of  Mexico  on  the  fifth  day  of  April,  A.  D.  1831,  between  the  United  States 
of  America  and  the  United  Mexican  States,  except  the  additional  article, 
and  except  so  far  as  the  stipulations  of  the  said  treaty  may  be  incompati 
ble  with  any  stipulation  contained  in  the  present  treaty,  is  hereby  revived 
for  the  period  of  eight  years  from  the  day  of  the  exchange  of  ratifications 
of  this  treaty,  with  the  same  force  and  virtue  as  if  incorporated  therein  ;  it 
being  understood  that  each  of  the  contracting  parties  reserves  to  itself  the 
right,  at  any  time  after  the  said  period  of  eight  years  shall  have  expired, 


TREATY    OF    PEACE.  341 

to  terminate  the  same  by  giving  oue  year's  notice  of  such  intention  to  the 
other  party. 

ARTICLE  XVIII. 

All  supplies  whatever  for  troops  of  the  United  States  in  Mexico,  arriving 
at  ports  in  the  occupation  of  such  troops  previous  to  the  final  evacuation 
thereof,  although  subsequently  to  the  restoration  of  the  custom-houses  at 
such  ports,  shall  be  entirely  exempt  from  duties  and  charges  of  any  kizid  , 
the  government  of  the  United  States  hereby  engaging  and  pledging  its 
faith  to  establish,  and  vigilantly  to  enforce,  all  possible  guards  for  securing 
the  revenue  of  Mexico,  by  preventing  the  importation,  under  cover  of  this 
stipulation,  of  any  articles  other  than  such,  both  in  kind  and  in  quantity, 
as  shall  really  be  wanted  for  the  use  and  consumption  of  the  forces  of  the 
United  States  during  the  time  they  may  remain  in  Mexico.  To  this  end 
it  shall  be  the  duty  of  all  officers  and  agents  of  the  United  States  to  de 
nounce  to  the  Mexican  authorities  at  the  respective  ports  any  attempts  at 
a  fraudulent  abuse  of  this  stipulation  which  they  may  know  of,  or  may 
have  reason  to  suspect,  and  to  give  to  such  authorities  all  the  aid  in  their 
power  with  regard  thereto  ;  and  every  such  attempt,  when  duly  proved 
and  established  by  sentence  of  a  competent  tribunal,  shall  be  punished  by 
the  confiscation  of  the  property  so  attempted  to  be  fraudulently  introduced 

ARTICLE  XIX. 

With  respect  to  all  merchandise,  effects,  and  property  whatsoever,  im 
ported  into  ports  of  Mexico  whilst  in  the  occupation  of  the  forces  of  the 
United  States,  whether  by  citizens  of  either  republic,  or  by  citizens  or  sub 
jects  of  any  neutral  nation,  the  following  rules  shall  be  observed : 

1.  All  such  merchandise,  effects,  and  property,  if  imported  previously 
to  the  restoration  of  the   custom-houses  to   the   Mexican  authorities,  as 
stipulated  for  in  the  third  article  of  this  treaty,  shall  be  exempt  from  con 
fiscation,  although  the  importation  of  the  same  be  prohibited  by  the  Mexi 
can  tariff. 

2.  The  same  perfect  exemption  shall  be  enjoyed  by  all  such  merchan 
dise,  effects,  and  property,  imported  subsequently  to  the  restoration  of  the 
custom-houses,  and  previously  to  the  sixty  days  fixed  in  the  following  ar 
ticle  for  the  coming  into  force  of  the  Mexican  tariff  at  such  ports  respec 
tively  ;  the  said  merchandise,  effects,  and  property  being,  however,  at  the 
time  of  their  importation,  subject  to  the  payment  of  duties,  as  provided  for 
in  the  said  following  article. 

3.  All   merchandise,  effects,  and  property  described  in   the  two  rules 
foregoing,  shall,  during  their  continuance  at  the  place  of  importation,  and 
upon  their  leaving  such  place  for  the   interior,  be  exempt  from  all  duty, 
tax,  or  impost  of  every  kind,  uuder  whatsoever  title  or  denomination. 


342  TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

Nor  shall  they  be  there  subjected  to  any  charge  whatsoever  upon  the  sale 
thereof. 

4.  All  merchandise,  effects,  and  property  described  in  the  first  and  sec 
ond  rules,  which  shall  have  been  removed  to  any  place  in  the  interior 
whilst  such  place  was  in  the  occupation  of  the  forces  of  the  United  States, 
shall,  during  their  continuance  therein,  be  exempt  from  all  tax  upon  the 
sale  or  consumption  thereof,  and  from  every  kind  of  impost  or  contribu 
tion,  under  whatsoever  title  or  denomination. 

5.  But  if  any  merchandise,  effects,  or  property,  described  in  the  first 
and  second  rules,  shall  be  removed  to  any  place  not  occupied  at  the  time 
by  the  forces  of  the  United  States,  they  shall,  upon  their  introduction  into 
such  place,  or  upon  their  sale  or  consumption  there,  be  subject  to  the  same 
duties  which,  under  the  Mexican  laws,  they  would  be  required  to  pay  in 
such  cases  if  they  had  been  imported  in  time  of  peace,  through  the  mari 
time  custom-houses,  and  had  there  paid  the  duties  conformably  with  the 
Mexican  tariff. 

6.  The  owners  of  all  merchandise,  effects,  or  property,  described  in  the 
first  and  second  rules,  and  existing  in  any  port  of  Mexico,  shall  have  the 
right  to  reship  the  same,  exempt  from  all   tax,  impost,  or  contribution 
whatever. 

With  respect  to  the  metals,  or  other  property,  exported  from  any  Mexi 
can  port  whilst  in  the  occupation  of  the  forces  of  the  United  States,  and 
previously  to  the  restoration  of  the  custom-house  at  such  port,  no  person 
shall  be  required  by  the  Mexican  authorities,  whether  general  or  state,  to 
pay  any(tax,  duty,  or  contribution  upon  any  such  exportation,  or  in  any 
manner  to  account  for  the  same  to  the  said  authorities. 

ARTICLE  XX. 

Through  consideration  for  the  interests  of  commerce  generally,  it  is 
agreed,  that  if  less  than  sixty  days  should  elapse  between  the  date  of  the 
signature  of  this  treaty  and  the  restoration  of  the  custom-houses,  con 
formably  with  the  stipulation  in  the  third  article,  in  such  case  all  mer 
chandise,  effects,  and  property  whatsoever,  arriving  at  the  Mexican  ports 
after  the  restoration  of  the  said  custom-houses,  and  previously  to  the  expi 
ration  of  sixty  days  after  the  day  of  the  signature  of  this  treaty,  shall  be 
admitted  to  entry  ;  and  no  other  duties  shall  be  levied  thereon  than  the 
duties  established  by  the  tariff  found  in  force  at  such  custom-houses  at  the 
time  of  the  restoration  of  the  same.  And  to  all  such  merchandise,  effects, 
and  property,  the  rules  established  by  the  preceding  article  shall  apply. 

ARTICLE  XXI. 

If  unhappily  any  disagreement  should  hereafter  arise  between  the  gov 
ernments  of  the  two  republics,  whether  with  respect  to  the  interpretation 


TREATY  OF  PEACE.  343 

of  any  stipulation  in  this  treaty,  or  with  respect  to  any  other  particular 
concerning  the  political  or  commercial  relations  of  the  two  nations,  the 
said  governments,  in  the  name  of  those  nations,  do  promise  to  each  other 
that  they  will  endeavor,  in  the  most  sincere  and  earnest  manner,  to  settle 
the  differences  so  arising,  and  to  preserve  the  state  of  peace  and  friendship 
in  which  the  two  countries  are  now  placing  themselves ;  using,  for  this 
end,  mutual  representations  and  pacific  negotiations.  And  if,  by  these 
means,  they  should  not  be  enabled  to  come  to  an  agreement,  a  resort 
shall  not,  on  this  account,  be  had  to  reprisals,  aggression,  or  hostility  of 
any  kind,  by  the  one  republic  against  the  other,  until  the  government  of 
that  which  deems  itself  aggrieved  shall  have  maturely  considered,  in  the 
spirit  of  peace  and  good  neighborship,  whether  it  would  not  be  better  that 
such  difference  should  be  settled  by  the  arbitration  of  commissioners  ap 
pointed  on  each  side,  or  by  that  of  a  friendly  nation.  And  should  such 
course  be  proposed  by  either  party,  it  shall  be  acceded  to  by  the  other,  un 
less  deemed  by  it  altogether  incompatible  with  the  nature  of  the  difference, 
or  the  circumstances  of  the  case. 

ARTICLE  XXII. 

If  (which  is  not  to  be  expected,  and  which  God  forbid  !)  war  shall  un 
happily  break  out  between  the  two  republics,  they  do  now,  with  a  view  to 
such  calamity,  solemnly  pledge  themselves  to  each  other  and  to  the  world, 
to  observe  the  following  rules:  absolutely,  where  the  nature  of  the  subject 
permits,  and  as  closely  as  possible  in  all  cases  where  such  absolute  ob 
servance  shall  be  impossible. 

1.  The  merchants  of  either  republic  then  residing  in  the  other,  shall  be 
allowed  to  remain  twelve  months,  (for  those  dwelling  in  the  interior,)  and 
six  months  (for  those  dwelling  at  the  seaports)  to  collect  their  debts  and 
settle  their  affairs  ;  during  which  periods  they  shall  enjoy  the  same  protec 
tion,  and  be  on  the  same  footing,  in  all  respects,  as  the  citizens  or  subjects 
of  the  most  friendly  nations  ;  and,  at  the  expiration  thereof,  or  at  any 
time  before,  they  shall  have  full  liberty  to  depart,  carrying  off  ail  their  ef 
fects  without  molestation  or  hinderance :  conforming  therein  to  the  same 
laws  which  the  citizens  or  subjects  of  the  most  friendly  nations  are  re 
quired  to  conform  to.  Upon  the  entrance  of  the  armies  of  either  nation 
into  the  territories  of  the  other,  women  and  children,  ecclesiastics,  scholars 
of  every  faculty,  cultivators  of  the  earth,  merchants,  artisans,  manufac 
turers,  and  fishermen,  unarmed  and  inhabiting  the  unfortified  towns,  vil 
lages,  or  places,  and  in  general  all  persons  whose  occupations  are  for  the 
common  subsistence  and  benefit  of  mankind,  shall  be  allowed  to  continue 
their  respective  employments  unmolested  in  their  persons.  Nor  shall  their 
houses  or  goods  be  burnt  or  otherwise  destroyed,  nor  their  cattle  taken,  nor 
their  fields  wasted,  by  the  armed  force  into  whose  power,  by  the  events  of 


344  TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

war,  they  may  happen  to  fall  ;  but  if  the  necessity  arise  to  take  any  thing 
from  them  for  the  use  of  such  armed  force,  the  same  shall  be  pnid  for  at 
au  equitable  price.  All  churches,  hospitals,  schools,  colleges,  libraries, 
and  other  establishments,  for  charitable  and  beneficent  purposes,  shall  be 
respected,  and  all  persons  connected  with  the  same  protected  in  the  dis 
charge  of  their  duties,  and  the  pursuit  of  their  vocations. 

2.  In  order  that  the  fate  of  prisoners  of  war  may  be  alleviated,  all 
such  practices  as  those  of  sending  them  into  distant,  inclement,  or  un 
wholesome  districts,  or  crowdiug  them  into  close  and  noxious  places,  shall 
be  studiously  avoided.  They  shall  not  be  confined  in  dungeons,  prison- 
ships,  or  prisons  ;  nor  be  put  in  irons,  or  bound,  or  otherwise  restrained  in 
the  use  of  their  limbs.  The  officers  shall  enjoy  liberty  on  their  paroles, 
within  convenient  districts,  and  have  comfortable  quarters  ;  and  the  com 
mon  soldiers  shall  be  disposed  in  cantonments,  open  and  extensive  enough 
for  air  and  exercise,  and  lodged  in  barracks  as  roomy  and  good  as  are 
provided  by  the  party  in  whose  power  they  are,  for  its  own  troops.  But 
if  any  officer  shall  break  his  parole  by  leaving  the  district  so  assigned  him, 
or  any  other  prisoner  shall  escape  from  the  limits  of  his  cantonment,  after 
they  shall  have  been  designated  to  him,  such  individual,  officer,  or  other 
prisoner,  shall  forfeit  so  much  of  the  benefit  of  this  article  as  provides  for 
his  liberty  on  parole  or  in  cantonment.  And  if  any  officer  so  breaking  his 
parole,  or  any  common  soldier  so  escaping  from  the  limits  assigned  him, 
shall  afterwards  be  found  in  arms,  previously  to  his  being  regularly  ex 
changed,  the  person  so  offending  shall  be  dealt  with  according  to  the  es 
tablished  laws  of  war.  The  officers  shall  be  daily  furnished  by  the  party 
in  whose  power  they  are,  with  as  many  rations,  and  of  the  same  articles, 
as  are  allowed,  either  in  kind  or  by  commutation,  to  officers  of  equal  rank 
in  its  own  army  ;  and  all  others  shall  be  daily  furnished  with  such  ration 
as  is  allowed  to  a  common  soldier  in  its  own  service  :  the  value  of  all 
which  supplies  shall,  at  the  close  of  the  war,  or  at  periods  to  be  agreed 
upon  between  the  respective  commanders,  be  paid  by  the  other  party,  on 
a  mutual  adjustment  of  accounts  for  the  subsistence  of  prisoners  ;  and 
such  accounts  shall  not  be  mingled  with  or  set  off  against  any  others,  nor 
the  balance  due  on  them  be  withheld  as  a  compensation  or  reprisal  for 
any  cause  whatever,  real  or  pretended.  Each  party  shall  be  allowed  to 
keep  a  commissary  of  prisoners,  appointed  by  itself,  with  every  canton 
ment  of  prisoners  in  possession  of  the  other  ;  which  commissary  shall  see 
the  prisoners  as  often  as  he  pleases  ;  shall  be  allowed  to  receive,  exempt 
from  all  duties  or  taxes,  and  to  distribute  whatever  comforts  may  be  sent 
to  them  by  their  friends  ;  and  shall  be  free  to  transmit  his  reports  in  open 
letters  to  tiie  party  by  whom  he  is  employed. 

And  it  is  declared  that  neither  the  pretence  that  war  dissolves  all 
treaties,  nor  any  other  wnutever,  shall  be  considered  as  annulling  or  sus- 


TREATY    OF    PEACE.  345 

pending  the  solemn  covenant  contained  in  this  article.  On  the  contrary, 
the  state  of  war  is  precisely  that  for  which  it  is  provided,  and  during  which 
its  stipulations  are  to  be  as  sacredly  observed  as  the  most  acknowledged 
obligations  under  the  law  of  nature  or  nations. 

ARTICLE  XXIII. 

This  treaty  shall  be  ratified  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  thereof ;  and 
by  the  President  of  the  Mexican  republic,  with  the  previous  approbation 
of  its  general  Congress  ;  and  the  ratification  shall  be  exchanged  in  the 
city  of  Washington,  or  at  the  seat  of  government  of  Mexico,  in  four 
months  from  the  date  of  the  signature  hereof,  or  sooner  if  practicable. 

In  faith  whereof,  we,  the  respective  plenipotentiaries  have  signed  this 
treaty  of  peace,  friendship,  limits,  and  settlement ;  and  have  hereunto 
affixed  our  seals  respectively.  Done  in  quintuplicate,  at  the  city  of 
Guadaloupe  Hidalgo,  on  the  second  day  of  February,  in  the  year  of  our 
Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  forty-eight. 

N.  P.  TRIST,  [L.  s.] 

LUIS  G.  CUEVAS,  [L.  s.] 
BERNARDO  COUTO,  [L.  s.] 
MIGL.  ATRISTAIN,  [L.  s.] 

And  whereas  the  said  treaty,  as  amended,  has  been  duly 
ratified  on  both  parts,  and  the  respective  ratifications  of  the 
same  were  exchanged  at  Queretaro,  on  the  thirtieth  day  of 
May  last,  by  Ambrose  H.  Sevier  and  Nathan  Clifford,  com 
missioners  on  the  part  of  the  government  of  the  United  States, 
and  by  Senor  Don  Luis  de  la  Rosa,  Minister  of  Relations  of 
the  Mexican  republic  on  the  part  of  that  government : 

Now,  therefore,  be  it  known,  that  I,  JAMES  K.  POLK,  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States  of  America,  have  caused  the  said 
treaty  to  be  made  public,  to  the  end  that  the  same,  and  every 
clause  and  article  thereof,  may  be  observed  and  fulfilled  with 
good  faith  by  the  United  States  and  the  citizens  thereof. 

In  witness  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and  caused 
the  seal  of  the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

Done  at  the  city  of  Washington,  this  fourth  day  of  July,  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  forty-eight,  and  of  the  Indepen- 
[L.  s.J  derice  of  the  United  States  the  seventy-third. 

By  the  President :  JAMES  K.  POLK. 

JAMES  BUCHANAN,  Secretary  of  State. 


r 


RESULTS    OF    THE    WAR.  317 

Let  us  turn,  for  a  moment,  to  the  RESULTS  OF  THE 
MEXICAN  WAR.  The  results  may  be  summed  up  in 
three  particulars,  viz. : — the  loss  of  lives,  the  loss  of  money, 
and  the  gain  of  territory.  Each  of  these  may  be  estima 
ted  with  sufficient  accuracy,  for  all  the  purposes  of  his 
tory. 

1.  OF  THE  Loss  OF  LIFE.     The  official  returns  of  our 
government  show  an  actual  loss,  in  the  field — by  battle  and 
sickness — of  fifteen  thousand  men.     But  this  is  by  no 
means  all.     There  were  large  numbers  of  men  mustered 
into  service  in  the  interior  of  the  United  States,  whose 
regiments  were  in  Mexico,  and  who  of  course  must  take 
some  time,  and  meet  with  much  exposure,  before  they  were 
entered  on  the  rolls  of  the  active  force.     Many  of  these 
were  taken  sick  and  died,  without  ever  appearing  on  the 
rolls  of  the  actual  force.     Again,  thousands  of  men  were 
discharged  in  Mexico,  as  their  time  expired.     Of  these, 
many  died.     These  facts  are  known  and  admitted  by  the 
officers   of  the  army.     It  may  be  said  then,  with  truth, 
that  the  real  arid  entire  loss  of  life,  from  the  invasion  of 
Mexico,  was  not  less  than  TWENTY-FIVE  THOUSAND  MEN. 

2.  Loss  OF  MONEY.     The  treasury  reports,  the  terms 
of  the  treaty,  and  some  allowance  for  arrears,  will  enable 
us  to  come  very  near  the  true  cost  of  the  war.     The  war 
commenced,  in  respect  to  the  action  of  our  government 
for  preparation  and   provisions,  in  May,  1846;  and   the 
army   was   not  withdrawn   from    Mexico  till  June,  1848. 
The  actual  war,  then,   occupies  a  little  more  than  two 
years.     The  appropriations  by  law  we  know,  the  balance 
in  the  treasury  we  know,  and  the  payments  under  the  treaty 
we  know.     There  is  nothing  left  to  conjecture,  then,  but 
lae  amount  which  may  be  supposed  necessary  to  cover  ar- 


348  LOSS    OF    LIFE. 

rears.  There  is,  however,  yet  another  expenditure,  which 
is  equivalent  to  money,  although  not  paid  in  money.  This 
is  the  bounty-lands.  By  the  act  of  Congress  passed  Feb 
ruary,  1847,  each  regular  soldier  and  each  volunteer,  who 
dies,  or  is  discharged  by  wounds,  or  is  regularly  dis 
charged,  is  entitled  to  a  warrant  of  160  acres  each  of  the 
public  lands.  The  number  of  volunteers  actually  in  Mex 
ico  was  about  56,000  and  the  number  of  soldiers  enlisted 
since  the  war  about  29,000.  About  85,000  men,  or,  if 
dead,  their  heirs  and  representatives,  are  entitled  to  land- 
warrants.  Nearly  the  whole  of  them,  we  may  assume, 
will  be  taken  out,  and  entered  in  the  land-offices,  gen 
erally  by  those  who  have  speculated  in  them.  Nearly 
thirteen  millions  of  acres  will  be  required  to  meet  the  land- 
warrants  issued  to  the  soldiers  of  the  Mexican  war  !  If 
sold  by  the  United  States,  the  value,  at  the  minimum 
price,  is  more  than  sixteen  millions  of  dollars.  The  gov 
ernment  has,  however,  fixed  a  commutation  price  of  $100 
in  scrip  for  each  160  acres.  Taking  that  as  the  standard 
of  value  for  land-warrants,  we  have  eight  and  a  half  mil 
lions  of  dollars  for  that  account.  The  arrearages  of  ex 
pense  attending  the  return  and  disbanding  of  the  army, 
cannot  be  very  closely  estimated  ;  but  we  may  safely  as 
sume  this  item  at  not  less  than  ten  millions  of  dollars. 
The  balance  in  the  treasury,  as  reported  by  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  in  May,  1846,  was  eight  millions.  The 
cost  of  the  war,  then,  stands  thus  : — 

Balance  in  the  Treasury,  May,  1846 $8,000,000 

Appropriated  by  Congress  for  the  fiscal  years  1846  and 

1847 '-     -    -  120,000,000 

Appropriated  for  the  Arrearages  of  1847      -     -    -    -  16,000,000 

To  be  paid  under  the  Mexican  Treaty 20,000,000 


LOSS  OF  MONEY  AND  LAND.  349 

Value  of  Land  Warrants  issued 8,500,000 

Add  probable  Arrearages 10,000,000 


$182,500,000 
Deduct  from  this  Civil  Expenses 16,000,000 


Total  Expense  of  the  Mexican  War $166,500,000 

To  find  the  DEBT,  which  must  ultimately  appear  on  the 
books  of  the  Treasury  Department,  the  following  deduc 
tions  from  the  gross  sum  must  be  made. 

Balance  in  the  Treasury $8,000,000 

Value  of  Land  Warrants 8,500,000 

Ordinary  Revenue  of  two  years 65,000,000 


$81,500,000 
Deduct  from  the  aggregate  above,  and  there  remains 

debt $85,000,000 

At  least  this  sum  must  remain,  as  a  permanent  debt 
against  the  United  States,  as  a  consequence  of  the  war 
with  Mexico. 

3.  THE  GAIN  IN  TERRITORY.  The  gain  may  be  sta 
ted,  in  general  terms,  as  the  provinces  of  New  Mexico 
and  New  California.  But  what  are  these  ?  Who  knows 
them  ?  Who  can  estimate  them  ?  Taken  as  so  much 
surface  of  the  earth,  this  is  a  vast  space  ;  but  a  space  ab 
solutely  hid  from  the  eyes  of  civilization — an  untrodden, 
untenanted  wilderness  !  The  southern  boundary  of  New 
Mexico  is  near  the  32°  of  latitude,  and  San  Diego  on  the 
Pacific  is  but  a  little  north  of  it.  The  northern  boundary 
of  New  California  is  in  latitude  42°,  being  formerly  the 
southern  boundary  of  the  United  States.  The  eastern 
boundary  of  New  Mexico  is  on  the  average  longitude  of 
29°  west  of  Washington,  and  the  Pacific  coast  of  Califor- 


350  TERRITORY    ACQUIRED. 

nia  is  on  the  average  longitude  of  44°,  varying  in  fact  from 
40°  to  47°.  We  have  an  immense  space  of  country,  then, 
— about  ten  degrees  north  and  south,  and  fifteen  degrees 
east  and  west.  This  makes  700  miles  north  and  south, 
and  900  miles  east  and  west.  This  surface  makes  630,000 
square  miles,  equal  in  space  to  FIFTEEN  LARGE  STATES  ! 
But  will  the  greater  part  of  this  vast  space  ever  be  in 
habited  by  any  but  the  restless  hunter  and  the  wandering 
trapper  ?  Two  hundred  thousand  square  miles  of  this  ter 
ritory,  in  New  California,  has  been  trod  by  the  feet  of  no 
civilized  being.  No  spy,  or  pioneer,  or  vagrant  trapper 
has  ever  returned  to  report  the  character  and  scenery  oi 
that  waste  and  lonely  wilderness.  Two  hundred  thousand 
square  miles  more  are  occupied  with  broken  mountains 
and  dreary  wilds.  But  little  remains,  then,  for  civiliza 
tion.  Of  that  little,  however,  there  is  a  future  value  which 
may  not  now  be  counted,  in  the  fine  ports  and  broad  coast 
which  look  out  on  the  noble  Pacific.  Beyond  that  live 
four  hundred  millions  of  the  human  race.  Soon  their 
minds,  as  well  as  their  commerce  and  their  kingdoms,  will 
be  open  to  the  purer  and  brighter  light  of  Christianity. 
We  shall  hurry  the  men  and  the  produce  of  our  land,  in 
mighty  railroads  to  the  Pacific  !  Great  cities  we  shall 
have  there  !  Nations  will  come  to  us,  and  we  shall  go 
to  them  !  And  this  continent  will  be  the  highway  for  the 
multitudes  of  the  world,  and  the  glorious  light  of  Chris 
tian  Progress  ! 


REGULAR    ARMY. 


351 


STATISTICS 

OF  THE  U.  S.  ARMY  ENGAGED  IN  THE  MEXICAN  WAR. 

The  following  tables  show  the  number  of  regulars  and  volunteers,  with 
the  list  of  the  commanding  officers;  the  number  furnished  by  each 
State;  the  total  strength  and  losses  of  the  army;  the  number  of 
killed  and  mortally  wounded  in  each  engagement;  and  the  names  of 
the  officers  killed. 

To  exhibit  the  Mexican  War  in  its  completeness,  we 
must  look  at  the  resources  employed  to  carry  it  on,  as 
well  as  the  origin  and  results  of  the  controversy.  Below 
will  be  found  tables  of  the  strength  of  the  army  (both  reg 
ulars  and  volunteers)  employed  in  Mexico,  with  the  losses 
it  sustained. 

TABLE  I. 

REGULAR  ARMY  EMPLOYED  IN  MEXICO  FROM  MAY,  1846,  TO  DE 
CEMBER  31sT,  1847. 


Descriptions. 

General 
Raff. 

Engineers. 

Ordnance. 

Artillery. 

Riflemen. 

Dragoons. 

Voltigeurs. 

Infantry. 

Marines. 

Aggregate. 

Original  army  in  Texas,  ) 
May,  1846  \ 

20 





976 



388 



2,170 



3,554 

Number  of  recruits  sent") 
to  Mexico  from  May,  ( 

23,556 

1846,    to    December,  [ 

1847                               J 

Total  

27,110 

Note.  To  the  above  aggregate  must  be  added,  by  the  report  of  the  Ad 
jutant-general,  2,493  recruits  sent  to  the  army  in  Mexico,  (regulars,) 
from  January  1st,  1848,  to  April  1st,  1848.  These,  added  to  the  above, 
rnuke  29,£>O3  regular  soldiers  Beat  into  Mexico  from  May,  1846,  to 
April,  1846. 


352 


TABLE    OF    VOLUNTEERS. 


TABLE  II. 

VOLUNTEERS  EMPLOYED  IN  MEXICO  FROM  MAY,  1846,  TO  DE 
CEMBER,  1847. 


States.       Regim'ts. 

Commanding  Officer. 

Foot. 

Horse. 

Art. 

Total. 

Mass.                   1 

Col.  Caleb  Gushing 

1,047 

— 

_ 

1.047 

New  York 

1st 

Col.  J.  D.  Stevenson 

1,179 

— 

- 

1,179 

u 

2d 

Col.  W.  B.  Burnett 

1,486 

— 

_ 

1,486 

N.  Jersey 

4 

Lt.  Col.  J.  Woodruff 

424 

— 

- 

424 

Fennsylv. 

1st 
2d 

Col.  F.  M.  Wyukoop 
Col.  W.  B.  Roberts 

1,125 
1,055 

— 

- 

1,125 
1,055 

« 

4 

— 

284 

— 

- 

284 

Maryl.  &  ) 
Dist.  Col.  $ 

4 

Lt.  Col.  W.  H.  Watson 

528 

— 

- 

528 

K 

1 

Col.  S.  W.  Hughes 

666 

— 

- 

666 

" 

[  Comp. 

" 

— 

— 

136 

136 

Virginia 

1 

Col.  F.  Hamtrenck 

1,303 

— 

- 

1,303 

N.  Carolina 

1 

Col.  R.  T.  Paine 

936 

— 

- 

936 

S.  Carolina 

1 

Col.  P.  M.  Butler 

1,054 

— 

_ 

1,054 

Georgia 

1 

Col.  H.  R.  Jackson 

924 

— 

- 

924 

" 

4 

Lt.  Col.  J.  G.  Seymour 

466 

— 

— 

466 

(C 

4 

Lt.  Col.  J.  H.  Calhoun 

— 

657 

— 

657 

Alabama 

i 

Col.  J.  M.  Withers 

931 

— 

- 

931 

u 

i 

Lt.  Col.  P.  H.  Raiford 

295 

— 

— 

295 

« 

4 

Capt.  W.  H.  Pratt 

278 

— 

- 

278 

M 

i 

Col.  J.  F.  Coffee 

945 

— 

— 

945 

«' 

4 

Major  J.  J.  Siebles 

469 

— 

- 

469 

" 

Comp. 

Capt.  J.  M'Gee 

— 

93 

— 

93 

Mississippi 

1st 

Col.  J.  Davis 

942 

— 

— 

94:2 

2d 

Col.  B.  Davis 

947 

|  _ 

947 

u 



431 



_ 

431 

Louisiana 

4 

Major  L.  Golley 

— 

— 

286 

2b6 

M 

1st 

Col.  J.  B.  Walters 

698 

— 

— 

698 

« 

2d 

Col.  T.  F.  Marks 

912 

_ 

912 

M 

3d 

Col.  J.  H.  Dokin 

759 

— 

- 

759 

« 

4th 

Col.  H.  Davis 

791 

— 

- 

791 

H 

5th 

Col.  B.  Peyton 

864 

— 

- 

864 

N 

6th 

Col.  E.  Featherston 

829 

— 

— 

fc29 

«( 

4 

Lt.  Col.  W.  F.  Biscoe 

— 

494 

- 

494 

« 

1 

Col.  L.  G.  de  RuHsey 

1,094 

— 

- 

1,094 

(I 

4 

Col.  C.  Pierce 

656 

— 

— 

656 

M 

Comp. 

Caprt.  Blanchard 

95 

- 

95 

Tennessee 

1 

Col.  J.  E.  Thomas 

— 

944 

- 

944 

1st 

Col.  W.  B.  Campbell 

1,054 

- 

1,054 

(4 

2d 

Col.  W.  T.  Karcell 

695 

— 

— 

695 

(( 

3d 

Col.  B.  F.  Cheetham 

945 

— 

— 

945 

H 

4th 

Col.  R.  Waterhouse 

800 

— 

— 

800 

U 

5th 

Col.  C.  R.  M'Clelland 

972 

—     1  - 

972 

TABLE    OF    VOLUNTEERS. 
Table  II.  continued. 


353 


States. 

Regim'ts 

Commanding  Officer. 

Foot. 

Horse. 

Art 

Total. 

Kentucky 

1st 

Col.  H.  Marshal 



838 

_ 

838 

" 

1st 

Col.  S.  Ormsby 

877 



_ 

877 

" 

2d 

Col.  W.  R.  M'Kee 

919 



_ 

919 

" 

3d 

Col.  M.  V.  Thompson 

1,054 



_ 

1,054 

<( 

4th 

Col.  J.  S.  Williams 

1,112 



_ 

1,112 

Ohio 

1st 

Col.  A  M.  Mitchel 

838 

_ 

838 

M 

2d 

Col.  S.  R.  Curtis 

810 

_ 

81U 

in 

3d 

Col.  S.  W.  Morgan 

738 



_ 

738 

" 

4th 

Col.  C.  H.  Brough 

1,011 



_ 

1,011 

it 

5th 

Col.  W.  Irwin 

942 



_ 

942 

Michigan 

1 

Col.  T.  B.  W.  Stockton 

888 



_ 

888 

« 

1  Comp. 

Capt,  M.  L.  Gage 

84 



_ 

84 

Indiana 

1st 

Col.  J.  P.  Drole 

856i     _ 

_ 

856 

« 

2d 

Col.  J.  Lane 

853     — 

_ 

853 

" 

3d 

Col.  J.  H.  Lane 

869 

_ 

869 

« 

4th 

Col.  W.  A.  Gorman 

919 

_ 

919 

" 

5th 

Uol.  J.  H.  Lane 

973 

_ 

973 

Illinois 

1st 

Col.  J.  J.  Hardiu 

927 



_ 

927 

it 

2d 

Col.  W.  H.  Bissell 

902 

_ 

902 

« 

3d 

Col.  F.  Freeman 

910 

_ 

910 

H 

4th 

Col.  E.  D.  Baker 

819 



_ 

819 

(( 

5th 

Col.  E.  W.  B.  Newby 

,  1,021 



_ 

1,021 

(( 

6th 

Col.  J.  Collins 

969 



_ 

969 

II 

1 

^apt.  A.  Dunlap 

— 

425 

_ 

425 

Wisconsin 

2  Comp. 

Capt.  W.  Knowlton 

146 



_ 

146 

Iowa 

Comp. 

Dapt.  J.  M.  Morgan 

73 

— 

_ 

73 

<( 

2  Comp. 

Capt.  J.  Porter 

— 

156 

_ 

156 

Missouri 

1st 

Col.  A.  R.  Easton 

687 



_ 

687 

« 

2d 

Capt.  F.  H.  Holt 

933 



_ 

933 

" 

1st 

3ol.  A.  W.  Doniphan 

— 

986 

_ 

986 

« 

2d 

Co!.  L.  Price 



845 

_ 

845 

« 

Battal. 

Lt.  Col.  D.  Willoch 



407 

_ 

407 

" 

2  Comp. 

Major  M.  L.  Clark 

— 

— 

239 

239 

« 

" 

" 

141 

— 

— 

141 

« 

Battal. 

Lt.  Col.  A.  Easton 

507 



_ 

507 

« 

1 

Lt.  Col.  J.  Balls 



1,107 

_ 

1,107 

« 

Battal. 

Lt.  Col.  L.  E.  Powell 



437 

_ 

437 

« 

2  Comp. 

Lt.  Col.  W.  Gilpin 

— 

179 

- 

179 

" 

« 

" 

161 

— 

_ 

Ifil 

(i 

Comp. 

(i 





104 

104 

Arkansas 

1 

Co5.  A.  Yell 



800 

_ 

800 

" 

2  Comp. 

Lt.  Col.  W.  Gray 

— 

158 

- 

15H 

" 

3  Comp. 

" 

265 

— 

- 

265 

" 

1  Cornp. 

Capt.  J.  B.  Engart 

— 

100 

- 

10U 

Florida 

4  Comp. 

2apt.  A.  J.  Johnson 

323 

— 

- 

323 

Texas 

1st 

Gen.  J.  P.  Henderson 



1,045 

_ 

1,045 

i< 

2d 

Col.  J.  C.  Hays 

— 

524'  - 

524 

23 

354  NUMBER    FROM    THE    SEVERAL    STATES. 

Table  II.  continued. 


States. 

Regirn'ts 

Commanding  Officer. 

Foot. 

Horse. 

Art. 

Total. 

Texas 

3d 

Col.  S.  T.  Wood 



718 

_ 

716 

«< 

4th 

Major  C.  C.  Cooper 

— 

802 

- 

802 

ii 

5th 

Col.  J.  C.  Hays 

— 

870 

_ 

870 

(4 

6th 

Lt.  Col.  Bell  ' 



711 

_ 

711 

« 

2  Comp. 

Henderson 

95 

— 

_ 

95 

« 

1 

Sol.  A.  S.  Johnson 

615 



_ 

615 

« 

Battal. 



393 



_ 

393 

« 

4  Comp. 

— 



209 

_ 

209 

If 

2  Comp. 

3apt.  M'Cullough 

— 

168 

- 

168 

« 

Indians. 

Black  Beaver 



35 

_ 

35 

(( 

Battal. 

Major  Chevallie 

— 

487 

- 

487 

Mormons 

« 

Lt.  Col.  J.  Alien 

503 

— 

_ 

503 

« 

1  Comp. 

Capt.  D.  C.  Davis 

82 

— 

_ 

82 

California 

Battal. 

Major  J.  C.  Fremont 

— 

470 

_ 

470 

« 

1  Comp. 

« 

— 

— 

41 

41 

« 

M 

Capt.  W.  A.  T.  Maddox 

47 

— 

_ 

47 

Remust'd  t 
Volunt.    \ 

Battal. 

Major  R.  Walker 

— 

257 

- 

257 

3  Comp. 

— 

— 

342 

_ 

342 

"              1  Comp. 

Capt.  Meers 

— 

109 

- 

109 

Totals          |  76  Regiments  and  3  Companies. 

51,726 

15,373 

806 

67,905 

Note. — This  excludes  a  large  number  of  volunteers  who  were  mustered 
for  payment,  but  never  in  service  ;  but  includes  the  Texaus  called  out  ia 
1845. 

TABLE  III. 

VOLUNTEERS  FURNISHED   BY    EACH    STATE,  FROM    THE    MARCH    TO 
CORPUS  CHRISTI  TO  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR. 


States. 

Foot. 

Horse. 

Artil'y. 

Total. 

1,047 

1,047 

2,665 

2  665 

2,464 

2,464 

424 

424 

Maryland  and  Dist.  of  Columbia  

1,194 
1,303 

— 

136 

1,330 
1,303 

936 

936 

South  Carolina          ... 

1,054 

1,054 

2,918 

93 

3,011 

Mississippi.  .. 

2,319 



2,319 

TOTAL    STRENGTH    OF    THE    ARMY.  355 

Table  III.  continued. 


States. 

Foot. 

Horse. 

Artil'y. 

TotaL 

1,390 

657 

2,047 

6,698 

494 

286 

7,448 

4,466 

944 

5,410 

3  962 

838 

4  800 

Ohio     ...     

4,694 

4,694 

972 

972 

4,470 

4,470 

5  548 

425 

5,973 

\Visconsin  

146 

146 

Iowa 

73 

156 

229 

Missouri  

2,429 

3,967 

343 

6,739 

Arkansas 

265 

1  158 

1,423 

Florida  

323 

323 

Texas 

1,103 

5,569 

6,672 

Mormons  

585 

585 

Californians 

47 

470 

41 

558 

Aggregates  

51,726 

15,373 

806 

67,905 

TABLE  IV. 

TOTAL    STRENGTH    OF    THE    ARMY    EMPLOYED     IN    MEXICO,     FROM 
APRIL,   1846,  TO  APRIL,   1848. 


Description  of  Force. 

Foot. 

Horse. 

Artil'y. 

Total. 

Remarks. 

Army   in    Mexico,  ) 
(regulars,)  May,  > 
1846        ) 

2,170 

408 

976 

3,554 

The  general  staff  is 
under  the  head  of 
"  Horse.'* 

Recruits  for  the  old  I 
regiments  $ 
Recruits     for     the  ) 
new  regiments...  ^ 
Recruits     sent     to  } 
Mexico  after  De-  > 
cember,  1847  ...  ) 
Volunteers           »     .». 

51,726 

15,373 

806 

12,551 
10,145 

2,493 
67,905 

The  '  new  regiments' 
were  the  3d  Dra 
goons,  the  Volti- 
geurs,  and  the  9th, 
10th,  llth,  12th, 
13th,  14th,  15th, 

347 

347 

and  16th  regi 

ments  of  Infantry. 

Aggregates  

54,243 

15,781 

1,782 

96,995 

Note.— From  the  above  table  are  excluded  12  companies  called  out  in 
Ohio,  and  mustered  in  "  Camp  Washington,"  but  not  in  actual  service  • 
so  also,  a  portion  of  Louisiana  volunteers  called  out  in  1845 ;  and  so  also 
of  a  few  other  companies.  If  these  were  included,  the  total  number 


356 


LOSSES    OF    THE    ARMY. 


called  out  by  government  during  the  war  would  exceed  ONE  HUNDRED 

THOUSAND. 

The  actual  number  in  service  in  Mexico  exceeds  eighty  thousand.  This 
number  was  not  called  out  at  one  time,  but  in  successive  periods.  At  the 
time  the  war  closed,  the  Adjutant-general  reports,  that  there  were  ac 
tually  more  than  forty  thousand  men  in  the  field. 

/ 
TABLE  V. 

TOTAL  LOSS  OF  THE  ARMY,  BY  REGULARS  AND  STATES,  FROM  MAY, 
1846,  TO  JANUARY,  1848. 


Description  of  Force. 

Disch'd 
from 
disab'ty. 

Killed 
in 
battle. 

Died  of 
wounds 

Died  of 
disease 

Desert 
ed. 

Totals. 

General  staff.  

1 



13 

14 

1 

1 

12 

6 

20 

Ordnance      

6 

4 

14 

5 

29 

1st  Dragoons        

25 

5 

56 

108 

194 

33 

8 

91 

112 

244 

Mounted  riflemen 

27 

18 

120 

64 

229 

1st  Artillery 

32 

1-0 

154 

123 

319 

2d        "            

24 

29 

126 

145 

324 

3d        " 

19 

24 

121 

148 

312 

4th       "               

20 

15 

108 

99 

242 

1st  Infantry 

13 

7 

133 

74 

227 

2d         "              

28 

2 

91 

147 

268 

3d        " 

40 

14 

145 

91 

280 

4th       "            

37 

31 

123 

86 

277 

5th       " 

50 

40 

149 

74 

313 

6th       "            

34 

60 

152 

112 

368 

7th       " 

21 

21 

95 

81 

218 

8th       "            

47 

56 

119 

123 

345 

Total  of  the  old  army, 

— 

458 

345 

1,822 

1,598 

4,223 

7 

4 

85 

54 

150 

9th  Infantry 

9 

5 

83 

64 

161 

10th      "        

3 

88 

25 

116 

llth      " 

10 

12 

102 

47 

171 

12th      " 

7 

13 

50 

19 

89 

13th      "            

100 

30 

130 

14th      " 

8 

9 

85 

45 

147 

15th      "             .. 

21 

24 

222 

37 

302 

16th      " 

2 

98 

30 

130 

Voltigeurs         .     .  . 

9 

10 

92 

94 

205 

Total  of  the  new  regiments, 

— 

74 

79 

1,005 

445 

1,601 

LOSSES    OF    THE    ARMY. 
Table  V.  continued. 


357 


Description  of  Force. 

Disch'd 
from 
disab'ty 

Killed 
in 

battle. 

Died  of 
wounds 

Died  of 

disease 

Desert 
ed. 

Totals. 

United  States  Marines  

— 

7 

— 

5 

9 

21 

Volunt.  from  Massachusetts 
New  York... 
"           New  Jersey.. 
"           Pennsylvania 
Md.  &  Dist.  j 
Columbia  $ 
"           Virginia  

33 
117 
3 
212 

148 
135 

29 

28 
8 

19 

10 
3 

30 
77 
11 
199 

54 
66 

105 
362 
51 

182 

176 

38 

168 
604 
65 
631 

389 
239 

"           N.  Carolina.. 
S.  Carolina  ... 
"           Georgia 

62 

104 
246 

30 
2 

26 

172 
234 
117 

19 
41 
60 

253 
435 
425 

Alabama  
"           Mississippi.... 
Louisiana  
"           Tennessee... 
"           Kentucky  .... 
"           Ohio  
"           Michigan  — 
"           Indiana  . 

220 
513 
215 
982 
533 
424 
4 
550 

54 
5 
45 

78 
18 

47 

4 
1 
6 
4 

103 
258 
201 
199 
176 
218 
3 
218 

27 
42 
703 
48 
132 
435 
77 
105 

350 
871 
1,125 

1,278 
923 
1,095 
84 
920 

'            Illinois  

489 

89 

11 

362 

68 

1  019 

'           Wisconsin.... 
'           Iowa  

2 
2 

9 
3 

1 

12 
5 

'           Missouri 

114 

19 

4 

229 

53 

419 

Arkansas  .... 
'           Florida 

68 
4 

19 
1 

2 

153 

Q 

27 
3 

269 
16 

'           Texas  .    ... 

243 

39 

2 

118 

115 

517 

"           Mormons  
"           Californians  .  . 
Reruustered  volunteers  

9 

7 

7 
35 

1 

11 

8 
62 

Total  of  volunteers  
Total  of  new  regiments  .... 
Total  of  old  regiments  

5,432 

508 

74 
458 

92 
79 
345 

3,160 
1,005 
1,822 

2,882 
445 
1,598 

12,082 
1,601 
4,223 

Aggregates  

5,432 

1,040 

516 

5,987 

4,925 

17,906 

Note. — It  will  be  observed  this  return  of  loss  includes  only  that  between 
the  1st  of  June,  1846,  and  the  1st  of  January,  1848.  Fifty  thousand  men 
remained  in  service,  chiefly  in  Mexico,  from  the  1st  of  January,  1848,  till 
the  1st  of  July,  1848.  In  this  time,  the  hospitals  were  full  of  the  sick, 
many  of  whom  died.  It  is  entirely  within  bounds  to  say,  that  one-fourth 
as  many  were  lost  in  that  period  as  had  been  previously.  This,  added  to 


358  LOSSES    OF    THE    ARMiT. 

the  above,  would  make  twenty-two  thousand  five  hundred.  Of  those  dis 
charged  for  disability,  three-fourths  died  before  they  reached  home.  Many 
of  these  died  iu  hospitals.  Of  the  deserters  many  died,  and  many  were 
found  in  the  Mexican  service.  The  official  muster-rolls,  as  returned  by 
the  Adjutant-general,  show  also  another  fact,  viz.:  that  the  difference  be 
tween  the  number  of  volunteers  mustered  into  service  and  those  mustered 
out,  or  on  the  rolls  at  the  last  return,  was  more  than  sixteen  thousand, 
But  the  number  accounted  for  above  is  only  twelve  thousand.  Four  thou 
sand  others  must  have  disappeared  in  some  way.  About  twelve  hundred 
are  accounted  for,  as  discharged  by  order  ;  but  three  thousand  have  gone 
without  being  heard  of.  The  greatest  number  of  them  have  unquestion 
ably  died  in  unknown  ways. 

The  summary  of  these  statements,  then,  may  thus  be  made  : — 

Killed  in  battle,  or  died  of  wounds  prior  to  January  1st,  1848  1,556 

Died  of  disease 5,987 

Disabled  and  discharged 5,432 

Deserted 4,925 

Disappeared,  unaccounted  for 3,000 

Died,  discharged,  deserted,  &c.,  from  January  to  July,  1848 4,500 

25,400 
Of  this  number,  supposed  to  be  dead 20,000 

It  is  presumed  that  this  is  less  than  the  real  number  ;  but  it  is  the  only 
result  to  which  we  can  arrive  by  the  official  returns. 

The  proportion  of  loss  among  the  different  arms  of  service — the  old  and 
new  regulars  and  volunteers — is  an  interesting  object  of  inquiry.  The 
reader,  by  running  his  eye  over  the  columns,  will  readily  ascertain  any 
fact  of  this  sort  he  may  wish  to  know.  The  general  result  is,  that  much 
the  heaviest  proportional  loss  fell  on  the  regulars  of  the  old  regiments. 
One  great  reason  of  this  is,  that  they  were  more  continually  and  actively 
employed,  in  the  whole  series  of  engagements  in  Mexico,  than  any  other 
class  of  troops. 


KILLED,    ETC.    IN    EACH    ENGAGEMENT. 


359 


TABLE  VI. 

THE  NUMBER  OF  KILLED  AND   MORTALLY  WOUNDED    IN    EACH    EN 
GAGEMENT  DURING  THE  WAR,  IN  THE  REGIMENTS  OF  REGULARS. 


Engagements. 

Killed. 

Died  of  wounds. 

Total. 

Officers. 

Men. 

Officers. 

Men. 

Affair  of  Captain  Thornton,  on  1 
the  left  bank  of  the  Rio  Grande  V 
—  April  25    1846                 .      ) 

1 

3 

8 

3 

1 
2 
1 
10 
9 
7 

10 

5 

30 

47 
1 
14 

1 

5 

6 
5 
5 

39 
96 
115 
97 

2 

1 
1 

2 
3 
5 

1 

8 
11 

8 

2 
3 

19 
28 
62 
39 

11 

15 

44 

64 
2 
17 

1 

5 

6 

8 
10 
61 
137 
191 
144 

Battle  of  Palo  Alto—  May  8,  1846 

Battle  of  Resaca  de  la   Palma,  \ 
Texas  —  May  9,  1846  j 

Battle   of   Monterey,   Mexico  —  ) 
September  21-23,  1846  S 

Siege  of   Fort  Brown,   opposite  i 
Matamoras  —  from  May  4  to  9,  > 
1846  S 

Affair  of  San  Pasqual,  California  ) 
—December  6,  1846  .         .       $ 

Affair  of  General  Kearny,  at  San  } 
Gabriel,    California  —  January  > 
8-9,  1847  ) 

Affair  of  Col.  Price  at  Puebla  de  ) 
Taos,    New  Mexico  —  Febru-  > 
ary  4,  1847.      ...                       ) 

Affair  of  Col.  M'Intosh—  June  6,  > 
1847  J 

Battle  of  Buena  Vista—  Febru-  > 
ary  22-23,  1847                         $ 

Siege    of    Vera    Cruz  —  March  ) 
9-28,  1847  ...        .                  j 

Battle  of  Cerro  Gordo  —  April  18-  ) 
19,  1847  \ 

Battles  of  Contreras  and  Churu-  ) 
busco—  August  19-20,  1847..  J 

Battle  of  Molino  del  Rey,  Sep-  ) 
tember  8,  1847  j 

Battles  of  Chapultepec  and  city  > 
of  Mexico  —  Sept.  12-14,  1847  $ 

360  KILLED,    ETC.    IN    EACH    ENGAGEMENT. 

Table  VI.  continued. 


Engagements. 

Killed. 

Died  of  wounds. 

Total. 

Officers. 

Men. 

Officers. 

Men. 

Major   Lally's    command  —  Au-  ) 
gust,  1847  j 

Siege  of  Puebla—  Sept.  and  Oct.,  > 
1847                                           \ 

1 

1 
3 

9 
3 
12 

1 

— 

10 
3 
13 

1 

3 

Battle  of  Huamantla—  October  \ 
19   1847                                      S 

Galama,  Mexico          

Incidental  

Totals     

50 

500 

16 

180 

746 

Note  on  the  preceding  Tables. — The  above  tables  are  deduced  and 
compiled  from  more  detailed  and  extended  tables,  prepared  by  the  Adju 
tant-general.  They  are  liable  to  one  objection, — a  defect  which  it  is  im 
possible  wholly  to  correct, — viz. :  that  they  are  not  complete  to  the  end  of 
the  war,  and  do  not  correspond  entirely  to  the  actual  condition  of  the  sev 
eral  regiments  on  their  return  to  the  United  States.  There  is  one  descrip 
tion  of  loss  which  will  never  appear  in  the  returns  of  the  army,  viz. :  tho 
loss  of  men  to  and  from  their  regiments,  either  before  they  had  joined,  or 
after  they  had  been  mustered  out  of  service.  This  loss  is  a  very  large  one. 
Subject,  however,  to  this  correction,  the  tables  here  given  present  a  very 
fair  view  of  the  loss  of  the  several  corps  while  actually  in  Mexico. 

It  will  be  seen  that  Table  VI.  does  not  altogether  correspond  with  the 
results  in  Table  V.  The  discrepancy  is  chiefly  found  under  the  head  of 
"  Died  of  wounds."  The  reason  is  very  obvious.  The  table  of  loss  iu 
each  battle  is  taken  by  the  Adjutant-general  from  the  reports  of  that 
battle  ;  but  the  aggregate  results  are  taken  from  the  muster-rolls  subse 
quently.  In  the  interval,  many  of  those  who  were  wounded  died  of  their 
wounds,  so  that  the  last  return  is  much  increased. 


LIST    OF    OFFICERS    KILLED. 


361 


TABLE  VII. 

LIST  OF  THE  OFFICERS,  KILLED   OR  DIED  OF  WOUNDS,  IN  THE  WAR 
WI1H  MEXICO,  WITH  THEIR  CORPS  AND  RANK. 


Names. 

Battle. 

Corps. 

Rank. 

Remarks. 

Trueman  Cross, 

C    Murdered, 
<    April  10, 

Assis.  Quar-  ) 
termaster-  > 

Colonel. 

Murdered  by  a 
Mexican  par 

(       1846. 

general.      ) 

ty  command 

ed  by  Falcon. 

G.  T.  Mason, 

^  Thornton's 
I       affair. 

2d  Dragoons. 

Lieut. 

At  a  Mexican 
rancho. 

(       Fort       } 

Killed     by     a 

Jacob  Brown, 

<     Brown,    V 

7th  Infantry. 

Major. 

bomb-shell  at 

(  May  6th.  ) 

Fort  Brown. 

(  Palo  Alto,  1 

Commander  of 

Samuel  Riuggold 

<  8th  May,  V 

1st  Artillery. 

" 

the      Flying 

(      1846.      } 

Artillery. 

John  Pago, 
J.  E.  Blake, 

<( 
9th  May,1846 

4th  Infantry. 
Top.  Engin. 

Captain. 
Lieut. 

Accid.  killed 

Z.  M.  P.  Inge, 
R.  E.  Cochrane, 

VResacade  ( 
1  la  Palma.  $ 

2d  Dragoons. 
4th  Infantry. 

" 

In  May's 
charge. 

T.  L.  Chadbourne 

(i 

u 

W.  H.  Watson, 

S    Monterey, 
)  21-23  Sept. 

Maryland    ) 
Volunteers.   ^ 

Lt.  Col. 

Lewis  N.  Morris, 
P.  N.  Barbour, 

Monterey. 

u 

3d  Infantry. 
u 

Captain. 
Major. 

G.  P.  Field, 

H 

M 

Captain. 

D.  S.  Irwin, 

it 

it 

Lieut. 

R.  Hazlitt, 

(( 

H 

« 

C.  Hoskins, 

U 

4th     " 

«< 

H.  M'Kavett, 

« 

8th     " 

Captain. 

J.  S.  Woods, 

II 

2d      " 

Lieut. 

W.G.Williams, 
J.  C.  Terrett, 
R.  Dilworth, 

M 
M 

Top.  Engin. 
1st  Infantry. 

Captain. 
Lieut. 

W.  B.  Allen, 
S.  M.  Putnam, 

(( 

Tenn.  Volun. 
ii 

Captain. 
Lieut. 

M.  Hett, 

(( 

Ohio  Volun. 

u 

I  San  Pas-  ) 

A.  R.  Johnston, 

<  quul,  Dec.  V 
(  6th,  1846.  ) 

1st  Dragoons. 

Captain. 

In  California. 

B.  D.  Moore, 

« 

u 

M 

«« 

T.  C.  Hammond, 

« 

u 

Lieut. 

«( 

C  Pueblo  de  ) 

J.  H.  K.  Burgwin, 

<  Taos,  7th  [ 

u 

Captain. 

New  Mexico. 

(  Feb.  1846  ) 

! 

Vou  Valkenburg, 

Mo.  Volun.    |    Lieut. 

ii 

362 


LIST    OF    OFFICERS    KILLED. 


Table  VII.  continued. 


Names. 

Battle. 

Corps. 

Rank. 

Remarks. 

George  Lincoln, 

Buena  Vista. 

Staff. 

Captain. 

A.    Adjutant- 

general. 

J.  J.  Hardin, 

(  Buena  Vis- 
}  ta,  22d  Feb. 

1st  Illinois    ) 
Volunteers.  ) 

Colonel. 

t       1847. 

J.  W.  Zabriskie, 

ii 

Captain. 

B.  R.  Houghton, 

« 

1st  Lieut. 

—  Woodward, 

2d  111.  Volun. 

Captain. 

A.  B.  Roundtreo, 

« 

Lieut. 

—  Fletcher, 

u 

(C 

—  Ferguson, 

« 

(C 

—  Robhins, 

« 

«( 

T.  Kelley, 

« 

« 

—  Steel, 

(C 

(« 

—  Bartleson, 

M 

«( 

—  Atherton, 

(( 

(« 

—  Price, 

(( 

tt 

W.  R.  M'Kee, 

2d  Ky.  Volun. 

Colonel. 

Henry  Clay,  jr., 

" 

Lt.  Col. 

W.  T.  Willes, 

It 

Captain. 

Archibald  Yell, 

Ark.  Volun. 

Colonel. 

A.  R.  Porter, 

(i 

C«ptain. 

E.  M.  Vaughn, 

1st  Ky.  Volun. 

Adjutant. 

Francis  M'Nulty, 

Miss.  Rifles. 

2d  Lieut. 

R.  L.  Moore, 

ii 

1st  Lieut. 

—  Campbell, 

Texas  Volun. 

« 

—  Leonard, 

" 

2d  Lieut. 

T.  B.  Kinder, 

M 

(    2d  Reg.     I 
I  la.  Volun.  $ 

Captain. 

W.  Walker, 

M 

u 

it 

Thos.  C.  Parr, 

(( 

u 

2d  Lieut. 

J.  Taggart, 

« 

3d  la.  Volun. 

Captain. 

John  R.  Vinton, 

f  Siege  of  1 
J  VeraCruz  I 
}   Mar.  22,   f 

3d  Artillery. 

« 

City   of   Vera 
Cruz,    Mexi 

L      1847.     J 

co. 

William  Alburtis, 

do.  March  11. 

2d  Infantry. 

« 

G.  M.  Coworden, 

C  Cerro  Gordo 
<    18th  April, 
(        1847. 

4th  Illinois    > 
Volunteers.   ) 

Lieut. 

F.  B.  Nelson, 

M 

2d  Tenn.  Vol. 

«( 

C.  C.  Gill, 

M 

«< 

«« 

Thomas  Ewell, 

M 

Rifles. 

M 

Wm.  Yearwood, 

i' 

1st  Tenn.  Vol. 

« 

Richard  Murphy, 

II 

4th  III.  Vol. 

« 

Thomas  Davis, 

M 

Rifles, 

(1 

LIST    OF    OFFICERS    KILLED. 
Table  VII.  continued. 


363 


Names. 

Battle. 

Corps.              Rank. 

Remarks. 

(  Churubus.  , 

E.  A.  C  apron, 

{   Aug.  20, 

1st  Artillery. 

Captain 

(      1847.      } 

M.  J.  Burke, 

a 

<« 

<« 

S.  Hoffman, 

« 

it 

Lieut. 

Jas.  W.  Anderson 

K 

2d  Infantry. 

Captain. 

Thomas  Easiey, 

ii 

M 

Lieut. 

Chas.  G.  Henson 

}  Contreras  > 
J  19th  Aug.  S 

7th     « 

Captain. 

Seth  B.  Thornton 

« 

2d  Dragoons. 

<« 

J.  P.  Johnstone, 

H 

1st  Artillery. 

Lieut. 

F.  D.  Mills. 
John  B.Goodman, 

City  gate. 
« 

15th  Infantry 

Major. 
Lieut. 

August.  Quarles, 

Churubusco. 

« 

Captain. 

W.  H.  Goodloe, 

M 

u 

Lieut. 

Died  at  Vera 

Cruz. 

J.  F.  Irons, 

« 

1st  Artillery. 

u 

Pierce  M.  Butler, 

« 

S.  C.  Volun. 

Colonel. 

David  Adams, 

M 

« 

Lieut. 

W.  R.  Williams, 

(( 

« 

« 

J.  P.  Dickinson, 

« 

« 

Lt.  Col. 

E.  Chandler, 

(( 

N.  Y.  Volua. 

Lieut. 

Martin  Scott, 

Mol.  del  Rey. 

5th  Infantry. 

Lt.  Col. 

Moses  E.  Merrill 

M 

ii 

Captain. 

W.  T.  Burwell, 

<( 

ii 

Lieut. 

G.  W.  Ayres, 
J.  F.  Farry, 

n 

<« 

3d  Artillery. 

Captain. 
Lieut. 

W.  Armstrong, 

« 

2d  Artillery. 

« 

M.  L.  Shackelford 

<« 

« 

« 

J.  S.  M'lntosh, 

H 

Staff. 

Colonel. 

W.  Roberts, 
E.  Kirby  Smith, 
R.  F.  Ernst, 

(( 

(( 

5th  Infantry. 
6th     « 

Ass.  Surg. 
Captain. 
Lieut. 

J.  G.  B  urban  k, 

U 

8th     " 

Charles  F.  Morris, 

(C 

<( 

Wm.  M.  Graham, 

« 

1th    " 

Lt.  Col. 

R.  H.  L.  Johnston, 

It 

n 

Lieut. 

(  Chapulte-  ) 

A.  P.  Rodgers, 

<  pec,  13th   V 

4th     « 

M 

(      Sept.      ) 

J.  P.  Smith, 

5th     " 

H 

S.  Smith, 

« 

4th     " 

M 

Levi  Gantt, 

u 

7th     "                   « 

S.  H.  Drum, 
C.  Benjamin, 

u 

(( 

4th  Artillery. 
u 

Captain. 
Lieut. 

T.  Ransom, 
L.  Twiggs, 

« 
II 

3th  Infantry. 
Marines. 

Colonel. 
Major. 

364 


LIST    OF    OFFICERS    KILLED. 


Table  VII.  continued. 


Names. 

Battle. 

Corps. 

Rank. 

Remarks. 

A.  Van  Olinda, 

Chapultepec. 

N.  Y.  Volun. 

Captain. 

J.  Willes, 

City  gate. 

S.  C.  Volun. 

Lieut. 

J.  B.  Moragne, 

" 

" 

" 

Charles  Baxter, 

Chapultepec. 

N.  Y.  Volun. 

Lt.  Col. 

E.  H.  Pearson, 

tt 

" 

Captain. 

S.  H.  Walker, 

(  Huamantla, 
I     October, 

f        1847. 

Mounted     ) 
Rifles.       j 

« 

(    National   } 

G.  D.  Twiggs, 

I  bridge,  12  > 

Staff. 

Lieut. 

(  Aug.1847  } 

R.  Ridgely, 

Monterey. 

3d  Artillery. 

Captain. 

Killed     by    a 

fall  from  his 

horse. 

G.Stevens, 

Fort  Brown. 

2d  Dragoons. 

Lieut. 

Drowned      in 

crossing    the 

river       from 

Dinan. 

Alex.  J.  Swift, 

New  Orleans. 

Engineers. 

Captain.  iTaken  sick  at 
Vera  Cruz. 

J.  A.  Richey, 

Villa  Garra. 

5th  Infantry. 

Lieut.     |  Murdered. 

Stevens  T.  Mason, 

Cerro  Gordo. 

$  Mounted  ) 
I     Rifles.     \ 

Captain. 

Died  of  w'nds. 

116    miles' 

Theo'c  H.  Porter, 

from  Ma-  j 
tamoras,   [• 

4th  Infantry. 

Lieut. 

Killed    in    ac- 

tioji* 

Apr.    19, 

1846.     J 

Chs.  B.  Daniels, 

Mol.  del  Rey. 

2d  Artillery. 

" 

Died  of  w'nds. 

Jno.  D.  Bacon, 

Churubusco. 

6th  Infantry. 

H 

"             " 

(  Pass  Ga-  ) 

Hender.  Ridgely, 

<  laxra,  24  V 

4th  Infantry. 

" 

(  Nov.  1847  ) 

Erast  us  B.  Strong, 

Mol.  del  Rey. 

5th  Infantry. 

" 

SPasoOve-  ) 

Jas.  H.  Calwell, 

jas,  Aug.  > 

Voltigeurs. 

Captain. 

(<                     c« 

10,  1847.  } 

(  La  Hoya,  ) 

Edwin  Guthrie, 

1  June   20,  \ 

15th  Infantry. 

" 

tt                 «( 

I      1847.      \ 

!    National    J 

J.  W.  Winder, 

bridge,  12  V 

Voltigeurs. 

Lieut. 

"           " 

Aug.1847  ) 

Whit.  B.  Brooks. 

Churubusco.  J12th  Infantry. 

" 

«                 t< 

LIST    OF    OFFICERS    KILLED.  365 

125  officers  killed  ;  of  whom  there  were 

Regulars 79 

Volunteers 46 

The  RANK  and  CORPS  of  the  officers — thus  killed  in  the  Army  of  Mex 
ico — may  be  thus  stated  : — 


o 
L 
M 

4tafF 

3ioneis  t 

ntry 
^oons 

Subalte 
Staff  ofl 

65 
5—125 

1 

f. 

9th  Infa 
10th 
llth 
12th 
13th 
14th 
15th 
16th 
1st  Dra 
2d 
3d 
Riflem 
Voltige 

Marines  

Engine* 
1st  Arti 
2d 
3d 
4th 
1st  Infa 
2d 
3d 
4th 
5th 
6th 
7th 

8th 

>rs                   •  •  3 

0 

Maryland  Volui 
Tennessee 
Ohio 
Missouri 
Illinois 
Kentucky 
Arkansas 
Mississippi 
Texas. 
Indiana 
S.  Carolina 
JNew  York 

iteers 

1 
5 
1 
1 
15 
4 
2 
2 
2 
4 
6 
4 

2 

1 

J 

0 

(                             2 

.  0 

5 

0 

5 

4 

§ 

3 

7 

6 

2 

..  4 

3 

urs.. 

2 

The  total  number  of  officers  killed  and  wounded  during  the  war,  was 
about  450.  Of  this  number,  more  than  half  were  of  the  regular  army, 
and  more  than  half  were  graduates  of  the  U.  S.  Military  Academy  at 
West  Point.  To  this  institution,  more  than  to  any  state,  or  any  arm  of 
the  service,  or  any  mere  exertion  of  valor,  is  the  country  indebted  for  the 
success  and  brilliant  achievements  of  the  war.  The  modern  art  of  war  is 
a  science  requiring  the  union  of  many  arts  to  its  perfection.  It  is  the  mind 
of  an  army,  not  its  physical  force  only,  which  wins  its  victories  and  makes 
its  conquests.  This  mind  is  developed  in  its  officers.  These  must  be  ac 
complished  men,  equipped  in  the  knowledge  of  many  things,  and  disci 
plined  by  much  study.  This  work  of  high  education  is  performed  at  West 
Point ;  and  no  school  of  military  science  in  the  world,  at  the  present  pe 
riod,  is  equal  to  it.  We  cannot  close  this  brief  history  of  the  most  brilliant 
career  of  the  army,  without  pointing  to  the  Military  Academy  as  the  great 
source  of  military  instruction,  and  to  the  victories  of  the  Mexican  War  as 
monuments  to  its  glory  and  its  excellence 


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